I. PRODUCTION AND UTHJZATION OF FISSIONABLE
Relative Abundancend Plutonium
n. SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST
Testing and the Limiled Test Ban Treaty
Peaceful Uses ofplostvcs .
ILL DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Weapons Now in
Development to Dale Underunited Test Ban
Future Weapons Development (ind
IV. STORAGE AND CONTROL OP SOVIET NUCLEAR
V. NUCLEAR POWER AND PROPULSION PROGRAMS
Air and Space Application* .
SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAMS
To reviev/ significant recent developments in Soviet atomic energy programs and to estimate the probable course of those programs over theoears.
USSRarge stockpile ol nuclear weapons, inand variety to fulfill the basic requirements of theforces. We believe that the Soviets have now, or will Ik?develop under the Limited Test Ban Treaty, improvedfor new delivery systems which we estimate willover the next decade,
Soviets are probably well aware of tlte potential ofof radiation as kill mechanisms for nntiballistic missileand they can further investigate these phenomenaof underground testing and the use of simulationbelieve that Soviet design practices reduce the vulnerabilitywarheads to certain typesay damage, and considerabout even that the Soviets have already developed aX-ray warhead suitable for exoatmospheric use by thosystem. If they have not abeady duno so. they coulda weapon on the liasis of existing technology without violationLimited Test Ran Treaty.
Soviets appear to be approaching their planned capacityof fissionable materials. Wc estimate that annual ratesproduction will level off in the near future, and that these rates ofwill be sufficient to support foreseen Soviet weapons
i. PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS Production
Wc believe that ihe Soviet* are approaching their planned capacity for production of fissionable materials and that annual rates of production mill level off inuture. Facilities under construction whenstimate was published are now coining into operation. Current construction appears to be directed only toward completion of facilities started several years :igO; during the past two years we liave detected no new construction stiirts on majorfacilities.
he USSR has four large gaseous diffusion complexes for theof uranium enriched: at Verkh-Neyvinsk In the Urals, ut Tomsk in westernid ut Angarsk and Zaozemiy in central Siberia. We believe that all hut the Init ofre complete, and that Zooxeniiy will soon beWe liave no evidence that the Soviets are planning or constructing any additions to their capacity to. We estimate that, withof Zaorrmiy, annual Soviet productionrill level off atetric tonsoar.j
The use of new evidence and methodology has this year led us to revise our past estimates of both annual and cumulative productionn the USSR. Jn tbe past, we have based our estimates of tlie production at Soviet gaseous diffusion plant* primarily upon estimates of electric power usage and of plantWe have considered the estimates of electric power inputs to beaccurate, but considerable uncertainty has been attached to theof plant efficiencies. Our judgments on the latter have, in large measure, been extrapolated from information provided by Connnn returnees In the. Wc have postulated Improvement since tlutt time, but our margins of error (minusercent, plusercent) have allowed for the possibility that little improvement hns taken place, or, conversely, that the improvement lias been considerably greater than wc have estimated.
Recent information has. however, permitted another approach to the estimateroduction, which has helped toower limit. Thissuggests that Soviet productioaay he substantially below our previous esttmatm Insed on power and efficiency calculations. On the other hand, it is unlikely to support an estimate of prodiK-tirm significantly above our nasl estimates of the most probable cumulative production.
We have expressed these judgments inyange for cumulative productiontuch uses, as the high end of the range, our
past estimates of the most probable production based on power and efficiency and, as the low end of tlie range, two-thirds of this Egure, We think it unlikely that production is substantially outside this range.
e think it unlikely that efficiencies would be any less In the fulure lhan It Implied by the low side of the estimaten the other hand efficiencies may improve10those implied by the high side of the estimate. Within the efficiency ranges implied, our estimates of future
ESTIMATED CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION AND AVAILABILITY OF FISSIONABLE MATERIA IA
Plutonium Eootvaumt 1
* IrtcludcaJxith ptutonnim ond tritium jOng kilogram of plutoniuni Is eiruivalent tii 12
1 The upper end of the range represents production utilising efficiencies as estimated in pint rtutrc,light allowance lor Increases tn efficiencies hy lhei. The loner end il th* nnvg* represent! production utilirtng town efficiency than hawUirnalnd Inyears,onsistent with interpretations of new data. (Seeheihui reflects different methodologies and assumptions. Wc haw no good Imsft fosost probable single figure within Out range.
