LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF

Created: 7/25/1967

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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY of

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGE.NCY NATIONAL SECURITY ACT7

Prepared

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I: EXECUTIVE

Coordinator of

Office of Strategic

OSS

Central Intelligence

Background

Joint Chiefs'

Secretaries of State, War, and Navy

Secretary of

Secretary of

Secretary of

Recommendations to the

Presidential

Achievement through Executive

CHAPTER II: LEGISLATIVEXECUTIVE

CIG

Presidential Recommendation to

CHAPTER UJ: CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF THE

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF

Legislative

Legislative Record on

CHAPTER IV: NEED FOR CENTRAL.

Senate Armed Services

House

Committee

Floor

CHAPTER V: POSITION WITHIN EXECUTIVE

NSC

Relationship with Intelligence

DCI Relationship with

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:

i i

VL

House

; -

t House

I CHAPTER VHI; CIVILIAN STATUS OF

House

Hous*

; Conference

,

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J CHAPTER DC: INTERNAL

House Committee Executive

House Published

House

The Federal Bureau of

j CHAPTER X: NATIONAL SECURITY ACT of

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

FOREWORD

This legislative history of the Central Intelligence Agency has been compiled in the interest ofetter understanding of the structure and functions of the Central Intelligence Agency.1

unction of'Government, foreign intelligence lies within the province of both the Legislative and Executive Branches. Not only does Congress possess the power of the parse but it has the power and responsibility to. for the common Defense and general fare of the United States... Roots of relationship are even found in f the power to declare war. the surest means of avoiding war X i* to be prepared for it in

Equally clear is the rertponsi'Mllty of the Chief Execut've to take executive action, not barred by the Constitution or other valid law of the land, which he deems necessary for the protection of the nation's

i

security.

atter of fact, the Central Intelligence Agencyroduct of both Executive and Legislative action. This partnership of action is seen in the major evolutionary stages that occured during the1

Executive Action

1

Forerunner of national intelligence service established by Presidential Ordered.. (Key Elements:

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Office of Coordinator of Information; Government-wide collection of information bearing on national security; direct reporting to the President; inter-departmental committee system,)

1

of Information authorized to expend funds for

certain limited purposes by Presidential letter.

2

Office of Coordinator of Information redesignated as Office of Strategic Services and its functions (exclusive of certain foreign information activities transferred to Oi'fice of War Information) transferred to Office of Strategiced.. (Key Elements: Joint Chiefs of Staff jurisdiction; Director of Strategic Servicss appointed by the President.)

12 Certain contracting. without regard to provisions of law.ranted to Director. Office of Strategic Services (Executive.

First Government-wide foreign intelligence serviceby Presidential directive. {Key Elements: National Intelligence Authority at Secretary-of-Department level; participation by personal representative of the President; the office of the Director of Central Intelligence {appointed by the President) Central Intelligence Group; within limits of appropriations available to Secretaries of State, War, Navy; precursor of Central Intelligence responsibilities and authorities later enacted into law.)

Legislative Action

4

First independent appropriations for Office of Strategic Services (National War Agency Appropriations Act. (Key Elements: novering the Executive office of the President; expenditures "for objectsonfidentialertain accounting by certificate of Director of Strategic Services.)

7

Statutory basis for centralised foreign intelligence service prescribed by the National Security Act (Key Elements: National Security Council, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence; the Central Intelligence Agency; foreign intelligence serviceovernment-wide basis.

9

Statutory basis for the administration of the CIA prescribed by the Central Intelligence Agency Act {Key Elements:

authorities *or the administration of the CIA on an

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basis.)

Executive correspondence and orders and Congressional material, including hearings and reports and Congressional Record reporting of floor discussions on bills specifically relating to CIA are the primary sources of material used for this paper. Secondary source material and other comment are used for continuity and completeness.

In .connection with past and on-going efforts to commit the Agency's history to writing, this paperhronology and bibliography of legislative actions affecting the Agency, and collects the issues concerning central intelligence which were put beforeor resolution; the alternatives considered by Congress in resolving them; and the reasons or rationale for the choices or compromises Congress ultimately approved.

It is recommended that the existing CIA publication on statutes specifically relating to CIA (in text and explanation form) be reviewed in connection with this work.

CHAPTER I. EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT Interest in the structure of the nation's foreign intelligence effort was of primary interest to the Executive Branch during16 period. In responsehe pre-war, wa-r, and post-war eventshis period, the Roonevelt and Truman Administrations saw theof the Coordinator of Information, the Strategic Services, and finally the Central Intelligence Group. Each serveduildingor itr succersor organization. Initiative

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The deteriorating international situation in thes sur-' umber of problems outside of the responsibilities of any one j department. Yet, it was becoming increasingly urgent that the Presl-dent receive coordinated information.

The Reorganization Act9asis for handling both ; of these problems.4 Under it, the Executive Office of the President was

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! established.5

The Executive Office,entral staff, was organized into six principal divisions. One was reserved for emergency. in the eventational emergency or threatational1,6 This was in September Eight months later andthreatened nationalhe Office of Emergency Management (OEM) was established.

OEM was concerned with clearing information and securing

| maximum "utilization and coordination of agencies and

In keeping with its duties. advise and assist the President in

the discharge of extraordinary responsibilities imposed upon him by

an emergency arising out of war, the threat of war, (or) imminence 8

of, the functions of OEM were further refined in January Clearly, the events which foretold the advent of the Second World War were also propelling the organization ofovernment-wide basis. Coordinator of Information

The responsibilitiesovernment-wide informational channel to the President became more explicit on1 when the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI) was added to theOffice. Colonel William J. Donovan was named to the position. The functions prescribed for the COI and those eventually enacted as duties of the Central Intelligence Agency were quite similar:

"Collect and analyze all inior:nation End data, which may hear upon national security; to correlate such information and data, and to make such information and data available to the President and to such departments and agencies as themay determine and to carry out, when requested by the President, such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of information important for national security not now available to the Government.

Authority to fulfill this commission included the right of access

to information and data within various departments and agencies as

long as the duties and responsibilities of the President's regular: mili-

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tary and naval advisers were not impaired. The COI was also empowered to obtain assistance through the appointment of various

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departmental committees. While no compensation attached to the office, transportation, subsistence, and other incidental expenses wereperating expenses were funded out of theEmergency Fund. Under this simple but broad mandate, Colonel Donovan beganoreign intelligence service. Office of Strategic Services

Following the Declarations of War against the AXIS powers, Congress enacted the First War PowersP.nd conferred upon the President the. urgently needed in order to put the Government of the United States on an immediate war footing.f the Act authorized redistribution of the functions of the various agencies to facilitate the prosecution of the war effort.

With the nationwart was clearly desirable to

| loser link between the tested and developing capabilities of

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COI and the Armed Forces. On2 the Ir resident, as Commander

in Chief,ilitary order re-designating the COI as the Office

of Strategic Services (OSS) under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs.

(Foreign information activities of COI were transferred to the newly

created Office of War The charge for OSS was to:

"a. Collect and analyze such strategic information as may be required by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. "

"b. Plan and operate such special services as may be directed by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. '*

The President appointed Colonel Donovan as Director of Strategic

a

under the direction and supervision of the United .States joint Chiefs ofuthorities

OSS was forced to adjustumber of problems which had not faced'COI. COI had received secure support in the form of funding, contracting and other services from the Executivehiscould not be continued indefinitely. Consequently, OSS needed and was printed certain specific authority.

The President extended to OSS the same privilege to enter into. without regard to the provisions of law relating to the marking, performance, amendment, or modification ofs had been earlier granted to the War Department, the Navy Department, and the United States Maritime Commission under the First War Powers Act

During the first Fiscal year of, OSS was supported out of allocations from the President's Emergency Fund. Significantly, and to the extent determined by the President, these Funds could be. without regard to the provisions of law regarding the expenditure of Government funds or the employment of persons in the Government In addition, the President could authorize certainfor objectsonfidential nature and in any such case the certificate of the expending agency as to the amount of the expenditure and that it is determinded inadvisable to specify the nature

OSS became independent of the President's Emergency Fund during the second fiscal year of It.. The National War Agencies Appropriation Act7 as it pertained to OSS. read a.

follows:

omcE ay smsoic atavicxa

Salaries and tipcucs: For allnecessary to enable ilia OQIoa of Strategic Service* to carry out iU functions and activities, including planesirector ater annum, ono assistant director- and one deputy dircctorat SO.OOO per annum each; utilisation of voluutary and uncompensated terriccs; pre<urerocnt of necessarysupplies and equipment without ce-wd toevised Statutes: travel expense,xpenses of auend-snee at meetings of organisations concerned with tho work of tho Office of Straussctual transportation and other neert-tary expenses and not toar diem in lion of subsiMenca o* poisons serving wnilo away from (hear homes without otherfrom tho United States in an advisory capacity,xpense* outside aw United States widiout regard to tho Standardized Government Travel Itcgulotions and the Subsistence Expense Acts amended.ndf tho Act ofU- S. C.reparation and transportation of lite remain* of officers and employee* who dio abroad or in transit, while in the dispatch of their cdwial duties, to their former homes in .

H-.it country orlace nn; more distant for interment, end for tho ordinary oxpensci o: rich interment; purchase and exchango ofand book* of reference; rental or news-reporting service*;of or subscription lo commercial and trade reports, nowspapcxs, snd nenciicali; the rendering of si.eh cratuiUwsvicxs and the free* oUmUition of such materials a* tho Director deems advisable; pur-duel or rental axd operation of photographic, reproduction,andnrmungquipment, and devices and radio-receiving and ratio-sending equipment and devices; maintenance, operation.

repair, and hire of moior-propelied or horse-drawnvjhicto* aad vessel* of all kinds; printing and binding; payment o: llvin-snd quartern allowances to employees with official hcad-qnarters iocsted abroad in accordance with regulations approved by the President on Dtvc-ticcrifc; exchange- ol funds without regard to section SCSI, .'teviwd Statutes (Si U. S. C.urchase and free

Strategic Service* er hi* designated rcprcflentativos for securityor tho protection of highly technical and valuableW,CCO. of which amount such sums as may bo authorized by tho Director of die Bureau of tiio Pudge; may be transferred to other department* or agencies of tho Govonunent, either as advance pay. meatimbur^cmcn; of appropriation, for tho performance of any of tha fiiiwjioiis or activities for which thi* appropriation wTiul may hu

hiwuliiLioiia rulatii

wiilui.ilihiw rv^uhition* (vlalingairo of Government fund* or the employment of persons in tho oovt>rnir.4nt service,f suchCO mayxpeiulvd for objeosonfidential nature, mch expenditures torcn tlieof lite Diiwuir ofo ofwry mi*'Ii ivrtittail* shall ho doomed a'

From its inception, OSS operated under two unusual rules relating to the expenditure of Government monies. One permitted latitude concerning the purpose for which funds could be expended. The other protected against the unauthorized disclosure of theand details of certain expenditures. The Director of OSS enjoyed the confidence of Congress in the exercise of this broad grant of

authority and this confidence in him was sustained in subsequent 18

appropriation acts.

Central Intelligence Group

the Office of the Coordinator of^Information and the Office of Strategic Services were forerunnersovernment-wide foreign intelligence service, the Presidential Directive of6 was the capstone of Executive action. It established the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Group, and the position of the Director of Central Intelligence.

Nearly two years of study and discussion preceded the issuance of the Directive. umber of different approaches werethe needolly coordinated intelligence'system was never questioned.

The influence of the Presidential Directive of6 on what was eventually enacted in the foreign intelligence secion of

the N'ational Security Act7t be 'overemphasized.

packpround "Principles"

In October4 Donovan, byeneral, presented

president Rooseveltocument entitled "The Basis for a

permanent United States Foreign Intelligence Service. " The need,

oS seen by General Donovan, was an organization "which will procure

intelligence both by overt and covert methods and will at the same

time provide intelligence guidance, determine national intelligence

objectives, and correlate the intelligence material collected by all

Governmenteneral Donovan formulated ten governing

principles in this presentation:

"That there shouldentral, overall Foreign Intelligence Service which (except for specializedpertinent to the operations of the armed services and certain other Government agencies) could serve objectively and impartially the needs of the diplomatic, military, economic, and propaganda service of the Government.

"Thatervice should not operateintelligence within the United States.

"That it should have no policy function and should not be identified with any law-enforcing agency either at home or abroad.

"That the operations ofervice should be primarily the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence on the policy or strategy level.

"Thatervice should beighly qualified Director, appointed by the President, and be administered under Presidential direction.

"That, subject to the approval of the President, the policy ofervice should be determined by the

Director, with the advice and assistanceoard on which the Department of State and the Armed Services should be represented.

"Thatervice, charged with collecting intelligence affecting national interests and defense, should have its own means of communication and should be responsible for all secret activities, such as:

(a) Secretg^^

(d) Clandestine subversive operations

"Thatervice be operated on both vouchered and unvouchered funds.

"Thatervicetaff of specialists, professionally trained in analysis of Intelligence andigh degree of linguistic, regional, or functional competence to evaluate incoming intelligence, to make special reports, and to provide guidance for the collecting branches of the Agency.

"It is not necessary toew agency. The nucleus of such an organization already exists in the Office of Strategic Services."

Thn document was returned to Genera) Donovan on4

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omment that an adviser had informed the Presidentetter and cheaper intelligence system was possible. However, there was also an accompanying request that General Donovanhis workost-war intelligence organization.

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In keeping with the President's request. General Donovanore detailed plan to the President. In transmittal, Donovan recommendedntelligence control be returned to

(am

superviaion of the President (with a) central authority reporting directly to you (theith responsibility to frameobjectives and to collect and coordinate the intelligence material required by the Executive Branch in planning and carrying out national policy and

The plan took the formraft directive and incorporated the principles General Donovan had earlier prescribed and several additional functions and duties Including: "Coordination of the functions of all intelligence agencies of the Government.ollection, either directly or through existing Government departments and agencies, of pertinentrocurement, training, and supervision of its intelligence personnel; subversive operations abroad, and determination of policies for and coordination of facilities essential to the collection of

Certain administrative authorities were also included in thr Donovan Plan, "to employ necessary personnel and make provision for necessary supplies, facilities, andand) to provide for the (Agency's) Internal organization andn suchas its Director may

Joint Chiefs' Consideration

The Donovan plan of4 was distributed to various Cabinet officials and the Joint Chiefs. Onhe Donovan plan and an alternate proposal by the Joint Intelligence

Cm*

Committeecoveredeporthe Joint

onth after the war had ended, thein that report were incorporatedoint Chiefs of Staff report. 24

The Joint Chiefs disagreed with Donovan's concept that the centralized service should exist under the direct supervision of the president. They felt that this would "over-centralize the National Intelligence Service and place it atevel that it wou.'d cortrol the operation of departmental intelligence agencies withouteither individually or collectively to the heads of departments concerned.

The structure recommended by the Joint Chiefsational Intelligence Authority (NIA) composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navyepresentative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Authority was to be responsible for overall intelligence planning and development as well as the inspection and coordination of all ederal intelligence activities. It was to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission as it relates to national security. entral Intelligence Agencyirector appointed by the President was to be responsible to the NIA and assist in its mission. An Intelligence Advisory Board made up of the heads of the principal military and civilian agencies having functions related to the national security was to advise the Director of Central Intelligence.

With one exception, an Independent budget for the National Intelligence Authority, the substance of the Joint Chiefs' report was to be eventually recommended to the President by the Secretary* of Stato, War, and Navy.

Secretaries of State. War, and Navy Consideration

To General Donovan the task of central Intelligence. the formulation of national policy both in itsmilitary aspects is influenced and determined by knowledgeof the alms, capabilities, intentions, and policiesby the customers, the Secretaries

of State, War, and Navy, was needed before further progress could be made.

Secretary of Navy

Fallowing the release of the Joint Chiefs' report. Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal,emorandum to the Secretary of War, datedommented upon subjects of mutual interest including: "Joint Intelligence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as you know,ecommendation to the Presidentational intelligence organization, the general outline of which provides for intelligence supervision by the War, State,Navy Departments,irector charged with the working responsibility functioning underroup. hink thisubject which should have our close

Attention. The Joint Chiefs of Stiff paper seems to me soundlyand, if youhink we should push it vigorocsl/ at the White House."

Secretary of War

Assistant Secretary Robert Lovett was placed in charge of a

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| committee in the War Department to study the matter. After consider-

ing the opinionsumber of people experienced in wartime intefii-

| gence, the Lovett Committeeeport to the Secretary

J of Warentralized national intelligence organization similar

to that which had been recommended by the Joint Chiefs six weeks

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j previously.

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P

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' Secretary of State

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arallel development and in keeping with his preeminence in the field of foreign affairs, the Secretary of State was directed by the President to "take the lead in developing the comprehensive and i coordinated foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies

concerned with that type ofhrough the creation of angroup, which would formulate plans for (the President's) The Secretary of State submitted his plan to the Secretaries of War and Navy on0

The State plan providedational Intelligence Authority consisting of the Secretary of State (Chairman) and the Secretaries of

War and Navy. Heads of other departments and agencies would be subject to call to participate in matters of special interest to them.

While the State plan did not preclude "centralized intelligence operations" its primary emphasis was on interdepartmental committees and organization- It did not envisage an independent agencyeparate budget. This approach was advanced as one which would

void publicityeduce competition among the central agency and the Intelligence ovfianizatioas of existing departments

The State planroup, not an agency, concept. Under it, if the Authority determinedentralized intelligencewas necessary the Authority would appoint'an executive and hold him responsible for the effective conduct of the operation. Operational support would be shared. personnel (including theunds androvided by the departments and agenciesin the operation, in amounts and proportions agreed by them and approved by the Authority, based upon the relativeand capabilities of the participating departments and

6 the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy jointly recommended that the Presidentational Intelligence Authorityentral Intelligence Croup. 33 The recommendation was identical to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee report which had

P. ecommendations to the President

W- i.

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been submittedear earlier to the Joint Chiefs with one major exception: the Secretaries did not recommend an independent budget. While an independent budget had been basic to the proposals advocated by the Secret ry of War and Navy, the apprehensions advanced by the Department of State prevailed and "it seemed to be thof the three Secretaries that an independent budget should be avoided for security Funds for the National Intelligence Authority were to be pr ivided by ihe participat-ng departments in amounts and proportion agreed upon by the members of the Authority. Within the limits of funds made available, the Director of Central Intelligence was to "employ necessary personnel and make provisions for necessary supplies, facilities and

Presidential Directive

The National Intelligence Authority, the office of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Group were established by Presidential Directive on Thewas substantially similar to the Secretaries' proposal although it contained no specific reference to the collection of intelligence by the Director. It has been suggested that this function was omitted solely to avoid mention of intelligence collectionublished3b

1

COPY

THE6

To The Secretary of State,

The Secret, ry of War, and

The Secretary of the Navy.

