NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
INTELLIGENCE Concuneo* by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD At indicated ovetleol7
Tha following inieJfiyc-nte oigonizoliom poilnipaled ir, Ihe piepataHon of Ih'tt
1'" Cental In'elhgence Agenty and the intelligence orgo' iai>oni ol ihe Oeportof Stole ond Defense. ond the NSA
Dr. R. J- Smith. fo> In* Deputy Duccrai. Cennol Intelligence
homas I.he Director ol Intelligence ondeporlineiu ol State
It. Gen Joseph F. Carroll. Director. Del-tie Intelligence Agency
It. Gen Asarv-oll S. Carter rheNalional Secumy Agency
he Assistantl eArtnooer. Aronue Energy
Mr. William O. Cregor. lor the Aimtani Director, Fedeiol 6vre.au olIhe nbjeci being oulWde O* hii jariidiction
material contoins rnloimation ode within the meaning of the eipionage la> mhiion or revelation of which In
National DefePie al the UnitedSC.. Ihe irons-.on unoulhoriivd person ii prohibited.
POUCY AND NATIONAL POUTY
Military Research and Development
TRENDS IN FORCE POSTURE
Forces for Intercontinental17
Forces for Strategic Attack Against19
Strategic Defense Forces
General Purpose Forces
FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICIESConlrol Possibilities
APPROVEO FOR RELEASE Clfl Hi^OmCAL-REVIEW PROGRAM
MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY POLICY
To review significant developments in Soviet military policy and programs, and to estimate main trends in Soviet military policies over thcoears.
This' estimate assesses broad trends in Soviet military policy and doctrine. It docs not attempt to recapitulate existing NIEs on Soviet strategic attack, strategic air and missile defense, and general purpost forces. Our most recent detailed estimates on the size, composition, and capabilities of these principal components and the supporting elements of the Soviet military forces are as follows:
, "Soviet Capabilities for StrategicatedOP SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA (LIMITED DISTRIBUTION).
Capabilities of Soviet Ceneral PurposeECRET.
, "Soviet Strategic Air and MissileatedOP SECRET.
A. In the past year, there has been no major change in the broad trends of Soviet military policy, which continues to place primary emphasis on strategic weapons. Outlays for defense have accelerated with the continuation of large-scale deployment of strategic missiles, both offensive and defensive, and continued research and development (RccD) on new strategic weapon systems. The Soviets are building
forces which we believe will give them, in the next year or two, greatly increased confidence that theyetaliatory capability sufficient to assure the destructionignificant portion of US industrialand population. They will probably also seek, through both strategic attack and defense programs, to improve their ability tothe damage the US can inflict on the USSR should deterrence fail and war in fact occur. Wc believe that the Soviets would not consider it feasible to achieve by tlictrategic capabilities which would permit them toirst strike against the USreceiving unacceptable damage in return.1
most important issues of military policy at presentthe strategic relationship with the US, Certain majorprograms aie either slowing or nearing completion. Thenre probably now considering further development andof strategic systems fors. For the .present,the chances as less than even that they would agree' to anyprogram of arms control or disarmament.
Soviets almost certainly believe that their strategicto that of the US has improved markedly. In the nextso they will approach numerical parity in ICBM launchers,believe to be their present goal. They are aware, however,improvements in US strategic offensive missile forcestheir view would threaten to erode their strategic position.responses could take the formonsiderable increase inof ICBM launchers, development of mobile ICBMs, aon ballistic missile submarines, or qualitativeas the development of very accurate ICBMs, possiblymultiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs).
Major On. JackTrsooiai, tbc Assistant OvKf of SiarJ. Intelligence. USAF. would eub-itirute for ihe lait lenience ofhe following:
The Soviet! may not consider it feasibley thei itrslegie capabilities which would permit there loirst itril* stuck against the US withoutnacceptable damage in return. On tho other hand, the lustalned inlernity wllh which the USSR is puriulng its massive militaryfforts and the pace of iU itrslegie lystemi de-ploymeat SUR^est the SovieU could be scekiog, ovet use longcenbinaUon ofwhich couldredible first strike capability against the US. Even If the Soviets considered lhat this itill would not mole rational deliberate initiation of nuclear attack against the US, they might well believe that achievementredible first stria* eapabihty would be worth the cost tn view of the strong backup thb would provide for aggiessive pursuit of objective* in other areas of tbo world."
