SITUATION APPRAISAL. STATUS OF THE GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT, AS OF 6 J

Created: 7/10/1967

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CENTRAL 1NTP UIGENCc AGENCY

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Intelligence Information Cable

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SITUATION APPRAISAL. STATUS OF THE GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARY

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MOVEMENT, ASULY(

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OF THE CURRENT SITUATION^^HlS NOT AN OFFICIAL J

THIS AGENCY OR ANY COMPONENT. IT REPRESENTS THE INTERPRETATIONSTAFF OFFICER BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO HIM AT THE TIME OF ITS PREPARATION.

(SUMMARY: ESULT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S SUCCESSFUL COUNTER-

( INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN, THE REBEL ARMED FORCES (FAR) IS UNDERGOING THE HOST . CRITICAL PERIOD OF ITS FOUR-YEARERIOD IN WHICH ITS CONTINUED . EXISTANCE MAY WELL BE DETERMINED. FAR OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY IN THE NORTHEAST AREA HAS BEEN PRACTICALLY ELIMINATED AND THE URBAN RESISTANCE FRONT, THE "NERVE CENTER" OF THE FAR, HAS RECEIVED IMPRESSIVE SETBACKS AT THE HANDS OF

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GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES. DISSENSION WITHIN THK REVOLUTIOS ARYHAS INTENSIFIED SHARPLY WITH THK "RED GUARD" FACTION OF THE FARG TO TAKE CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT FROM THE GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY (POT).)

REBEL ARMED FORCES (FAR) IS CURRENTLY UNDERGOING THEPERIOD IN ITS FOUR-YEARERIOD IN WHICH THEOF THE FARIGNIFICANT REVOLUTIONARY FORCE MAY WELL THE FAR HASERIES OP SEVERE SETBACKS SINCEOF THE GOVERNMENT'S COUXTKRINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN IN

BYHE GUATEMALAN ARMY RAD STRIPPED FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES THE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY FROM THE EDGAR IBARRA GUERRILLA FRONT (FC.EI, GUERRILLA ARM OF THK FAR) IN TUE NORTHEAST AREA OF GUATEMALA, AND HAD FORCE THE FGEI INTO EXPENDING ITS ENERGIESUEST FOR SURVIVAL AND IN EFFORTS TO REGROUP ITS MILITARY FORCE. AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE REMNANTS OF THE FGEI ARE BELIEVED TO NUMBER APPROXIMATELYEN, THE MAJORITY OF WHOM ARE REPORTEDLY HIDING IN THE MOUNTAINS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF IZABAL.

SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN BY THE ARMY AGAINST THE RURALSOON FOLLOWED BY GOVERNMENTAL EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE THE "NERVETHE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT, THE URBAN RESISTANCE FRONT OF THE FAR. OF COLOXEL MANUEL FRANCISCO SOSA AVILA AS DIRECTOR GENERAL OF

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HE NATIONAL POLICE WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN ACHIEVING CLOSER COORDINATIONTHE MILITARY AND THE POLICE IN COOPERATIVE EFFORTS AGAINST THE Jit BAN SEGMENT OF THE FAR. SOSA IS ALSO CREDITED WITH THE PROMOTIONUER ESPRIT DE CORPS WITHIN THE NATIONAL POLICE, WHICH IS BELIEVED TO 1AVE BEEN LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RECENT INCREASE IN POLICE MORALE AND DEFECTIVENESS.

4. THE BUCCESSES OF THE SECURITY FORCES AGAINST THE URBAN RESISTANCE FRONT OF THE FAR SINCE7 HAVE BEEN IMPRESSIVE. AJOR PORTION OF THE EAR'S PROPAGANDA NETWORK, THE ENTIRE WORKERS SELF-DEFENSE UNIT (UNIDAD DE AUTODKPENSA OBRERA), LED BY FRANCISCO RAMIREZARGE PART OF THE FAR "SHOCK UNITS" (UNIDADES DE CHOQUE), AND MOST RECENTLY THE 1JCADERSHIP OF THE FAR SUPPLY UNIT HAVE ALL BEENED BYCTION. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE URBAN CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN LARGELY ATTRIBUTABLE TO GOVERNMENT-SANCTIONED POLICE AND MILITARY TERRORISM. THE HARSH INTERROGATION METHODS UTILIZED BY THE POLICE HAVE BROUGHT FORTH INFORMATION WHICH HAS ALLOWED THE SECURITY FORCES TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE VERY HEART OF THE URBAN RESISTANCE FRONT. THE ASSASSINATIONS AND TERRORIST BOMBINGS BY THE SPECIAL COMMANDO UNITS OF THE GUATEMALAN ARMY, COUPLED WITH THE PROPAGANDA BOMBARDMENT OF THREATENED ASSASSINATIONS, HAS SERVED TO KEEP THE COMMUNIST LEFTTRICTLY DEFENSF,

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POSTURE AND HAS UNDOUBTEDLY DECREASED PARTICIPATION OF FAR MILITANTS AND HINDERED EFFORTS BY THE FAR TO RECRUIT NEK MEMBERS. WHATEVER THE JONG-TEnM CONSEQUENCES OF THE GOVERNMENT ACTION, THE IMMEDIATE BENEFITS HAVE BEENHE QUESTION OF MAJOR CONCERN AT THIS POINT IS WHETHER THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT, HAVING UNLEASHED THIS INTENSIFIED CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THE COMMUNIST OPPOSITION, CAN MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT CONTROL OF TnE RIGHTIST FORCES INVOLVED TO PREVENT THESE FORCES FROM POSING AN EVENTUAL THREAT TO THE STABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF.