L It is my deaire,ereby direct, that all Federal foreign intelligence activities be planned, developed and coordinated so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security. ereby designate you, together with another person to be named by me as my personal representative, as the National Intelligence Authority to accomplish this purpose.

Within the limits of available appropriations, you shall each from time to time assign persons and facilities from your respective Departments, which persons shall collectivelyentralGroup and shall, under the directionirector of Central Intelligence, assist the National Intelligence Authority. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be designated by me, shall be responsible to the National Intelligence Authority, and shall siton-voting member thereof.

Subject to the existing law, and to the direction and control of the National Intelligence Authority, the Director of Centralshall:

the correlation and evaluationrelating to the national security, anddissemination within the Government ofstrategic and national policy intelligence. doing, full use shall be made of the staff andthe intelligence agencies of your Departments1.

for the coordination of such of thethe intelligence agencies of your Departments asthe national security and recommend to theAuthority the establishment of suchand objectives an will assure the mostof the national intelligence mission.

for the benefit of saidsuch services of common concern as theAuthority determines can be morecentrally.

d. Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as theand the National Intelligence Authority may from time to time direct.

police, law enforcement or internal security shall he exercised under his directive.

intelligence received by the intelligence agenciesDepartments as may be designated by the Nationalshall be freely available to the Director of Centralfor correlation, evaluation or dissemination. To theby the National Intelligence Authority, the operationsintelligence agencies shall be open to Inspection by theCentral Intelligence in connection with planning functions.

existing intelligence agencies of yourcontinue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminateIntelligence.

Director of Central Intelligence shall be advisedIntelligence Advisory Board consisting of the heads (orof the principal military and civilianof the Government having functions related toas determined by the National Intelligence Authority.

the scope of existing law and Presidentialother departments and agencies of the executive branchfederal Government shaU lurnish such intelligenceto the national security as is in their possession, andDirector of Central Intelligence may from time to timeto regulations of the National Intelligence Authority.

herein shall be construed to authorize theinvest.gations inside the continental limits of the United Statespossessions, except as provided by law and Presidential directives.

10. In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sourcon and methods.

Sincerely yours.

arry Truman

icvement through Executive Action

The6 Directiveajor breakthrough for the conceptovernment-wide foreign intelligence system. for national intelligence had been clearly fixed on the office of the Director of Central Intelligence. It provided for direction and control from the President's chief advisers in international andaffairs. Itocal point for the correlation of foreign intelligence, its proper coordination and dissemination, and for all other needs affecting national intelligence. Clearly, centralas an entity now existed.

The Directiveompromise of diverse views which had been articulated for two years within the Executive branch. While the fledgling organization was deprived of certain attributes of. independent budget and authority to hire personnel, its charter was sufficiently flexible to permit it to "feel Its evolutionary way and handle obstacles only in such order as it deemed The details of the organization were to be worked out in the first instance by the officials responsible for its performance. 38

II. LEGISLATIVEXECUTIVE BRANCH As earlyegislationermanent post-warorganization was seen as desirable.6 the Secretaries

to "include drafts of all necessaryhould be the first

of State, War, and Navy believed that the preparation of organizational

P

of business following the establishment of central intelligence by Executive action.

r.tr, Ccr.sideration

Six months following the Presidential directive, Clark M. Clifford, Special Assistant to the President, was reviewing draft enabling legislationroposed Central Intelligence Agencyeneral Hoyt S. Vandenburg, USAAF, then the Director of Central Intelligence,inevision of the draft to Mr. Clifford, wrote that the "current draft has been expanded in the light of the experiences of the last ten months and the administrative facilities available. However, it does not materially change interdepartmental relationships conceived in the original Presidential letter of

The CIG's comprehensive legislation proposaltatement of policy that "foreign intelligence activities, functions, and services of the Government be fully coordinated, and, when determined in accordance with the provisions of this act, be operated centrally for 1 the accomplishment of the national intelligence mission of the United

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plates- " The CJG proposal referred to programs for collecting

foreign intelligence information by any and all means deemed. to the President and the appropriate departments and agencies of the Federal Government ofnd for planning andf all foreign intelligence activities of the Federal Government. "

Further, the National Intelligence Authority was to be statutorily prescribed and the Director of Central Intelligence was to siton-voting member. The CIA was to provide the Secretariat. This followed the structural relationships established under the6 Directive.

The CIG proposal also sought administrative authority sufficient to the autonomy envisaged. The authority to hire personnel directly and an independent budget had been denied CIG. These were important deficiencies Co be overcome. 42 Other hey elemerts were:

of the Director from either civilianer annum (equivalent to the salaryby the Atomic Energy Act6 for the Commisioners).

Deputy Director who "shall be authorized to signpapers, and documents, and to performduties as may be directed by thendas Director in the Director's absence.

C. authority to employ personnel including retired personnel of the Armed Forces.

for the DCI "in his absolute discretionthe provisions of other law,employment of personnel in the Interest of the (The latter was in keeping with ain the Department of State-lsoecretaries of WarP.)

oficn in Une with Sectionf theAct (At the time the Departmentwas alsoroposal to reviselaws as recommended by the War andand tha FBI. )

authority.

The proposed draft was fully representativeentral Intelligence Agency. As events transpired, provisions relating to CIA's functional responsibility as well as its structural relationship within the Executive Branch would be enactedhile

administrative authorities, for the most part, would be enacted in

Comprehensive enabling legislationentral Intelligence Agency was subordinated in7 to the more pressing need of

<-biainiiii; unification of the militarynification legislation was accorded the highest priority within the Executive Branch.

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The concept of central intelligence was not overlooked in the unification proposals, however. President Truman's second plan for military unificationingle defense establishment servedumber of coordinating agencios, some for inter-military departmental coordination and others for military-civilianhe existing National Intelligence Authority was seen as the mechanism for linking military and foreign policy and it followed that itsagency, CIC, would serve an mechanism for coordinating civilian-military intelligence.

A team for drafting the National Security Act7 was assembled within the White House. It included Mr. Clark M. Clifford (Special Counsel to ther. Charles S. MurphyAssistant to theice Admiral Forrest P. Sherman (Deputy Chief for Navalnd Major General Lauriatad (Director of Plans and Operations, War Department General Staff). The team's prime objective was unification. While there was support for prescribing the Central Intelligence Agency in the National Security Act, it was felt the administrative authorities for the Agency should be dealt with in separate legislation.

The second White House draft of the proposed National Security Actatedovered the CIA as follows:

a) There is hereby established under the National Securityentral Intelligence Agencyirector of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof, to be appointed from civilian or military life by the President,

by and with the advice and consenTof the Senate. The Director thall receive compensation at the rateer annum.

Subject to existing law, and to the direction and control of the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency shall perform foreign intelligence functions related to the national security. 44

Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) has taken office -

The functions of the National Intelligence Authority (established by Directive of the President, datedre transferred to the National Security Council, and such Authority shall cease to exist.

The functions of the Director of Central Intelligence, and the functions, personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group, established under such directive are transferred to the Director of Central Intelligence appointed under this Act and to the Central Intelligence Agency, and such Group shall cease to exist. Any unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available or authorized to be made available

in like manner for expenditure by the Agency. "

87 memorandum to Mr. Clark M. Clifford, General Vandenhnrg Bummarlzad earlier exchanges of views on language for CIA in the National Security Act) settingorking basisentral Intelligence Agency to the merger; and

(b) eliminating from the proposed National Security Act any and all controversial material insofar as it referred to central intelligence which might in any way hamper the successful passage of the Act."

While deferring to the higher priority of military unification. General Vandenburg urged the incorporation of three additional

provisions in the final draft. he DCI shall serve as the

J

While General Vandenfcucrg's recommendations were not includedhe proposed "National Security Acthe points were discussed. Excerpts followovering the

discussion at the'f

PCI as Intelligence Adviser

IG conference preceding the first

with the White House drafters

he Director also indicated his desire to

rovision that he would serve as the adviser to the Council on National Defense (later changed to National Security Council) on matters pertaining to intelligence,

and that In this capacity he would attend all meetings

the Council. It was agreed that the Director should take

no part in the decisions of the Council as this was a

making body, and it had long been agreed that central

intelligence should not be involved in policy making.

At the White House meeting with the

eneral Vanderbiirg stated that he was strongly opposed to the Central Intelligence Agency or its director participating in policy decisions on any matter. However,

he felt that he should be present at meetings of the

To this General Norstad voiced serious exceptions, as he

felt that the Council was already too big. He thought that

the Director should not even be present as an observer,

as this had proven to be cumbersome and unworkable at

meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Sherman

suggested, however, that the Director should normally

be present at meetings of the Council, in its

General Vandenberg concurred in this, as did General Norstad, and it was accepted with the additional proviso that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would also attend meetings at the discretion of the Council. "

Further--

he Army-Navy conferees felt that the position of the Director as the Ingelligence Adviser was inherent in the position itself, and that it would not be proper to provide by law that the head of an agency under the Council should sit on the Council."

Specific Statement of Functions of CIA

eneral Vandenberg indicated the difficulties which he had had in having to go to the N. I. A. on so many problems. He felt that the difficulties of his position would be multiplied, as he would have to ask policy guidance and direction from the Council on National Defense, which consists of many more members than the N. I. A. He was assured that the intent of the act was that the CIA would operate independently and come under the Council only on such specific measures as the Council may, from time to time, desire to direct. It would not be necessary for the Agency to ask continual approval from the Council."

Further--

t was the final sense of the meeting that the Director of Central Intelligence should report to the Council on National Defense. As General Vandenberg indicated it would be necessary tc report somewhere; that neither thn President nor he was anxious to have another agency "free wheeling" around the Government. However, it was thought that the agency should have sufficient power to perform its own functions without It being necessary to have specific approval from the Council on each action. "

Presidential Recommendation to Congress

Onresident Truman submitted to theraft entitled "National Security Act Under Titleoordination for National Security as it pertained toead as follows:

"SEC.. (a] bv^es^bUshed ur.dcr the National

Securityentral Intelligence Agency,irector of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof, to be appointed by the President. The Director shall receive compensation at the rateear.

Any commissioned offi er of the United States Army, the United States Navy, or the United States Air Force may be appointed to the office of Director; and his appointment to, acceptance of, and service in, such office shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the United States Army, the United States Navy, or the United States Air Force, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident toising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such commissioned officer on the active list shall, while serving in the office of Director, receive the military pay and allowances payableommissioned officer of his grade and length of service and shall be paid, from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Agency, annual compensationate equal to the amount byxceeds the amount of his annual military pay and allowances.

Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) has taken

The functions of the National Intelligenceebruaryi) are transferred to the National Security Council, and such Authority shall cease to exist.

The functions of the Director of Central Intelligence and the functions, personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Croup are transferred to the Director of Central Intelligence appointed under this Act and to the Central Intelligence Agency respectively, and such Group shall cease to exist. Any unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available are authorized

to be made available in like manner for expenditure by the Agency."

In retrospect, it is recalled that the White House drafting committee's prime concern was the unification aspects of the legislation.

in thi* connection, thereeneral feeling that any unnecessary enlargement of the CIA provision would lead to controvsrsy^and would affect the legislative processing of the National Security Act In addition, it was believe that detailed administrative provisions for CIA could not be adequately presented as part of the National Security Actimply because of the lack of time.

As events transpired, however, Congress was to delve into the CIA provision.'! at some length. In fact, during the floor discussion of the bill in the House chamber, Mr. Carter Manasco,ember ofHouse Committee which marked up the bill, said: "This section on central intelligence was given more study by our Subcommittee and the Full Committee than any other section of the bill."

48

III. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF THE

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF

qackpround

On7 the Presidentraft bill entitled "National Security Acto tha President of the Senate

I

pro tern and tha Speaker of the House of Representatives andits enactment byh Congress. Prior toate consideration had been given in both Houses to the naadovern -

i

ment-wide foreign intelligence service and tha structure it should take.

House: Duringh Congress, tha House Committee on

I

Military Affairs had issuedeport on the System Currently Employed in the Collection, Evaluation, and Dissemination of Intelligence

Affecting the War Potential of the United The report

i

recognized the naad for strong intelligence aa the "nation's iinal

line ofnd made nine vary specific recommendationa:

Recommendation 1: That tha National Intelligence Authority, established ony Presidential directive, be authorized oy act of Congress.

|

Recommendationhat the National Intelligence Authority shall consist of the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy, or deputies for intelligence.

Recommendation 3: That the Central Intelligence Group receive Its appropriations direct from the Congress.

Recommendation 4: That the Central Intelligence Group

has complete control over its own

Intelligence Croupivilian appointedreliminary term of two yearsermanent term ofears,alary of atear.

Recommendation 6: That the Director of the

Intell-.gence Group be appointed by the President,

and with the consent of the Senate.

Recommendation 7: That the Director of accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence, and in so doing making full use ol the staff and facilities of the intelligence agencies already existing in the various Government plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of the various Government departments as relate to the national security and recommend to the NationalAuthority the establishment of such over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence perform, for the benefit of said Intelligence agencies, such services of common concern related directly to coordination, correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as the National Intelligence Authority shall determine can be more efficiently accomplishederform such other similar functions and duties related toaffecting the national security as the Congress and the National Intelligence Authority may from time to

time direct. It Is specifically understood that the

of Central Intelligence shall not undertake operations for the collection of Intelligence. (Emphasis added)

Recommendation 8: That Paragraphs,,,ndf the Presidential directive ofelating to the establishmentational Intelligence Authority be enacted into law, with such revisions in wording as may seem necessary.

Recommendation That the Army bo requestedto examine further the question of theof an Intelligence Corps for the training,assignment of especially qualified officers.

Senate: In terms of legislative processing duringh

Congress, the Senate got farther than the House. The Senate

Committee on Military Affairs reportedill proposing a

Natioual Security Council outside of the national defense establishment

entral Intelligence Agency for the purpose of coordinating

military and civilian programs, policies, and plans in the foreign

intelligence field. 50 This bill was introduced as4 by Senators

Thomas, Hill, and Austinursuant to President

Truman's unification message of

The need for "national intelligence" was underscored by

General George C. Marshall In hearings before the Senate Committee

on Military Affairs:

'Intelligence relates to purpose as well as to military capacity to carry out that purpose. Thehink, is we should know as much as we possibly can of the possible intent and the capability of any other country in the world... Prior to entering the war we had little more thanilitary attache could learninner, more or less, over the coffee cups... hink we see clearly we must know what the other fellow is planning to do, in our own The important point is that the necessity applies equally outside of the armed forces. It includes the State Department and other functions of the Government, and it should therefore be correlated on that

While4 was favorably acted upon by the Senate Military Affairs Committee, the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, which had

concurrent jurisdiction, did not report it out.

io the firstofh Congress in the Presidential draft of

:he National Security Act f the draft concerned the "National Defense Establishment." Title II, entitled "Coordination for Nationalrovided for the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. ^

omplicated and vital legislative task related to the nation's future security, Congress deliberated on the National Security Act7 for nearly five months.

Senate: Introductionill incorporating the President's draft was temporarily delayed while the Senate determined which standing committee would have jurisdiction over the bill. Theon Expenditures in the Executive Departments (now theon Government Operations) questioned the decision of the President pro tern, Arthur Vandenburgn referring the measure to the Armed Services Committee. ^ The Senatethe President pro tern's ruling7 and Sen. Chan Gurney. D.hairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, then introduced the measure as. The Senate Armed Services Committee held hearings for ten weeks, went into executive session onay. and reported out an amended version ofnune.he bill was considered by the Senateuly and was approved

House: The measure eventually reported to the Houseon7 as H.by Chairman

Hoffmanf the Committee on Expenditures in the <r-

tive Departments (now the Committee on Governmenthis bill was the subject of hearings which commencedpril

nd concludeduly. avorable report was issued on

July. Onuly H.4 was considered by the House, amended

and passedulcu vote. Immediately following this acti>n, the House passedfter substituting the provisions of Its own measure.

Conference: merged from Conference Committee on The Senate accepted the Conference Report the same dayoice vote and the House followed suit onh of July.

legislative Recoro on CIA

The legislative record on CIA in the National Security Act7 consists of testimony before committees, committee reports, floor discussions, amendments proposed and the provisions which were ultimately adopted. Overall, this record identifies the issues raised, the alternatives considered, and the reasons or explanations for the choices or compromises ultimately approved.

Of the many factorsearing on the type of legislative record made on CIA, two seem especially deserving of mention. First, security inhibited the full development of the public legislative record

_j

on CIA- In opposing an amendment on the floor in the House, Mr. Manasconderscored this handicap by revealing that "Many witnesses appeared before our Committee. We were sworn to secrecy,esitate to even discuss this section,m afraiday say something, because the Congressional Kg cordublic record, and divulge something here that we received in that committee that would give aid and comfort to any potential enemy we

Second, CIA was only one aspectomplicated andlegislative proposal dealing primarily with military unification. The controversy surrounding the "National Military Establishment" also engulfed other provisions of the Act, including CIA. This, however, is not meant to imply the absence of independentconcerning the CIA.

Considering all of theseairly extensive public record was made on the CIA section. Further, the reasons and rationale for CIA related legislative action is, for the most part, readily identifiable in the public record.

The White House drafting team was correct in estimating that the CIA section had the potentiality for being controversial but it was wrong in assuming that extensive deliberation could be avoided by reducing the CIA section down to "minimal provisions." Congressional intorest in providingIA was clearly underestimated. Probably

The need for institutionalizing central intelligence was estab-

I

liahed in certain committee findings duringh Congress and was to be stressed again duringh Congress.

In anticipation of hearings on, Senator

tah)ajor address to the Senate on the "President's"

bill and emphasized the needentral Intelligence Agency:3'

"Neither the War Department nor the Navy Department had an intelligence service adequate to our needs when the war broke out. The intelligence agencies in eachoperated separately for the most part, except for the exchange of routine military and naval attache reports. There was no real integration of intelligence at the operating level, and no established liaison with the State Department. Though funds were inadequate, there was much duplication of effort by the services.

