Created: 6/15/1967

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible




W. TofdeJIa, (or the Director. Notional Security Agency hm"

. 't-' *V-rown, the Assistant General Mcrrvoger, Atomic Energy ceavriuion v

Villlomrcgar, for the Assistant Direct or. Federal Bureau ofhe subject being outside of his Jurisdiction.






RelaUwi 0


Test Activity fl

Testing and dm Limited Test Ban Treaty y

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Eaplosives


Weapons Now in Stockpile g

Development to Date Under the Limilcd Test BanH

Future Weapons Development andH




Nuclear Electric Power H


Air and Space17

top sccuct



To review significant recent developments in Soviet atomic energy programs and to estimate the probable course of those program* over theoears.


USSRarge stockpile of nuclear weapons, inand variety to fulfill the basic requirements of theforoes. Wo believe that the Soviets have now. or will bedevelop under the Limited Test Han Treaty, improvedfor new delivery systems which we estimate willover the next decade.

believe that the Soviets have already developed afor exoatrnospheric use by the Moscow ABM system. Ifnot already done so, they could developeapon onof exisling technology without violation of the Limited Test

Soviets appear to be approaching their planned capacityof fissionable materials. Wc estimate that annualproduction will level off in the near future, and that these rateswill be sufficienl to support foreseen Soviet weapons

he Soviets probably will continue to test nuclear devices undergroundanner that, in some cases, exceeds the USof the limits of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. We do not believe that military requirements will cause them to rasumetesling in the near future. Should they cloet to resume atmos-



ating, however, intelligence sources would have only very limited capability to provide advance notice.

believe (hat the engineering problems formerlySoviet marine propulsion reactors have been overcome, andclasses of nuclear submarines now under construction willhave increased reliability. We do not anticipate that theachieve within the nextuclearuclearsystem,ilitarily useful nuclear-poweredbelieve that they will not be able to develop an operationalauxiliary power supply of sufficient power to support spacebefore the.

Soviets are moving forwardrogram forof nuclear explosives, and probably lead the world in someWe do not expect nuclear electric power to occupy aplace in Soviet plans for power production over lhe




believe that the Soviet* are approaching their planned capacityof Bssionablc materia II and lhat annual rates of production willin Ihe future. Facilities under construction when our last estimateare now coming into operation. Current construction appearsdirected only toward completion of facilities started several years ago;past two years we have detected no new cocrstrucrion starts on ma forfacilities.

he USSR has lour large gaseous diffusion complexes for theof uranium enriched; at Verkh-Neyvinsk In the Urals, at Tomsk in western Sllwria. and at Angarsk and Zaozemiy in central Siberia. We believe that all but the last of these are complete, and that Taorcmiy will soon beWe have no evidence lhat the Soviets are planning or constructing any additions to ibeir capacity to. We estimate that, withof Zaoietniy. annual Soviet product woill level off atetric tonsear.

The use oi new evidence and methodology has this year led us to revise our past estimates ol both annual and cumulative productionn the USSR, In the past, we have based our evlimates of the production at Soviet gaseous diffusion plants primarily upon estimates of electric power usage and of plantWe have considered tlie estimates of electric power inputs to beaccurate, but considerable uncertainty has been attached lo theof plantOur rudgmenis oo the biter have, la large measure, been extrapolated from information provided by German returnees in tbee havr postulated improvement since lhat time, but our margins of error (minusercent, plusercent) have allowed forpossibility that little improvement has taken place, or, conversely, that Ihe improvement has been considerably greater than wc have cvtiraated.

Recent ^formation has. however, permitted another approach lo tlie estimateroduction, which has helped toower limit. Thissuggests lhat Soviet productionay be substantially below our previous estimates based on power and efficiency calculations. On the other hand, it is unlikely lo support an estimate ol production MrmitVatitly above our past estimates ol the most probable cumulative production.