'Cumulative production,roduction and reworking pipeline estimated to beereent of cumulative production, andsed in the text program and in power, impulsion, and research reactors.
"These ranges represent limits within which we think tho true valueigure midway between the top and the bottom of the range I* die most probable.
' Cumulative production,roduction and reworking pipeline estimated to boercent af cumulative production, and less plutonhim equivalent used ill weapons tests und lost through tritium decay.
produeiionrc based on assumed full power operation of all existing production facilities, but no construction of additional facilities.
Plutonium Equivalentlie USSR lias large reactor complexes at Kyshtym In the Urals and at Tomsk in western Siberia. There isarge multipurpose nuclear complex at Dodonovo, north of Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia, which, wc believe, has one or more reactors InstalledWe believe another reactor at Tomsk is nearing completion and will probably be in operation next year; we have no evidence of construction of new reactors designed for production of plutonium. We believe that any additional increases in plutonium production capacity will therefore come from power reactors.
Wc continue to believe that the best estimate for cumulative Sovietof plutonium equivalent through mid-lSSO Is that
ffven in TABLE
mlf irhd-UJbV estimate of
cumulativeone year, and repre-
ange ofercent above andentral figure.
of future production assume the completion of the reactorand of those nuclear power and propulsion reactors that we estimate willover the nexte have no evidence of the constructionproduction reactors, Our estimates assume no suchthey do assume continued operation of existing production reactors.
nil cumulative production of fissionable materials is .in weapons,The principal nonweapons uses for use in propulsion systemssubmarines, and in other power, propulsion, and research reactorsuranium enriched. [
] in addition, the SovietJpst program has used, and will continue to
use,nd pIutonium.MWe believe that these nonweapons uses and losses do not now amount to more than about five percent of the total cumula-
or discussion nl such reactors.
tive production of Soviet fissionable materials, but they have to be consiuVrici in esliinales of the amounts nf fissionable materials available in weapons^B
Other quantities of flttionnhlc materials which are in pipeline, or which are in weapons withdrawn from stockpile for quality control or reworking, are also not available for weapons use. We have no information on Soviet practice in these areas, but US experience indicates that tlie amounts involvedignificant. In estimating the fissionable materials available for weapons, wc have assumed that (in addition to non weapons uses and tritium decay) aboutercent of total cumulative production will be involved in pipeline, reworking, and quality control checks at any given time, and therefore will not be available in weapons in stockpile.
The estimates of the amount ofnd plutonium equivalent in weapons in stockpile shown inake the foregoing considerations Into account.
Relative Abundancend Plutonium Equivalent
f>iuii ratios are
'not unusual Dot mere arc apparent inconsistencies when tliey Br considered in.
ic inn insistencies appear to bo in the direction, particularly
In future years,arger relative quantityvailable than appears necessary for foreseeable requirements.
lnconsiitcncles suggest (a) that our estimates of availability ofmaterials may be incorrect; (b) that our assumptions regarding theof fissionable materiah to stockpile weapons may be incorrect;roduction capacities, planned years ago, may no longer bechanging requirements; or (d) that some combination of errors in theand assumptions Involved has led to tlie appearance of andoes not actually exist. The answer mayombination of theseOn the other hand the Soviets may haveequirementhave not recognized.
II. SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST PROGRAMS Test Activity
Soviets have been slowly but steadily increasing tho pace andthrir underground nuclear test program since tho Limited Test Baninto effect3
7 underground tests2nd
Increasing, fromilotons (kl).etnd In addition to theests deteetedhe Soviets
b tcsti io farho maximum yields of Ihe devices tesled been
ince tlie Memorandum to Holders of. Tne Soviet Atomic Energyatede have judgedeismic event equating tot. which occurred on0 near Axgir north of the Caspian, was of nuclear origin. In addition, we now estimate that the previously reported linttlo test at Semipalatinskay iOOQ was in fact 2
in timeeconds and in distance byilometers. These tests.
then, are listed In TABLE II. Undcr-
testing will probably continue.