"The war brought substantial appropriations and drastic reorganization. The Office of Strategic Services was finally set up under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and acted as the central coordinating agency in intelligence matters. Later, the Joint Intelligenceand its subcommittees made further provision for the coordination of intelligence activities. In spite of these and other changes, however, much unnecessary duplication existed in the intelligence services of the State, War, and Navy Departments. The significance of the collection, analysis, and evaluation of informationforeign countries is no less great now than it was during

the war. The effective conduct of both foreign policy

military policy is dependent on the possession of full, accurate, and skillfully analyzed information concerning foreign countries. With our present world-wide sphere of international responsibility and our position among the world powers, we need the most efficient intelligence system that can he devised. Organization, of course, is not the whole story. We do know, however, that there is no returning to the prewar system, where the War, Navy and Statewent their respective ways. We haveentral

intelligence agency established by executive action. Provision for such an agency should be made in permanent legislation. It seems entirely logical that such an agency should be placed in the framework of any agency that might be set up to coordinate military and foreign policies."

genatc Armed Services Committee

The theme so strongly stated by Senator Thomas was reiterated

and amplified before the Senate Armed Services Committee during the

hearing on: (Excerpts follow)

Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman (member of the White House drafting team and detailed by the Secretary of Navy to work with the Military Affairs Committee on the Common Defense Act: onsider the Central Intelligence Agency toital necessity under present world conditions. Its necessity will increase with our greater international responsibilities as the power of sudden attack is amplified by furtherin long range weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenburg^fbirector of Central incerely urge adoption of the intelligence provisions of this bill. ill enable us to do our share in maintaining the national security. It willirm basis on which we can construct the finest intelligence service in the world.

"In mytrong intelligence system is equally if not more essential in peace than in war. Upon us has fallen leadership in world affairs. The oceans have shrunk until today both Europe and Asis border the United States almost as do Canada and Mexico. The interests, intentions, andof the various nations on these land masses must be fully known to our national policy makers. Wc must have this intelligence if we are to be forewarned against possible acts of aggression, and if we are to be armed against disaster in an era of atomic

hink it can be said without successful challenge that before Pearl Harbor we did not have an intelligence service in this country comparable to that of Great Britain or France or Russia or Germany or Japan. We did not have one because the people of the United States would not accept it. It was felt that there was something un-American about espionage and even about intelligence generally. Thereeeling that

(jam?

all that wn necessary toar-lf there ever were to be another war-was an ability to shoot straight. One of the great prewar fallacies was the common misconception that, if the Japanese should challenge us in the Pacific, our armed services would be able to handle the problematterew months at most.

"All intelligence Is not sinister, not is it an lnvid*'ms type of work. But before the Second World War, our intelligence services had left largely untapped the great open sources of information upon which roughlyercent of intelligence should normally be based. ean such things as books, magazines, technical and scientificphotographs, commercial analyses, newspapers, and radio broadcasts, and general information from peopleroad. What weakened our position further was that those of our intelligence services which did dabble in any of these sources failed to coordinate their results with each other.

"The Joint Congressional Committee to Investigate the Pearl Harbor Attack reached many pertinent conclusions regarding the shortcomings of our intelligence system and made some very sound recommendations for its improvement. We are incorporating many of these into our present

"The committee showed that some very significant information had not bean correctly evaluated. It found that some of the evaluated information was not passed on to the field commanders. But, over and above these failures were others, perhaps more serious, whicr went to the veryof our intelligence organizations. m talking now of the failure to exploit obvious sources; the failure to coordinate the collection and dissemination of intelligence; the failure to centralize intelligence functions of common concern to more than one department of the Government, which could more efficiently be performed centrally.

"In the testimony which has preceded mine in support of this bill- by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, General Eisenhower, Admiral Nlmitz, and General Spaatz. among others- there has been shown an awareness of the need for coordination between the State Department and our foreign political policies one one hand and our National Defense Establishment and its policies on the other. Similarly with intelligence, there must be coordination and someso that no future congressional committee can possibly ask the question asked by the Pearl Harbor Committee;

'Why, with tome of the finest intelligence available In our history- why was it possibleearl Harbor to occur? '

"The committee recommended that intelligence work have centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation of responsibility. It foond specific fault with the system of dissemination then in use- or, more accurately, the lack of dissemination of intelligence tofhose who had rital need of

it. It statedsecurity of the Nation can be insured

only through continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in those charged with handling intelligence.'

"It found that there is no substitute for imagination and resourcefulness of the part of intelligence personnel, and that part of the failure in this respect. the failure to accord to intelligence work the important and significant role which it dj serves. '

"The committee declared. efficientservices are just as essential in time of peace as in war. '

"All of these findings and recommendations have my hearty concurrence. In the Central Intelligence Group, and in its successor which this bill creates, must be found the answer to the prevention of another Pearl Harbor.

"As the United States found itself suddenly projectedlobal war, immense gaps In our knowledge became readily apparent. The word "intelligence" quicklyashionable connotation. Each new wartime agency- as well as many of the older departments- soon blossomed out with intelligence staffs of their own, eachf largely uncoordinated information. The resultantfor funds and specialised personnelonumental example of waste.

"The War and Navy Departments developed full political and economic intelligence staffs, as did the Research and Analysis Division of the OSS. The Board of Economic Warfare and its successor, the Foreign Economicalso delved deeply into fields of economic Not content with staffs in Washington, they established subsidiary staffs in London and then followed these up with other units on the Continent.

"When, during the war, for example, officialseport on the steel industry in Japan or the economic conditions in the Netherlands East Indies, they had the reports of the Board of Economic, ONT, and the OSS from which to choose. Because these agencies had competed to secure the best personnel, it was necessary for each of them to back up

u1

its experts by asserting that its particular reports were tho best available, and that the others might well be disregarded.

"As General Marshall stated in testifying on thebill before the Senate Military Affairs Committee lastrior to entering the war, we had little more thanilitary attache could learninner, more or less over the coffee cups.'

"From this start, we suddenly had intelligence springing up everywhere. But nowhere was its collection, production, or dissemination fully coordinated- not even In the armed forces. General Marshall pointed this out in his

testimony when he mentioneddifficulty we had in even

oint Intelligence Committee. That would seem toery simple thing to do, but it was not at all. '

"There are great masses of information available to us in peace as in war. With our wartime experience behind us, we know now where to look for material, as well as for what to look.

"The transition from war to peace does not change the necessity for coordination of the collection, production, and dissemination of the increasingly vast quantities of foreign-intelligence information that are becoming available. This coordination the Central Intelligence Agency will.

"President Roosevelt established the Office of Strategic Services for the purpose of gathering together men of exceptional background and ability who could operate In the field of national, rather than departmental intelligence. In weighing the merits of the OSS, one should remember that it came late into the field. Ittopgap. Overnight, it wasunction to perform that the British, for instance, had been developing since the days of Queen Elisabeth. When one considers these facts, the work of the OSS was quiteand its known failures must be weighed against its successes. Moreover, itrucial turning point in tbe development of United States intelligence. We are now attempting to profit by their experiences and mistakes.

"Having attained its present international position of importance and power in an unstable world, the United States should not, in my opinion, find itself again confronted with the necessity of developing its plans and policies on the basis of intelligence collected, compiled, and interpreted by somegovernment. It is common knowledge that we foundin just that position at the beginning of World War

"For months we had to rely blindly and trustingly on the superior intelligence system of the British. Our successes prove that this trust was generally well placed. However, in matters so vitalation havingorld power, the United States should never again have to go hat in hand, begging any foreign government for the eyes- the foreign intelligence- with which to see. We should be self-sufficient. The interests of others may not be our interests...

"The need for our own coordinated intelligencehas been recognized in most quarters. The Pearldisaster dramatized that need and stopgap measures were adopted. As the war drewlose, the President directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to*study the problem and draft recommendations for the future.

"By the assignment of primary fields of intelligence responsibilities, we are- in the fields of collection, production, and dissemination- preventing overlapping functions- that is, eliminating duplicate roles and missions, and eliminating duplicate services in carrying out these functions."

House Committee

Testimony before the House Committee on Expenditures in the

Executive Departments provided additional insights into the need for

oreign Intelligenceovernmen*-wide basis.

General Carl Spaatz. Commanding General, Army Air Force: "The bill provides the basic elements of security of which we may mention five... Fourth, correct intelligence. The bill provides for enlargement of our capacity to know theof our possible enemies, how they can attack us, and with what. Each service will retain its own technicalwith its own trained attaches abroad. The CIA will coordinate information from all the services, as well as from other branches of the Government. "

Fleet Admiral Nimitz: "The bill willentral Intelligence Agency with the responsibility for collection of information from all available sources, evaluation of that inlormalion and dissemination thereof. This Agency is intended to secure complete coverage of the wide field of intelligence and should minimize duplication. The billthat military intelligenceomposite of authenticated

and evaluated information covering not only the armed forces establishmentossible enemy but also his industrial capacity,traits, religious beliefs, and other related aspects."

Secretary James V. Fcrrestal. Secretary of theisted the CIA secondssentials of the bill, after the National Security Council: "The need for that (CIA] should be obvious to all of us.

Rep. W. J. Pom: "With regard to the Central Intelligenceay be wrong,ave always felt that if Admiral Klmmel had had proper intelligence from Washington the attack on Pearl Harbor would not have occurred, or atouldeer, able to meet it better. From your experience, do you think that this Central Intelligence Agency alone would warrant passage of this bill?"

Vice Admiral Radford: "Ofhink it is most Actually it is in existence now. It is already functioning. "

Committee Reports

The Senate Committee report ononcluded: "To meet the future with confidence, we must makeentral Intelligence Agency collects and analyses that mass of information without which the Government cannot either maintain peace or wage war

The House Committee report on H.4 was equally clearuccinct in its conclusion: "The testimony received by yourdiscloses an urgent needontinuous program of close coordination between our domestic, foreign and military policies so it.ii wc may always uu able to appraise our commitmentsation in the light of our resources and capabilities. This, your committee

(eels, can be accomplished by the Central Intelligence Agency.n order that the Council (National Securityn itsand advice to the President, may have available adequatethere isermanent organization under the Council,

66

which will furnish that information. "

Floor Discussion

Senate: The Senate Armed Service Committee findings and report were re-echoed in floor statements during the Senate'sof:

Senator Chan GurneyChairman of the Armed Services Committee): "As an important adjunct to the National Security Council thererovisionentral Intelligence Agency, whichong recognized demand for accurate information upon which important decisions, relating to foreign military policy can be based. "

Senator Raymond Baldwinonn.): Under the Council there isentral intelligence agency to provide coordinated, adequate intelligence for all Government agencies concerned with national security. When one reads the record of the past war in regard to that field it is found that there was much to be desired in the way intelligence was covered, and there was great conflict about it. ay nothing here inof the men who were engaged in the intelligence service, because some remarkable and extremely courageous things were done. Nevertheless, we demonstrated from our experience the needentral intelligence

Senator Lister Hillla.): "It would) provide security measures at all times, rather than only whenthreaten. Itentral intelligence agency which is so essenti.il for the Government to maintain peace and without which the Government cannot wage

wide support from many members of the House during the floor discussion of H.

Rep. Wad. Y.This (H.4 and theit establishes) links the military policy with foreign policy, all measusyed by our resources and theof other people."

Rep. Busbey'although troubled with certain features of the CIA section)m not opposedentral intelligence agency. ou remember Pearl Harbor. They hadbut it was not correlated and evaluated

Rep. Andrews. Y. ): "On the next level above the National Military Establishment there is provided the National Security Council with the President as chairman, which will effectively coordinate our domestic and foreign policies in the light of sound information furnished by the Central Intelligence

Rep. Sikesla.): "During the intervening years between wars we have neverroper balance between our foreign and military policies. .. We have never been fully informed of the capabilities, potential or intent of likely This is another time when we can well say, 'Remember Pearl HLrbor.11

Rep. Shorto.): "Mr. Chairman, on every score and by every count we should vote adequate fundsur Central Intelligence- which has been lamentablyhese (including Central Intelligence) are the things above all others which will guarantee our security."'*

Rep. Porn. C. ): "Mr. Chairman, one of the mostfeatures of this bill is the Central Intelligence Agency. ould like for you to turn back with me this afternoon to the most terrible period preceding World War II. Why, you had most of the newspapers and people in this country thinking that Adolf Hitleromic character,ar in Europe could not last through theemember those editorials quite well-that Germany would not last through the winteremember officers of the Navy coming back from observation posts in the Pacific and saying that the Japanese could not

-

(mm'}

eeksar with America, The Government in

Washington was stunned and shocked beyond belief when it

suddenly realized that Paris and France would fall.

"An important Member of the other body, who I*

still serving in that body, saidew bombs on Tokyo would knock them out of the war. oeful lack of intelligence as to the potential power of our enemies. People were saying that Mussolini would not attack: that he was only bluffing. Around the world thereotal lack of knowledge of those forces that were marshalling to destroy American democracy. ell you gentlemen of the committee that your central intelligence agencyery important part of this bill.

Rep. Holuieldalif.): ant to read to you rome of the conclusions of the Pearl Harbor Committee, as follows. Their conclusions were: 'That the Hawaiian Command failed to discharge their responsibility in the light of the warnings received from Washington, and other information possessed by them and the principal command by mutual cooperations. (B) They failed to integrate and coordinate their facilities for defense, to alert properly the Army and Navy Establishments in Hawaii, particularly in the line of warning and Intelligence available to them during the period Novembero December They failed to effect liaisonasis adequately designed to acquaint each of them with the operations of the other, which was necessary to their joint security, and to exchange fully all significant intelligence, and they also failed to appreciate and evaluate the significance of the intelligence and other information available to

Rep. Harnessord about the Central Intelligence Agency. When such an organization was. firstad some fear and doubt about it. Along with other members of thensisted that the scope and authority of this Agency be carefully defined and limited. Please bear in mind that thisold departure from American tradition. This country has never before officially resorted to the collection of secret and strategic information in time of peace as an announced and fixed policy. m convinced that such an Agency as we arc now considering is essential to our national security. ""

Rep. Wadsworth: . In Addition, under the Council there would be another element which it to advise the Council, subject to regulations made by the Council, in the field of Intelligence, in the foreign field; and there isentral intelligence agency subject to the Council headedirector. The function of that agency is to constitute itselfathering point for informationfrom ill over the world through all kinds of channels concerning the potential strength of other nations and their political intentions. There is nothing secret about that. Every nation in the world is doing the same thing. But It must be remembered that the Central Intelligence Agency is subject to the Council and does not act Independently. Xt is the agency for the collecting and dissemination ofwhich will help the President and the Council to adoptd effective policies. So with the information ofort concerning other nations and information coming in with respect to our own resources, both of which are available to the Council and President, we will have for the first time in ouriece of machinery that should work and it is high time that we have it. We have never bad it before. During this last war all sorts of devices were resorted to, obviously in great haste, tohing like this. You may remember the huge number of special committees, organizations and agencies set op by Executive Order in an attempt to catch up with the target. We have learnedesult of the war that we should have some permanentand that Is the-one proposed in this bill."

Rep. Manascola.): "If we hadtrong central intelligence organization, in all probability we would never had had the attack on Pearl Harbor; there might not have

orld Warope the committee will support

the provision in the bill, because the future security of our countryarge measure depends upon the intelligence we get. Moat of it can be gathered without clandestinebut some of it must be of necessity clandestine intelligence. The things we say here today, the language we change, might endanger the lives of some American citizens in the

Thus, thereonsensus of agreement, almost reaching to

unanimous proportions, that the concept of central intelligence should

V. POSITION WITHIN EXECUTIVE BRANCH_ The position that should be prescribed for the CIA within the Executive Branch was understandably of considerable interest. This was the very marrow of the central intelligence concept and anto its disposition was an appreciation of theature of the relationships which had been established within the "intelligence community" under the National Intelligence Authority.

art

It is recalled that the6 Presidential Directive

placed the Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence

Group under the control of the President's chief advisors in international

and military affairs, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and the

personal representative of the President. The DCIon-voting

member of the NIA.

Following this pattern, the proposed National Security Act of

imply. niutor the National Security Council a

Central Intelligence Agencyirector of Central Intelligence,

who shall be the headnd. the functions

of the National Intelligence Authority.o the National Security

These functions were to plan, develop, and coordinate all Federal

foreign intelligenceto assure the most effective.accomplish-

82

mcnt of the intelligence mission related to the nationalhe functions of the DCI and the CIG under the NIA were transferred also to the DCI and the CIA Act.

j

effectively by reportingroup (National Security Council) rather than to an individual? Second, would satisfactory relationships be

maintained between CIA and the departments and their

agencies? Third, what relationship should exist between the DCI

[

and the NSC?

NSC

House. During Committee hearings in the House,Walter Juddursued the respective merits of the CIA reporting to the NSC or to an individual:

Rep. Judd: ave concern as to whether the

agency provided in the bill is given anywhere near theitt seems tooint and hydra-headed agency which will weaken our intelligence rather than

strengthen

Dr. Vannevar Bush (Director of the Office of Emergency Management, Scientific Research and Development): . The Central Intelligence Agency provided for (in the bill) links the military establishment and the State Department, and hence cannot logically be placed under the Secretary of

National Defense. Itoint matter. It might be

directly to the

Rep. Judd:ave neverydra-headed organization which functions as well as one headedingle man. If we were caught flat-footed without proper intelligence at theof another war, it might be disastrous. "a

u.

Rep. Judd: "Regarding the CIA, do you think that It ought to be under the National Security Council, or directly under the Secretary of National Defense,ar with the National Security Resources Board, the Joint Research andBoard, the National Security Resources Board. The CIA is put under the National Security Council so that itozen heads. It seems to me that this is so important that it ought to bear with those other agencies."

Vice Admiral Radford:eel that the CIA should be under the National Security Council. "

Rep. Judd: "You don't think that its reports will make the rounds and never get any action?"

Vice Admiral Radford:ardly think so. hink Its handling of reports gan be controlled by the Director. m sure it would be. "

Senate. tatement before the Senate Committee, Mr.

