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CONTENTS
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THE 1
SUMMARY AND 1
DISCUSSION *
L SOVIET SPACE LAUNCHES OVER THE PAST TWO 4
A
Flight
Scientific Satellites I
and Planetary
Meteorological
Communications Satellites
PriotorecDnnaissance
Space
C. Uncategorixed Space 8
IL SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURE
PROSPECTS 8
nL OTHERIS
IV. OUTLOOK FOR THE NEAR 17
Lunar
SptceS
Cueumluriar
and Planetary
Soviet Military
Exploration of Near
V. THE LONG-TERM
A Factors
B. Possibility of Soviet Cooperation in Space
C Possible
ANNEX:
3V
ESTIMATED TIMING OF MAJOR SOVIET SPACE EVENTS SOVIET SPACE LAUNCHES0 HISTORY OF SOVIET MANNED SPACEPLICHT PROJECTS HISTORY OF SOVIET LAUNCHLNGS OF LUNAR AND PLANETARY PROBES
WW
THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable accomplishments in space over theoears.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
space program hasigh priority amongobjectives. The number of space launches attemptedpast two years was nearly equal to the total of theNevertheless, Soviet achievements were less spectacularFor the most part, the Soviets exploited existingcarry out unmanned space exploration and intensive satellite recon-
'* naissance, and to expand space applications. There have been no manned flights since
continuing high level of development activity andof major new launch facilities suggestew series ofspace missions is likely in the next few years. Untilthe Soviets used military boosters almost exclusively, butnow developing launch vehicles, specifically for tbe spaceTbey haveew boosterhrusto 3wbich was used^tojaunch the Proton satellites. And theya major new launch facility (Area J) at Tyuratam thatable to take vehiclesirst-stage thrust in thepound range; it will be completed next year.
Soviets have probably planned some form of7 in connection withh anniversary ofRevolution orh anniversary of Sputnik I. Thisthe orbiting5 ton spaceew mannedor some activity involving both. We cannot predict the precise
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of the spectacular but believe that the event will be confined to near-earth space.
of the Soviets space program have risen sharply overfew years, but now appear to be leveling off. The programtoignificant share of resources of the same typefor strategic military programs and for economicthe present Soviet leaders may try to effect economies insectors, we consider it unlikely that they can effect anyin the overall nature of the program for the next fivefor the longer termtoearsdoubt that the
Soviet leaders have yet come to firm decisions as to the scope
pace of their space program; certainly we have no basis for detailed estimates of Soviet space activities diiring this period.
view of competing claims on their resources, we believeSoviets will not be able to undertake simultaneously all thetheir technical capabilities. Further, wc do not believe thatwill seek toarge space station and to achievelunar landing concurrently. The dates estimated forare based oo technical feasibility; we cannot estimate thein which they may be attempted,
Lunar Landing. Two years ago, we estimatedSoviet manned lunar landing program was probably notbe competitive with the Apollo program as then projected,atime period. Wc believe this is still theis the possibility, however, that depending upon their viewApollo timetable, the Soviets may feel that there is some prospectgetting to the moon first, and they may press their programof being able to do so. Considering the Soviet technicalthe status of construction at Area J, and the variousmight be employed, we estimate that the earliest the Sovietsa manned lunar landing would beethat the most likely date is sometime inime period.
Circumlunar Flight. The Soviets will probablya manned arcumlunar flight during the next few years.consider this venture one of the few within theircould offset some of the propaganda valueuccessfullanding. We consider it unlikely that the Soviets would attempt
this mission before the first half, although it is conceivable that they would accept the high risks involved in making the attempt as an anniversary spectacular in
Space Stations. We believe that the establishmentmanned space station isovietpaceounds weight and capable ofrew ofmore could probably be orbited in the first halfylaunch vehicle under development for Area J, the Sovietsa space stationounds by aboutat the earliest, but we believe sometime into be more.
Systems. The expansion of the Soviet satelliteproject over the last two years shows that projects ofstrategic value can and will be funded. The Soviets willcontinue to support this program at about the present levelit with improved collection and oata-handling systemsnext few years. They will probably give increased emphasiswhich have both civil and military support applications,communications, meteorological, and navigation satellites.
J. During the past year, the Soviets have conducted flight tests which could leadtrategic space weapon system. We estimateractional orbit bombardment system could be deployed in small numbers by7 ore cannot at this time estimate the likelihood that the Soviets will choose to deployystem. On the one hand, it would complicate the US defense problem; on the other, it would be more complex, more costly, and less accurate than ICBMs. Ifystem is deployed, the Soviets would probably regard itupplement to_existing strategic attack forces and would deploy it in relatively small numbers. In view of Soviet agreement to the treaty on peaceful uses or space as well as theultiple orbit bombardment system, we do not believe that the Soviets will deploy and maintain weapons in space during the period of this estimate.
e 1
DISCUSSION
I. SOVIET SPACE LAUNCHES OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS A. General
During ihe past two years the Soviet space program has retained its high priority among major national objectives. It has placed slgniflcandy increased demands on the economy lor scarce resources of the same general type and quality as those required for strategic military programs and for investment lor economic growth. The number of space launches attempted In this period nearly equals the total number of launches attempted in the previous seven years.
The Soviets scored some dramatic "firsts" during this period, including the spacewalk by Leonov during the Sight of Voskhod IL the lunar soft landing ofnd the lunar orbitingut in general, their achievements in space were much less spectacular than previously. For the most part, they exploited available hardware, especially boosters, to engage in unmanned space exploration, an fntensivo photoeexmnaissanoe program, and an expansion In the scope of their space applications.
The Soviets have, however,igh priority to researchnd D) on new space systems. Three new programs were brought to Eight phase during the past two years: theound) Protonwhich were launchedillion pound thrustaneuverable satellite capable of small orbital adjustments;ystem which probably relates to the development of fractional orbit weapons, depressed trajectory ICBMs, or both. In addition, construction of major new launch facultiesn associated hardware for more advanced future missions has continuedapid pace.
f- The Soviets have failed to carry out certain activities which we consider essential to. their manned space program and which we believe they could have undertakenndhey have not attempted rendezvous and clc<krag, although test of unmanned maneuverable space hardwareay relate to the development of this capability. They have nota long duration manned flight,eeksanned Bight scheduled for the spring6 and later cancelled may have related to this problem, and the re2 day flight of two dogs earlier In the year. No high speed reentry tests to. simulate lunar return problems have been conducted, and no water landing and recovery techniques which probably would be required on lunar return have been demonstrated. Most notable, however, is the hiatus in manned space flights of any kind in tbe nearly two years since
B. Manned Flight1
he only manned flight conducted by the Soviets56 was Voskhodwo man mission which was launched on5 and
'Seeor history of Soviet roanned ipacdlight prefects.
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successfully deorbited Ihe following day. The Voskhod II incorporated anwhich allowed ono of the cosmonauts to perform the firstor spacewalk ever attempted. Cosmonaut Leooov emerged fromvia tbe airlock and spent someinutes outside, attached to theby an umbilical line but without any propulsion aid. Leonovof the discomforts suhsequendy noted by several US astronauts. 1
^Tfae manually cor.trolled dcorbit resulted in. "overshoot" of tbe planned recovery area,
nhe Soviets launchedhichoskhod-like vehicle containing two dogsariety of other biological specimens. Thenvironmental control system was probably intended toouth-long flight with dogs, the equivalent ofan days, i
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view of tbe importance of the manned space effort in terms ofcosmonaut training, and national prestige, we do not believeSoviets originallyap of as long as two years in theirprogram. Available evidence provides no certain explanation forIt may beombination of technical and politicalthe decision te cancel the Voskhod Sight scheduled to lake placeperiod. It appears that the Voskhod spacecraft has been exploited tolimit. Bather thanore daring venture than the Voskhod II Bight.
