VIET CONG POLICY TOWARD AND EXPLOITATION OF U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR

Created: 3/14/1967

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION HEPCRT. NOT FINALLY LV'LUAIfO INTCLLIGCNCE

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I. (SUMMARY. VIET CONG (VC) POLICY TOWARD PRISONERS G'.m

WAR> WHICH DATES BACK TO THE RESISTANCE AGAINST THE

FRENCH IS STILL APPLICABLE. POW'S, BASICALLY, THE

CAPTURING OF THE MAXIMUM NUMBErt. FORCES IS ENCOUnAGiD,

DfcA THAT THEY CAN BE EXPLOITED FOR INTELLIGENCE. PROP..SAI1DA

AND POLITICAL PURPOSES. THIS POLICY HAS NOT ALWAYS BEEN

CARRIED OUT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE VC TROOPS WERE NOI AWARE OF IT, BECAUSE

IhEY SOUGHT TO AVENGE THEIR COMRADES BY KILLING THE EKEttY,

BECAUSE OF DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN TRANSFERRING PKlSGKiRS

TO THE COMMAND POST, AND BECAUSE IT WAS EASIER TO KILL POi *S

THE UNIT HAD TO WITHDRAW UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCE:.

VC MILITARY REGION (MR) FIVE UNITS HAD TAKEN. PKISCiIRS

IK TKE LAST TWO YEARS. HREE-PHASE CAhPA13i

WAS INAUGURATED IN6 TO INDOCTRINATE ALL CADRES AiD

TROOPS IN THE VC POW POLICY, TO DISSEMINATE SLOGANS AND OPERATIONAL

PLANS FOR. TROOPS AND TO RECAPITULATE THE

SUCCESSES OF THE VARIOUS UNITS IN. FORCES.)

2. VC GENERAL HEADQUARTERS DOCUMENTS WHICH DEALT WITH

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POLICY. POVS MADE THE FOLLOWING THREESSESSING THE POSITION. TROOPS IN SOUTH VIET(SVAO : Ci) If. ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ADVISORY AID TO SVN FAILED TC PRODUCE RESULTS,. VAS FOHCED TO SHOW ITS TRUE COLONIALIST INTENTIONS BY SENDING TROOPS TO SVN AND BOMBING NORTH VIETNAMN ACTION WHICH PROVES THAT THEY ARE AGGRESSORS AND WHICH WILL EARN THEM THE CONDEMNATION OF ALL PROGRESSIVE PEOPLE If. -IHE WORLD. . TROOP STRENGTH PROVIDES MORE OPPORTUNITIES FOR CAPTURING AND KIDNAPPING AMERICAN PERSON .EL AND FOR CAKRYIIiG OUT PROPAGANDA EFFORTS AIMED AT. FORCES TO DEF^RDERS AND TO SUPPORT THE VC REVOLUTIONARY

CAUSE, BECAUSE. TROOPS, PARTICULARLY OFFICERS,WELL TRAINED, ARE AFRAID OF THE HARDSHIPS OF WAR. <o>. SERVICEMEN ARE DRAFTEES FROM THE WORKING CLASS WHO HAVE BEEN DELUDED BY. GOVERNMENT INTO THINKING THAT THEY ARE FIGHTING TO DEFEND THE FKEE WOULD. E TASK OF THE VC ISAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE FACT THAT. FORCES ARE FAR FnJH HOKE AND ENGAGEDIFFICULT GUERRILLA WAR, BYVEh, EVEN THOUGH THEY AKE NOT CAPTIVES, BY MAKING THEM AWARE OF THE TRUE NATURE OF THEIR MISSION IN VIETNAM, THEREBY SOWING

DISUltlTY IK THEIR RANKS.

HREEFOLD PURPOSE IM. PRISOi-LCAM BE EXPLITED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES; THEY CANFOR PROPAGANDA AND COUNTER-PROPAGANDA PURPOSESBROADCASTS AND INTERVIEWS PUBLISHED IN THE NEUTRALISE

AMD PitO-COMMUNIST PRESS; THEY CAN BE USED POLITICALLYRTnErt THE CAUSE OF COMMUNISM BEYOND THE LIMITED CONTEXT OF VIETN,.ftROPAGANDIZING. THEM, BRAIN WASHING.THEM, AND CONVERTING TKi.ft INTO COMMUNIST OR PRO-COMMUNIST CADRES WHO WILL WORK ACTIV!JLYTHE PARTY IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY AFTER THEY HAVE BEEN RE1 EkSED.