We hove espiesscd these Judgments inyange for cumulative productionhich uses, as the high end of the range, our


past estimates of the most probable production hosed on powerxncy and. as the low end of the range, two-thirds of this figure Wc think it unlikely lhat production is substantially outside this range,

e think it unlikely lhat efficiencies would be any less in the future than is implied by the low side of Ihe estimaten Ilie other hand efficiencies may improve10those implied by the high side of the estimate. Within the efficiency ranges implied, our estimates of future productionrc based on assumed full power operation ol all existing production facilities, but no construction of additional facilities.





Plutonium Equivalenthe USSR hat luge reactor complexesKyshtym in the Dials and at Tomsk in western Siberia.arge multipurpose nuclear com pica atnorth ot* Kiasnoyatsk in central Siberia, which, we believe, has one or more react on installedWe believe another reactor at Tomsk is nearing completion and will probably bo in opeiauoo next year, we have no evidence of construct ion of new reactors designed for production of plutonium. We believe that any additional increases in plutonium production capacity will therefore come from power reactors.

We believe that cumulative Soviet production of plutonium equivalent throughs as given in TABLEhese figuresange ofercent above andentral figure. Ourstimate ofproductionange ofercent above andentral figure.

Estimates of future production assume the completion of the reactor at Tomsk and of those nuclear power and propulsion reactors that we estimate will be completed over the neate have no evidence of the construction of additional production reactors. Our estimates assume no such construction, but they do assume continued operation of esasting production reactors.


all cumulative production of fissionablen weapons,The principal noawraponi uses for use in propulsion systemssubmarines, and in Other power, piopulsion. and research reactors uranium enriched in

lln addition, Ihe Soviet test program has used, and will continue to use,nd plutonium. We believe thai these nonweapons uses and losses do not now amount to more than about five percent of the totalpioduction of Soviet fissionable materials, but they liave to be considered in estimates of the amounts of fissionable materials available In weapons.

Oilier quantities of fissionable materials which are in pipeline, or which arc in weapons withdrawn from stockpile for quality control or reworking, ate also not available for weapons use. In estimating the fisskmahlo materialsfor weapons, we have assumed lhat (in addition to nonweapons uses and tritium decay) aboutercent of total cumulative production will be involved in pipeline, reworking, and quality control checks at any given time, andwill not be available in weapons in stockpile

Tho estimates of the amount ofnd plutonium equivalent in weapons in stockpile shown inake tbe foregoing cnnsideiatuuis into account.

'Vr puagtiplu6 lor dimmnn of mcfc reactors.

Relative Abundancend Plutonium Equivalent

ratios arc

not ununial but there arc apparent inconsistencies when they are considered in terms oflj

jThe Inconsistencies appear to be in the direction, particularly in future years,arger relative quantityvailable than appears necessary for foreseeable requirements.

inconsistencies suggest (a) that our estimates of availability ofmaterials may be incorrect; (b) that our assumptions regarding theof fissionable materials to stockpile weapons may be incorrect;roduction capacities, planned years ago, may no longer bochanging requirements; or (d) that some combination of errors in theand assumptions involved has led to the appearance of andoe* not actually exist. Tlie answer mayombination of theseOn the other hand the Soviets may haveequirementhave not recognized.


Soviets have been slowly but steadily iiicrearing the pace andtheir underground nuclear test program since the Limited Test Baninto effectfJ"

J7 underground tests2ndn

J5 tests so far The maximum yields of the devices tested have also been morcasing, fromilotoos (kt)lt In addition to theests detectedhe Soviets ^ad previouslynderground tests in1 and

the Memorandum to Holders oflheatedc have judgedeismicto about fi kt, which occurred on6 near Azgir northCaspian, was of nuclear origin. In addition, we now estimate thatreported single test at Semipalatinsk6 was in facttime byeconds and in distance byilometers.imce then, are listed in TABLE II.tciting will probably continue.

iaihj: ii


Kitunaled Mow

lOEV*ld (It)




T May



5 Aug


fll*ep 5



2lfl ct eOQ

220 ee







it'tu are believed lo have been (or peaceful puipotet.