/which at worst might have resulted in failure or at best compared unfavorably with the achievements of the US Gemini program, the Soviets may have decided to forego further manned missions until theyew spacecraft, which we believe to be under development. An earlier gap ofonths in Soviet manned space flights occurredhile minor modifications were made to the Voslok capsule to upgrade it to the Voskhod.
Scientific Satellites
rate of launching from Kapustin Yar of the unmanned. Cosmosscientific satellites hasairly deliberate pace since theintroduced inhere have been ne major changes over theyears in launch vehicle "Tonfigura Hons or orbital parameters. Thesatellites, launched from Tyuratam. were almost certainly used forresearch, but the primary purpose of these firings was probably toillion pound thrust booster.
and Planetary Probes*
the past two years tbe Soviet program of lunar exploration hason two objectives: soft lunar landing and orbiting the moon.have included photographing the moon's surface. Six attempts were
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made to softehicle on the moon's surface, of which the last two were successful:nducceeded inound packages on the moon which transmittedpanoramas of the moon's surface and thewere of good quality; Lunalso tested the firmness of the surface. Three lunar probesuccessfully orbited the moon, but only from Lunao we have evidenceuccessful photographic mission was carried out. The photographs were of poor quality.
he Soviets attempted three Venus probes ln the past two years, allnly two of these launches were even moderately successful:ransmitted no data as it flew past the planet, missing byndllegedly impacted on tbe plane* but no signals were transmitted during tlie terminal phase.
IL Until recently the Soviets had used every opportunity available to launch probes toward Venus and Mars since their interplanetary probe program beganhey did not. however, take advantage of the "window" to Mars which opened7 and closed in February. Failure to capitalize on this opportunity may indicate that the unprofitable planetarybeen curtailed in an attempt to reduce expenditures for space-On the other band, the Soviets may have elected to standdown their planetary program temporarilyew system Is ready for use in that program.
E. Applied Satellites Afeieorafogica' Sa refill
the past two years the Soviets have orbited four, possibly five,their meteorological ESV program.ndothusable cloud photographs, Some of those fromerethe US last fall pursuant to2 bilateral agreement to exchangeweather data. This satellite ceased Ixansrnitting onctober.and infrared photography is of about the same quality as that producedUS systems. Onhe Soviets placed While the Soviets have not yet announced the purpose of this vehicle,
asatellite. If so. it may
hrst of an operational system.
Communication! SafefC'oi
toe past two years, the Soviets have successfully orbited foursatellites of the Molniya class. These satellites have beento relay high capacity, multichannel telephone andtelevision, and other information forms between Moscowareas of the USSR, mainly Vladivostok. They have also been useda link with France for the exchange of television programs, and toa platform for an earth-scanning television camera. The Molniyanot yet been put into routine operation but is still under development andsubjected to extensive tests and experimentation.
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F. Military Systemsrecon naiitance
The Soviet photoreconnaissauce satellite program has continuedigh rate (about two launches per month) over the past two years. This program has enjoyed one of the highest priorities in the entire Soviet space effort,for almost half of all space launchings during this period. The high priority and the use of time-tested hardware, have made the photorcconnaissancc effort the most successful of all Soviet unmanned space programs. The program involves two basic types of reconnaissance vehicles. One payload weighs0 pounds andow resolution photographic missionround resolution on the order ofoeet under average conditions) and probably collects Elint as welL The second type of payload weighs0 pounds; itigher resolution photographic mission, and we believe it achieves ground resolutions on the orderoeet under average conditions. Under ideal conditions the resolution could be somewhat better. The Soviets recover the photography acmrired by both systems by deorblting the entire spacecraft into the Kazakhstan recovery area after missions of about eight davs.
Generalus to judge that this extensive reconnaissance program was proDaoiy undertaken to accomplish the following:
precisely target US nuclear strike forces, especially ICBM sites;their status, and to detect new deployments.
map areas of general military interest, especially those bordering
c To monitor the development and testing of new military systems, not only In the US but also in Communist China.
d. To monitor large-scale military and naval activity.
Spore Weapons
During the past year, the Soviets haveestsystem (which we have designated thehich could leadtrategic space weapons system. This'system (theCBM boosterew third stage and reentry vehicle) bos been used in two types of tests.
Onhe last of three suborbital flights, tbe second and third stages and the reentry vehicle were launchedo. balhsrichaving an apogee ofa. (Soviet ICBMs fired to the same range on normal trajectories would reach apogees
This suggests that thisest of components and techniques for
a weapon system.
September and November8 and again inheof system was used to put the second and third stages, and theinto low earth orbit We thinkeorbit was intendedfirst orbit and that the vehicles were to impact on the Kapustin Yar rangc-f^
(the reentry vehicle being deorbited in tbe January test and believe that tost "was successful; the other two tests were probably failures.
believe that these tests relate to the developmentepressed trajectory ICBM, or both. Either woulddegrade the value of the US BMEWs and complicate tbe US problemeffective ABM defenses. The tests could also relate toultiple orbit bombardment system.
G. Uncategorired Space Launches
satellites whose complete mission is yet to be determined havefrom Tyuratam under tbe Cosmos series designation.ndvehiclesa new propulsion device for injection of tbe payload into orbit- Another
opulsion system was probably used to effect minor changes in the orbit-
A probable mission of these satellites was to evaluate tbe injection and orb it-ad just maneuver propulsion engines and the vehicle attitude control system. Such systems may be incorporated into an improved manned spacecraft
be Soviets have launched seven multiple payloadmission cannot be deterrnined. Tbe launch system employs astage whichayioads into selected orbits. Thesebe associated with the Initial phasesommunication/ navigation
II. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL FACTORS AFFECTING
Soviet capabilities in tbe basic end applied sciences willadequate throughout the period of this estimate to support an ambitiousAny difficulties encountered are more likely to arise fromthan from scientific limitations. Space payioads designed byhave historically been much heavier than their US counterparts, inof their early decision to develop boosters of very large thrustpart because of their tendency to use cumbersome, but proven componentsrather than develop new, more advanced hardware specifically
weight penalty Imposed by tbe Soviet practice of tuing heavier,equipment In space payloads is not critical for near-earthbelieve tbat current Soviet technology could be extended withto conduct further operations of this type. In moreanned lunar landing, the saving of weight assurors greaterin miniaturization, packaging, and other weight saving techniquesas more powerful propellents would be needed to make morepracticable. Development of such technology Is almost certainlyat the present tune.
Energytudy of Soviet open source literaturean Interest in high energy propcllants such as liquid hydrogen and fluorine.
j To date, no Soviet fligbt tests or rpaoc launches have been delected which used nigh energy propcllants in any of the stages. However, we believe some phases of static testing are now being conducted and flight testing could begm. possibly as part of the development of the system intended for Area J. and that0 or shortly thereafter high-energy upper stages could be man-rated and available for use with existing or more advanced space Lunch systems. Such upper stages will increase tho capability and efficiency of the launch systems available to the Soviets and permit considerable flexibility In planning future space missions.
aunch Vehicles. In all their major space activities7 throughho Soviets used military boosters fitted with additional upper staging. The present Soviet inventory of boosters and the wide range of their payload capability have allowed them toiversified program. To undertake more complex space missions in the future, however, the Soviets are evidently now being forced to develop large boosters specifically for the space program: their military vehicles are not adequate for such missions. The chart on the following page depicts the various launch vehicle configurations the Soviets havo used to date and shows the SI, {space launcher) designations we haveo each.
he booster designated SL-B, which is used in the Proton satelllto program, is the first Sovlot booster which we bellevo will be used solelypace Uunchcr. It ii possible that this booster was originally to serveelivery system forT nuclear weapon (of which Khrushchev boasted in thes well as for space teuncfaings, but we now believe that theery unlikely toresent Sovietheystem has an estimated first-stage thrust ofillion pounds and has demonstrated an earth-orbit payload capability of0 pounds. There are reasons to believe,that this system will soon be modified.