D. The Soviets have probably concluded that if no arms control agreement isS decision to deploy ABMs will soon beand are probably concernedS ABM deployment seriously degrade their retaliatory capabilities. S decision toeither heavy or light ABM defenses would probably lead the Soviets to develop and deploy penetration aids and possibly MIKVs for their ICBM force, or they might increase the size of that force. Systems designed to elude US ABM defenses, such as aerodynamic vehicles or space weapons, might be given greater emphasis. their specific responses to developments on the US side, wethat the Soviets will hold it essential to maintain what they would consider to be an assured destruction capability.
continue to believe that the Soviets will deploy ABMsof areas other than Moscow, but their decision mayavailability of an improved system. In any case, given theinvolved, ABM defenses will probably not becomethe Moscow area before thes. We woulddetect construction of such additional defenses two to threethey became operational."
in the general purpose forcesreaterwith meeting contingencies short of general war and aof the possibility of poslponing, limiting, or avoiding the useweapons. In part thiseaction to the USstrategy of flexible response, but it alsooreinterest in broadening the range of Soviet militaryand airlift have been considerably expanded. We do nothowever, that the Soviets are developing the sea and airrequired for distant Umited military action against They evidently see advantages in wars fought by proxy with
. Ceo. Joseph F. Carroll, Durctor, DeJense Intelligence Agency; Brig. Cen. James L. Collins. Jr, Acting Deputy Chief of Staff fee Intelligence, Department oi the Army, and Maj Cen. lack E. Thomas, (ha Auistanl Owl oi Staff. Intelligence, USaF. note lhat thU petngraph considers the Moscow ABM ryiiem ts the only ABM system currently beingand does not ascribe aa ABM capability foe the Tallinn system. They believe thai tho krdeeauAOOaat present ii .till miuSeient lo eatrftsate with confidence thep.ibdiMi and mission ol the Tallinn syslem. They agree lhat the available evidence doesonclusion that the Tallinn ailesefensive mission against lhe aeradynamlc Uveat except against low altitude threats.they also believe thai the system, where augmented by lhe Hen House type radar, hai ft cnpnbllity againsi ballistic mfssueiubstantia] portion of lhe deployment area; and lhal the system has considerable growth potential. They therefore would evaluate III continuing development and deployment with this capabilitymind.
indigenous forces rather thau by their ownractice which reduces both military risks and adverse political reactions. Intheir influence abroad they will continue to give economic and military aidarge-scale, and to use political and diplomatic means.
Soviets now describe Chinaower with ahostile" to the USSR. They have increased theirin areas close to the Chinese and Mongolian borders, andto strengthen thc defenses of Mongolia. At present theyto regard the Chinese as posing moreorder securitya major military threat, but they almost certainly see tbeof China as increasing over tlie longer term. So long asconflict persists, Soviet military planners will have toof the possibility of large-scale war with China andstrategic nuclear capabilities.
internal situation appeais generally favorable totrong military effort. The present leaders seemthan was Khrushchev to the opinions of thc militaryEstimated military and space expendituresncrease ofercentarked change from thelevel of spending. The adverse effectseconomy of large military and space programs will exert someinSuence on, military spending. We believe that militarywill continue to rise, butate generally consonantgrowth of the Soviet economy.
strong effort inill be continued despiteallocation problems. The Soviets probably regard suchas imperative in order to prevent the US from gaining aadvantage and also to gain, if possible, some advantageBut in deciding to deploy any new weapon systemhave to weigh the prospective gain against the economicthe capabilities of the US to counter it.