Allen W. Dulles, who made extraordinary contributions to the success

of the OSS and who eventually was to become the first civilian to be

appointed Director of Central Intelligence, questioned the desirability

of the Director reportingarge National Security Council:"*

his (National Security) Council will have at least six members, and possibly more, subject to Presidential appointments. Prom its composition it will be largely military although the Secretary of State willember. If precedent is any guide, it seems unlikely, in view of the burden of work upon all the members of this Council, that it will prove to be an effective working body which will meet frequently, or which could give much supervisory attentionentral intelligence agency. It would seem preferable that the Chief of Central Intelligence should report, as at present,maller body, of which the Secretary of State would be the chairman, and which would include the Secretary of National Defense,epresentative of the President, with the right reserved to the Secretaries of State and of National Defense to be represented on this small board by

deputies, who should have at least the rack of And this board must really meet andresponsibility for advising and counseling theof Intelligence, and assure the proper liaisonAgency and these two Departments and the

However, under no circumstances did Mr. Dulles want CIA

86

to be organized under an individual policy maker:

"The State Department, irrespective of the form in which the Central Intelligence Agency is cast, will collect and process its own informationasis for the day-by-day conduct of its work. The armed services intelligence agencies will do likewise. But for the proper judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important thatshould be processed by an agency whose duty it is to weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facts, without having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable and even proper prejudices of the men whoae duty itto determine policy and who, having onceolicy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty. The Central Intelligence Agency ahould have nothing to do with policy. It should try to get at the hard facta on which othera muat determine policy. The warnings which might well have pointed to tha attack on Pearl Harbor were largely discounted by those who had already concluded tnat the Japanese muse Inevitably strike elsewhere. The warnings which reportedly came to Hitler of our invasion of North Africa were laughed aside. Hitler thought he knew we didn't have the ships to do it. It is impossible to provide any system which will be proof against the human frailty of intellectual stubbornness. Every individual suffers from that. All we can do is to see that we have created the best possible mechanism to get the unvarnished facts before the policy makers, and to get it there in time. "

Chairman Gurney of the Senate Armed Services Committee became particularly interested in whether the CIA should report to <ne National Security Council or to an individual, particularly the Secretary of National Defense. In Una with this interest he arranged

for Mr. Charles S.ormer Assistant Director of the Office of Strategic Services, to meet with Admiral Roscoe Hillen-koetter, who succeeded General Vandenberg as DCIr. Cheston's viewpoint was subsequentlyatter

I

of record in the Senate

It has been amply demonstrated that problems of peace and war in modern times require total intelligence. Each of the principal departments and agencies ofrequires information for the determination of basic questions of policy, the collection and analysis of which are entirely outside the scope of its own operations. It does not solve the problem toind of clearing house for information gathered in the ordinary operations of the several departments. What is needed is an effective, integrated, single agency with clearly defined duties and authority to analyze and correlate information from all sources and, wherever necessary, to supplement existing methods of collection of information. Such an agency must serve all principal departments of the Government and also bring together the full and comprehensive information upon which national policy must be based. It should not supplant existing intelligence units within the several departments.

Every effort should be made to improve and strengthen

units wherever possible. The problem is national and not

departmental. And it will not be solved by having the policies

and operations of such an agency determinedommittee

of Cabinet members, whose primary duty is to discharge

the full-time responsibilities of their own offices. "

eeting with Mr. Cheston In Philadelphia on

Memorial Day, Admiral Killenkoetteretter to Senator Gurney,

from which the following is excerpted:

"The third point (advocated by Mr. Cheston) is that the Director should report to an individual ratherommittee.reviously stated before the Senate Appropriationseel that thisatter to be determined by

the Congress rather than by me. On purely

i

t would, of course, be best to^-ep^brt to oneratherroup. an workouncil equally well, and see no great difference in either solution that Congress may determine. There may be some question as to the wisdom of having the Director of Central Intelligence report to the Secretary of National Def mse. This, in effect, might be considered as placing thewithin the military establishment, which would not, in all probability, be satisfactory to the State Department. Theyreat interest in the operations of the Agency, and their contributions in the intelligence field are particularly important in time of peace, when the Foreign Service can operate throughout the world.

"As General Donovan stated in his memorandum to yountelligence 'must serve the diplomatic as well as the military and naval arms.' This can be best done outside the military establishment. As General Donovan statedSince the nature of its work requires it to have status, it should be independent of any Department of the Government (since it is obliged to serve all and must be free of the natural bias on operating DepartmentsV "

When this matter came to the Senate floor, Senator Robertson

of the Senate Armed Services Committee proposed an amendment

elevating the Secretary of National Security (Secretary of Defense) to

a. where he will be over the National Security Council,

the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Resources

Board, and over the entire military establishment as' The

emphasis behind this amendment, however, was to make the Secretary

of Defense the coordinator of national security and immediately under

the President. It was only collaterally related to central intelligence.

Senator Gurney, in opposing the amendment, said, "We do not believe

that the (Secretary of Defense) should in any way control, by means of

superior position, the conclusions which emanate from the Security

f he amendment was defeated.

helped to illuminate the supra-departmental nature nf rhc Agency's freedom as it did to ratify earlier Executive Branch action.

The second concern relating to the establishment of the CIA under the National Security Council was whether this arrangement wo'ild support satisfactory relationships between the CIA and theand their intelligence agencies. This concern was brought out in the following colloquy during the Senate Committee hearings:^0

Senator Tydlnfisd. ): . when you get down to the Central Intelligence Agency, which certainly is one of the most important of all the functions set forth in theotice that it reports directly to the President and does not seem to have any line running to the War Department, or the Navy Department, or to the Secretary for Air. as wondering if that rather excluded position, you might say, washolesome thing. It seems to me that CentralAgency ought to have more direct contact with the Army and the Navy and the Air Force; andee it on the chart here, it is pretty well set aside and goes only to the President. What is the reason for that? "

Admiral Sherman: "Well, sir, this diagram shows thecontrol of the Central Intelligence Agency through the National Security Council which, of course, is responsible to the President. But, of course, the Central Intelligence Agency, by its detailed directive, takes information in from the military services and also supplies them with information.

"In other words, ittaff agency and controlled through the National Security Council, which is supported by the military services, and in turn, supports them."

Senator Tydings: "It seems to me that of course they would diffuse such informationatter of orderly procedure

lo the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as they collected the information and as they deemed it pertinent. ouldittle more secure about it if thereine running from that agency to the War Department, the Navy Department, and the Air Force, rather than have it go up through the President and back again. Becauseather busy man, and whi'e he hasr it, one of its functions, it seems to mw, ought to be to

loser tie-in with the three services than the chart

indicates."

Admiral Sherman: "Well, sir, that it the trouble with the diagram. Actually, the Security Council, placod directly under it, has members of the three departments, the Secretary of National Defense, the Central .'nulliganca Agency, who collaborates very closely with Military and Naval Intelligence, aad thereood many other cross-relationships. "

Senator Tydings; ealize that, but evenhinkis about asart ofar as there is,now you will agree. And it is rather sat off there by iteelf, and la only under the Prealdent; which la all right for general direction purposes,o not feal aatislied in having it over there without some lines runninge War Department, tha Navy Department, and the Air Force, even though that might follow and they might do it anyhow."

Admiral Sherman: "Well,urther development of this chart, we mightine of collaboration and service and so on, extending from the Central Intelligence Agency to the three departments, and to thoae others."

Senator Tydinea: "To the Joint Chiefi of Staff anyway. "

Admiral Sherman: "They serve the Joint Chiefs of Staff,atter of fact. Weentral Intelligence (man) In the Policy Council of the Research and Development Board at the present time. "

Senator Tydlngs: "If you ever do another chart, will you do me the favor of connecting that up with those three departments and with the Joint Chief, of Siai;' Because it looks like it bj set up in that way to advise the President, more than to advise the services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; which, of course, is not the intention of it at all, in my opinion."

00m

Sherman: "We tried, in this particular chart, to show only the primary line of control, with the exception of the dotted line from the President to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is there for constitutional reasons."

Senator Tydings: ope that my comments will cause us to find some way that we can make sure that someone will offer an amendment from the War Department or tha Navy Department that the Intelligence Agency is to have direct tie-in with the Joint Chiefs and the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Otherwise, we may have another Pearl Harbor controversy, with the question arising,got the information? 1 And the reply, 'It was not transmitted.1 That Is one thing that should not happen again. And as this Is set up, it would lend the layman the opinion that it was more or less detached, ratherthan an integral part of the three services.

Senator Tydings: "Admiral, that is an awfully short bit of explanation, under the caption "Central Intelligencehe way it is set up here, separately, to be appointed by the President, and superseding the services now run by tho Army and theespectfully submit to you and to General Norstad that it might be wise to put an amendment in there, in order to make certain that the thing is understood; that this Central Intelligence Agency shall service the three departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and have some tie-in with the three departments, rather than to leave it hanging up thereimb all off by itself. o not think that would change anything mate* rially, but it would clarify it, and make it plain that we are setting up something for the purposes for which we conceive it tc be set up. "

Admiral Sherman: "Well,ould like toomment on the language as to the Central Intelligence Agency. At one time in the drafting we considered completely covering the Central Intelligence Agency in the manner that it should be covered by law."

Senator Tydings: "Admiral, my point is simply this: that under the wording as to the Central Intelligence Agency which

begins on pagend ends at the top oft deals more or less with consolidation and not with the duties that devolve upon that office. It seems to me thereoid in the bill that ought to be eliminated. "

Admiral Sherman: "Well, we considered the matter of trying to cover the Central Intelligence Agency adequately, and we found that that matter, in itself, was going toatter of legislation of considerable scope and Importance. "

Senator Tydings: eparate bill?"

Admiral Sherman: eparate bill. And after consultation with General Vandenberg, we felt it was better in thisonly to show the relationship o* the Ce-itral Intelligence Agency to the National Security Council, and then leave to separate legislation the taskull and thoroughof the Central Intelligence Agency. "

Senator Tydings: "'Well, now, for the record, is it safe for this Committee to assume that during this session it is likelyill will come along dealing with the CentralAgency in the particulars weunder discussion? "

Admiral Sherman: "It is my understanding that that will take place. "

The Chairman: "How about tnat."

General Vandenberg: "The enabling act is prepared, but we do not want to submit that until we have reason for it."

Later, General Vandenberg reviewed for the Senate committee

the relationships which had been developed between the Director of

Central Intelligence and the intelligence community under theanuary

residential directive:91

"In order to perform his prescribed functions, the Director of Central Intelligence must keep in close andcontact with the departmental intelligence agencies of

EM

Government. To provide formal machinery for thisthe President's Directive established an Intelligence Advisory Board to advise the Director. The permanentof this Board are the Directors of Intelligence of the State, War and Navy Departments and the Air Force. is made, moreover, to invite the heads of other intelligence agencies to sit as members of the Advisory Board on all matt srs which would affect their agencies. In this manner, the Board serves to furnish the Director with the benefits of the knowledge, advice, experience, viewpoints and over-all requirements of the departments and their intelligence agencies."

The responsibility to support the departments and theiragenciesunction of the DCI under the President's Directive of6 and was carried over into the CIA section of the President's proposal by providing that "the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence and thef the Central Intelligence Group are transferred to the Director of Centralappointed under this act and to the Central Intelligence Agency respectively. However, in keeping with the House Committee'sthat it is better legislative practice to spell out such (CIA's) duties in the interest of clarity andhe CIA section was amended to specify these supporting functions. This provided "the basis for the following colloquy on the House

Rep. KerstenIt seems to me from what the gentleman has said that the Central Intelligence Agency is one of the very important parts of this entire set-up. ish to ask the gentleman if thereefinite coordination provided for between that Agency and, say the Department of State?eel that certain information of the Agency would affect the activities of the entire system."

u

Rep. Wadsworth. Y. ): "The gentleman is correct.oint out that under the provisions of the bill the Central Intelligence Agency in effect muat cooperate with all the agencies of the Government, including the State It is the gathering point of information that may come in from any department of the Government with re-spoct to the foreign field. Including the State Department, of course; including the War Department,; including the Navy Department, through ONI. Thatis gathered into the central agency to be evaluated by Central Intelligence and then disseminated to those agencies of Government that may be interested in some portion of it. "

PCI Relationship with NSC

t

The third and final consideration relating; to structuralconcerned the position of the Director with respect to the National Security Council. As background it Is recalled that prior

f

to submission of the proposal act to the Congress, Generalstroungly opposed participation by either CIA or its Director in policy decisions but felt that there shouldrovision providing for the Director's presence at the meeting of the Council. Tho6 Directive provided that the Director ait on the National Intelligence Authorityon-voting member. However, theteam felt that the position of the Director as the intelligence advisor to the Council was inherent in the position itself, and that it would be improper to provide by law that the head of the Agency, under the Council, should sit on the Council. ^4 While being present at the nieeting of the Council did not necessarily constitute sitting "on" the Council, General Vandenberg's recommendation was rejected.

Secretary Forrestal testifying the issue was reopened:95

Rep. Boggsa.): "The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency would work under the National Security Council. "

Secretary Forrestal: "That is correct."

Rep. Boggs: "He isember of the National Security Council; he is an independent appointment of the President, but he works under, on this charthe isember of the Council, the heavy line drawn here, but he is more or less An nxecufivr secretary on intelligence matters for the Council. "

Secretary Forrestal: "Well, it is obvious, Mr. Boggs, that the results of his work would be of essential importance to the Security Council. "

oggs: hink so,gree with you, but the thoughtave in mind was that he shouldember of the Council himself. After all, he is dealing with all theand the evaluation of that information, from wherever we can get it. It seems to me that he has knowledge andof matters which the National Security Council would consider mors information at hand and the evaluation of that information than any other member of that Council. He should be put on an equal basis."

Secretary Forrestal; hink that there is always some limit to the effectiveness of any organisation in proportion to the number of people that are on (t. The services and theinformation of the Director of Intelligence would be available, and certainly no man who is either the Secretary of National Defense or the Chairman of the Security Council, would want to act or proceed without constant reference to the sources available to this Central Intelligence Director. Butould not try to specify it by law, so confidenthat the practical workings out of this organization would require his presence most of the time. "

Rep. Boggs: an see o not knowan seean visualize in my mind, even if this billaw, as presently setreat deal of room for confusion on

intelligence matters. Here we have the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, responsible to the National Securityand yet the Director isember of that Council, but he has to get all of his information down through the chair of the Secretary of National Defense, and all the other agencies of Government In addition to our national defense agencies, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of State, and soust cannot quite see how the man is going to carry out his functions therereat deal of confusion, and really more opportunity to put the blame on somebody else than there is now. "

Secretary Forrestal: "Well, if you have an organization, Mr. Boggs, in which men have to rely upon placing the blame, and this is particularly true of Government, if you once get that conception into their heads, you cannot run anyand it goes to the root, really, of this whole question. This thing will only work,ave said from the beginning it would only work, if the components, in it want it to work. "

Rep. Boggs: ertainly agree with

There was to be no further proposal to place the Director of Central Intelligence on the National Security Councilember.

Forrestal help to shed further light on the role of the DCI as the nation's chief intelligence advisor, as confirmed by subsequent Presidential action. ^

Summary

The relationships which had existed for central intelligence

within the intelligence community and to the policymakers under the National Intelligence Authority were for the most part ratified by the Congress in the National Security Act The Director of Central

Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency were placedational Security Council, whose membership was expanded to include the President.

As finally enacted, the "Central Intelligence Agency with a

Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the headas

97

. under the National Security Council. " Theof the Director of Central Intelligence to the departments and their intelligence agencies under the6 Presidential Directive were made specific duties for CIA "under the direction of the National Security Council" as follows:

to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using whereexisting agencies and facilities...

to perform, for the benefit of the existingagencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished

The Congressional discussions leading to this enactment helped to publicly clarify the role of the DCI and the CIA and the nature of the supra-departmental tasks facing central intelligence.

0*3

The basic functionsational foreign intelligence organization

e prescribed as early1 in connection with the appointment of

the Coordinator of Information; continued2 in the case of OSS in a

form tailored to the War effort; reviewed4 within the Executive

Branch as "Donovan'seaffirmed5 in the plan of

the Joint Chiefs' and the recommendation of the Secretaries of State, War

ard Navy; and6 directed by the President as responsibilities of

the Director of Central Intelligence.

7 the basic functionsational foreign intelligence

organization were approved by the Congress of the United States in

f the National Security Act

(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security

to advise the National Security Council In matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;

to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence, activities of the departments and agencies of theas relate to the national security;

to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: Provided further. That the departments and otherof the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental Intelligence:

And provided further: That the Director of Centralbe responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorised disclosure;

to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services ofconcern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

Thus, with slight modification andirthright backhe responsibilities of ttvi Director of Central Intelligence" under the6 Presidential Directive were specified in the National Security Act7 as duties for the CIA and imposed upon the DCI as tho head of the Agency.

The approval ofnvolved more thantatutory capstone on six years of prior development within the Executive Branch.umber of reasons alreadyongress was to show deep interest in the functions of CIA.

It is recalled that the President's proposal sought to incorporate the6 Presidential Directive by referencing the functions of the DCI and CIC under it and transferring.them to the DCI and the CIA under the proposed Act. This procedure caused some discomfiture within the Senate committee in connection with CIA's responsibilities to the departments and their intelligence agencies. Senator Tydings registered his concern over the lack of specificity on this issue and remarked that tho CZA section as proposed by the President "deals more or less with

- U=

as*

and not with the duties that devolve upon that office. It

to me that thereoid in the bill that ought to be eliminated.

While the Senate committee and the Senate were willing to await

the early submission of enabling Legislation for CIA to correct what was

viewed by someeficiency. Senator Robertson commented when the

measure reached the Senate floor, "It is necessary to go to Executive

Order to find out what the functions and the powers of the Central Intelli-

genci Agency Me to le. Many.have taken the trouble to do so--and I

comment parenthetically that it should not be necessary to go to Executive

Order to

The functions of the CIA were eventually spelled out in the

National Security Act7 In lineetermination. it is

better legislative practice to spell out such duties in the interests of

clarity and

The interest of the House Committee on Expenditures in the

Executive Departments in the functions for the CIA is illustrated in

Mr. Busbey's questioning of Secretary

Rep. Busbey: "Mr. Secretary, this Central Intelligence Croup,nderstand it under the bill, is merely for the purpose of gathering, disseminating, and evaluating information to the National Security Council, is that correct?"

Secretary Forrestal: "Thateneral statement of their activity. "

Rep. Busbey: onder if there is any foundation for the rumors that have comenc to :iic ul:cc; that through this Central Intelligence Agency, they are contemplating operational activities?"

0

Forrestal: ould not be able to go into the details of their operations. Mr. Busbey. The major part of what they do, their major function, as you say, is the collection andand evaluation of information from Army Intelligence. Navy Intelligence, the Treasury, Department of Commerce, and most other intelligence, really. Most intelligence work is not aor mysterious character; it la simply the Intelligent gathering of available data throughout this Government and throughout ou-consular services, from our military attaches. As to the nature and extent of any direct operationalhould rather have General Vandenberg respond to that question.

hould like to add this, however, that in the democracy in which we live, and which we certainly intend to keep,activityifficult task. By the nature of its objectives it ought not to have publicity, and yat that ia one of our difficults, duringar, one of our greatest problems was the making available of the news that should be available, and yet denying to the enemy tha things that would lend him not only comfort but substantial and effective help; and the same is true of intelligence. We doentral intelligence agency, and we do need access--we do need to have some machinery for collecting accurate information from the rest of the world, because,aid earlier, the speed, the tempo, and the fluidity of events in the world today very definitely require some central source here that is trying to evaluate those events for the various departments of Government that arc charged with our security. "

This line of questioning was continued by Rep. Brown, who

participated in the hearingsember of the Rules

Rep. BrownHow far does this centralagency go in its authority and scope?

"You mentioned that they combine and can use thewithin theelieve, within the Department of Commerce, and the like. "

Secretary Forrestal: aid they had available to them, and should have available, and should gather all information that bears upon our national security, from every agency of

"Take, for example, the question of raw material."