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We therefore estimatehird stage will soon be employed with the basic SL-9.
ith suitable upper staging would provide the Sovietscapability toariety of advanced space missions, includingstations and manned circumlunar flights as well as more ambitiousplanetary missions. The additionhird stage employing' propellants. wouldayload of someoundsplaced into near-earth orbit. With this in-orbit weightuitablestage, also using conventionalayload ofpounds could be placedunar transfer trajectory. Wea payload of tins weight would be adequate for the Soviets tomanned circumlunar flight The useigh-energy third stageound payload to be orbited,
1 Wc believe that initial unmanned Brings of theonventional third stage will occur In the first halfanned Bights using this system could begin some six monthsear later, depending on the rapidity and success of tbe unmanned testing.
construction oft Tyuratam makes It clear that theunder development another and much larger booster.slarge launch facility which appears to be of the same magnitude asApollo launch complex at Merrirt Island. It has been underthe past 3Vi years and we estimate that it will be ready for initial launch
operations in the first half8 at the earliest
I will accommodate vehiclesirst-stage thrust inOO.OOO-ie.OOO.rjDTrpound range. It is possible that the system utilizingooster will incorporate thes its second and third stages. Ifombination were to be launched initially by aboutt could be ready for manned space missions by aboutf the entire vehicle is new, however, and uses conventional propellants in all its stages it could probably not be man-rated0 at the earliest Eitherwould permit payioads0 pounds to be put in near-earth orbit Tbe useigh energy propellant in the out-of-earth-orbit ejection stage for either of these combinations would allow them to be ready for manned flight0 or shortly thereafter.
A new manned spacecraft which may be capable ofdocking has probably now reached the early, unmanned Bightnd againbe Soviets used anlaunch. Theayload was dcorbitedNovember andebruary. During tbe flight of Cosmos
defineropeOant) it (hose which bate been used thus (ar tn the Soviet launch vehicle*.
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nplaoe adjustments were made in Ihe orbit.
to believe rie*Sovictj ate testing a
new spacecraft.
We have insufficient data to evaluate fully tbe characteristics of this new spacecraft The weight theystem can place into near-earth orbit Is limited to0 pounds- We think theeighed0 pounds. These firings probably were for the purpose of checking newly developed capsule subsystems as well as testing an entirely new spacecraft
A new maneuverable spacecraft, about tbe weight of tbe Voskhod but with moro usable volume, wouldery valuable adjunct to some of thoventures, suchanned circtimlunar tight, in which the Soviets have expressed interest.ehicle could be designed for rescue, ferrying, andpurposes and thus could he useful toong-lived orbitingIt oould also be adapted to an unmanned reconnaissance miisloo. Ifere, in fact, the first testew spacecraft, an initial manned flight could occur bye believe the Soviets will develop still larger and more efficient manned space vehicles which will allow more sophisticated and venturesome missions to be performed.
Command and Control for Sear Earth Orbit. The Soviet capability to undertake complex earth orbital operationi is limited by certain majorin the USSR's command and control network. Some existing deficiencies relate to point-to-point communications within the USSR; these will probably be eliminated in the near future as tho internal network of long distancebecomes operational. Although we believe the internal commaiMl and control network generally will be adequate lo support most single missions, the lackorldwide tracking and communications network may handicap the Soviets In the performance of some orbital operations and willevere handicap if the Soviets attempt to control several operational systems, each consisting of several orbiting vehicles. Major improvement to Soviet tracking capability would result from additional tracking stations almost any place outside the USSR. Soviet interest in acquiring tracking stations abroad has been high. Cube, wliere the Soviets have installed an optical tracking station and are going toalniya receiver station, inay^bc the site of the first Soviet land-based tracking station outside the territory of ihe USSR. Soviet efforts toracking station in Australia have been frustrated. Current Soviet activities In the UAR and Somalia may foreshadow attempts to establish tracking stations In one of those countries.
Command and Control for Deep Space. The deep-space tracking facilities located in the Crimea and currently used in unmanned lunar and planetary flights limit tracking and communications to interrupted schedules. Tbe actual time available for tracking and conmiunkatioox for lunar probes depends upon the lunar declination and varies fromoay. We believe that the ability to track and communicate with manned lunar flights4 hours per day basis Is needed to help insure the safety of such missions. The Soviets
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could, however, undertake manned lunar flights even with their limited tracking and communication capability by accepting the calculated risk of not being able to communicate with the spacecraft for certain periods of time If the Soviets constructed facilities in their Far East areas, they could increase significantly tbe time available for contact with their lunar missions There is no evidence that any facilities comparable to those in the Crimea are being installed elsewhere, however, and we believe their construction would require at least two years.
The Soviets could also extend the time available for comrnunicatfng with their lunar mlssloa by using appropriately equipped ships as relay centers between tbe spacecraft and the control center. To be effective,ystem wouldigh capacity communications link between the ship and the control center. Without this high capacity link, communications would be limited to relay of verbal instructions and system status summaries and would not permitositive mission control. We have no evidence that the Soviets have installed the necessary equipment on any of their surface ships as yet butystem using such shfpbome relay links is well within their capability. Tlie Soviets could conceivably use communications satellites as relay linkssurface stations for deep space flights.
Rendezoout and Docking. Critical to many advanced types of manned space missions is the requirement to develop techniques for rendezvous and docking of vehicles in space. New Soviet spacecraft, unlike the Vostok and Voskhod, will probably be designed for rendezvous and docking and willthe necessary equipment for maneuverability, engine restart, aod hook-up. Soviet technology is sufficiently advanced to make available the various sensors required for such spacecraft, ie, radar and transponders. Ifere the initial testsew spacecraft designed for rendezvous and docking, the Soviets could conduct initial manned missions of these types using currently available launch systems within the next few months.
ecovery. The point of reentry into the earths atmosphere of lunar return trajectories would lie betweensouth andnorth latitude on the earth's surface, depending upon the declination of the moon at the time of the flight. The Soviet land mass Iks well north of this band. Thus, any spacecraft which did not incorporate some means ror altering its reentry trajectory could not be recovered wit bia the USSR. Since we believe having an on-board propulsion system for altering reentry- trajectories would be impractical, the Soviets need topacecraft having some aerodynamic lift characteristics or,toater recovery capability. There are no firm indications that tbe. Soviets have conducted aerodynamic reentry tests or that they area water recovery capability but tests of either could begin at any time. We believe that tbe time required toecovery technique would notimiting factor io the Soviet manned lunar program.
eentry. Some Soviet scientists have indicated that reentry at lunar return velocities is one of the major problems confronting them in their lunar program. The angle of reentry into the earth's atmosphere must be kept within
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narrow limits. If the angle it too steep, accelerations would be too greatanned spacecraft to withstand. On tho other hand, if the reentry angle is too shallow tbe spacecraft would "slop" ofi the earths atmosphere back into space,
n additional reentry problem is that of heating. Tbe ablative material used on the Vostok would be adequate topacecraft having nolift characteristics. Heat shieldingpacecraft having some degree of liftifferent problem because tho heat abiorbed is greater.the higher aerodynamic forces exerted on tbe spacecraft would tend to strip away the heat shield material.
e believe that the Soviets will have to test their new spacecraft, whateverupe, under conditions expected on lunar return najertories. Boostedfrom earth orbit or from high altitude ballistic trajectories could produce some necessary test data, but for fell scale simulations of lunar return velocities, tbe Soviets must conduct an unmanned drcumlunar flight ot wait until theehicle is available.