SOVIFT UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS7
Kitimalrd Mi* I
7 Sep 6
... ct 0
linvctl to have been for peaceful puruoii'*.
' Located4 km from thr preceding test and detonatediomfehuwn* pinhibly, al leail In part, for peaceful purpom.
Testing and the Limited Test Bon Treaty
l^bris from (he shots at Novaya Zemlya onnd at Semipalallnsk on6 was collected outside the territorial limits of the USSR; debris possibly from the test of6 has also been collected. In addition to these instances, at least two earlier tests conducted by the Soviets since the Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed have also released debrk identifiable beyond the borders of the USSR. This reeoid leads us to believe that the Soviets have run considerable risks of putting debris in tlie atmosphere which could be detected outside tlie USSR, and that the number of such occasions has increased in the post year.
Although Soviet military leaders are probably pressingore vigorous lusting program, we do not lielievo that military requirements will become so urgent as to cause the Soviets to withdraw from the Treaty or to resume atmospheric testing in the neare lielleve, rather, that they will continue deliberately to testanner that, in some cases, exceeds the US interpretation of die limits of tlie Trealy. However, should they elect to break the Treaty by resuming atmospheric testing, intelligence .sources would have only very limited capability to provide advance notice.
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives
scientist?4 showed interest in tin- US Plowshareit with US scientists, and indicated tliat they were consideringof nuclear explosives in the USSR. Starting inuchuir tests primarily for peaceful purposes and 2may belong, at least in part, in the peaeeftil uses category.n addition, we believe tliry Live derived valuablethe use of kilotonofexplosives formining projects, and from nuclear weapon tests al tbe Semirialannsktest site.
of tin- six tests mentioned above may have been connected wilhto explore the capabilities of nuclear explosives for construction.probably also provided Information on shock and earth movementmissile silo vulnerability and to peaceful nuclear exploslvm projectsearby structures couldroblem.
'See paragraphi xm7 lor tlitcuujcn oi military re*|ulroiiniU.
Three of the peaceful uses tests appear to have involved application of underground nuclear explosives to problems associated with the petroleumTests at Ufa innd Azgir inere probably attempts to stimulate production of oil or gasepleted fieldew field, respectively. Tlie Soviets6 kt underground detonation near Karshi ino snuffarge gas well fire that had lieen burning for about Oiree years.
These tests indicate that the Soviets are quite sophisticated in theirfor peaceful uses of nuclear explosives and that this is an area in which the Soviets lead the world in some applications. They have not chosen to disclose their tests or their results publicly, but they probably can estimate reasonably well the extent of our knowledge of their program. We believe the USSR has much to gain from peaceful uses of nuclear explosives and that the program will continue. We cannot judge when or under what conditions the Soviets may sec fit to publicize their program.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Weapons Now in Stockpile
Weapons. Until the signing of the Limitedhe Soviets had,uclear test program ofeveloped nuclear weaponsariety of designs and sizes,have yields ranging from fractionsiloton up to ICOSoviets have emphasized the development of mnltimegatonweapons, rather than relatively small, light weight weapons of lowerhave achieved high thermonuclear performance in the multimcgatonbased on12 lest series probably began tofor the Soviet strategic attack systemsnd haveproduced in sufficient quantities since then to meet most of tlieof these forces.
ission Wcaponi^Thc Soviet fission weapons program lias been directed toward development offclmblc, efficient, ami economic devices, f"
esult olests, the Soviets were able to developin the, low klloton and nossihlv subltiloton range, to reducediametcrs|
Most of the newer lissiOn weapons entering theoviet general pur-pose and air defense forces gjjer the past few years have probably been these Improved low-yield weapons.
