SUBJECTi Naslx'e : .i
X. Noelr stillaptivs of th*attitudes of his radical partners Algiers andnd of his dependence on Moscow's support. His room for maneuver is small, and he knows lt.
and Damascus continually speakew of fores against the Israelis,f ths type thatAlgsria. Nasir can neither envision his Egyptianssuccessful guerrilla fighters against thedoss he care to turn his country into asituation which would eliminate his In despsratlon he continues to carry on abattle against Israel and the US,^emphasisingcharges of US collaboration with Israel in the recant
that ha cannot safalyJttbKIMSVn
eace with Israel emphasizes hit Inability to
Toretgn nlUna Only
regain the initiative aa leader of the Arab world. The fact that Bounediene vent to Moscow twice aa the spokes-raan for tha Araba in indicative of Naslr's present weak-nesa among the Arab etatea as wall as his fear that if he went he would return relatively empty handed. .
appears to be resisting the Algeriansixsns by issuing vague propaganda whichfuture "liquidating of the aggression and removing of consequences." In addition, he apparently believesdegree of harassment of the Israelis alongCanal lifts the low morale of the army and improves
tho regime's image among the Egyptian people and other Arabs.
the fact of Arab disunity andapparent to all. Tho inability to hold an Arabis obvious, and its possibility of success, evenia admitted to bs 'slim" by Naeir'e spokesman Haykal
. over Cairo Radio. .
courses of action open to him at homeas limited as his opportunities in the foreign Although he remains his country's leader, hismaneuver is increasingly restricted by aan increasingly difficult economic situation, andinfighting among his entourage, with acmeties with Moscow and others arguinglight shift
has reverted to an old "crisis" taotlcouteasilythe US with the hope of eliciting some economic aidsupport. These approaches usually aresuggestions that he fears the Communists and thatwith the West, especially the US, areow accomodation can be achieved. Cm thehe lets lt be rumorod that ha is consideringof closer relation with Moscow.
has notolution to his dilemma, and
his frustration has inhibited his formulationolicy.
ifo appears to be waiting to see an opening to retrieve his
losses. He realises that his relationship with tho Soviets mora
is/complex than over before and that ha cannot disengage because of his dependence on Moscow for militarymore important than everwell aa economic Hs can see no returnalanced position be-twoun Bast and Wost so long as tho US is regarded as Israel's, mentor by the Arabs despite his oblique approaches to Hs will try to play both sides of the street, but his goals remain more in accord with Soviet objectives.Original document.