Oi Board Power. The majority of Soviet spacecraft flown to date have used chemical batteries or solar oefls for electrical power supply._jSoviet chemical-efficiencies of aboutart hour/pound, which compares favorably with current US capabilities. The Soviets could increase this figure toatt hour/pound if they feel the need to save weight, Radirnsotope/thermoelectrio conversion systems which were used in two Soviet satellites orbited5 delivered^ _Jwarts of electric powerapacity far too small to be usedife support system.
During theears the Soviets have been pursuingirected toward the development of fuel cells. Performance testingl cells using the hydrogen-oxygen reaction principle Is probably underway
""frve estimate the Soviets could have fuel cells suitable for short space missions now.
Biomedical. The Soviets probably now have sufficient biomedical data to plan withanned flighteeks; this would be adequate foranned circurnlunar or lunar landing minion. At present, however, the Soviets appear to be corscerned with the effects on human beings oflonger duration flights (Le^ aboutays orhere are few indications of how they wfll solve the biomedical problems associated with flights- of that duration, but we believe that practical solutions should be ready in time for long-duration projects In the next few years.
Tlie Soviets have numerous facilities for simulating various aspects of space environment including centrifuges for C. stresses, low pressure and lowchambers, suspension devices for simulating reduced gravity, and various devices and equipments for experimentation with men and animalt in closed
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environments. These facilities and activities are probably adequate to support any of tbe various manned space ventures they may attempt.
Life Support Systems. In their manned space flights the Soviets haveife support system based on an air-like mixture of oxygen and nitrogenea level pressure of onehe Soviets have apparently been able to scale up tbe system0 toan-day limit. They probably can adapt this system and their experiencemall manned earth-orbiting station as well asanned circumlunar mission. For future missions in which weight wouldreater limiting factor or in long duration Sights, suchanned lunar landingarge space station, wholly new techniques probably would be required. These could be partial regenerative or closed loop systems. The first Soviet flight withew environmental control system would probably be experimental and probably would involve limited objectives, primarily biomedical in nature.
Orientation and Stabilization. The Soviets haveigh degree of precision in the orientation and stabilization of spacecraft when the mission requires iL On those payioads where such pointing accuracies arc not required, the Soviets have utilized spin stabilization or have tolerated random tumbling. All Soviet space vehicles requiring accurate earth orientation have been provided with fully automatic systems. In manned vehicles, the automatic system is backed upanual system which can override the automatic system when necessary. Tbe manual system is capable of accuracies consistent with the safe recovery of die manned vehicle.
III. OTHER FACTORS
from the scientific and technical considerations which wc havethereariety of other factors which will influence the scopeof future Soviet space endeavors. These include such things as tbepast decisions, the views of the present Soviet leaders on the benefits tofrom their space program, costs, the need for regaining lostSoviet views on the US orocram.
Broad policy directives on all space matters are probably issuea riy the"Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We believe that these directives are implementedigh-level commission composed of both government and party officials. This commission probablyParty Secretaryesponsible for defenseV. Smirnov, Deputy Chairman of tbe Council of Ministers, and M. V. Keldysh, President of the Academy of Sciences. The Mtalstry of General Machineheaded by S. A. Afanas'ycv, supported by tbe industrial ministries such as defense, aviation, radio, and electronics, probably is responsible for theand production of space hardware. The Academy of Sciences provides scientific expertise to the entire space effort, controls scientific programs, and
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principally through Iho Commission for ihe Exploration and Utilization of Spaceponsor* representatives at interruitional meetings.
lie Soviets almost certainly have already decidud the nature of tlieir space program for the next five years and have probably established antimetable for the various activities related to that program. While it is possible to stretchrogramonger period oi time than originally planned or even to speedrogram somewhat to meet new deadlines, it is extremely difficult torogram In its late stages to meet an entirely different objective than was initially established. While the present Soviet leaders may try to effect econorniAs in certain sectors, we consider it unlikely that they can, at this late date, effect any basic changes io (he overall nature ofprogram for the next five years
we estimate
that expenditures in the Soviet space program have been rising at an average annual rata roughly equivalent to USillion2 when aboutillion were expended,6 when about SS billion were expended. Much of this increase is accounted for by the major launch systems at Tyuratam and the associated program represented by the coostructkio of Area J.s not yet complete and the booster for use there has not yet been seen, but we believe that the program is sufficiently advanced to permit the overall cost of the Soviet space program to level off shortly and hold al about5 billion per year for the next few yean. These costs include our estimates of boih the military and ncmmilitary portions of the Soviet space program.
The/iecendy signed Ouler Space Treaty is not likely loignificant eHecl on the military or nomnilitary aspects of the Soviet space program. Tlie treaty prohibits the establishment of military installations, the testing of any types of weapons, and the staging of military maneuvers on celestial bodies. It also bans placing nuclear weapons ln earth orbit and on celestial bodies, but it does not prohibit tbe development or testing of delivery vehicles for an orbital or fractional orbit weapon system. Further testing of theystem would not be contrary to the treaty aa long as such tests did not Involveuclear weapon in orbit Deployment of an operational system oo the ground is not prohibited.
The treaty permits the use of military personnel and equipment for the peaceful exploration ofexample,anned space station or for conducting scientific research on the moon. While there is no specific mention in the treaty of satellite reconnaissance, the Soviets made tto effort to revive their old charges tbat such activity is Illegal and they seemed to accept It as legitimate.
Tbe extent to which the treaty wfll help the USSR lupplement its own space tracking capabilities is uncertain. According to the treaty, parties to the treaty 'shall consider" requests of other signatories to be afforded anto observe the flight of tbe requesting state's space objects; the nature
of this opportunity, ai well as the conditions under which il would be afforded, would be determined by agreement between tbe states coocmtxxI However, other signatory rations are not obliged to grant any Soviet request for observing itspace objects when they are out of view from Soviet territory.
Soviets probably fee! that during the next few years they mustto regain some of tbe prestige they lost to tbe highly successful USFurthermore,7 two important anniversaries will bein the USSR,h anniversary of thendhof the October Revolution. Tho Soviets probably have plannedof space spectacular to celebrate one or both of lliese dates.they will be confronted with the necessity to at least partially bluntImpact of tbe US ApoQo program. For these reasons andtho capability of the space hardware which they arc now developing,believe that tho next five years willeriod in which the Sovietsspace ventures far more complicated and spectacular than
IV. OUTLOOK FOR THE NEAR. General
considering developments in the Soviet space program over theyears, we can estimate feasible extension of all current projects but itto determine which specific missions will bo flown. We do notSoviets have at band all of tbe necessary technical and economicundertaking all projects anrultaDeously. We therefore believe thatprojects wiD not be attempted, others will be slowly paced, andresources wiD be cotrimrtted toew. The expansion of theproject over the past two years shows that projects ofvalue can and will be funded. Whilelear that usefulstill be accomplished with existing hardware, ft is equally clear thatand sophisticated missions will have to await the newunder development.