Locatedm from the preceding Int and detonated

ThU lot wu probably, at leail in pail, for peaceful puipraa

Testing and the limited Test Ban Treaty

Debns from Ihe shots at Novayannd at Scmipalatinsk on6 was collected outside the lerrlloiial limits of (he USSR; debris possibly from (he tost of0 has also been collected. In addition to these instances, ul least (wo earlier tests conducted by (he Soviets since (he Limi(ed Test Hanas signed have abo released debris Identifiable beyond (he borders of (he USSR. This record leads us to bclteve tliat the Soviets have run considerable risks of pulling debris in the atmosphere which could be detected outside the USSR, and that the number of such occasions has increased in the past year.

Although Soviet military leaders are probably pressingore vigorous testing program, we do not believe that military requirements will become so urgent asause (he Soviets lo withdraw from (he Treaty or to resume atmospheric testing in the neare believe, rather, thai they will continue dcLbcrately to testanner that, in some cases, exceeds the US interpretation of the limits of the Treaty. However, should (hey elect to break the Treaty by resuming atmospheric testing, intelligence sources would have oidy very limited capability to provide advance noticef

'Seeor rirrriieston ofecuueraecti


Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosive*

oviet scientists4 showed interest in the US Plowshare program, discussed it with US scientists, and indicated that they were considering peaceful uses of nudcar explosives in the USSR. Starting inhe Soviets haveuclear tests primarily for peaceful purposesthers that may belong, at least in part, in the peaceful uses category. Three weren addition, we believe they have derived valuable data from the use of kiloton amounts of conventional explosives for coostructioii and mining projects, and from nuclear weapon tests at the Semipalatiiislctest site.

Three of the six tests mentioned above may have been connectedrogram to explore the capabilities of nuclear explosives for construction. These tests probably also provided information on shod and earth movement appficable to rnissile silo vulnerability and to peaceful nuclear explosiveshich damage to nearby structures couldroblem.

Three of the peaceful uses tests appear to have involved application of underground nudcar explosives to problems associated with the petroleumTests al Ufa innd Azgir inere probably attempts to stimulate production of oil or gasepleted fieldew ti<-H. respecfivdy. The Soviets6 kt underground dctonaoon near Karshi ino snuffarge gas well Ere that had been burning for about three years.

These tests indicate that the Sennets are quite sophisticated in their pro gram for peaceful uses of nuclear explosives and that this is an area in wtudi the Soviets lead the world itt somehey have not chosen lo disclose their tests or their results publtdy, but they probably can estimate teasonably well the extent of our knowledge of their jirogram. We believe (he USSR has much to gain from peaceful uses of nuclear explosives and that the program will continue. Wc cannot judge when or under what(he Soviets may see fit lo publicize their program.


ncrrnonuclear Weapons. Until ihc signing of the Limited Test Run Treatyhe Soviets had,uclear test program of almostests duration, developed nudcar weaponsariety of designs and sizes, which could have yields ranging from fractionsiloton upegatons.

The Soviets have emphasized Ihc development of mullimegalonweapons, rather than relatively small tight weight weapons of lowerIiavc achieved high thermonuclear performance in the mulufncgatonbased on12 test scries probably began tofor the Soviet strategic attack systemsnd haveproduced in sufficient quantities since then to meet most of elseof these forces

usion Weapems. The Soviel fission weapons program has beendevelopment of leliable, cmeienr, and cconotnic devices. Asests, the Soviets were able to develop fission weapons inLiloton and possibly subblofon range and probably to reduceweights and duuneteis. Most of the newer fission weapons enteringfor Soviet general purpose and air defense forces over the pasthave probably been these improved low-yield weapons

Development to Dote Under the Limited Test Bon Treaty

phScC " bcthe atrnos-


The number ot* underground testi and (heir associated yields Soviets could have made advances In weapons ranging in yieldsow let upew MT. However, we cannot determinewhat has been actxwnplished and what impact these tests might have upon future weapons capabilities.

ltermonuclear Weapons. Since the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Soviets have conducted lour tests int range which we ben eve were related to tests of TN weapons. Another test in this yield range was probably associatedeaceful nuclear explosive experiment, but some weaponsdata could have been obtained from it. Tito yieldsarge number of tlie remauung Soviet underground tests fall betweenndt. To the degree that they have been successful In their underground testing, the Soviets could have in stockpile within the next few years improved TN weapons Int range

We believe that the Sovirts have alreadyarhead suitable, for exoatmuse by the Moscow ABM system. If they have not already done so, they could developeapon on the basis of existing technology without violation of the Umited Test lian Treaty.