Rep. Brown: o you limit itlor.al security? "

it,

3

rather not try to have that bill Incorporatedart of this bill. "

Rep. Brown: "Do you not think this bill should come first, then, and have an agency legalize and authorize the law and put it in here? "

Secretary Forreatal: "There is no reason why you could not haveart of this bill,hink General Vandenberg.atter of fact, is nowtatute which could either bein this bill or dealt witheparate act.

"Either way would be quite all right, as farm concerned."

Rep. Brownis cuestionlng of Secretary Forreatal

concerning the functions of the Agency with Admiral Sherman. After

getting Admiral Sherman to admit that he believed the outline of our

national security structure should be established by

Admiral Sherman: hink that this bill does lt properly.aid in my prepared statement, this billompromise between opposing views,elieve it is the optimum settlement of the matter, for the time being.y understanding of the effect of this bill in that regard is that it would 'reeaerdcr specifically referred to, which is President Truman's letter ofhat it would freeze that letter and make it permanent until such time as the Congress passed an adequate organic law for the Central Intelligence Agency."

Later, during the same session. Admiral Sherman pointed out

that:

t was not the Central Intelligence Group which wanted to defer their legislationater time; it washo were charged withraft for this bill. We felt that if we attempted to get all the duties of the Central Intelligence Agency in here, then there wouldnrn&nd to put all the duties of (he Xavy, all the duties of each agency, in great detail, and we would wind upery bulky volume."

:;p. Harnesshen asked if that was

the only reason given why you preferred to simply transfer the Security Agency under the Executive order rather than to write in the act, the functions of the Agency?"

vdmiral Sherman replied:

"That was the only reason from my point of view, sir. elt that that wasarge subject by itself, and that it would unduly complicate this other legislation."

Dep. Harness concluded by observing:

"But at the same time you proposed later on to ask the Congress toav that would do that very thing? "

The Presidential Directive of6 was entered into

chc Record in the Committeend the basic functions of the

Director of Central Intelligence under that directive were described by

General Vandenberg before both committees in the following terms:^^

"The Director of Central Intelligence is presently charged with the following basic functions:

Tou collection of foreign iutelligenco information cf certainwithout interfering with or duplicating thecollection activities of the military and naval intelligence services, or the Foreign Service of the State Department.

The evaluation, correlation and interpretation of the foreign information collected, in order to produca the strategic and national policy intelligence required by the President and other appropriate officials of the Government.

The dissemination of the national intelligence produced.

The performance of such services of common concern to the various intelligence agencies of the Government as can be more efficiently accomplished centrally,

Planning for the coordination of the intelligence

activities of the Government so as to secure the more effective accomplishment of the national intelligence objectives."

It was clear that the correlation, evaluation and dissemination

ol intelligence relating to national security was an inherent part of

central intelligence and that these functions were widely recognized and

supported by the Congress, Four of the five functions as seen by General

109

Vandenberg are clearly recognizable Ins enacted. The first, collection of foreign intelligence of certain types, was not to be specified in the Act but understood to be one of the services that the National Security Council could direct the Agency to perform.

VII. COLLECTION Certain elements within the intelligenced feared (com the outsetentralized organization would so dominate the intelligence field that it would encroachpon departmental collection, evaluation, and dissemination functions. In the interest of assuaging these fears, the Presidential Directive provided that "The existing intelligence agencies of your Departments (State, War, and Navy)ontinue to collect, evaluate, correlate and dinseminateintelligence."

Not withstanding this qualification,ousefh Congress, apparently again reflecting the reservation of certain elements in the intelligence community, recommended that the Director of Central. should not undertake operations for the collection of Prior to the issuance of this House report, the National Intelligence Authority, in furtherance of itsto insure "the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission relating to the Nationalad directed that:

. the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby directed to perform the following services of common concern, which this authority has determined can be more efficiently accomplished centrally: Conduct of all organized Federal espionage and counter-espionage operations outside the United States and its possessions for the collection of foreign intelligence information required for the national

There/ore, when this issue was *giin raised during the SQih Congress, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy constituted as the '

iioril Intelligence Authority,etter to Clare Hoffman, Chairman, House Committee on Expenditures in the Executivewhich referred to6 directive and denied charges appearing in the press that the CIC had usurped vArious departmental intelligence functions and had forced established organizations out of ihe field. Excerpts from that7 letter follow:

"It has long been felt by those who have successfully operated clandestine intelligence systems that such work must be centralized within one agency. orollary to this proposition, it has likewise been provenultitude of espionage agencies results in two shortcomings: first, agents tend to uncover each other or block each other's funds or similarly neutralize each other, being unaware of identical objectives; second, each agency tends to hoard its own special information or attempts to be the first tohoice piece of information to higher authorities. This latter type of competition does not permit the overall evaluation of intelligenceiven subject, as each agency is competing for prestige...

he Central Intelligence Croup should be free to assume, under our direction, or the subsequent directionational Security Council, the performance, for the benefit of the intelligence agencies of the Government, of such services, of common concern, including the field of collection, as this Authorityubsequent Council determines can be most efficiently performed centrally."

In keeping with the precedent of not publicizing espionage as an activity of the United States Government, almost all discussion relating to the clandestine collection function was deleted from the printed committee hearings. However, the day after Chairman Hoffman had received theune letter from the National Intelligence Authority, the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments

1

:tiet in executive session to hear testimony on whether or not the respon-

bility to collect certain foreign intelligence should be assigned to the

Intelligence Agency.

Wadswort';: . in view of this paragraphthe existing intelligence agencies of your departments, which, ONI and the appropriate agency of the State Department, which paragraph reads:

'The existing intelligence agencies of your Departments shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence. '

"Apparently the issue arises around the meaning and interpretation of that paragraph along with paragraph 'C

which directs the Central Intelligence to perform such service of common concern as can be, more efficiently

accomplished centrally. "

General Hoyt S. Vandenberg:The Intelligence Advisory Board, which consists of the three departmental intelligence organizations, State, War, and Navy, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence made an exhaustive study of the best way to centralize, both from the point of view of efficiency of operation and cost, certain phases of the nntlo.ial intelligence.

"They all felt, together with myaelf, who was Director at that time,ery small portion,ery important portion, of the collection of intelligence should be centralized in one place. Now, the discussion went on within theAdvisory Board as to where that place should be."

Rep.. In other words, you proceeded under the theory that this Central Intelligence Agency was authorized to collect this information and not simply to evaluate it?"

General Vandenberg; "We went under the assumptionhat part that says that weerform such other functions and duties as the President and the NationalAuthority may from time to timend 'recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the National Intelligence mission 'gave us that right."

Rep. Brown: "Ir. other words, if you decided you wanted to go into direct activities of any nature, almost, why, that could be done?"

General Vandenberg: "Within the Foreign Intelligence field, if it was agreed upon by all of those agencies concerned. "

Rep. Brown: "And that you were not limited to evaluation?"

General Vandenberg: "That is right, sir. "

General Vandenberg: . Now, the difficulty we ran into in

the Intelligence Advisory Board was this: It is almost universally

agreed that the collection of clandestine intelligence must be

centralized some place; because if it Is disseminated among

several organizations without one head, the agents who are

operating expose each other. We saw that ourselves during

the war inthe Balkans.

"The British have had their experience, and the Germans in their report of the war indicate that that was one of the causes of their failure. We believe that the Russian expose in Canada had something to do with the numerous agencies up there. Universally, among the heads of the intelligence organizations in the government, the belief is thatintelligence should be centralized.

"Then the point came: Where should we centralize it? If we put it, that made an organization which had particular points of view and priorities responsible for collecting the clandestine intelligence for the State Department and the Navy Department, and that would immediatelyuror, because neither State nor Navy could have assurance that the proper priority would be given to the collection of their intelligence.

"The same thing was true if we put it in State, and the same thing was true if we put it in the Navy Department. "

Rep. Wadsworth: "And did the headnd the head of ONI agree to this proposal?"

General Vandenberg: "Yes sir."

Brown:

one of the big questions in my mind is whether

not we should not set forth in the statute,aw-making

body is presumed to do. what the functions of an agency it creates may be."

General Vandenberg:ould agree with that, except for this one point. Today we arc tyros in this game of foreign intelligence. We are trying to overcome in two or three years sometimes hundreds of years of experience.

"People will tell you that we know all of the answers and this is the right way to da it. o not believe that there is anybody in the United States today who can tell you that:ould prefer to let this thing grow in the hands of people who are primarily interested in getting this intelligence."

Rep. Brown: "You can write these functions In the statute and you can change them?"

General Vandenberg: o not think anybody knows."

Rep. Brown: "We are supposed to say what an agency of this Government can do."

General Vandenberg: "If we had had the Central Intelligenceears ago.ears ago, we could come In and tell you what, in our opinion, was our best advice on how those functions should be delineated. o not think that we can do that today. "

Rep. Brown: "You think we should delegateecurity Council, then, the authority to fix functions and to change them as they may see fit, which might possibly endanger the rights and privileges of the people of the United States?"

General Vandenberg: "No,o not think there isin the bill, since it is all foreign intelligence, that can possibly affect any of the privileges of the people of the United States... My feeling is that the limitations, asfrom the President's letter, are sufficient to protect the people of the United States, but that is my personal opinion, and that in the hands of the Security Council the collection of foreign intelligence can be properly administered and will be given enoughroad policy In order to set this thing up, so that we will have, some day. real national intelligence. an see no reason for limiting it at this time."

Rep.ass. J: "Do you think the CIC should do collection work? "

Mr. Allen W. Dulles: o. ould like to get into that point,ealize itontentious point, and itifficult point, and there are arguments on both sides. Thereot of misunderstanding about secret intelligence."

"Ir the first place, secret intelligence and clandestine intelligence is only one relatively minor segment of the whole intelligence picture. There are several branches of secret intelligence, and some one agency has to do that. hink it Is impossible to continueeries of agencies engaged in the work of secret intelligence. You are going to cross wires, and you are going to find that these various agents will become crossed. You will find that, because it Is very delicate and difficult field which requires the greatest amount ofo not know where else it can be put...

eel very strongly that there mustentral directing agency of that with the power to do the secret collecting, using such agencies as that Central Agency desires, including its own. That has been the experience of most other

"The argument has been raised that If you have both the functions of collection and analyses and reporting, that you are likely to put undue weight on the information you collectas against the information that comes to you from other agencies. Well, thatuman failing. hink if youood man, that is not the case. ould not, myself,remendous amount of weight on clandestine intelligence. It has got to be proved Defore it is any good."

in the same session Rear Admiral Thomas Inglis gave the committee three supporting reasons for centralizing certain economy, effectiveness and plausible denial.

Admiralold the view that covert operations should be controlled centrally and divorced from the departments having intelligence agencies for the following reasons.*

gence __

Central operation is more economical because Lt avoids duplication, reduces overhead, and assures that the needs of all departments requiring covert intelligence are equitably met.

Central operation is considered more effective because

it can cover the entire field of covert intelli

a field which for its full exploitation must beand closely integrated, with no competing agents working at cross purposes, (c) Covert activities are occasionally exposed by foreign governments. It is desirable that no embarrassment, such as exposure may entail, should fall upon the State, War or Navy Departments which must protect the diplomatic standing of their missions and attaches."

There is no record of any subsequent challenge to either the authority or the desirability of the Agency engaging in certain espionage and counter-espionage activities.

In connection with tha6 Presidential Directive, it was determined that it was not in the interest of the United States to refer to clandestine collection (espionage)ublic document. Apparently following the precedent thus established, the House Committee did not specify the collection function in the legislation. Instead, the House Committee inserted language essentially identical to both theconcern and catch-all provision of the Presidential Directive:

to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

Thus, the authority and indeed the responsibility for certain intelligence

collection was deferred to the general authorities and responsibilities

ofd) with the knowledge of the manner in which these general

authorities and responsibilities had been implemented in the past and

would be implemented in the future.

MB

STAT'JS OF DCI The civilian status of the Director of Central Intelligenceentral issue in the Congress. Undoubtedly, the language ofontributed to the doubts of member* concerned with retaining civilian control over the armede have constantlyivilian in the positions of Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy, and this bill provides that the Secretary of Defense shallhink it Is lor the same reason exactly, (toivilian DCI) toand to make certain there is not to be any usurpation of

An amendmentivilian Director passed the House in lineegitimate faar in this country laat wa develop too much

military control of an agency which has greatand operates

While the requirement was eliminated in conference, the

Houce conferees pointed out the compromise provisiono

divorce the head of the agency from the armed servicesan in the

service is

Three months earlier General Vandenberg was succeeded as

Director of Central Intelligence by Admiral Roscoe Hllleokoetter. The

Washington Post,7 editorial, observed:

enoral Vandenberg's resignation points up aweakness in our intelligence set up which is carried over in the new Central Intelligence Authority (sic) envisioned under the armed forces merger bill. That is the weakness ofilitary man to retain his active duty status while serving as

Director of Central Intelligence. Inevitably this resultsendency on part of the incumbents to regard the job astepping stone in an essentially military career. Hence. It invited the trading back and forth between the Army and Navy evidenced by the appointment of two admirals and one general Inonths. What is needed is to develop the concept of long-term career service in this highly important job. We hope Congress will see to it that the merger bill is amended topecific term of office and to require that the Director be inivilian. This need not militate against Admiral Hlllenkoetter if he is sincerely interested in ancareer, for he can relinquish his active Navy status and retain the Directorship

Conceeding tnat the ps&ition of DCIe heldivilian, it was also true that the nation did not have extended experience in the foreign intelligence field. The few men who had the. have gained their experience in the Army and Navy, and are still in the

The provision concerning the DCI in the Presidential draft sought to overcome the existing legal disability running against certain officers of the Armed Services fromivil The results of this legal disability would have required certain officers to vacate their commissions. Consequently, one of the prime objectives of the Presidential language in the proposed act was to overcome this legal disability and otherwise to provide benefits and protection to asium thatareer officer in the position of the DCI would have the requisite freedom from control by his parent service.

With the exceprion of requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to the appointment of the Director, the language pertaining to the

director of Central Intelligence approved by Congress did not substan-tially vary from the Presidential proposal. However, the result was to farther amplify the importance of freedom from departmental influence

and the other side of that coin, the non-political and non-policy nature

ol* the position of the DCI and the Agency which he heads.

Senate

The only amendments proposed to the CIA section by the Senate Aimed Services Committte related to the Director cf Centralhe proposed.irector of Central Intelligence, who ihall be the head thereof, to be appointed by theas amended to.irector of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof, to be appointed from the armed services or from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the

The Senate Committee thus adopted language which substantially

was the same language carried in the White Houses late as a

month before the final proposal was submitted to the Congress. The

Committee explained In Its report:

"In view of the fact that certain officers of the armed services have had wide experience in handling the type of intelligence with which this agency will be largely concerned, the provision of the bill to permit the Director of Central Intelligence to be appointed from the armed services as well as from civilian life is most desirable. During the Agency's formative years, it is essentialts Director be tochr.ically the most experienced and capable obtainable, regardless of whether he Is appointed from civilian or military

1*3

mm

Robertsonited the language relating to the

Director of Central Intelligence in the President's proposal as evidence

he military control being established under the bill, thus creating a

"military empire."

he bill really goes further than this; by its emphasis on provisions relatingilitary director, it suggests that the Director shouldilitary officer. Originally, the billilitary director; the modification toivilian to serve as Director was inserted only after opposition to such an obviously improper requirement. The mere fact that the bill stillilitary if fleer to serve as Director in sufficient Indication, to my way of thinking, that the draftees of the bill still expect the President toilitary officer to the Director's job.

On the last day of Senate debate on the bill. Senator Robertson

concluded:

ith respect to the Central Intelligencehall leave to other critics of the bill the problem of writing intoroper set of functions to replace the bland reference to present duties under executive order. inimum step in the protection of civil liberties it should be made mandatory, however, that tha Director of Central lntilllgei.ee should at all timesivilian who can make^

However, these remarks by Senator Robertson were only ato more extensive discussion on the floor of the House some ten days later, which culminated in an amendment requiring that the Directorivilian. House Committee

The House Committee on Expenditures in the Executivevigorously explored the question in executive

General Vandenberg (replyinguestion as to whether the Director of Central Intelligence should be appointed from

military or civilian life); . It makes not one bit of difference, except for this fact: Initially, the military are very loath to trust their top secret information to someone over whom we do not have the ability to penalize by court action if they divulge some of this. We do not have an official secret act with teeth in it, but we do have within the Army and the Navy the ability to court martial anybody.

ow, if we canilitary person in there Initially and let him organize this thing and let the flow ofget fully established, after that period it makes nowhether it is civilian or military, and the information will continue to flow. "

Rep. Manasco (commenting on General Vandenberg's . would you object to an amendment to the bill providing that, say, in therears the person at the head of the CIG mustivilian, and that will give you an opportunity then to take the civilian and train him like Mr. Hoover was trained andareer man of him? hange every four years weakens our intelligence."

General Vandenberg: ould prefer not to see it written in. It is now left up to the President and Congress under this bill to pick the man, and if he happens toilitaryhink they ought to be free to put him in. "

The Chairman: "Do you not realise that thereearreat number of our people that there are too many military men getting in? For instance, Marshall is Secretary of State and so on down, and everywhere we look, we see an Admiral or former military man."

General Vandenberg: "Yes, sir."

The Chairman: "Would not the law work better and be more acceptable if the fears, justified or not, on the part of the people were sort of allayed?"

General Vandenberg: nticipate, Mr. Chairman, that after Admiral Hillenkoetter. who the Secretary of War has statedenate Committee intend* to makeareer, that afterould anticipate that probably the next man to be appointed wouldst guess that. "

J

Rep. Judd (readingettererson whom thedescribedovernortate who was formerly withLet me read the second part of this. This gentleman says most emphatically:

'The Director shouldivilian. The

of the last few months shows the complete futility

placing otherivilian in charge of the

Intelligence Agency. an from the services will

subjected to pressure for his own particular

Unless heeakling, he will ardently desire

leave Intelligence. He will never wish to make a

of the securing of

'In the pastonths there have been three

to "rit Central Intelligence Agency. Under the set-up

the bill as now it will servetop-gap position

officers being moved up to other assignments.

gence today is not primarily military. It is political

technological, as essential in peace as in war.

career officer is likely to look on it this way.

ould like to have your comment on that. He is

man who has been immediately in charge of the prototype

the first experimental efforts in this

General Vandenberg;: eel that up to this time, the change

directors at Central Intelligence hasealthy

Rep. Judd: "Three times in IS

General Vandenberg: hink that is right. Now, we have

the diversified ideas of Navy, Army and State, and we have

different people viewing this, and it has been shifted and

with new points of view, which has been very healthy in

formative

Rep. Judd: ou would not recommend thategular policy?