The Soviets In their many official and unofficial statements about their space program, have given no roo'ication of what the order of priority is to be. Indeed, much of what is said is conflicting or ambiguous. In arriving at likely dates for specifice haveigh but not complete level of successharing of priorities among several categories of projects. In general, the Ukoly date for any given mission wouldear or so later than that which we consider to be tbe earliest practicable date. We note that delays and failures have occurred and have sometimes plagued tbe Soviets for long periods. Such difficulties can recur at anyupon theof hardware based on new and more complexcould delay achievementpecific missionear or two.
Tbe Soviet manned lunar landing program and the Urge manned space ftation program are bnge-scale undertakings, both of which require the use of
the system intended for Area J. The dates we believe these ventures can be carried out are based on technical feasibility and do not take into account the order in which they may be attempted. We do not believe they could beconcurrently. It must be understood therefore, that the one which is given priority may be carried out at the time indicated and that the other will be deferredear or so.
B. Monnod Lunar Landing
estimated that the Soviet manned lunar landing pro-
gram was probably not intended to be competitive with the Apollo program as thenimed atime period. We believe this is probably still the case. There is the possibility, however, that depending upon the present Soviet view of the Apollo timetable, they may feel that there is some prospect of their getting to the moon first and they may press their program in hopes of being able to do so.
Several factors militate against their being able to compete with the Apollo timetable as originally planned. The status and pace of construction ofndicate that the launch system will probably not be ready for test until aboutaunch vehicle is available, we would expect toeries of tests for man-rating Uie system extending over atearunar landing would be attempted. In the meantime, the Soviets will need toa new spacecraft, to test reentries at lunar return velocities, and perhaps toater recovery capability, Depending upon the technique selected, they may also need to test rendezvous and docking techniques and equipment.
Some Soviet scientists liavehe Apollo technique and stated that their lunar flight will go directly from earth to the moon's surface and return without any orbital rendezvous required. We estimate that any lunar landing mLssion whichingle vehicle using conventional propellants wouldooster developing considerably greater thrust thanan accommodate. The Soviets have alsoechnique involving the placing of components and fuel on the moon by two or more very large vehicles, then having cosmonauts assemble these components on the moonehicle and fuel it for direct return to earth. This" technique is risky since very accurate guidance Is required to place the manned vehicle sufficiently close to the landing site of earlier flights and there is no provision for an abort of the manned Bight.
Other techniques could involve rendezvous and docking of two or more very large vehicles in earth orbit for assembly and fueling the lunar vehicle, before proceeding to the moon. The Soviets could also carry out two launches to the moon, one for landing on the moon and return to lunar orbit, and another for lunar orbil and return to earth. Either of these missions could be attempted within the capabilities we believe tho Soviets will have when theystem Is available.
however, the Soviets were to develop high energy propellants forupper stages of tbeehicle they could use anyide variety of
r
mission profiles toan oa the moon and return him to earth. We have estimated earlier that man-rated upper stages using high energy propellents could be available0 or shortly thereafter.
things considered, we estimate that the earliest the Sovietsa manned lunar lamiing. would bee believemost likely date is sometime iaime period.
C. Manned Space Station
Soviets are continuing to voice generalities about manned space(ions. They refer to themost of terms, such as cities in space, giant flying
laboratories, scientific research institutes, refueling stations, etc. Sovietfrequently identify two broad space station functions: to pursue research objectives, and to serveaunching or an assembly base for manned lunar and planetary missions. References to military applications of space stations have been conspicuously absent.
Neither the interim nor ultimate configurationpace station* has been defined by the Soviets. Prerequisite techniquesong-term space station would be maneuver, rendezvous, docking and extensive useful EVA. None of these techniques have been demonstrated in the Soviet manned space program to date, although the Soviets have beenariety of laboratory simulations involving multiman crews for long periods of time.
Based on our expectation that theonventional propeUant upper stage will be used in the manned space program, we believe that this system
/would be employed toanned space station or componentspace station weighing0 pounds and capable ofrew of three or more could probably be placed in earth orbit in the first halfhis could be attempted in7 as an "anniversary spectacular" but Only if the Soviets press this developmentew spacecraft,docking and extravehicular operations could extend tbe operationalof the station to several months and perhaps as longear.the Soviets couldission in7 wherein theould be used toarge unmanned platform and theould be used to put the new spacecraft Into orbit to rendezvous and dock with the platform already in orbit. The crew could be augmented or exchangedan or twoime by subsequent
believe that tbe Soviets will probably also develop and establishlarge manned space station. This development will probably be onefrom their manned lunar landing program and probably not bewith that program at Area J. It appears likely that the booster
' Wepace stationulntDaiiaed, nonrecoverable orbiting vehicle intended for prolonged useinimumhe crew could be recovered by deotbHingci die vehicle; alternatively crew recovery or retupply could be curled out byferry vehicle.
c 2
being developed for me with the Tyuratamaunch facilities will be capable of placing on the order ofounds in near-eartheight budget of this magnitude Li sufficientariety of activities about which the Soviets havepace station of this size wouldermanent or semipermanent space laboratory to be placed in orbit byt the earliest We believe the most likely date is sometime Inime period. Rotation of personnel and resupply of the station would beby spacecraftendezvous and docking capability.
Circumlunor
e think it probable that the Soviets willanned crrcumlunar flightteprogram having more ambitious objectives as Hs subsequent goals, suchanned lunar landing or manned flights to explore other plancts. The Soviets have sometimes describedlight as one preliminary activity leading up to the manned landing. They may also consider that an early manned drcumlunar flight would pay importanterms of prestige, and couldeans to offset some of the propaganda value of the US Apollo program.
The Soviets couldanned drcumlunar flight by using existing hardware. In order lo do so they would need toenik upper stage to theystem, man-rate this combination with aninal stage, and modify the Voskhod spacecraft to giveidcourse correction capability. Thiscouldayload of0 poundsircumlunar trajectory, which would permit the Soviets torew of twoircumlunar flight. Alternatively, the Soviets may choose toew conventlonal-propellant upper stage designed to be flown with theystem and the new spacecraftidcourse guidance capability inherent in its design.
We believe that an attemptanned circumlunar flight would be preceded by at least one unmanned mission utilizing the same mission profile and hardware. We believe that test Bightseriod of about six months would be requiredan-rate the system and to test the equipment and recovery techniques for water landing which may be requiredanned circumlunar flight.
Optimum "window" conditionsoviet manned circumlunar flight occur during tbeonths^ the year when the moon isortherly declination. For this reason, we believe that the earliest the Soviets wouldanned circximrunar flight would be during the first halft Is conceivable that they would attempt such an operation as an "anniversary spectacular" Inut because of the grave risks involved we believe that it is unlikely that they will do so.
and Planetary Probes
systems utilized for the current phases of unmanned lunarprobably adequateariety of missions In the near future. Lunarseismographic, and gravity iristrumentatlon equipment may be incor-
poistcd into the missions of future soft-landers. But if the Soviets continue to employ existing lunar probe vehicles, weight limitations probably will prevent the inclusion of all threehe same mission.
photographic capabilities probably will be used to providephotographs of the moon to aid in selecting future landing sites for
payload weight eonld be increased tounar mapping mission in
the orbiter program;ission was possibly intended forcientific measurements acquired by lunar orbiters will be necessary to give an account of the hazards the moon's environment will impose on lunar cosmonauts. Orbiters can alsoetermination of tbe moon's mass, size, and anomalies in its gravitational field. Thus, the data obtained try lunar orbiters wouldanned circumlunar mission as wellanned lunar landing.