We have no direct evidence of specific Soviet efforts to harden their nuclear warheads against nuclear effects. In their past test piograms, they have gained considerable experience with blast and thermal effects Thereossibility that in their high altitude tests. conducted at the Sary Shagan test center, they also gained some limited inlortnation relating to tlie effects of radiation on antuTiissile guidaivee systems and nuclear weapons components.

Weapons. Improvement in fission weapons!

Tennld have occurredumber of Soviet tests since the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty have been in0 kt range;[

ome of those tests probablyimprovements in fission weapons technology.^

jThey might also be developing small fission weapons lor atomic demoutions.

Future Weapons Development and Requirements

nder Current Treaty Comlitions. The Soviets could probably test upew megatons under the current Limited Test Ban Treaty, and thus could probably meet any present or future weapon development requirements except

for full-scale systems tests and testsew megatons. We believe tliat could make significant advances in the submegaton and low megaton range of TN weapons. Thisield range in whicb tlvey appear toajor rrxruirerncnt for unproved warheads for new strategic missile delivery systems and possibly for multiple warhead application. They could also test the response of various materialsays at various energy levelsimulated exoatmos-phcric environment.

Tests of fission devices will probably bo directed toward further reductions in size and weight. If thereoviet requirement for small diameter weapons,or use in tube artillery, (he Soviets could probably develop one

Under Unrestricted Testing. If the Soviets were to resume unrestricted testing, they might be able to achieve over the next decade yield/weight ratios in completely new designs which might lead to weapons usable for exoatmosphcric intercept.

Probably one of the strongest Soviet weapons development requirements is in the area of high altitude effects of nuclear weapons and the response of materials to those effects. We believe (hat earlier Soviet high altitude tests, while highly sophisticated in their missile involvement and probably welllacked the characteristics of tests designedive detailed information on warhead kill mechanisms. The Soviets probably also need more information about Ihe effects of ground shock and dectromagnetic puke from high yield, near surface bursts. They would probably like to conduct an ABM vs. ICBM system lestmprove (he effectiveness of an exoatmospheric intercept system.


nuclear weapons storage includes two general classes ofnational reserve stockpile facilities, and operational storage sites alin direct support of military operations. National reserve stockpilecharacterized by isolation, extreme security, hardened bunkers, andin housing and service support. The operational militaryassociated with military bases arc usually located apart from otlierand areby stringen( physical security measures.has been different in each stage of (he stockpile program; most ofsites have been modified by the additionunker of moreln the event of war, the Initial needs of Soviel forces forwould be met by the operational storage sites. The nationalinstallations are intended to provide strategic reserve and directthe operational sites. Some national sites are located near the bordersprovide direct support to Soviet forces in the area. In addition tosloicd at these locations, we believe tha( sizable numbers ofare deployed with certain operational forces, including ihcForces, missile-equipped surface ships, and missile submarines.

Operationsheie arearge, sd(-contained,miliUry installations located throughoutopcaii USSR whichSensitive Operations Complexesach complex hasand motor transport facilities and extensive operations andThey have been under construction since tbe; tbe firstbecame operational In thes. The rail and rail to-madand high degree of security at tho SOCs lead us to believe thatof the SOCs may be nuclear weapons storage. On the other hand,operations and support areas at the SOCs Indicate that theyin addition to nuclear weapons storage, and that thesemay, in fact, be an impoitant purpose of the SOCs: some ofmay be missile associated.

functions of these complexes remain unclear. Wc believe thatof the purpose of the SOCs is that they are rear area storagebases for the supportcrational forces. In this role theya number of Soviet nuclear missile deliveiy systems, providingretrofit, and repair of nuclear weapons and other critical items.and spacing is such that they could give support toootsthe main approaches to tlte European USSR from the West.


e believe that decisions on the deployment and use of nudear weapons are made by the Politburo of the CPSU, and implemented through theHigh Command and the Ministry ofigh level authority within the Ministry of Defense serves as executive agent for the Minister in the operation and control of the nudear weapons logistics system We have no evidence concerning how operational nuclear warheads on ready missiles on land or at sea arc controlled, but some form of authentication system or use of permissive links in weapons is probably used toigh degree of control.