General Vandenberg: "If that continued. It would be vary

mental. ointed thatelieve, when we appeared

the Senate Committee. At that time, however, Mr.

Secretary of the Navy, stated that Admiral Hillenkoetter

to makeareer. From thathink that he

a very fine choice to head this organization,gree

what the gentleman said in the letter, if you will take it

this time on.

Mr, Allen W. Dulles (commenting on the need to construct the centralized organizationermanent basis):eel that the important thing if we are going to build up an Intelligence Agency is permanence. We have got to make sure that the fellow that goes in there as head of the Central Intelligence Agency is going to stick to it. Thisob not of one year but of five or ten or fifteen years. hink J. Edgarstige and the prestige of his organization is due to the fact that he has been there for twenty-five-odd years. That ishink, with the British Intelligence Service, too. The fellow that has beenhink has been there for twenty-odd years. It takes time.

o not think,elieve therefore that the person who acts as head of that agency should activilian capacity. o not say that he shouldean he shouldivilian, and make that his lifn -work and not look forward to promotion in the Army or the Navy or the Air Corps.

"It might well be that the best person to head up that agency might have had military training up to the time be takes that job, but when he takes that job It Is like goingonastery. He has got to devote his life to that, and to nothing else."

Mr. Dulles (commenting on the curtailment of benefits should the Director of Central Intelligence return to his parentI do notould put any prohibition on that. hink ititv if the fellow that does that feels after two or three years he can go back and be an admiral or vice admiral or the other. s unsettling. The President has got to be satisfied thatellow goes into this job that he Is going to make that his life work and perform his duties to the satisfaction of the Authority under which he works."

Rep. Manasco: as thinking now, since we have no civilians in this type of work, we should have for the nextilitary man as head of it, if he continues to serve from now on and does not go back to the Army. "

Mr. Dulles: ould not affect his retirement,ould make him operateivilian while he is there. Later he may want to resign if there are provisions for his going back in the service,m skeptical about thatm afraid if you open that door too wide, you are going to dcicat the essential purpose wo are trying for."

8S

McCornuckass. J: o not think there is too much disagreement, except at the outset, Mr. Vandenberg felt that there mightilitary man at the outset."

Mr. Dulles: ave the highest regard for General Vandenberg and the others, as far as individuals are concerned. They are menery high type."

Rep. McCormack: "What would be your opinion at the outset?"

Mr. Dulles: hink that you have got to start now. If you are going to develop this thing, and develop it with tho utmostand the fellow that takes it on, who is appointedhink ought to makeife work."

Admiral Thomas Inglla {presenting assets that mUitary men would carry over into the position of Director of Central "Civilian vs. military appointee as Director of Central Intelligence: The Director of Central Intelligence should be the man best qualified for the job, whether he be civilian or military. This Is wisely provided for in the bill under consideration. ave heard many arguments on the meritsivilian director,ave no objection to the appointmentompetent civilian to the post, but there are also advantages to the appointmentilitary man to the post.

"In the first place his loyalty would be unquestioned, for any conceivable military appointee wouldan who had served his country faithfullyong period of years under clcse There can bo no question but that absolute loyalty to the Government of United States is the first requirementirector of Central Intelligence.

ilitary appointee would be politically His complete independence from political ties or commitments would give assurance that *he conclusions of tho Central Intelligence Agency will be entirely objective.

ilitary appointee would be readily available, whereas the best qualified civilian might hesitate toovernment post requiring almost certain financial sacrifices, or the abandonment of an established civilian profession. It Is not recommended, however, that an officer, no matter how well qualified, be ordered unwillingly to the position of Director of Central Intelligence. irector, whether civilian or military, should assume the post voluntarily with the intention of devoting to intelligence the rest of his useful career.

f

i

ave on occasion heard the objectionilitary man would be partial, that ha would attach too much weight to reports from military sources. It may be answeredilitary officer will be more sharply aware of military developments whichhreat to our security. It may be similarly arguedivilian would over estimate reports from civilian sources. Impartiality is not an attribute of either thj civilian orind alone. Ituality to be soughtirector regardless of his past training or career. The practice of other democratic nations has almost invariably been toilitary director to foreign intelligence and to make him responsible either to his country's General Staff or to its civil Premier. That is true, for instance, in Great Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian States.

"There hasot of confusion in the statements that nave been made about that, and vory often when they say that the Director of the intelligence service of soma countryivilian, they are referring to the counterpart of FBI, rather than to the counterpart of the Director of Central Intelligence here."

Rep. Judd (following up In detail with Admiral Inglis on distinction between "retiring" and "resigning" in connection withilitary officer as Director of CentralLet me ask you one more question. It is on this question of whether the Director shouldivilianilitary man.

"Do you think that if tha best man for the joban from the Army and Navy, and he is appointed as director of Central Intelligence, that he should resign so that he gives his whole undivided attention without any possibility of being Influenced either by bis former associations or present associations or his

own hankering perhaps to get back into the service where he spent

most of his Ufa?"

Admiral Inglls: "Yes, sir; do you mean resign or retire?"

Rep. Judd: "Either one. hink in any case,hould qualify the question, that he should resign or retire with fullof his personal rights."

Admiral Inglts: "Yes, sir, that would beep. Judd: "Yes."

Atimvral Inglis: "He shouldnter that job with the idea that he has burned his bridges behind him professionally, that he

has given up any ambition* of becoming Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and so forth. and he is in the psychological frame of mind that he will devote the rest of his life, assuming his service continues to be desired, to the national intelligence authority, to that particular job. "

Rep. Judd: "And ascivilian, after he assumes it."

Admiral Inglis: "To all intents and purposes. If Congress believes that that Is not sufficient, if they believe that however psychologically he might be prepared then for that, still two or three years later he mightittle disgusted with the way things are going, and he mighteturnankering to get back into the Navy, if they believe that, they would have to have some protection against th-it eventuality,ould suggest that Congress write into the law that the individual must retire, not resign...

ant to make that distinction between retiring and resigning. Once he has retired, he can never entertain any ambitions from then on of ever getting back into the swing."

Rep. Judd: "Do you feel that if the individual's personal rights are properly protected, that it would be better, he would be able to approach the thingreater detachment, If, as one witness here this morning testified, he ought to approach itan goingonastery, 'This Is the placean make the greatest contribution to my country in my remaining

Admiral Inglis: recisely that same philosophy about it."

House Floor

The language pertaining to the position of the Director of Central Intelligence reported out by the House Committee was the language which was eventually adopted by both Houses. Rep. Harness explained that the committee had taken special pains in drafting language pertaining to the Director of Central Intelligence to assure on the one hand that the nation would not be deprived of the servicesilitary officer in the

cosition and on the other, that any officer serving in that position would

free from undue departmental influence.

Rep. Harness: "There has been Insistence that the director of this agencyivilian. elieve we should eventually place,estriction upon the authority we are proposing to create here,ay franklym not convinced of theofestriction at the outset.

"Prolonged hearings and executive sessions of thebehind closed doors lead me to wonder if we have any single career civilian available for this jobew men who might be drafted from the services for tt. Understand, please,ant to protect this very influential post against the undue military influence which might make of this agency an American Gestapo. If we canell qualified civilian career man able and willing to handle thisould readily accede to this limitation. Let me repeat, however, that this Nation is without extended experience in this field; and that we actually havefew men qualified by experience to head this agency. Most of these few qualified men have gained their experience in the Army and Navy, and are still In service. Before we deny ourselves of the service such military men may be able to render the country in this capacity, let us be very sure that there are civilian candidates qualified by training and experience available to serve us equally well, or better.

"Again let ma sayave no objectionestriction in this measure which willivilian head in thiserely want reasonable assurance thatestriction will not deny ua of the aervices now of the best available man if this plan becomes operative. It wrote into the bill provisions that should allay any of their suspicions or fears as to what might happen if this bill is enacted Into law. eel their apprc-henaiona are without*

When the proposition was opened to amendments. Rep. Judd, explaining that he had lost out in committeemall majority,loor amendment requiringilitary officer appointed as Director of Central Intelligence must either resign or be retired. The colloquy which this amendment sparked and which eventually led to the adoption

j:substitute amendment by Rep. Brown requiring that the Director of

Central Intelligence be appointed from civilian life underscores

concern with the permanency of the position of the Director of Central

Intelligenc and its freedom from departmental influences:

Reo. Judd: "Much of the testimony before us from peoplereat deal of experience in this field was to the effect that the director shouldivilian. On the other hand, the committee did not think it ought toan who is now or at some later time may be in the military service from being appointed as director of the Central Intelligence Agency if he should be the best man for the job. It was agreed that le should not have the job unless he firstivilian so that he will have no divided loyalties, will not be standing with one foot in the civilian trough and one foot in the military trough.

"Under the present language of-this bill which thohas drawn up. It was trying to accomplish the samem after;o not believe it goes far enough. On pageines the following:

ommissioned officer of the armed services Is appointed as director then-

(A) in the performance of his duties as director, he shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect to him if heivilian in no way connected with the department of the Army, theof the Navy, the department of the Air Force, or the armed services or any component thereof.1

"Now that sounds all right, but all of us, being human beings, surely know thatne-star general is Director of Intelligence,wo-star generalhree-star general talks to him, it is wholly unrealistic to imagine that they will not have an influence over him. despite the law.

"The man who had charge of Jur secret intelligence in Germany during the warivilian, Mr. Allen Dulles. He did such an extraordinary job that he was in contact with the top men in Hitler's secret service. Hitler had to execute Us top live men because they were double-crossing him and playing bail with our people. Mr. Dulles told us that the man that takes this job ought to go into itan who goesonastery. He ought to take it as J. Edgar Hoover has taken tho FBI job- make it his life's work. He certainly ought to be cut completely loose from any ties or responsibUUies_or^onnections with any other

1

brancy of theivil orxcept theand the National Security Council.

"All this amendment does is to provide thatommis-ioned officer of the armed services is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate as Director of Intelligence, then he shall be ineligible to accept such appointment and take office until he has either resigned his commission or has been retired. The amendment provides further that he can at his own request be retired in order to accept this appointment, but his retirement rights are protected so that when he is through as Director of Intelligence he will have the same perquisites and retirement benefits asajor general or rear admiral, upper half."

Rep. Harness: "Does the gentleman think it makes any difference whether he is retired or whether he has not retired?"

Rep. Judd: o."

Rep. Harness: "His sympathies and his heart will be withbranch of the service he was connected with."

Rep. Judc: "Certainly, his heart will always be with that branch, but his organic connection with it will be broken. In no sense will he be under its control or influence. Under the bill as it is written now he is always tempted to regard himself as what he still is, an officer of the armed forces. When he gets through as Director of Intelligence, or if he does not like the work, or does not do tooob andut, mil, never mind, he can always eo back to active military service. To do that, he has to keep his bridges intact, his military fences in good repair. That is, his mind may not be single because his interest are divided. We do not want that.

"Under the amendment he will still have his retirement rights; his family will be protected, and yet he is retired and completely separated from the military service, free from any possible influence so that he does not need to consider what might happen if the time should come that he wanted or needed to go back into the military service."

Rep. Harness: the bill itself say6: 'In the performance of

his duties as Director he shall be subject to no supervision, control,

restriction, or prohibition, military or

Rep. Judd: "That is correct."

Rep. Harness: "Now, how much stronger can you make It? The only way you can change it is to say, 'You are going to

Rep. Judd: "The only way to make it stronger is to have the man resign or retire. o not want to make him resign and losa the benefits accumulated during his military life. ant him tc retire so he can go, as it were,onastery; but at the same time to preserve what he has earned as an officer in the armed services so he and his family have that security. It seems to me that this is the middle ground between the two extremes. It will give us civilian-directed intelligence, and at the same time will protect any commissioned officer. If one is appointed because he is thought to be tha best man for theope the Committee will support the amendment."

Rep. Manasco {rising in opposition to the amendment): . this section on central intelligence was given more study by ourand by the full committee than any other section of the bill. Itost difficult section to write. All of ua had the same objective in view, yet we had different idaaa on it. hink personally that the compromlae we reached adequately protects the position. ertainly trust that the head of this intelligence agency willivilian who is trained In tha agency. It takes years to train that type of

"We did our best to work out language here that would protect that position and keep from buildingo-calledhierarchy. ill will be Introduced soon aftergfsLitlon becomes law that will be referred to the Committee on Armed Services, where more study can be given to this most important subject. incerely trust that the amendment will be voted down."

Rep. Hoffman: ote the gentleman's statement that thedid its best. Yes, we did our bast, but wereat deal of doubt whan we.finished whether we were right or not. Does the gentleman recall that?"

Rep. Manasco: "We did, and still have. "

Rep. Hoffman: "We are not seeking to impose our judgment on the Members of the House."

co: "Thar is right. m justo show thai we wore all honest in our efforts to accomplish the same objective."

Rep. Holifield: "If the Members read this section carefully they will see that we did everything possible to divorce any military person from this position without taking away from him his perquisites, emoluments, pension expectations, and so forth, and also the rights of his family. "

Rep. Busbey: "Mr.rust the committee will give tho amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota (Rep. Judd) very careful consideration,hink it is extremely important. There was considerable discussion in the committee, andery, very narrow vote it was decided not to include the amendment in the bill as reported by the committee.

all the attention of the committee to one thingelieve the gentleman from Minnesota failed to emphasise due to "he fact that he did not have enough time. This nger.cy has been running lessearalf. We have had three directors of the Central Intelligence Agency in that time. No one is criticizing Admiral Hillenkoetter, the present director of the agency, but there is nothing in the world to prevent him from being removed next week or next month and replaced with someone from the War Department or tho Navy Department. The main point in the amendment offered by tho gentleman fromis permanency and the effort to workivilian head who is not Influenced by any department of our Military Establishments.

"It is true that yoa can refer to the language of the bill where it states he is relieved from this and he Is relieved from that, but ycu cannot write into legislation that human element which enters into the Military Establishment of our countryubordinate officer fearing that some day he might come under the direct commanduperior officer somewhere along the line...

"The committeehole was agreed that it would be fine toivilian head of the Central IntelUsenn- Ae*>rcy. But they did not want to includeualified military or"naval man from occupyingosition. The amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota corrects this situation,ope the Committee will adopt it."

Rep. Hardya.}: "Under the present language of the bill, assuming that the admiral now in charge continues in his present position, he would still be in the Navy, would he not?"

r.aabcv ouldbe la the Navy,. could be transferred at any time."

Rep. Hardy: "That is my point. He certainly could be transferred, and he could work it out with the Navy Department and get any other assignment that he wanti

Rep. Busbey: "Absolutely. He isaval officer.

Holifield: now the gentleman wants to be fair. Sectionageontinuing tond then In sectionxpressly states that no superior officer of any of theseshall have any control over the gentleman once he is appointed by and with the consent of the other body. He could not be shifted orour of duty. There Is absolutely no control over him. Tha gentleman knows that that language is in the act. "

Rep. Busbey:m aorry, but theelieve, did not understand my reference to human nature when it comes toofficers."

Rep. McCormack: ew observations lo make on this very important question. ant no member to underestimate the importance of this. Whatever action the Committee of the Whole takes will be most agreeable to me because if we wereery practical situation, in the subcommittee and in the fullould have voted to provide for theonlyivilian. ould have taken that action at the But we are confrontedery practical situation where the present director la an officer in the United States Navy with the rank of read admiral...

"It seems to me if we are going to keep any language in here, the language contained in the bill is preferable to thatby the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Judd. gree that whoever is appointed should be permanent. But what la permanency, unless it is appointment for life, with removal as provided for in the case of judges? We cannot give any man any assurance of permanency as far as an administrative position is concerned. The best we can do is as in the case of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover:an by hisan who impresses himself so much upon his fellowmen that permanency accrues by reason of the character of service that he renders. But J. Edgar Hoover ha* no tenure for life. He has earned it because of his unusual capacity. "

rown: "Mr.ubstitute amendmentave sent to the desk. (Substitute amendment follows:)

'On pagetrike outothon pagetrike outothand insert in lieu thereof the following: "head thereof. Tha Director shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Director shall receive compensation at the rate

"Mr. Chairman, this amendmentimplifying This amendment is offered for the purpose of settling the differences between the members of my committee, the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. It simply eliminates any quarrel or discussion about just how we take care of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency if he shouldommissioned officer by providing very simply that the Director shallivilian. Thenesult you can strike out all of subsection (b) and on down to linen

Rep. Judd: ay say to the gentleman from Ohio andyself prefer his amendment and have from the beginning. ave one exactly like itntended to offer if theave offered were to be defeated. Inas trying to go halfway between requiring that tho rru.r. to be appointed beivilian, andhance for men now in the military service to take the job as civilians, but without losing their retirement rights."

Rep. Brown:emind the gentleman from Minnesota that at times one comes to the place where one has to go all the way, where one cannot go halfway.

"In my mind the people are afraid of just on* thing in connection with this bill and in connection with many otherthat have come before this Congress in recent months and recent years, and that Is they are afraidilitary government, some sortuper-dictatorship which might arise in this They are afraid. In this particular instance, over the possibility that there might be some sort of Gestapo set up in this country.

ill agreeill admit to you very frankly that It is entirely possible that you mightilitary officer who would like to do that;now one thing, that If youivilian to be the head of this agency then you will not have any danger within the agency of military influence oro not believe the present occupant of that office would ever abuseave the highest confidence in him,o not know who may succeed him. We have had three different military officers in charge of this central intelligence group or agency In the lastonths, and we might have more. ay to you that we needivilian of the type of J. Edgar Hoover in charge of an agency like this, and the appointmentivilian would at leastartial guaranty to Che peopiu oi the Unitud Status that this agency is not going to be usurped by any branch of tha armed services at any

esigned military officer is no longer under the control or direction of the military branch. etired military officer is subject to recall in time of emergency, still has to take certain orders and instructions from the military branch of the Government. The gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Judd) in his provision toilitary officer to hold the post, set up certain safeguards. My amendment goes the whole

Congressman Judd's amendment as amended by tbe substitute offered by Congressman Brown was adopted by the House. However, the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses onecommended on7 the Identical language which had been reported out by the House Committee on Expenditures in thoDepartments:

. (a) There is hereby established under the National Securityentral Intelligence Agencyirector of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof. The Director shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of tie Senate, from among the commissioned officers of the armed services or from among Individuals in civilian life. The Director shall receive compensation at the rateear.

(b) ommissioned officer of the armed services is appointed as Director then--

in the performance of his duties as Director, he shall be subject to no supervision, control,or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect to him if heivilian in no way connected with the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Ihe Air Force, or the armed services or any component thereof; and

he shall not possess or exercise anycontrol, powers, or functions (other than such as he possesses, or is authorized or directed to exercise, as Director) with respect to the armed services or any component thurcof, the Department of the Army, theof the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force, or any branch, bureau, unit or division thereof, or with respect to any of the personnel (military or civilian) of any of the foregoing.