Development to Date Under the Limited Test Ban Treaty
t Is now more than four years since the Soviets lost tested in the|
The number ot underground tests and their associated yields Soviets could have made advances In weapons ranging in yieldsew kt upew MT. However, wc cannot determine specifi-
cally what has brcii accomplished and what impact these tests might have-upon future weapons capabilities.
hctmonuelrcrr Weapons Sincemiled Test Ban Trraly. tbe Soviets have rondiutVri four tests int range which wc believe were related to tests of TN weapons. Anotlver test in this yield range was probably associatedeaceful nuclear explosive experiment, but Mime weapons de-velopmcnl data could have been obtained from it. The yieldsarge number of the remaining Soviet underground tests fall betweenndt. Many ol these were probably TN development levi*t does not appear to us lhat' the Sovietsetirement for extensiveclopmcnt ofh-yiekl fission systems at this time.
the Moscow ABM systenj^lncy are probably well aware of tlte
x-licvc that tlte chances are about even that ihe Soviets have de-warhead suitable for csoatmosphcric use by
various forms of radiation as kill mechanisms for ABM application.
pTicy could have furtherthis subject hi their underground testing.
have no direct evidence of specific Soviet ellorls lo harden theiragaiust nuclear effects, hut we believe that Soviet warheadreduce the vulnerability of their warheads to certain types ofIn their past test programs, they have gained considerableblast and thermal effects. In their high altitude testst the Sary Shagan test center, they also gulned considerableradar blackout phenomena and possibly some limited informationthe effects of radiation on antimissile guidance systems and nuclear
Weapons. Improvement in fission weapons,)
Jcoulrt have occurred since l'Jfri. umber ol Soviet tests since thei' the Limited Test Ban Treaty have been in
0 let ranged
| some Ol tftcse ipsis prooaniyimprovements in fission weaponsrlicularly in reducing diameters and developing special effects warheadsj
They might also be developing small hssion weapons lor atomic
Future Weapons Development and Requirements
nder Current Treaty Conditions. The Soviets could probably test upew megatons under the current Limited Test Ban Treaty, and thus could probably meet any present or future weapon deveksprnent requirements except for full-scale systems tests and tesiiew megatons. We believe that they could make significant advances in the subrnegaton and low megaton range of TN weapons. Thisield range In which they appear toajor requirement for unproved warlieads for new strategic missile delivery systems and possibly for multiple warhead application.
They could also test the response
various energy levelsimulated
of various materialsays at environment, and conduct
ests of fission devices will probably be directed toward further reductions in size and welghtllf thereoviet requirement for small diameteror use In tube artillery, the Soviets could probably develop
Jit lead to wenp
lor exoalmospherlc intereept^j
one of the strongest Soviet weapons developmentin the area of high altitude effects of nuclear weapons and tlte responselo those effects. We believe that earlier Soviet high altitudehighly sophisticated in their missile involvement and proliahly wellrd. lacked the characteristics of tests designed to give detailedwarhead kill mechanisms. The Soviets probably also need mornIhe effects of ground shock and electromagnetic pulse from highsurface hursts. They would probably like to conduct an ABM vs.test to refine the hlackoul data gatherednd Ineffectiveness of an exoatmospherlc Intercept system.
IV. STORAGE AND CONTROL OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS Storage
Soviet nuclear weapons storage Includes two general classes of storage sites: national reserve stockpile facilities, and operational storage sites :it military bases in direct support of military operations. National reserve stockpile sites are eharaeterlicd by Isolation, extreme security, hardened bunkers, and self-sufficiency in housing and service support. Tlie operational military storage sites associated with military bases are usually located apart from other base facilities and are characterized by stringent physical security ineasures. Their design has been different in each stage of lhe stockpile program; most of the ear Ikt sites have been modified by lite additiontunker of more recent design. In the event of war, the initial needs of Soviet forces for nuclear weapons would be met by the operational storage sites. Tho national reserve stockpile Installations are intended to provide strategic reserve and direct support to the Operational sites. Some national sites arc located near the borders and could provide- direct support to Soviet forces In (he area. In addition to the weapons stared at these locations, we believe that sizable numbers of nuclear weapons are deployed with certain operational forces. Including the Strategic Rocket Forces, mUsile-equippcxl surface ships, and missile submarines.