VC ALSO WANT TOARGE NUMBER OF CAPTIVES

IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO CALL FOR AN EXCHANGE OF POM'S. DURING

THE PAST TWO YEARS, HOWEVER, MR FIVE HAS CAPTURED. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SPITE OF NUMEROUS ENGAGEMENTS. THERLFOHE DURING AN MR FIVE CELEBRATION HELD IN6 IN THE JUGGLE AREA OF SON HA DISTRICT, QUANG NGAI PROVINCE, FIELD GRADE POLITICAL OFFICER MAJOR GENERAL CHU HUY MAN AND DEPUTY FIELD GRADE POLITICAL OFFICER SENIOR COLONEL TRINH CALLED ON ALL UNITS TOHOROUGH STUDY OF PARTY AND NVN GOVERNMENT

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POLICY ON POW'S AND .TO EXECUTE IT CORRECTLY. FAILURE TO DO SO

WOULD RESULT IN SEVERE PUNISHMENT. COLONEL TRINH THEN INAGURATED

A THAEE-PHASE CAMPAIGN BYYPICAL VC UNIT WITH A

"SYMBOLIC" HOPE FOR TYING UP PRIOSNERS.

5. THE FIRST PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN CONSISTED OF AN

INTENSIVE INDOCTRINATION OF ALL CADRES AND TROOPS Oh THE POW POLICY WHICH HAD BEEN IN EFFECT SINCE THE TIME OF THE RESISTANCE AGAINST THE FRENCH, BUT WHICH HAD NOT ALWAYS BEEN CARRIED OUT EFFECTIVELY. THIS PHASE, WHICH LASTED THREE MONTHS, FROM iARCH THROUGH MAY, WAS FIRST ORGANIZED BY THE PARTY COMMITTEES Ai' DIVISION, REGIMENT, AND BATTALION LEVELS AND THENEKBChS WERE SUBJECTED TO INDOCTRINATION. THE ADVANTAGES AKING LIVE PRISONERS WAS STRESSED, AND THE FOLLOWING REASONSIVF.NVC CADRES AND SOLDIERS FAILURE TO DO SO IN THE PAST:

THE VC WERE NOT AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF TAKING POW'S| THEY WANTED

TO AVENGE THEIR CAHRADES BY SLAUGHTERING THE ENEMY; THERE WERE

DIFFICULTIES AND HARDSHIPS INVOLVED IN TRANSFERRING PRISONERS FROM

THE UNIT TO THE COMMAND POST; ANDNIT WAS SUKROUt DED

On HAD SUFFERED MANY CASUALITES PRISONERS WERE KILLED TO tAKE WITHDRAW.

EASIER.

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ti. THE SECOND PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN, VHICH STARTED iu6 AND WAS SCHEDULED TO CONTINUE THROUGHAS ENilTLED "EMULATION FOR CAPTURING AMERICANS". SLOGANS SUCH A3IVE POW IS EQUAL TO TEN DEAD AMERICANfit DISSEMINATED AND OPERATIONAL PLANS BASED ON THESE SLOGANS 4zrz. FOaMULATED. ALL SOLDIERS AND CADRES HAD TO OBTAIN ROPES,

Pit ICR TO AN OPERATION THE LEADERS CHECKED TO MAKE SURE THE

TROOPS HAD THEM. THOSE WHO DID NOT HAVE ROPES WERE/SEVERELY PUNISHED. THE VC WERE ORDEKED TO ENGAGE IN CLOSE COMBAT IN ORDER TO. PRISONERS. IHEY WERE ALSO ORDERED TO. POW'S WELL, TO GIVE THEM ENOUGH TO EAT, TO BEHAVE POLITELY, AKD TO ATTEMPT TO PROPAGANDIZE THEM. POW'S WERE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE COMMAND POST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED, EVEN IF THE PRISONER HAD TOARRIED. -UPON WITHDRAWING WHEN SURROUNDED BY THE ENEMY, POV'S, WOUNDED, AND DEAD SHOULD BE EVACUATED FIRST, THEN WEAPONS AND FINALLY THE UNIT.

7. THE THIRD PHASE, WHICH WAS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD INAS TOECAPITULATION OF SUCCESSES AND CELEBRATIONS

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