Created: 8/3/1967

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Tlie following Intelligence organications participated in thethis estimate:y '' .

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizationshe Itepartirients of State and Dofonso, the ABC, and the HSA.


Dr- Edward Proctor, for the Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Mr. Thceaas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research,

Eenjertaient ofr

.Lt.oseph f- Carroll, Director, Defense Intelligencet- Gen. Marshallarter, the Director, national Security Agency Mr. Howard C.ho Assistant General Managor, Atonic Snorgy



Mr. Williamregar, for the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of his Jurisdiction-

national security espionageaw prohibits its any mariner to an prejudicial for the benefit United States, trinuted and control channels.

Thre document contains Information*affect of She United States within the meaning of,ransmission or the revelation of its content ur.authairlzed person, as well as its use in any to the safety.or interest of the United Statos of any fforeign government to the detriment of It is toseer, only by personnel especially authcrizedYto receive information in the desigtiat

Controls.ich Bay gained, if ence anded by the







To assess the effectshineployment- on China' strategic strike program.


A. We doubt that the US decision to deployould have much, if any, impact on the timing of the IOC date for the Chinese

Xf The deployment assumed here is that known as7ystem and briefed to the Secretary of DefenseIt basically consists of an area defense of the continental USerminal defense of selected Minuteman installations. The possible Chinese responses considered here do not include such unconventional methods as clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US.


automatic dcvno-aemie and

ICBM. The Chine ICHM development program seems already to have high priority and there is little likelihood that it could be further accelerated.

B- ikely Chinese advanced veapcns program5 could Include: (l) the deploymentf sufficient MRBMc, plus some medium Jet bombers, to threaten major cities and most US bases froia Japan through the Philippines, southeast Asia, and northern the deployment,oderate rate, of first-generation ICBMst the earliest. Vithin this program, the main direct responseS antiballistic missile (ABM) deployment vould be the introduction of some warhead hardening and some relatively simple eotoatmospheric penetration aids- If the Chinese are already planning such aids, they could be available by.

we consider it unlikely, the Chinese couldeployment byaximum effort in their ICBMvould involve Btretchlng out or reducing other important Even in this case, however, and assuming highlygrowth rates ir. China, we doubt that the Chinese couldthanCBMs

robable Chinese responses depend heavily oncf intervening years. If the Chinese etxeunter major delays with

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solid propcllants for ICBM ranges, deployment of the first-generation vehicle In soft sites might be stepped up and deployment In hard sites initiated. More sophisticated penetration aids and further warhead hardening might also be Introduced.

E. Regardless of the scale or speed of the Chinese responseS ABM deployment, intelligence probably will be ablo to provide some advance notice of developments in the Chlnosa strategic weaponsho poasible intelligence leadtiaes are discussed inf this paper.



1. Ve have nc direct evidence of the strategic thinking that governs tho Chinese advanced weapons program. The present leaders probably believe that the successful development of an ICBM would greatly enhance their prestige and strengthen their claims toin Asia and their atatusreat power. They would also hope that the possessiontrategic capability would nive then greater security in supporting revolutionary struggles, particularly in Asia, and that it would serve to lessen the dangers of nuclear strikes or.

weighingounds,angeautical milest will probably have radio-inertial guidance, uno atorable liquid propellants, and be deployed in soft sites.

k. Without considering the effectsS decision to deploy KTXK-X, we can make some judgaentB about current Chinese plana for their first ICBM. First of all, China la likely to see advantages in deploying even on unsophisticated ICBM as soon as possible. Since the system vill probably be deployed in soft sites, however, and be vulnerableirst strike, it is questionable whether the Chinese vould deploy their first ICBM in large numbers ever several years. It seoos acre likely that the Chineso would, in time, choose to make their major investmentees vulnerable system. Aside from these most general statements, ve have no good basis for estimating the probable deployment program for China's first ICBM.


5- We doubt that the US decision to deployould have much, if any, Impact on the timing of the IOC date for the Chinese ICBM. Tho Chinesoevelopment program seems already to have high priority and

2/ Sea Section TV for our estimate of the probable Chinese response.

there is little likelihood that it could be further accelerated. It ia conceivable that the Chinese might react by slowing work on their first-generation ICBM in favor of the developmentore sophisticated system. But this toe seems unlikely; we believe that for political reasons alone the Chinese will strive for the earliest possible testing and deployment of an ICBM.

6. The mexlmum efforts which the Chinese might moke to counter thedeployment are shown in the attached chart. The judgments as tc the time it might take the Chinese tc develop various weapon systems ere based on US and Soviet experience and on the present state of Chinese technology, as indicatod by their current nuclear weapons and missile programs.

?. It is Important to note that these projections are cot our estimates of the most likely pace of development. epresent cur assessment of the best tho Chinese could do if ixitaro Chinese leaders continue to give the ICBM program the priority it now enjoys, and if each of their programsearly saxlmuffl degree of success.