3S. Although the non-Soviet forces of the Warsaw Pact have nudcar capable delivery systems, wc bdievc that the USSR has not furnished nuclear weapons to these countries, and thai any nuclear weapons which may be located in Warsaw Pact countries are under strict Soviet control.


oviet lesearch on nuclear power and propulsion reactors hasairly wide spectrum of reactor types, but development has concentrated on pressurized-water, pressure-tube superheat, and fast breeder types. Industrial and military applications ol these readors have, however, suffered fromchemical and metallurgical engineering. Moreover, limited devdopoient testing of components under operational conditions, dictated by attempts to achieve scheduled goals, has often tended ro degrade operational reliability, ln an attempt lo overcome these problems, Soviet icactor research now tends

to utilize existing reactors in extensive materials testing programs, rather than to explore new reactor concepts.

Nuclear Electric Power

The Soviet nuclear power program announcedalled (or electric generating capacity0 megawatts (row) in nuclear power sUtionsrogress toward this goal has, however, been extremely slow, aod the program has been extensively modified. Two power plants tn the originalBeloyarsk and Novoa total capacity at present ofw went into operation at full powerSocnsome GOO mw of generating equipment bas been installed lo utilize heat from tho Tomsk plulonium production reactors. With other plants, the Soviets now havew of nuclear generating capacity. Additional reactors under construction for several years at Tomsk, Beloyarsk, and Novovoronczh will probably be conipleted, and addw of generating capacily. The Soviets export tow fast breeder reactora dual purpose power generation and desalination facility at Shevchcnko on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, but we believe tliat tbe state of Soviet fast reactor and desalination technology is such that they proli-ably will not be able to meet this deadline, and that Soviet nuclear generating capacily therefore probably will not0 mw until the.

Th* Sovietsrogram to develop and deploy packagednuclear power stations. One such station went into operation at Metekesstation is being constructed at Biubtno on the Chukotskiy Peninsula which will probably become operational ineriod. We have no evidence of further developmentmobile" IS MWc presxurized-waternuclear power plant, which went into operation al Obninsk

The long stretch-out of the Soviet nuclear electric power program as originally announced has been due both to technological problems eneoiuitcred and tho economic costs involved. Construction costs ol nuclear power stationsimes the cost ol comparable thermal power stations. The Soviets have apparently decided tnemporary halt in the construction of new nuclear power stations, and to await operational data from the Shevchcnko reactor and tlie second units of the power stations at Beloyarsk and Novovoronczh before planning new construction. The Soviets are also giving some thought to the designw pressure-tube type reactor similar to the oneat Beloyarsk andarge new fast reactor, but we do not expect these proposals to be realized before the. It seems likely, therefore, that it will be theefore the Soviets move much beyond thew now foreseen, and that nuclear electric power stations will continue lo account for less than one percent of Soviet electric power generating capacily. This slow pace leads us to believe lhat the Soviet nuclear electric power program does not nowery important place in Soviel plans lor powerover the nexturopean programs are somewhat larger, and planned us nuclear generating capacity far exceeds this level.




Location and Type


Dual Purport Reoctori Tonuk





Crtpliite/WAtci Graphite/Water Ciaphite/VVatct

Year In Operation





Pienrure tube, with nuclear


8 . Similar to I




to I



Fait lAactuc

. Packagedreactor








Packaged power reactor


Fast tret reactor (BOB) Organic/Organic Packard power reaetoi

e;ower generating equipment in megawatts MWt, capacity of Uie reactor In megawatts of thermalart of Ihe thermalesalination plant.