(2) Except as provided in paragraphheto the office of Directorommissioned officer ofservices, and his acceptance of and service inshall in no way affect any status, office, rank, ormay occupy or hold in the armed services, or anyright, privilege, or benefit incident to orof any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any suchofficer shall, while serving in the office ofthe military pay and allowances (active or retired,case may be) payableommissioned officer of hislength of service and shall be paid, from any fundsdefray the expenses of the Agency, annual compensationrate equal to the amount byxceeds thehis annual military pay and allowances. 31

Onh ofhairman Hoffman, in recommending

that the House agree to the Conference Report,*'^ explained:

"You will recall that when the House passed on this legislation it amended the bill H.hich the committee reported, with reference to the Central Intelligence Agency. The committee had written into therovision that the head of that agency mightivilianan from the armed The House amended the bill to provide that he shallivilian. During the debate the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Judd) offered an amendment which provided thatan from theervices was appointed he should be required to relinquish his rank and his authority in the Army...

when we went into conference, the conferees for the other body flatly refused to accept that amendment. They had made certain concessions to which your attention will be called later on, but on that one they stood pat. They refused to accept the House amendment to the committee bill so your conferees compromised by accepting the language of thes reported by your committee to the House, thus discarding the amendment written into the bill by the House which would have required that the head of that agencyivilian. My own choice,hink the choice of six of the seven members of the House subcommittee who were conferees, was that the head of that agency shouldivilian, but we could not get it, so we went along with that compromise. It seeks to divorce the head of the agency from the armed servicesanhe service is appointed."

itt opportunity for Congressional Impact on the position through the innate confirmation proceedings. b) assured. In so :ir as possible, that any commissioned officer of the armed forces appointed to the position would be free from outside control. The 'elibera-lions leading to the enactment of these provisions made furtherto the understanding of the position of the Director of Central Intelligence and the agency he would head by underscoring the non-politicalature of the tasks to be faced and the freedom (rom departmental influence that would be needed to assure their accomplishment.

IX. INTERNAL SECURITY As earlytatement of principles formulated for the President maintained:

"Thatervice (Permanent United lUtas Foreign Intelligence Service) should not operate clandestine intelligence within the United States.

"That It should have no policy functions and should not be identified with any law-enforcing agency either at home or abroad.

The Presidential Directive of6 reinforced and

i

Implemented these principles by providing that:

"4. No police, law enforcement or internal security functions shall be exercised under thisnd

"9. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorizeof Investigations inside the continental limits of

United States and its possessions, except as provided by law and Presidential directives."

I

Thus, the issue of internal security had received attention from the outset,lear and complete divorce between internal security functions and foreign intelligence functions had been explicitly

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee and

House Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments, General

Vandenberg pointed out that the President's directive:

ncludes an express provision that no police, law enforcement, or Internal security functions shall be exercised. These provisions are important, for they draw the lines very sharply between the CIG and the FBI. In addition, theagainst police power* or internal security functions will assure that the Central Intelligence Group can neverestapo or security

It Is recalled, however, that the CIA section of the Presidential

draft of the National Security Act7 relied upon the legislative

technique of establishing the functions of the DCI and CIA by reference

to the6 Presidential Directive. Consequently, th* jpe-

cific language of proscription of the Presidential Directive did not

appear In the CIA section. This lack of specificity together with the

overall concern with the general subject of internal security led Che

ommitter torovision in therohibiting the

Agency from having the power of subpoena and from exercising internal

police powers, provisions not included in the original bill nor in.

The House Committee considered the issue of internal security

from two different aspects. The first related to simply prohibiting

the Agency from engaging in internal security functions. The secind

concern related to the Agency's relationship with the Federal Bureau

of Investigation in the interest of assuring the integrity of "domestic

information" in the files of the Bureau. The issue of internal security

from both of these aspects was developed before the House Committee

as brought out in the following colloquies during executive session:

General Vandenberg (in replyinguestion as to whether the Central Intelligence Group operated in foreign or domestic fields): "The National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group have nothing whatsoever to do with anything domestic; so whenever we talk about the Central Intelligence Croup or the NIA. it always means foreign intelligence, because we have nothing to ao with (domestic intelligence."

Rep. Holifieid: "That was my understanding,anted it

General Vandenberg (later in commenting upon specificlanguage): ery strongly advocate that it have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal-security

General Vandenberg (in replyinguestion as to whether the Central Intelligence Agency might endanger the rights and privileges of the people of the United States): "No,o not think there is anything in the bill, since it is all foreign intelligence, that can possibly affect any of theof the people of the United States."

Rep. Brown: "Thereot of things that might affect the privileges and rights of the peoplo of the United States that are foreign, you

Rep. Hale Boggsin obtaining Mr. Dulles'rivate citizen, sir, and with your experience in this field, do you have any suggestions or do you think thereecessity of putting in additional safeguards on this Central Intelligence Agency to protect ur, as citizens of the United States, from what this thing might possibly be or develop into?"

Mr. Dulles: o not really believe so. You meanestapo established here in the United States?"

Rep. Boggs: "Will you clarify that question? ust add this? Under this Act the authorities and functions of the Central Intelligence Agency would be based entirely upon an Executive Order issued by the President which could be changed, amended or revoked or anything else at any time.

"Now, the real question comes down to whether or not we should write into this Act the limitations and restrictions or define the functions and the activities in which they should engage, rather than dependather nebulous thing called an Executive Order, which is here today, but may be gone In three minutes, if the President decides to sign some other paper."

Mr. Dulles:ooid prefer to see the Congress, not in too much detail, however, define tha nature and functions of tha Central Intelligence

Rep. Wilson: uestion?

"With the provision in the bill that the activities of the Central Intelligence Bureau are confined out of the limits of the continental United States and in foreign fields, do you think that that would tend to confine their activities? Now could theyestapo in thia country with that?"

Mr. Dulles: o not think there is any real danger of that. The/ would hi.ve to exercise certain functions innited States. They would have their headquarters in tha United States."

Rep. Wilson: "But their activities would not be here, would they?"

Mr. Dulles: "We have lived along with, pretty well,o not think itestapo; and if the F. B. I. has notestapo. It seems to mo that there is extremely little likelihood of any danger Lore. Tbe field Is different. They have no police powers, and they should have no police powers. They cannot put their hanrfningla individual."

Rep. Wilson: "My understanding is that this bill takes that right away from them, any police power or anything else within the confines of this country. Their operations are foreign, except to disseminate information, of course."

Mr. Dulles; "They cannot exercise police powers."

Rep. Wilson: "Itecret situation. Let us not try to rule

Rr:i. [in asking certain questions relating to the FBI and the CIA): ave one other point. They do not operate, as brought out. in the United States. For instance, hereaturday some foreign agentlane out of Paris for LaCuardia Field. He lands there on Saturday. Well, any

agent of that kind has to come under the F. B. I. in this country. They drop him when he leaves France,o not think the present set-up is adequate to handle the situation. Then they follow him here in the United States for whatever period of time he has here, and then he probably would go to Mexico. Well,, drops him at the border and some otherof Cei ;ral Intelligence picks him up down there in Mexico. "

Mr. Dulles: "On the secondelieve thoroughly there mustlose coordination between the new agency andhink that that has been working pretty well as farnow.

"You are perfectly right that if the Intelligence Service picksge:it and finds hemo the United States, that ought to go to, like that, and, ought to pick the fellow up or watch him when he arrives. Then, if he leaves this country, the F. B. I. ought to notify the Central Intelligence Agency that he has gone. Thatuestion of coordination,elieve with the right kind of people, there is no reason why you cannot have close cooperation between this agency and the State Department and thend the ONI and.

"If you have that, you have something; and if you are going to have all of these agencies fighting among themselves, you are not going to get anywhere. "

Rep. Manasco (in discussing the meaning of certainMr. Dulles, would not the language to 'evaluate or disseminate intelligence' cover almost anything in the world that they wanted to do?"

Mr. Dulles: "But, then, you get into the question of what is to be the relationship with the others."

Rep. Manasco: "So far as giving CIG authority to gatherthat language could not be expanded on any by Congress, "

Mr. Dulles: as looking over this. io not know what the

status of tho other bill was."

Rep. Bender Ohio): "It was introduced by the Chairman of the Committee because certain recommendations were made by individuals appearing before thenderstand."

r

Rep. Manaaco: hink that language would include

in the world.

Rep. Judd: "The question is whether you should have some limitations on it. You would have three things. You want the objective and. second, its power and. third, the powers it docs not have."

Rep. Manasco: "Limit it to foreign countries, of course. "

Mr. Dulles: "There is one little problem there. Itery important Section of the thing, theaised there. In New York and Chicago and all through the country where we have these business organizations and philanthropic and other organizations who send their people throughout the world. Theyremendous amount of information. There ought toay of collecting that in the United States,magine that would not be excluded by any terms of your bill."

Rep. Manasco: "The fear of the committee as to collectingon our own nationals, we do not want that done,o not think the committee has any objection to their going to any source of information that our nationals might have on foreign operations. Is that your understanding?"

Rep. Wadaworth: "Yes."

Rep. Manasco: "They could go to Chicago and talk to theof some of the machinery firms that have offices all over the world."

Mr. Dulles: "That must be done. "

Rep. Manasco: hink we would have no objection to his gettinglane in France andan around the United States."

Rep. Brown: "He might follow one or two of these boys that we brought over to see how we did the war work."

Rep. Judd: "As to Russian agents in this country, only, watches

Admiraltatement of overallDomestic Security: y view that the activities of the Central Intelli-

1

Y

no

Rep. Manasco: "The CIG agent would not necessarily be interested in the cHminal actions that go on in the United States."

Admiral Inglis: "No, sir."

Rep. Manasco: "It would be purely security. "

Admiral Inglis: dmit without any argument that there are difficult problems that are going to come up in that connection, and my only solutionave is men of good will to sit around the table and work them out. "

Rep. Judd: "Of the two alternatives that you have delineated, you prefer the former, good coordination. "

Admiral In^Us: refer Ihe latter. refer to leave the organized spy networks abroad to CIG and any information that they get which is pertinent to FBI's work at home in the law enforcement field, let it be turned over to FBI by CIG.

Rep. Judd: "By the same token, could FBI call on CIG for information regarding the source of opium that was coming from where we did not know, Iran or China or somewhere?"

Admiral Inglis: "Absolutely. "

Rep. Hardy: "Granted that thereossibility that operatives representing different agencies, operating in the same area might get in each others' hair, might they not get slightly different slantsarticular piece of information they are trying to secure so that put together it wouldetter picture than the one-sided view that would be gotteningle individual agency?"

Admiral Inglis: "That is conceivable, yes, sir. Of course, any information that we get is usually checked from two or more different sources. For example, we may get from thewhich the Russian Government is making to the Russian people an indication that some political move is afoot. We get the idea that they are preparing the Russian peoplefor some important political move in the international field. We will want to have that deduction confirmed by some other source. This source is the Russian Government propaganda to its own people.

u

"Well, now, perhaps we will ask CIG to get someif they can, from their agents, bearing on that particular problem, to confirm or not what we have deduced from these Russian propaganda broadcasts."

Rep. Hardy: "Theas trying to make, though, is if you have more than one agency securing information in alocality, are you not more likely to be able to getyou can rely on than youingle one there, because it has got to be acknowledgedot of the information they get is deliberately planted for them."

Admiral Inc.lis: "That is right, sir. o not think go, sir. That ic an imponderable, and in a. certain case what you Bay might work out that way. "

Rep. Hardy: "It might cost more money; it would cost more money."

Admiral Inglis: "It would cost more money, and it would lead to morehink, than it is worth, becauseay, these people would not know each other's identity, and they would be spending their time chasing each other, instead of going after the real antagonist, the real intelligence target."

Rep. Hardy: "You are presuming there that you would have direct employees over there, rather than that you might be working on locale you not? "

Admiral Inglis: "Well, whatever you are doing, you have to have some men over there who are operating this spy network, and if you have two of them, they are going to get their wires crossed, and your men are going toood deal of their energies uselessly to either keeping out of the hair of the other operatives, or else unknowingly they are going to be chasing each other, and not producing the information that you want."

Rep. Hardy: "Thank you."

Rep. Ghenowetholo.): "Are you talking about the FBIdmiral Inglia: particularly; any two organized spyep. Chenoweth: hought you wereistinction. "

Admiral Inglis: "We started out that way,hought your question was more general."

Rep. Hardy "It was."

Rep. Chenoweth: "You could not refer to the FBIpy organization; theyaw enforcement agency."

Admiral Inglis: "Yes, sir."

Rep. Chenoweth: "They have an entirely different function, no conflict whatever."

Admiral inglis; "Not in function. "

Rep. Chenoweth: "They should not be in each others' hair at any time.

Admiral Inglis: "They might be in the field of countcr-espiona because that isinction of FBI*"

Rep. Chenoweth: "So far as the foreign activity is concerned, there is no excuse for them operating In foreign countriesan see."

Admiral Inglis: "No,o not meanep. CVmoweth: "That is your contention. "

Admiral Inglis; "That is my contention, but that has not been the case.

Rep. Chenoweth: as surprisedearned today that they were operating in foreign countries. id not knowhought they confined their activities exclusively to the United States. "

Admiral Inglis: "Their responsibility is confined to the United States, but tn meeting that responsibility, they do have interests abroad. Ituestion of whether they are going to send their own people abroad to do that, or whether they are going to let CIG do

Rep. Brown [in questioning the Secretary of the Navy): "This Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director, should he decide he wants to go into my income taxresume he could do so, could he not?"

Secretary Forrestal: o not assume he could.

hink he wouldery shortm not referring to you, Mr. Brown,hink he wouldery short life."

Rep. Brown: "Well, he probably would, if he sent into mine, (sic)as woudering how far this goes.

"Thisery great departure from what we have done in the past, in America.

"Perhaps we have not been as good as we should have been,ill agree with that, either in our military or foreign intelligence,m very much interested in seeing the United State* have a*oreign military and naval intelligence aa they can possibly have,m not Interested in setting up hare in the United States any particular central policy agency under any President,o not care what his name may be. and just allow him toestapo of his own if he wants to have it.

"Every now and then youan that comes up in power that has an imperialistic Idea."

Secretary Forrestal; 'The purposes of the Central Intelligence Authority are limited definitely to purpose* outside of thisexcept the collation of information gathered by other Government agencies.

"Regarding domestic operations, tha Federal Bureau of Investigation is working at all times in collaboration with General Vandenberg. Ha relies upon them for domestic activities."

Rep. Brown: "Is that stated in tha law?"

Secretary Forrestal: "It is not; no, sir."

Rep. Brown: "That could be changedinutes, and have tha

action within the United States instead of without; is that correct?

Secretary Forrestal: "Ha could only do so with the President's direct and specific approval."

Pep. Brown: now, but even then it could be done without violation of law by the President or somebody who might write the order for him and getpproval, and without theand consent or direction of the Congress.

"Do you think it would be wise for the Congress of the United States to at least fix aome limitations on what the power of this individual might be, or what could be done, or what should

be done, and all these safeguards and rights of the citizen may

be protected?"

" thin* is pTftflfhlt to expire what

you need for protection,m in complete sympathy about tha dangere of sliding into abrogation of powers by tha Congreas.

"On the other hand. If you had limited Mr. Hoover, for example, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to operations only domestically, he might have been very greatly hampered in this last war, "

Rep. Brown: m not talking about domestically, and interna-tionally alone,m talking about how far he can go in his studies and inveatigationa, eapecially of individuals and citi-zena, and for what purposes he can conduct his investigation.

"Now, the Federal Bureau of Investigation la under certain reatrainta by law. "

Secretary Forreatah "That is correct. "

Rep. Brown: "The Secret Service has certain dutiea andwritten out, word by word, in tha statutes."

Secretary Forrestal: "Itroblem for the Congress and the Executive uepartments, Mr. Brown. ay, exploration certainly could be profitable.

"However, there is not the slightest question,an assure you from my own experience and knowledge that you need someone in this Government who is going to be charged with that aspect of national^

Admiral Sherman (onuestion on greater specificity on the bill): "Well, sir; in my opinion, that isroblem in the convenience and handling of legislation. ould like to comment thai in the existing directive to the Central Intelligence Group, their appears this provision, 'no police, law enforcement.

I

or internal security functions shall be exercised under this'elt that that was fairly concise about the matter that has been discussed here."

Rep. Harness: "Of course, that can be changed, can it not?"

Admiral Sherman: ould not think so under this legislation;mawyer. If there is concern about it, it seems to me that it is something that could be rectified with very few words."

Rep. Harness: "Well, did you have anything to do with theof this bill, Admiral?"

Admiral Shcvman- "Yun,reat deal to io with it. .

Dr. Bush (inuestion concerning tha danger of the Central Intelligence Agencyestapo): hink there is no danger of that. The bill provides clearly that it is concerned with intelligence on internal affairs,hink thisafeguard against its becoming an empire.

"We already have, of course, the FBI in this country, concerned with internal matters, and tha collection ofIn connection with law enforcement internally. We have had thatood many years. hink there are very fewwho believe this ar.-angernent jgUl gat beyond control so that It will be an improper affair."

In line with the House Committee's overall desire for specificity in provisions relating to the Central Intelligence Agency, H. as reported out. contained thethat the Agency shall have

no police subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security

- ^ unctions.

Thus. Congressman Hoiiiield could explain during the floor

civil liberties of our people,elieve this agency has had written around it, proper protections against the invasion of the police and the subpena powersomestic policeant to impress upon the minds of the Members that the work of this Central Intelligence Agency, as far as the collection of evidence is concerned, is strictly in the field of secret foreign intelligence, what is known as clandestine intelligen ce. ave no right in the domestic field to collect informationlandestine military nature. They can evaluate it; yes."

Thc Federal Bureau of Investigat'lor.

That aspect of the internal security issue relating to access by

the Central Intelligence Agency to information in the possession of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was not so easily resolved.