CONCURRENT WITH, AND PERHAPS BECAUSE OF, THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTIVE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE COMMUNIST INSURGENTS, DISSENSION AMONG THK LEADERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT HAS INTENSIFIED SHARPLY. THIS DISSENSION HAS BEEN PRIMARILY VOICED BY THE "RED GUARD" LEADERS OF THK FAR WHO OPPOSE THE DOMINATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT BY THE GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PGT) AND THE FAILURE OF THE PGT TO AGREEORE MILITANT STAND IN THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS. THIS DISSENSION IS NOT UNLIKE DIFFICULTIES EXPERIENCED BY SEVERAL LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES VHICH ARE BEING CHALLENGED BY PRO-CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS.

THE LEADERS OF THE "RED GUARD" FACTION OF THE FAR ARE GABRIEL SALAZAR, PSEUDONYMAR LEADER WHOSE IDENTITY HAS NOT BEENSE MARIA ORTIZ VIDES, AND RICARDO RAMIREZ DE LEON. ALL THREE HAVE RECENTLY

BEEN IN CUBA FOR EXTENDED PERIODS. SALAZAR HAS RETURNED TO GUATEMALA AND ORTIZ HAS BEEN TRAVELLING THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNIST BLOC, INCLUDING CHINA AND VIETNAM. THE POSITION OF CESAR MONTES IN THE TACTICAL DISSENSION IS SOMEWHAT UNCLEAR. IN RECENT MONTHS MONTES HAS VACILLATED BETWEEN THE HARD AND SOFT LINES,RO-PARTY POSITION WHEN IN THE COMPANY OF PGT LEADERS, BUT BEING MENTIONED IN INTERNAL FAR CORRESPONDENCE AS SUPPORTING THE POSITION OF SALAZAR. PGT LEADERS HAVE VOICED THE OPINION THAT SALAZAR, WHO WAS REMOVED FROM ALL POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY WITHIN THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT WITH THE REORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE FAR INTO THE HIGH COMMAND, WILL ATTEMPT TO FORM HIS OWN SEPARATE REVOLUTIONARY FORCE. THERE HAS BEEN NO CONFIRMATION THAT SALAZAR IS ATTEMPTING TO FORM HIS OWN MOVEMENT. HOWEVER, OVE WOULD APPEAR TOOGICAL ONE.

7. PGT LEADERS HAVE EXPRESSED THE VIEWPOINT THAT THE FORTHCOMING CONFERENCE IN HAVANA OF THE LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION (LASO) WILL BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN RELATION TO THE FUTURE COURSE OF THE REVOLUTION IN GUATEMALA. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE "RED GUARD" FACTION OF THE FAR WILL ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE THE CUBANS TO PROD THE PGT INTOORE MILITANT FORMULA TO RESOLVE THE SOLUTION TO THE ARMED

STRUGGLE. THE PGT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY DEPEND ITS THESIS AND POINT TO THE RECENT LOSSES OF THE FAR AS FRUITS OF THE "RED GCARD" STRATEGY. IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT THE PGT CAN BE CONVINCED TO FOLLOW THE LINE ADVOCATED BY THE "RED GUARD" LEADERS. HOWEVER, THE CUBANS MAY WELL ENCOURAGE SALAZAR TO ORGANIZE HIS OWN PRO-CUBAN MOVEMENT BY PROMISING TO SUPPLY FUNDS AND OTHER MATERIAL SUPPORT. OVE BY THE CUBANS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE IMMEDIATE REPERCUSSIONS AMONG THE COMMUNISTS IN GUATEMALA AND WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN SEVERE FRAGMENTATION AND INFIGHTING.

8. EVEN DISCOUNTING THE INTERNAL DISSENSION AMONG THE COMMUNISTS AND ITS HARMFUL RAMIFICATIONS WITHIN THE GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT, THK FAR IS STILLERIOD APPROACHING STAGNATION. AT THE PRESENT TIME, ITS CAPABILITY FOR OFFENSIVE ACTION IS PROBABLY LIMITED TO OCCASIONAL AND BOTHERSOME ACTS OF VIOLENCE WHICH WOULD NOT SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE STABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE FAR IS IN SHORT SUPPLY OF FUNDS AND SUPPLIES, WHICH ARK TWO INDISPENSABLE ITEMS FOR THE SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT OF RESERVE FRONTS IN THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL AREAS OF GUATEMALA. IN ORDER TO REGROUP ITS FORCES, THE FAR WILLARGE INPUT OF FUNDS AND SUPPLIES FROM

EXTERNAL SOURCES. IN ADDITION, THE REVOLUTIONARIES NEED TIME AND RELATIVE FREEDOM OF ACTION TO REORGANIZE. AS LONG AS THE GOVERNMENT'S AGGRESSIVE

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CAMPAIGN AGAINST THK INSURGENTS CONTINUES, THE COMMUNIST LEFT KILL EXPERIENCE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN ATTEMPTING TO REVITALIZE THE FARIABLE REVOLUTIONARY THREAT.

9. FIELD DISSEM: NONE. SHOWN TO AMBASSADOR AND DCM.

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