Sensitive Operations Complexes. There arerge, sdf-eontairted. highly secured, military installations located throughout the European USSR which wc call Sensitive Operations Complexesach complex hai extensive railroad and motor transport facilities and extensive operations and support
areas.iave been under construction since ihehe first prob-ably becameon.nl in (In-lie rail and rail-toioad transfer facilities and high degree of security at the SOCs lead us to believe that one function of the SOCs may be nuclear weapons storage. On the other kind, the extensive operations and support arms nr ihr SOCs indicates that they perforin operations In addition to nucsear weapons storage, and that these additional activities may, in fact, be an important purpose of the SOCs. some ofctivities may be missile associated.
functions of these complexes remain unclear. We believe thatof the purpose of the SOCs Is ihat they are rear area storagebases for the support nf operational forces. In (his rule (livya number of Soviet nuclear missile delivery systems, providingretrofit, and repair of nuclcni weapons and other critical items.and spacing is such that they could give support to Soviet frontsthe main approaches to the European USSR from the West.
We believe that decisions on tin- deployment and use of nuclear weapons are made by the Politbureau of the CI'SU, and implemented through theHigh Command and the Ministry ofugh level authority within the Ministry of Defense serves as executive agent for the Minister in the Operation and control of the nuclear weapons logistics system. We liave no evidencew operational nuclear warheads on ready missiles on land or at sea are controlled, but some form of authentication system or use of permissive links in weapons is probably used toigh degree of control.
Although the non-Soviet forces of the Warsaw Pact have nuclear capable delivery systems, we believe that the USSR has not furnished nuclear weapons to these countries, and that any nuclear weaponsay be located In Warsaw Pad countries are under strict Soviet control.
V. NUCLEAR POWER AND PROPULSION PROGRAMS
research on nuclear power and propulsion reactors hasfairly wide spectrum of reactor, IhiI development has conceitlrati*dpressure-tube superheat, and fast-breeder types.military applications of these reactors have, however, suffered fromchemical and metaDurgical engineering. Moreover, limitedof components under operational conditions, dictated by attemptsscheduled goals, has often tended to degrade operationalan attempt to overcome these problems, Soviet reactor research nowutilize existing reactors in extensive materials testing programs, ratherexplore new reactor concepts.
Nuclear Electric Power
The Soviet nuclear power program announced6 called for electric generating capacity0 megawatts (mw) in nuclear power stationsrogress toward this goal has, however, been extremely slow, and the program has been extensively modified. Two power plants in the originalBeloyarsk anda total capacity at present ofw went into operation at lull powerSee TABU?nw of generating equipment has been installed to utilize heat from the Tomsk plutonium production reactors. With other plants, the Soviets now havew of nuclear generating capacity. Additional reactors under construction for several years at Tomsk, Beloyarsk, and Novovoronczh will probably be completed, and addw of generating capacity. Tlie Soviets expect tow fast breeder reactora dual purpose power generation and desalination facility at Shevchenko on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, but wc believe that the state of Soviet fast reactor and desalination technology' is such that theywill not be able to meet this deadline, and that Soviet nuclear generating capacity therefore probably will notw until the.
Ttie Sovietsrogram to develop and deploy packagednuclear power stations. One such station went into operation at Melekesstation is being constructed at Bilibino on the Chukotskiy Peninsula which will probably become operational ineriod. We have no evidence of further developmentWc pressurized-waternuclear power plant, which went into operation at Obninsk
The long stretch-out of the Soviet nuclear electric power program as originally announced has been due both to technological problems encountered and the economic costs involved. Construction costs of nuclear power stationsimes the cost of comparable thermal power stations. The Soviets have apparently decided toemporary lialt in the construction of new nuclear power stations, and to await operational data from the Shevchenko reactor and the second units of the power stations at Beloyarsk and Novovoronczh before planning new construction. The Soviets arc also giving some thought to the designw pressure-tube type reactor similar to the oneut Beloyursk andarge new fast reactor, but wc do not expect these proposals to be realized before the. It seems likely, tlterefore, that it will be theefore the Soviets move much beyondw now foreseen, and that nuclear electric power stations will continue to account for less than one percent of Soviet electric power generating capacity. This slow pace leads us to believe that the Soviet nuclear electric power program does not nowery important place in Soviet plans for powerover the next decade. Several European programs are somewhat larger, and planned US nuclear generating capacity far exceeds this level.