Many of the techniques utilized bynd Lunan soft landing on the moon have obvious applicationanned lunar landing mission. However, very extensive modification of the descent and landing procedures used by the recent soft-landers wfll be required for manned lunar landing. Lunarovided more refined data on.tbe physical characteristics of the lunar surface which will be useful in determining techniques and weight tolerancesanned lunar landing.
The Soviet program for unmanned planetary exploration probably has two principal objectives: to collect photography and scientific data by fly-by Drobes, and to make planetary atmosphere and surface measurements, in spite
/ of the failure of tbe Soviets torobe toward Mars during the recent "window" early this year, we believe planetary exploration will continue. The Soviets will probably avail themselves of the next "window" to Venus inossibly using theaunch system. Theaunch system, with its considerable payload capability, willariety of other interplanetary missions to be attempted as the period progresses. These could include Mars and Venus orbiters, Mercury and Jupiter fly-by probes, and Mars and Venus soft-landers.
Applied Satellites
ground terminals
i as part oi the
The Soviets have started construction in the northern and eastern areas-of the USSR as part ot their project to integrate the Molniya communication satellite system into their communications structure. We believe that all of the new terminals will be operational by7 to receive satellite relayed transmissions. We believe that this network will probably continue to expand as more sophisticated communications satellites are developed and that stations will be equipped toroad range ofservices.0 the Soviets probably wfll have tested the feasl-bUity of broadcasting directly to home receivers or to relatively simple community TV antennae.
We estimate that the Soviets wiD launch meteorological satellites innumbers during the next five years; there are indications that they plan
L 3.
22
2
launch aboutf these vehicles duringeriod. Ihe Soviets will probably develop more sophisticated instrumentation for use in theirsatellites to obtain information on such things as atmospheric temperature, humidity, and precipitation. Meteorological satellites may also be used to conduct additional observations such as geological mapping, crop surveillance, and ice reconnaissance.
G. Possible Soviet Military Uses of Space
Throughout the period of the estimate tbe Soviets will experimentariety of space systems which could be used for military purposes. Newspace applications will be introduced as Soviet technology advances and as requirements for such systems arcilitary role for man in space may emerge prior to the end of the period, particularly as the ability to operate manned space stations grows.
Military Support Systems. The launching of recoverable photographic and Hunt reconnaissance satellites from Tyuratara and Plesetsk will probably continue at about the present rate until similar missions of longer duration, or manned orbital reconnaissance platforms, are employed. To improve data handling time the Soviets will probably develop an improved photovideo systemultiple film capsule recovery system for long duration missions; they will probably also use communication relay satellites in an attempt to achieve near-real-time data handling between widely separatedatellite with limited maneuver capability for electromagnetic and pbotoreconnaissance may be developed to meet military needs in the next few years.
The high priority evident in tbe recoverable photographic reconnaissance satellite project will probably be extended to other selected military support systems which the Soviet leaders decide are essential; these will probably include systems for improved global communications and TV relay, weather observation, and navigation,
Offensive Weapon Systems. On the basis of Soviet tests of thesee paragraphs. we estimateirst generation fractional orbit bombardment system using theooster could be deployed in small numbers by7 ort could be deployed in silosfrom those associated with theCBM. This systemj""
EP on the orderjtl depending on the range couldarhead ofounds.* hort-lived multiple orbit
We believe that If thli system were to bo firedortherly trajectory toward the us coveringthe cep oould be on tbe coderm. If, however, the Soviets were to launch the systemotherly trajectory covering0 run. to attack the us from the south, the cep could be oo the, order3 tup. This tudmxreot ii baud, oo our estimate of Soviet technical capabflltlo^
We have no firm basis for fudging What the accuracy of this system would be la in csrratiannl mode; it could be. somewhat less accurate at an early ioc. If. In the future, some meant for trajectory correction were to be hxarparated In the system, the cep could be improved somewhat.
2
bombardment system could be developed irom the same hardware aod deployed in the same manner but we believe thatevelopment is unlikely.
There is no identified program which Indicates that the Soviets are developing an offensive space weapon system that would be deployed and maintained in orbit. Several new system components would need toong-lile power source and an attitude reference system. However, much of the space lechnology and hardware currently being tested by the Soviets could be usedasis for tiie development nfystem.
For the foreseeable future, we thinkultiple orbit bombardment system deployed in space will not compare favorably with ICBMs in terms of effectiveness, rehabdity, vulnerability, average hie, and siuiceptibility to loss of control due to accident or couriterrneasures. Tbe Soviet leadership probably would recognize that the deployment in spaceuclear-armed orbital bombardment system would bo an act of major international Import which would intensify greatly East-West hostility andtrong now stimulus to USprograms. In view of tlieae factors, the much greater cost of such orbital weapons, and Soviet agreement to the treaty on peaceful uses of space, wethat tbe Soviets are unlikely toultiple orbit bombardmentIn space during the period of this estimate.
Wc recognize that the Soviet, might reach different concisions as to cost and effectiveness and thai altered political considerations in some future phase of East-West relations might lead themifferent decision, Even in these
.circumstances, we beb'eve thai they would regard space weapons primarilyeans of supplementing existing forces, of introducing additional complications into US defense planning, and of supporting Soviet claims to strategic parity or even superiority.
efensive Weapon Systems. The Soviets almost certainly havesystems for use against satcllrtes. Tbe deployment of some of the Hen House/Dog House radars, and their technical characteristics .Indicate that they could lie used in support of an antisatellite weapon system.
3
Developmentoorbital Intercept because of the added capability of Inspection nnd the greater operational flexibility against satellites at higherprovided byystem, tbe Soviets may explore such an approach in addition to, but not in placeirect ascent antisatellite system.
he Soviets have demonstrated, as part of their missile and space programs, many of the necessary technologies, subsystems, and capabilities applicableoorbital interceptor development. These Include the precise control of launch time; some of the operational procedures required for rendezvous; orbital transfer; stability and control systems; and an engine restart capability. These provide the technological base for tbe Soviets to develop an initial unmanned coorbital
2-1
JLUILI
by the time the Hen House/Dog House radar system becomes fully
n ystem would be very expensive and
would probably be severely constrained in target selectionimited plane
change capability, and inspection would be limited io TV. For these reasons we .
doubt that the Soviets would developystem. We do not exclude the
possibility, however, that the Soviets may elect toore efficient
unmanned coorbital inspection capability at some time later in the period.
A manned coorbital system could be developed in thes an outgrowth of the Soviet manned space program. Although the costs ofystem would he high, operationalopportunities for inspection, nondestructive neutralization, orJustify Us
The interference with orbiting satellites Is prohibited in the spacebut the developmentapability to do so is not We believe that the Soviets
would realize that any use of antisatellite systems in peacetime would risk opening their own military support systems to retaliation. We think it likely, therefore, that the Soviets would use andsatellite systems only if they believed that war with the US was imminent and that neutralization of our military support systems was consequently an overriding consideration. There might also be other specialin which they would use antisatefiitc systems in peacetime; for example, they might believe that they were retaliating against US interference with their own satellites.
H. Unmanned Exploration of Near Space
exploration of near space to date has been given a" lowSoviet scientists haveide range of scientificbe studied by means of satellites and space probes. Their stated plansprobes and satellites for observing solar electromagneticstreams, cosmic rays, radiation belts, magnetic fields, theand infrared and ultraviolet radiation. Many of thesebeen and will continue to be carried out by the small Kapustin YarAdditional satellites may be launched from Tyuratam todata at great distances from earth.