Underf the Presidential Directive of

the intelligence received by the Departments of State, War and Navy's intelligence agencies was to be made "freely available" to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, or dissemination. Further, the operations of these three intelligence agencies were to be

opened to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence in connec-

tion with his planning for coordinationo the extent approved by the National Intelligence Authority. These provisions were carried over into H.4 as reported in committee:

. (e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence operations of the departments and other agencies of theas relate to the national security shall be open to theof the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by suchand other agencies shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemina-

Whereas the6 Presidential Directive by its terms

applied solely to the intelligence agencies of the Departments of State, War,

and Navy, the language reported out by the committee applied to all Federal

departments and agencies. When the matter was opened tc amendment

during the floor discussion, Congressman Judd pointed out that this would

authorize the Agency to inspect the operations of the FBI and he offered an

amendment to eliminate this possibility. This amendment was approved by

the House and its thrust was incorporated in the Act as it emerged from

conference. Excerpts of the House floor discussion on the amendment follow:

Rep. Judd: "Mr. Chairman, to reassure the committee let me say that this is the only otherhall offer,resent it now because it also has to do with the CentralAgency, If the members of the committee will look on pagef the bill,ubsectionnd follow along withhink we can make it clear quickly. The subsection reads;

'(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence operation? of the departments and other agencies of the Government as relate to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence. '

"The first half of the amendment deals with that. It strikes out the words inand other agencies. 1 Why? Primarily to protect the FBI. gree that all intelligence relating to the national security which the FBI,mic Energy Commission, and other agencies with secret intelligencedevelop should be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination. The second half of my amendment provides that their intelligence must be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence. But under the amendment he would not have the right to go down into and inspect the intelligence operations of agencies like the FBI as he would of the departments. o not believe we ought to give this Director of Central Intelligence power to reach into the operations of J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI, which are in the domestic field. Under the language as it now stands he can do that.

fmm2

"The Director of Central Intelligence is supposed to deal with all possible threats to the country from abroad, through intelligence activities abroad. But without this amendment he will have not only tho results of the FBI's intelligence activities hers at home, but also the power to inspect its operations. o not believe that if we had realized the full import of this language when we were studying it in committee we 'vould have allowed it to stand as it is. Surely we want to prottho Atomic Energy Commission and the FBI from the Director of Central Intelligence coming in and finding out who their agents are, what and whore their nets are, how they operate, and thus destroy their"

Rep. Busbey "Under the present language of the bill, is it not the gentleman's judgment that the Central Intelligence Agencyhe right, the power, and the authority ts go dc-vn and inapect any records of the FBI which deal with internal security, whereas the Central Intelligence Agency deals only with external security?"

Rep. Judd: "Yea; not only inspect its records but also inspect its operations, and that includes its activities and itse do notoment want that to happen. ope the members of tho committee will accept thi* amendment."

;

Rep. Manasco: "If you do not give tha Director of Centralauthority to collect intelligence in this country andit to tha War Department and Navy Department, the Air Force, and the State Department, wny not strike the entire section out?"

Rep. Judd: "We do under this amendment give him that powor. We say: 'Such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments, and other agencies of the Government'--that includes the FBI andother'shall be made available to tho Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and

Rep. Manasco: "If the FBI has intelligence that might be of benefit to the War Department or State Department, certainly that should be made available."

Rep. Judd: "Under this amendment it will be madeo not strike that par: oi tho >ection out. All the intelligence the FBI has and that the Atomic Energy Commission has must be available to the Director of Central Intelligence if it relate* to the national security. But tho Director of Central Intelligence

will not have the right to inspect their operations, which isifferent thing. o not think we ought to give theof Central Intelligence the right to go into the operations of FBI. "

Rep. Stefaneb.): "In setting up the Central Intelligence group it was agreed that the FBIart of the organization. Now, what would the gentleman's amendment do?"

i

Rep. Judd: "Does the gentleman state that the FBIart of the Central Intelligence Agency?"

i

Rep. Stefan: "Certainly. nderstand it, as it was explained to our committee, the FBI information would be part of the information secured by the CIG."

Rep. Judd "That is right. The FBI information would beto the Director of Central Intelligence, but under mythe FBI operations would not be part of the Centralas they would be under the present language of the

Rep. Stefan: "But the CIG could draw any informal,;on from the FBI it wanted?"

Rep. Judd: "Yes, it would be made available, if reining to the national security."

Rep. Stefan: "But what would the gentleman's amendment do other thar what this is doing?"

Rep. Judd: "It would merely withdraw the right of the Director of Central Intelligence to inspect the intelligence operations of the FBI. It would still make available to him the intelligence developed by FBI. "

Tie.p. Stcfai^ "Does the gentlemanthat this section on Central Intelligence makes it possible for the Director of the CIG to go into Mr. Hoover's office?"

Rep. Judd: "That is right. "

Rep. Stefan: "And supersede his direction of FBI operations?"

Rcp. Judo: cl'i. itlainly that 'Such intelligenceof the departments and other agencies of the Government as relate to the national security shall be open to the inspection

-

of the Director of Central Intelligence.' 'Other agencies' certainly includes the FBI.

Rep. Stefan: "And the gentleman objects to the inspection of it. does he?"

Rep. Judd- "The inspection of its operations;ep. Stefan: gree with the gentleman. "

Rep. Judd: "Then the gentleman will support myep. Stefan: ertainly shall. "

Rep. Judd: "Under it. the information is all available, but the operations are not open to tiapecticn."

Rep. Johnsonalif.): ant to get this straight. If the FBI has information about fifth-column activities and subversive information affecting the national defense, would that be open to the Central Intelligence Agency?"

Rep. Judd: "Yes. It must be made available under thia aub-section. but the Director of Central Intelligence under mycould not go in and inspect J. Edgar Hoover's activities and work. Central Intelligence is supposed to operate only abroad, but it will have available all the pertinent domestic information gathered by the FBI. It should not be given power to inspect the operations of the FBI. "

Rep. Holifield: "The gentleman realizes that the limitationa in the first lines would limit his ability to go in and inspect any operation. "

Rep. Judd- "That Is true. "

Rep. Holifield: o not think it is necessary for him to inspect the operations in order to set up his own intelligence unit In the way that he wants to.oint out that the National Security Council Is composed of the Secretaries of State, of National Defense, of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the National Security Resources Board, and the Central Intelligence Agency, so it seems to me that the protection of the National Security Councilheck and the Presidentheck. ardly think that the man could exceed his authority."

Rep. Judd:elieve the FBI operations should be protected beyond question. It is too valuable an agency to be tampered with. "

Rep. Thomas. ): ant to say to the gentleman from Minnesotam wholeheartedly in favor of his amendment. If we open tho doors to the Central Intelligence Agency to go In and inspect the operations of the FBI, you are starting to do the thing that is going to oe the end of the FBI In time, because you will open lt to this agency and then you will open it to somebody else. hink we willreat mistake unless we accept the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota."

Rep, Judd: hank the gentleman. hink wo will all agree he knows what he Is talking about. "

Rep, flusbey: "In reference to the gentleman from California (Mr.hen he states that we can assume that this National Security Agency will do this and doust wish to remind the membership that the trouble in the past with legislation has been that we have not taken the time to spell out the little details. It is these assumptions we have had that have gotten us into trouble. hink it is very important that the gentleman's amendment be adopted. "

Rep. Andreaeninn.): "Is there anything in here that permits the FBI to inspect the personnel of the Central Intelligence?

Rep. Judd: "No; there is not. "

Rep. Andrescn: nderstand that some of the men In Central Intelligence at the present time are certain foreign-born persons who might need some inspection, and they hold some verypositions with Central Intelligence. "

Rep. Judd; ave had no information on that one way or the other. ust assume the Director of Central Intelligence is going to exorcise utmost care in choosing his personnel. ope this amendment will be adoptedannot see how it can hurt the Central Intelligence Agency In the slightest and It certainly will protect the inteUsjaence operations of FBI and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Cms}

Conferees

The language adopted by the Kojse and Senate conferees in con-

nection with the Intelligence of other departments and agenciaa of the

Government provided:

. (e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such Intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except aa hereinafter provided, relating to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and ia possassad by such departments and other agencies of theexcept as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination: Provided, however. That upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, theof the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available toirector of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to tha national4

Thus, tha Inspaction role ofirector of Central Intelligence

was identified with "intelligence" as contrasted with "Intelligence

" Tha correlation, evaluation, and dissemination functions

preserved by directing that intelligence relating to national security be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence.

e) applied to all departments and agencios of the

Government. However, in the case of the FBI, institutionalas well as functional disengagement between tha Central Intelligence Agency and the domestic intelligence of the FBI was achieved.

Summary

A clear and complete divorce from internal security functions hadonstant principleovernment-wide foreign intelligence service s'nce Its early conceptualization.

Clearly,overnment-wide foreign intelligence serviceegitimate interest in using domestic sources for obtaining intelligence information originating outside of the United States. This was fully appreciated by the Congress In establishing the cleavage between the intelligence functions of the Central Intelligence Agency and thefunctions of tha other departments and agencies.

124

X. NATIONAL SECURITY ACT7 Publich Congress, the National Security Actas approved by the Congress onh of7 and was

1

siftned by President Truman tbe following day. The provisions relating to the Central Intelligence Agency became effectivehe day after Mr. James Forrestal took the oath of office as the first Secretary of Defense.

f the National Security Act7 established the

j

position of the Director of Central Intelligence and the CentralAgency. It also established functions and executive branchfor central intelligence. Congress provided the Agencyefinitive charter which did not unduly circumscribe, curtail, or interfere with functions of other agencies and departments of Government.

During the almost five months of Congressionalignificant number of issues concerning CIA were resolved, this despite tha fact that CIA was only one segmentighly complicated andlegislative proposal.

Controversy surrounding the Agency which was prompted primarilyisunderstanding of tha functions to be performed was resolved for the most part to the satisfaction of all parties concerned. ore general level the legislative history surrounding CIA bespeaks ofsupport for institutionalizing foreign intelligence to serve the needs of the President and his policy advisors. In so far aa it is possible

i

to achieve an executive objective through legislation. Congress provided authority and responsibility for both the comprehensive and effective functioning of central intelligence, in all its elements.

While an enabling set setting forth administrative authorities for the Central Intelligence Agency would become the next pressing order of business, central intelligence as an integral function of thaBranch of Government had been statutorily prescribed. Thia would permit those charged with the responsibility for administering the Agency to get on with the demanding job of building an organization equal to the important national responsibility levied upon it.

Name

Andrews, Rep. Walter G.us.in, Sen. Warren R.t. J

Baldwin, Sen. Raymondender, Rep. George K.hio) Boggs, Rep. Halerown, Rep. Clarence J.hio)

Busbey, Rep. Fred E.ush, Dr. Vannevar

Chenoweth. Rep. J. Edgarheston, Charles S. Clifford. Clark M.

Donovan, Colonel William J. "Donovan'srinciples" DOVQi Rep- W. J. Bryanulles, Allen W.

Eisenhower, General Dwigfat D. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy James

Gurney, Sen. Chan

Hardy, Rep. Portorarness, Rep. Robert A.ill, Sen. ListerUlenkoetter, Admiral Roscoe Hoffman. Rep. Clareolifield. Rep. Cheloover, J. Edgar

Inglis. Rear Admiral Thomas

48

35

47

107

.

6

7

7 67

8

42

,

2

1

6

8

Judd, Rep. Walterinn.)

Rep. Charles J. ovett, Assistant Secretary of War Robert

Manasco. Rep. Carterarshall, General George C. Murphy. Charles

McCormack. Rep. Johnass.)

Nimitz. Admiral Chester W. Norstad. General Lauris

Robertson. Sen. Edward V.oosevelt. Franklin O.

Sherman. Vice Admiral Forrest P.

Short, Rep. Deweyikes, Rep. Robert L. F.paatz, General Carl

Thomas, Sen. Elbert D.tah) Truman, Harry S.

Tydings. Sen. Millard E.andenberg, General Hoyt E.

17

0

26

5

2

48

48

5

1

2

8

Rep. James W..ilson, Rep. Earlilson, Rep. J. Franklinexas)

106

106

Subiect

Intelligence Group

Deputy Director of Central Tn-rllijer.c* Director of Central Intelligence

28

Office of the President Fust War Powers1 Intelligence Advisory Board National Intelligence Authority

National Intelligence Service National Security Act7

National Security Council

IS

5

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I.

Forrief summary of the authorities of Central Intelligence, See Kirkpatrick, "Origins, Missions, and Structure of CIA" in Studies In Intelligence, Volume II, No.

Articleection 8.

Story Commentaries on the Constitution, II,th

Reorganization Plan No..3

Executive. R.

Administrative Order of the President,

Order of the

Order ofed.

10. Actually the President hau earlier, onilitary order as Commander In Chief, designating this office as the Coordinator of Strategic Information to include the performance of dutiesmilitary character" for the President. The preeminence of the President's regular military advisors for military matt era was corrected in theuly order.

Presidential letter dated

House Committee on the Judiciary, Report5

Military Order,ed. Reg. For establishment of Joint Chiefs of Staff and description of its functions and duties. See Federal Records of World WarI,. National

Activities and Records Service, and Ray S. Cline. Washington Command Post: The Operation.n (United State* Army in World War II

14. Executive

15. Executive7ed. Reg.. and Executiveed.

.

.

War Agencies Appropriation Acttat.National War Agencies Appropriation Actseeinternal requirements to

assure the full satisfaction of this high trust.

Need Octonovan Memo to Pres.

Memo for the President from William J. Donovan, Director,ith attached directive "Substantive Authority Necessary In Establishmententral Intelligence Service."

by the Joint Strategic Surveyentral Intelligence.

J. C..

Letter from Director, OSS, to Director, BOB, dated

Including an extensive "Report on Intelligence Matters" from Brig. Gen. John Magruder, Director. Strategic Services.

Memorandum for the Secretary of War, "Preliminary Report of Committee Appointed to Study War Department Intelligence Activities".

Letter from President to Secretary of State, dated

Memorandum for the Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, from

Secretary oi State, Subject: National Intelligence Authority.

31. Letter from Secretary of State to Secretaries of War and Navy, National Intelligence Authority,

"Establishment of National Intelligencettachment to5 memorandum from Secretary of State to Secretaries of War and Navy, Subject: National Intelligence Authority.

Letter to President from Secretaries of State, War, and Navy,

Memo from Special Assistant for the Secretary of State to the Secretaries of War and Navy. NLA,

Draft "Directive Regarding the Coordination of Intelligencearagraph 8.

S. B. L. Penrose.ollection of Background Papers on Development of CIA, dated

Memorandum to General Magruder from Commander Donovan, General Counsel..

38. Letter to the President from Secretaries" of State. War, and Navy,

Memo for the President from William J. Donovan, Director, OSS, dated ISithective, "Substantive Authority Necessary in Establishment of -he Central Intelligence Service."

Ibid. 38

Memo for Clark M. Clifford,ubject: Proposed Enabling Legislation for the EstablishmentIA.

to hire personnel directly and independent budgetmost. Fortunately BOB, CAO, State, War, Navy,recognized the problems and made arrangements which

enable CIG to operate. egards working fund for

DCI.

Letter from President Truman to Senator Thomas Walsh,May and Vinson.

This section was deleted from final draft. CIG had urged that phrase "subject to existing law" be eliminated as It adds nothing and many of the functions and authorities of this Agency are excepted from existing law." (Letter to Charles Murphy,) While Aamiral Leahy, the President's personal representative to the NIA, agreed, Mr. Murphy suggested that the entire clause be omitted and CIC agreed. (Pageroposed legislation for CIG, Chief, Legislative Liaison Divisionfor the Record.)

Memorandum for the Record, Proposed Legislation for CIG, Chief,

Legislative Liaison Division, CIG.

salary was loweredy the Whiteon basis that incumbent wouldilitary orwhose salary should not be greatly in excess of thatof Staff or Chief of Naval Operations, and it wasthe same level as that of Director, Military Applications ofCIG Legislation Memorandum for the Record,Liaison Division.)

Househ Congress. Second

Senateh Congress. Second Session.

New York Times..ol. 1.

See Pageupra lor the wording of the CIA section. Title II was changed toince it. on the highest level, under the immediate supervision of the President, the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies and functions of the Governmentto NationalS.h Congress, First Session). Further. Coordination for National. was outside, separate and apart, from the Defense(and) in an effort toealization to the members of the Committee that we wereational security organization andational militaryas able to have the Committee amend thehus at least placing first things first." (Senator Robertson,Record,uly.)

The Legislative Reorganization Plan6 combined thefor Naval Affairs and the Committee for Military Affairs.

he DCI, General Hoyt Vandenberg, was succeeded by Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter.

Congressional Record.

Senator Thomai had worked on the Common Defense Act6 which was repoi :ed out of the Military Affairs Committee but which died in the Naval Affairs Committee.

Congressional Record.

Testimony before Senate Armed Services

59- Testimony before Senate Aimed Services Committee.

Hearings before House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments on H.3

5

Secretary Forrestal was to be appointed the first Secretary of Defense.

0

6

Senate, p.h Congress, First

House, p.h Congress, First Session,

Congressional p.

Congressional

Congressional

Congressional Record.

Congressional Record.

Congressional Record.

SO. Pageupra.

upra,

upra.

before House Committee on Expenditures in theon H.4

6

Hearings before Senate Armed Services Committee on,.

.

.

Congressional

Ibid.

Hearings before Senate Armed Services Committee on,.

.

Househ Congress, First Session.

Congressional Record,

Pageupra.

Hearings before House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments on H. R.

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F.. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B. Letter from the President of the United States to the Director of Central Intelligence, dated

P.

Chapter VI.

99. P.upra.

upra.

Hearings before Senate Committee on Armed Services onh

Cong.6 (daily ed. July.

H.R. Hep.hst

Hearings before House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department?h

.

.

Statement of Lt. Gen. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence, before tha House Committee on Expenditurea in the Executivo Departmentsnd, Hearing before Senate Armed Services Committee onhst Sass.

Hearings before Senate Committee on Armed Services onhst

P.upra.

P.upra.

Hearings before House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departmentshst

Cong.4 {daily ed..

Cong.daily ed..

Fixed term appointment of up toears had been suggested.

Rep. Harness

.4 Op. Atty..

As reported out of Senate Committee, the salary of the position was reduceder annum in Une with an across the board reduction for certain positions under the National Security Act

8 (daily ed. July. Admiral Shermanthe Senate Committee that addition of the phraseor civilian life" or vice versa would clarify the intent that

a civilian could be appointed Director.

P.upra.

S. Rep.hst.

Cong.6 (daily ed. July.

Cong.4 (daily ed. July.

Hearings before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departmentshst Sess. .Unpublished classified transcript,

The House Committee on Expenditures In the Executive Departmentsalaryor theore than approved in

. The salary of the Chairman of the National Security Resource! Board was set at the same level. See footnoteupra. Tho salaries of the Service Secretaries were set. Cabinet members at the timeer annum.

Cong.6 {daily ed..

Cong.dally ed..

H.hstational Security Act.

Cong.daily ed..

Cong.daily ed..

Chapter IX.

upra.

Statement of Lt. Gen. Vandenbe rg before Senate Committee on Armed Services. Hearings inhst Sess. on.

Additional views of Chairman Hoffmanhst.

Hearings before Committee on Expenditures in the7

.

.

.

pp. .

Hearings before the Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments in thehstational Security Act

.

.

,

1 (daily ed.. upra.

Presidential Directiveb, Para. 3B, p.upra.

Original document.

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