Full power opera-tioo5

Full power la

Full power ia





Full power In


Full power 4

of electric power.



these problems, (he Soviets during the latter half6 signed agreements with Hungary and Bulgaria tow prcssuritcd-water nuclear power stations, each containing two icactor units ol the type being built at Novovoronczh. Inid to consuuet the same type of nudcar power station was submitted to Finland. During the past year, the Soviets did place in operation at Bheinsberg in East0 mw pres-surized-water nuclear power station, that had been under const ructionw station at Bohunice in Czechoslovakia, started at Ihe same time, will probably not be operatingonsidering past Sovietwe believeoviet bid to enter the world power market, if one is in fact made, is not likely to meet with great immediate success.

Safeguards. The Soviets probably have imposed safeguards on theto which they gave nuclear assistance. The bilateral agreement under which theyeactor to Yugoslavia contained provisions for aprotocol, but this has not been seen by the West. In the contracts for sale of small research reactors provided to such countries as the UAH andthe nuclear fuel was sold outright However, the contracts do restrict those countries from passing the fuels, documentation, or any technical infeama tionhird country. In the case of the large power reactors provided to Czechoslovakia and East Ormany. it was stipulated that the fuel was lo be returned to the USSR.

Marine Propulsion

The early nuclear propulsion systems in the icebreaker Lenin and in nuclear submarines encountered major problems and proved unjehable. The Lenin was bid up during6 navigation season but the main problems apparently were related to hull itnicture. Il may not yet lie operational. Our evidence indicates that the difficulties in many of Ihe nuclear submarines have been overcome through extensive overhauls. Thus Soviet nuclear submarines are now sufficiently reliable to conduct regular long-duration patrols without surface ship support, and we expect to see increasing numbers of Ihem oo stanOii.

No new classes of nuclear submarines have appeared in the Soviet fleetnd only one of the three original classes is still beingE-II cruise missile submarine We estimate that at least one new class of isudear submarine is now under construction, wcew ballistic missile submarine will probably enter the fleete estimate thai the Soviets arc alsoew attack dass which could become operational at about the same time. We have no information regarding Ihe nuclear reactor to be used in Ihe new classes of submarines, but wc expect that it willingle picssurizcd-watei reador of tbe same general type as that employed in carllei submarines. Il will probablyonger service life, and provide the new submarines withreliability and performance.


Air and Specs Applications

'Tbaxttmfartric <eai*ersaoo is used to producer.dy small amount* of electricity fromeat ofW ihcrwoopfe fa wiuefc appWk..bra,am at electricity.

* Thermionic convert tori prod am electricity directly from heat by thermalof rlec-trocu, which in Mreamlngathode to an anodeacuum produce an electric current.

*Magnetohydrodynamlc conversion produced eUvtrWIty by passingai. athigh tempnialure.agnetic field.

Aircraft Propulsion. Wc do not believe thai the Soviets ue avctivelyin developmentpulrioo system suitable for nueleai-powered air-craft. There is however continuing Soviet materials research which could be appbcable torogram Even if the Soviets nowrogram under way. we behoveilitarily useful nuclear powered aircraft could not be operational during at least the next Eve years, and probably not during the term of this estimate.

Rocket Propulsion. The Soviets have investigated tbe basic materials problems connecteduclear rocket and probably have developedmateriaU. They have followed the progress of the US Rover nudear rocket program, and may be undertaking developmental work in this field We do not anticipate that the Soviets will develop an operational nudear rocket within the next decade.

Spaos Propulsion. The Soviets have also shown considerable interest in dectric projHiIsion systems for sjiace applications. However, such systemsudcar power source are still in an early stage of development, and are probably atecade away from becoming operational.

Suclear Auxiliary Power Supply The Soviets are actively engaged in the development of nuclear auxiliary power supplies for use in spacecraft They are exploring all the major energy cenverjion systems, mdudingnd turhoelectric generators Wc believe, however, that tliey will not be able to develop an operational nuclear auxiliary power supply ol xuffident power to support space exploration before the

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