V. THE lONG-TERM OUTLOOK "A. Factors Affecting
have little evidence concerning long-term Soviet objectives incan estimate the likely scope of the Soviet spacenlyery tentative basis. Some cosmonauts, scientists,other Soviet space enthusiasts have often referred to possible futureas interplanetary exploration, but tbe political leadership during the pastor so has made little public reference to space activities, and has avoided
3
open reference to any particular programs' The leadership has probably not yet decided which particular ventures to emphasize beyond the manned lunar landing era, and almost certainly has been unable to gauge with any degree of precision the amount of resources likely to be available for space programs In the next decade.
The question of resource allocationentral one in Soviet politics. Competition for resources has intensified since the, when the marked slowdown in Soviet economic growth began, and political infighting, in part based on this competition, has become characteristic of life within the leadership. The post-Khrushchev collective leadership has not indicated any substantial ability to resolve problems associated with the establishment of economic priorities; it has as yet been unable to agree on die final version of the current five-year plan, which began moreear ago. In the meantime, competingand space, growth andall, in effect, been assured high priorities.
One of the principal causes of economic difficulties in the USSR duringas been the preemption of highly skilled human resources and top-grade material resources by rapidly growing programs in advanced weapons and space. Among other things, these programs have impinged on the quality and effectiveness of investment elsewhere in the economy, and the present collective is surely aware of this. Aside from efforts to achieve marginal economies,the leadership has not sought to attack the problem by reducing or even leveling off expenditures in these areas, and we estimate that it is unlikely to do so over the next four or five years. If important programs must be cut civilian claimants arc the most likely to suffer, as in the recent past
Whether the Soviet leaders will be witling to approach the problemew way inill, of course, depend on many factors; the state of the cconomv, the international climate, the composition and nature of the leadership, the Interplay of domestic political and economic pressures, the progress of specific military and space programs, the progress and scope of comparable US programs, and the leaderships calculations as to the costs of the program versus Its probable returns, scientific, military, and political. The latter factor, the political, is likely to be of pjirticular importance. The propaganda and psychological benefits of tbe program, both at home and abroad, have always been of prime interest to the Soviet regime; the USSR's pioneeringin space added greatlyTo its mternational prestige and probably helped to justUy the regime to its own people. It may be, however, that such benefits will diminish with time and familiarity, and that Soviet prestige is less likely in the future to increase rignificandy on the basis of individual exploits, such as Sputnik.
the guideline! for the current Five-Yearie quite brief and are tpectfic only concerning the application of space technology to on oo earth: To provide in tbe five-year planhe further study of apace end (he application of the otrtjinrd results for improving radio communications, radio navigation and television, for weather forecasting and for other practical rxupoies."
e 2
of Soviet Cooperation in Space Matters
Until recently, the Soviets had staunchly refused to offer any indication that Ibey were willing to cooperate in any field of space activity.2 the Soviets' agreed to exchange satellite-collected weather data with the US. and in6 passed the first of their data to tlie US. This step plus the cooperative Soviet attitude evidenced during the recent discussions on the UN treatypeaceful uses of space and the agreement with France on relay of TV and other cooperative space projects lead us to believe tbat the Soviets will become more willing to exchange various scientific and technical data with the US and other nations as the various programs progress. They may, for example, be willing to exchange such data oo radiation belts, solar effects, gravity anomalies, and additional and more detailed meteorology.
Apart from technical difficulties, there are three factors which would tend to limit the extent of Soviet cooperation in space. Fast, the prestige of being the first nation to accomplish various space missions continues to be Important to the USSR. Second, the prospective gain in cooperating beyond the exchange of scientific and technical data would have to be convincing to the Soviets as long as major international political issues remain unresolved. Third, the close association of military and civilian space programs in the USSR would restrict the areas of cooperation which the Soviets would be willing to consider. We believe, however, that if tbe advantages to be gained are persuasive, the Soviets may agree to some ventures in which compatible equipments could be launched by the USSR and another nation and link together to perform functions of mutualxvrnmunications systemarge portion of the globeorldwide meteorological system. We consider it unlikely, however, that within the period of this estimate the Soviets will be willing to cooperate to the extent of exchanging space hardware.
We have considered the possibility that at some time beyond the lunar exploration era tbe costs and technical complexity of more extensive planetary exploration may be so great that one nation would not consider it feasible or practical to undertake it We believe it less likely that the Soviets would be willing to join tbe USilateral venture than to participaterogram sponsoredroup ofne under the aegis of the UN.
Undertakings
Because we are unable to estimate Soviet intentions in space over the long term, our consideration of possible space activities must rest heavily on our estimates of likely Soviet capabilities in the field. Moreover, even on this basis, we must make tbe assumption that the various projects the Sovietsin the near term will for the most part be successful and that long-term ventures will be able to proceed from earlier achievements,
Soviet writings and oratory haveroad spectrum of potential undertakings In space but have tailed, probably deliberately, to highlight any particular one or ones as those likely to be pursued by tbe USSR. However,
c 3
certain ventures are mentioned more often than others and this repetition may provide the clue to future Soviet undertakings. eview of Soviet writings, speeches, and interviews over the past two years shows that the followingilities are the most often addressed:
expansion of the applied satellite program in the Belds ofmeteorology, geodesy, and navigation.
of the sun and planets.
complex space stations, to serve as scientific research bases,platforms for other space ships, as astronomical observatories, etc.
lunar base or laboratory" toariety ofaunching station for deep space probes,observations, as well asase for the exploration of the itself.
Normally missing from their official statements is mention of programs with direct military applicability. Nevertheless we believe that thej' willto explore military applications of space.
In discussing tbe lunar base or "laboratory" the Soviets are obviouslyto something far more extensive and complicatedather small, two or three man, short duration installation. In these discussions, tbe Soviets do not describe the means of puttingtation in place, but restrict the discourse to desirabilityase of this type and the scientific advantages to be gained. The constructionanned lunar base of the size and nature
' implied in the Soviet discussions would be extremely complex and cosdy, and would require the Soviets to develop equipment and techniques far morethan we believe that they will be able to achieve within the nextears.
time table for tbe Soviet manned planetary exploration programnot been established. Soviet developmentapability tolaunch manned vehicles from an orbital space station launcheventually lead to maimed fly-by* of Mars, Venus, or other planets.connection, the Soviets are actively engaged In the Investigation ofpropulsion devices, which would be efficient means ofpayioads over interplanetaryhe Soviets claim to havea device for attitude control of the Zond IT spacecraft, which theyMarsowever, the Soviet lackuitable nuclearfor an electrical propulsion system* would precludelanet before tbet the earliest. The periodestimated toeriod of decreased solar activity and therefore afor such flights. We believe, however, that It is unlikely that thehave advanced sufficiently far In their programs to attempt any suchthat time, chiefly because of the problems inherent in tbe developmentlife support system capable of supporting manned flights of the severalrequired for mterplanetary travel.
l 3
irrrirT"
There is no evidence that the Soviets areuclear rocket engine for interplanetary propulsion, although they are continuing research which could be applicable toevelopment It would probably take the Sovietsoears, after initiation of the program, to develop such in engine.
The Soviets arc believed torogram aimed at developmentuclear reactor/thermionic converter power source.ystem would have greater efficiency than thermoelectric systems and an output of hundreds of kilowatts of electric power. The development program is probably in an early stage, andystem will probably not become operational until the.
Varioustechnical, andprobablythe exploitation of soange of possibilities as is indicated by Soviet open sources. However, the steps taken toward these programs arc so interrelated that any step taken in any one program would be of benefit in others. Priority projects will probably be undertaken, but we have no evidence upon which toudgment of which program or programs will be assigned what priority.