8. The ability of China's economy to bear the costs of developing and deploying an intercontinental strike capability, while at the same time supporting other ambitious military programs, is open to serious

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question. The rates of development and deployment shown in the table would require that the Chinese reach and sustain high rates of growth throughout the economy. Such growth now appears unlikely at least for the next several years, particularly in view of the continuing general disruptive effects of the Cultural Revolution. Unusually favorable conditions would be required, such as agricultural output growing faster than population, increasing access to foreign markets and credits, good, management, and political stability. Even with favorable conditions, the proportion of heavy industrial resources allocated to all militaryprobably would not be increased much, because such action would deny the rest of the economy the level of investment needed to sustain its rate of growthigh level. In order to pay for ancapability such as described here, spending for development andr, production of other types of military hardware would probably have to be held at approximately present levels. This in turn would mean that Peking would have to cut back or stretch out some other military programs now just reaching the deploymentAMs, MRBMs, short-range cruise missiles and,ollow-on to the

A. ICBM Programs

9- Maximum First-Generation Deployment. he Chinese might maximize the deploymentoft, first-generation system.

especially if they saw no seed proopect of having largo and increasing numbers of hardened missile sites (with first or second-generation missiles). In such an effort, as canyaunchers night he deployed irst strike role, in which the Chinese would have unlimited time to get their missllos ready, this force nighteliability of aboutercent. If work was begun when theecision was cade, China could develop exentmospheric decoys for this systemefense was completed. Though we do not Know their characteristics, specially hardened reentry vehicles (RVs) might betoward thes. Depending on the progress in reducing the else of warheads, the system might include multiple warheadsrf reduced yield, perhaps as early

he Chinese might choose to continue to deploy an iminroved version of the first-generation ICBM. Alternatively, they might decide toecond-generation liquid propelled system. Either course might involve greater dieparsnl and hardening of launch sites.

Maximum Two-System Eeployment There is some basis forardened, second-generation, solid-fueled ICBM. The Chinese have almostargo installation at Hu-ho-hao-te in Inner Mongolia which wo believe is for testing and manufacturing composite solid fuel rocket motors, including some of relatively leree size. It will probably be throe years before motors developed here could bo ready for flight testing. With the experience gained in missilery since the

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nd assuming no major setbacks In design and development work, the Chinese might be ablo, by thes, to design and complete the developmenthree-otago solid-fueled miBsilearhead weight

ange of

China should limit tho deployment of Itslt could,ombination of first andmissiles deployed at aboutoft sites and someosites. They could, however, by continuing thehaveCBM launch sites operational

B. Penetration Measures

decision to deployould force the Chinese towhich would giveetter chance to saturate or penetrate

US ABM defenses with limited numbers of ICBMs.


size cf the warhead of any solid propellant ICBM would increase the problem cf hardening itegree necessary to offer some protection against theystem. Wo have no basis, however, for makingestimates of the probable hardness of either system.

lA. China nay* also develop exoatmosphericalloons. The leadtime for the development and deployment cf such penetration aids would vary. But, in general, if development work on exoatmospheric decoys beganhey probably could be available3, when the full operational capabilityhinefense might he achieved. The development of an effective chaff system and of sophisticated, endo-atmospheric decoys would be difficult and probably could not be accomplished until some time

15. Multiple RVs that could be used on the first-generationight conceivably be available as early

Probably the best they could hope to achieve5 or so wouldystemarheads,

C. Regional Deterrent

16. We believe that the Chinese are already preparing toegional strike capability consisting of MRBMs and, possibly, medium jet bombers. The present status oflass diesel-powered ballistic missile submarine program is obscure. If the Chinese perceivedS ABM effort would nullify the deterrent value of their early ICBM, they might react by focusing their resources on enlarging and improving their

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regional force in the hope that they could threaten US cases near China as well as irtrportant cities of Asian allies of the US. If the Chinese chose this course, they would almost certainly view it as only an interim expedient while they worked on ways toredible threat against the continental US.

Missile Systems

IT* China has already builtlass submarine capable ofallistic missiles which couldange. But no such missile for this submarine has yet been detected. The Chinese probably couldaximumoats But these submarines would probably be able to fire only when on the surface, and the Chinese would have major problems in operating them far from their bases. Hence, these submarines will pose little threat to the US; their chief usefulness would be as partegional capability, and for training in preparation for later nuclear-powered models. China might be able touclear-powered submarine by the. Additional submarines might not be availableears after the comndssiofllmg and successful testing of the first unit.


18. Awareness of the US ABM potential may already have caused the Chinese to consider the development of more complex techniques such as


KXRVs and fractional orbital bombardment. We doubt, however, that any of these could be developed as effective weapons earlier thans.


19* Each of the responses discussed aboveaximum possible effort by the Chinese under optimum conditions. We think that suchare unlikely to prevail and that5 the Chinese ICEM program will show less quantitative and qualitative progress than postulated in Section III. For one thing, we believe that the Chinese will want fairly extensive SAM and MRBM programs, regardless of what the US does about HTKE-X. The Chinese vill probably also attempt to meet the continued requirements of the general purpose forces.

For these reasons, and because the Chinese stillimited scientific, technical, and Industrial base to support sophisticated research and developmentnd production, we doubt that the Chinese can respondarge-scale acceleration of their advanced weapons program during thes.

A likely Chinese jrrogram5 could include: (a) the deploymentf sufficient MRBMs simultaneously to threaten major cities and most US bases from Japan through the Philippines, southeast Asia, and northern India; (b) the deployment of first-generation ICBMs,

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beginning as early,ate veil belcv the postulated rawimumc) sane warhead hardening and sane relatively simple exoatiaospheTic penetration aids could be introduced

22. e doubt that the Chinese will be striving specificallyapability to saturate USefenses. In view of the requirements of other military programs and the pros euro on resources, we believe ICBM deployment will proceedoderate pace and wellaximum effort. By moderate, we mean that5 the number cfICBM launchers might fall somevhere between

23- robable Chinese responses depend heavily on the events of intervening years. If tho Chinese encounter major delays with solid propellants for ICBM ranges, deployment of the first-generation vehicle In soft sites might bo stopped up and deployment in hard sites initiated. More sophisticated penetration aids and further warhead hardening might also bo introduced.



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