Location and Type Beactun
SOVIET NUCLEAH POWER STATIONS
Full power in
Wam/Wahr Prrmun. ntvael Similar to 1
wi'if#rtmr*tal Few Ct-lu-
2 MW* cadi
Tutreactor (BORJ Organic/Organic Packaged power reactor
Full power 4
' HWe capacity ol Ilm electric power generating npilpmciil In tncgftwMtf of electric power. MWt: capacity iJ the reactor In megawatt* of thermal power.Part of ihoetnlmalion plant.
Notwithstanding these problems, the Soviets during the latter half6 signed agreements with Hungary and Bulgaria tow pressurized -water nuclear power stations, each containing two reactor units of the type being built at Novovoronezh. Ino eonstruet the saroe type of nuclear power station was submitted to Finland. During the past year, tbe Soviets did place In operation at llheinsberg in East0 mw pres-surized-watcr nuclear power station, that had lieen under constructionw station at Bohunicc in Czechoslovakia, started at the same time, will probably not be operatingonsidering past Sovietwe believeoviet bid to enter lite world power market, ifn fact made, Is not likely to meet with great Immediate success.
Safeguards. Tlie Soviets probably have imposed safeguards on theto which they gave nuclear assistance. The bilateral agreement under which theyeactor to Yugoslavia contained provisionsafe-gujrdi protocol, but thn lias not bttslsate of small research reactors provided to such countries as the UAR andtbe nuclear fuel was sold outright. However, the contracts do restrict those countries from pasting the fuels, documentation, or anyhird country. In the case of the large power reactors provided to Chechoslovakia and Eiist Germany, it was stipulated thai Ihe fuel was to be returned to the USSR.
Tlie early nuclear propulsion systems in the icebreaker Lenin and in nuclear submarines encountered major problems and proved unreliable. The Lenin was laid up during6 navigation season but the main problems apparently were related to hull structure. It may not yet be operational. Our evidence indicates that theany of the nuclear submarines have been overcome through extensive overhauls. Thus Soviet nuclear submarines are now sufficiently reliable to conduct regular long-duration patrols without surface ship support, and we expect to see increasing numbers of them on station.
No new classes of nuclear submarines have appeared in tlie Soviet fleetnd only one of the three original dosses Is still beingE-II cruise missile submurine. Wc estimate that at least one new class of nuclear submarine is now under construction; weew ballistic missile submarine will probably enter the fleete estimate that the Soviets arc alsoa new attack class which could become operational at about the same time. We have no information regarding the nuclear reactor to be used in the new classes of submarines, but we expect tbat it wiDingle pressurized-water reactor of the same general type as that employed in earlier nibmarines- It will probablyonger service Ufa, and provide the new submarines withreliability and performance.
Air and Space Applications
Aircraft Propulsion. We do not believe that (lie Soviets lire activelyin developmentropulsion system suitable for nuclear-poweredThere is however continuing Soviet materials research which could be applicable torogram. Even if the Soviets nowrogram under way, sve believeilitarily useful nuclear powered aircraft could not be operadonal during at least the next five years, and probably not during the term of tliis estimate.
Rocket Propulsion. The Soviets have investigated the boric materials problems connecteduclear rocket and probably have developedmaterials. They have followed tho progress of the US Hover nuclear rocket program, and may he undertaking developmental work iu this field. We do not anticipate that the Soviets will develop an operational nuclear racket within the next decade.
Space Propulsion. Tlie Soviets have also shown considerable interest in electric propulsion systems for space applications. However, such systemsuclear power source are still in an early stage of development, and are probably atecade away from becoming operational.
Nuclear Aux&iatij Power Supply. The Soviets are actively engaged in the development of nuclear auxiliary power supplies forpacecraft. They are exploring all the major energy conversion systems, including thermoelectric*nd tiirboelectric generators. Wc believe, however, that they will not he able to develop an operational nuclear auxiliary power supplv of sufficient power to support space exploration before the.
* Thermoelectric conversion it uwl to produce directly small amounts of electricity (rom the heat cf radioisotopes, using two materials in ibe dtermocoiiple In which application of heallow of electricity.
'Thermionic conssirslon produces electricity directly from hi-at by ihcrmal emission ofwhkh in streamingathode to an nnudeacuum produce nn electric current.
' Macitetdiydrodyitamtc conversion produced electricity by passing an ionived gai. at ex-ticmely high temperature.agnetic field.