ANNEX
ESTIMATED TIMING OF MAJOR SOVIET SPACE EVENTS SOVIET SPACE LAUNCHES0 HISTORY OF SOVIET MANNED SPACEFLIGHT PROJECTS /HISTORY OF SOVIET LAUNCHINGS OF LUNAR AND PLANETARY PROBES
ESTIMATED TIMINO OP THE MAJOR SOVIET MANNED SPACE PLIGHT PROJECTS OVER THB NEXT PIVE YEARS
long Duration Manned Flight or Smell Spaceb)
Manned Grncr Fllght
Spaceb)
Manned lunar landing
il
i/
The lightly ihaded oreos represent Ihe earileir possible date!elieve the projects could be onderfoktn. The darker shading represenrj our etlina'e at to when the project! en nor* likely tobeuneeerokwt.
Optimumfor Soviet circwnlwnor flights are duringonthi of Iht yeor.
We do not believe the large space !lallan ond manned Ivnor landing programs can be undertaken concurrently but we cannotalid estimate ai lo which will be undertaken first.
32
JUS
I*
9
0 4
SATELLITES
0 4
SCPOLOGICAL
3
HISTORY OF SOVIET MANNED SPACEFLIGITT PROJECTS(Through
(Nolo:ere haveumber of failures Id Che Soviet program, we have no evidence support! na Ihe tailur of any Soviet manned spacecraft.)
Date
Recovery Date
Recovery Orbit
kecisrkn
ay CO (attempted)
ulug
ir.
00 ug GO
. .
(Unannounced)
Sputnik).
iU'zfttl^ -. *.
Dee
ee
60
Deo attcmpUd)
.
Mar
Mar
5.
Mar
Mar
1
Apr
Apr
2
Aug
Auk
3
Aug
Aug
4
Aug
Auk
5
JUD
Jun
Jun
Jun
Oct
Oct
1 h
Oct
Oct
613
arar
ov
eb
Voakhod IS Mar
7 Fab
07
07
3?
Cosmos eb
133
bs. Firet known Soviet use ot tbe expression "Cosmic Space Ship." Retrorocket
PayM. Contained two dog* andspecimens. Firet successfulVcatok-like spacecraft. Comprehensiveexperimentation; In- flightof dog; effects of aeoeleration, weighradiation on animals, plants,immunological, microbiological
imilar to Korabl'2. Two
0 lbs. Contained one dog.ot man-rating of Vostok.
9 lbs. Contained one dog. Con-tinuatioo of man-rating of Vostok.
5 lba. Gagarin; firet manned orbital space flight.
8 lbe, Titov; first one-day mission; demonstrated human ability to eat. sleep, and work under conditions of epace flight; veatibular diaturbar.cei nv,ilc;rri by cosmonaut.
2 lba. Nikotoyev; along with Vostokbe first test ot two subject* under generally similar conditio ne of space flight,
5 lbs. PopovIeJi.
ykovakly;furtherevaluation of human reactions to extended space flight, especially cardiovascular deconditioning.
0 lbs. Tereahkova; along withral test of male and female aubjeeta under generally similar oo edit tone; first flightonpllot.
Voskbod with dummies. Computed psy'.,ni! same as Voskhod.
0 lbs. Col. V. M- Komarov, Dr. B. B. Yegexov, and Bag. R. Feoktlstov; first flight without apaceauile; first flight with direct inflight medical observations, including sampling of body fluids.
Voakhod with airlock for EVA. Unmanned. Burned up.
Two
Two doge. Extendedays) biological
experiment. Probobla unmanned tost of new spacecraft.
w mmwirsft.
AU lauDcbings have employed the SS-fl booster. Vostok-reloUdmployedupper Stage. Voskhod-relaled flights, beginning with Cosmosnave emnbiyed thestage. Payload weights are those announced by
Six daya prior to the launch of Voakhod, CosmosrovidecTnnal fligbt qualification of the new spacecraft. onstituted the only full flight test of the Voakhod carrying aU of Its associated subsystems. Four other Cosmos, In addition to performing their primary reconnaissance missions, served to man-rate the Venik pre-pulsion stage and possibly provided testing of VcnikjVoakhod compatibility and of Voakhod structural integrity.
HIBTORY OF SOVIET LA UN CHIN OS OF LUNAR AND PLANETARY PROBES
(TorouRliebruary)
(No'.n: All launchinga hav* been from)
Dai*
Tumi
Ob.)
an 8 Jim D9apct 19
pr 60 Moor
of Direct-Ascent Launch failure.
unik I. Mlaaed moon and want Into orbit around- Launch failure
Lunik II. Impacted moon.
Lunik m. Oreumluiiar. Sueeeeafully photographed
bidden eld* of Insufficient velocity. Nearest approach lo moon waa
ilea.
Ocl et eb 61
Mara Venua
' u
Beginning of Parking-Orbit Teehniqu*
ESvJ
cot achieved.
achieved, announced .
parting orbit
th aaage failed.
orbit not achieved. 'TSinik IV. nflea of mooo after mldoouree correction._ Probableg tcet of planetary
probe. Failed lo eject from orbit. Probable engloeerlcg test of planetary probe. Vehicle ^did not achl^eorbit.
"lparfcicg omit aot achieved.aa Cosmo*ltar 4th si*ge failed,nitial injcctory would have cauaod probe to paw0 mile* of Venua. Soviet* announced two mldeotuae eorrectlona4 and IS; ntlaa.(balance loereaaed end contact apparently lost before paaalng Venue.
HISTORY OF SOVIET LAUNCHINGS OF LUNAR AND PLANETARY PROBES
(ThroughCoiUumad)
(NoUr All launching, have md from Tyuralam)
Dalo
Target
(lba)
Kerua.k.
)
U Mar ttprarOS
8 Jun tt
Moon Moon Moon
SOSO
Jul 65
Oct esov Pi
V*nu*
Nov 66
Nov 6SM
an ar 66
Moon Moon Moon
Unknown
Mar4 Aug 66
ct 66
Moon Moon
nknown
Dae 06
orbit not achieved Toad II power encoonwnd diSeultia* Inay on flight. Arrived la lba vicinity of Mara during tbe aerty pan olour-lb stag* lalhire.
Third atage
Luna. -afHaciiingailed. Lunaattempt failedondraluued picture* of lunar surface
taken during fly-by.Lunar soft-lander attempt. Failed at retrofire. Venn*lucoaaa: Venus ny-by (Brat ue* of
Sr parkingtuccesa all.gadly impacted on
Venua probe attempt. Failure. Luna, 8. 8ofl-landing attempt, failed at retroEre. Luna 0. ouooesaiul sott-landing.
. Lunar probe attempt; vohiola failed
rom earth parking orbit. Lunar or biter. No pleturaa. Lunar orbiter. No pieturea. Luna ia. Lunarpictures of lui
auaoaf<J
direct-aaecc-.lauocbea needlaeaand th* Lunll uppe* etago. InaddiUon to lbatcmpu noted la thia aeries, wa believe thai than war* throe launch fafluroi iwo Id the fall8 and on* la early
aallma'.ed. Other payloada were announced by lha Bovle^
All thea* launoheo have uaodjh*ooatar and Vwuk upper ateg* to place Into earth0 pound package turSitliog of th* payload and Ita propulalou atage. Thia eiage (known aa the 4th or ejection attge) la ueed lo eject the payload from earth orbit and to place itrajectoryta target.
Payloada unknown. SovMta for the Venue
Believed to be the iai of
ound announced by the
q
-C 3
1
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