J. Soviet foreign policy will continue to be based primarily upon political and economic factors, but the military capabilities that the Soviets are developing and thc military relationships that are evolving will affect their attitudes and approaches to policy. They will probably seek to gain some political or propaganda advantage from theirmilitary position, and mayarder line with the US in various
crises than they have in the past. We do not believe, however that <heir .mproved military capabilities will lead them t0ourses of action as would, in their view, provoke directrontabon with US. The Soviet leaders recognize tkHTum as weU as the US is deterred from initiating general war, and^ll con tinue to avoid serious risk ofar*
I. THE BACKGROUND OF SOVIET MILITARY POLICY
Thc overriding concern of the Soviet Union, as of other countries, ls national security. Beyond thil. the USSR reeks greaterreeminent world power with corresponding prerogatives end seeks to expand its influence and leadership on tha world scone. As taught by Communist doctrine, Soviet leaders calculate the "relation of forces'* io any particular situation with regard to political, economic, and psychological at well as military factors. They value military strengtheterrent to any attack on the Soviet Union or its allies,anifestation of tho success and growing power of the Soviet system, andupport for Soviet foreign policy. To serve these purposes. Soviet forces must of course bo made capable of fighting effectively if war should occur. The means to be devoted to military preparedness, however, must be calculated In the context of all the demands upon Soviet resources. In short. Soviet military policy does not existhing apart, but is only an aspect of the totality of Soviet ;
In contrast to the fluctuations wlilch have characterized the military policies of other powers, Soviet military policy has been remarkably stable. The military establishment hasigh priority in the allocation of national resources since the very inception of the Soviet regime. This stability can be attributed iu part to such basic factors as geographic positionense of Insecurityostile world. It also reflects the historic role of the military as one of the main supports and preferred instruments of the Soviet state, from the imposition of the revolutionary regime on Russia to the cc-inmuniiatlon of Eastern Europe. To some extent, stability has fostered rigidity; great military forces, once created, have tended to become vested interests. This tendency, however, has beenby other forces at work in the postwar era.
At tho close of World War II the USSR moved into the front rank of world power and directly confronted the opposing power of the US. Soviet military planners for the Erst time were forced to think ln Intercontinental as wellhange of focus that has profoundly affected priorities within thu military establishment. Tbc building of capabilities for intercontinental attack and strategic defense has claimed an increasing share of the military effort. Moreover, the series of cold war confrontations with thc US, both political and military, have revealed limitations on Soviet military power, indicating at tho same time additional military "requiremeots.
Another major force for change has been the rapid postwar advance of military technology, particularly in nuclear weapons, missiles, ond electronics. The Soviets pushed research and development (HAD) on all aspects of the new technology (in some cases, ahead of thend deployed the new weaponsargo scale. Outlays for defense rose as new advanced weapon programs
were superimposed upon the In general purpose forces already in being. The Soviets were quick to gmsp lhe importance of the new weaponry, hut they were slow to adapt their forces to its revolutionary implications for warfare. Not untd theere these implications reflected in basic changes in Soviet strategy and doctrine and in force posture.
onsequence of the advance of military technology bas been tbeof li-ajtirr.es for modern weapon programs, requiring ever earlier decisions from the political leaders and military planners.umber of majoras to tbe size aod composition of the Soviet military establishment in theust already have been taken, and decisions for the period beyond are probably now under consideration. This is not to say that programs cannot be modified and force levels adjusted as the leadership's assessment of military requirernents changes; the making of military policyontinuum rather than clusters of isolated, unalterable decisions. Moreover, the Soviets haveertain boldness In curtailing or even abandoning programs that in their view no longer met their needs. But tinsostly business, aod the Soviel leaders, facing difficult problems of resource allocation, must carefully weigh decisions to launch expensive programs to counter threats that may arise up toears hence.
he Soviets' determination of future military requirement* will be based in the first Instance upoo tbeir asiessT/terst of the political and military relationship with the US and of the situation in Europe. Tbey will, however, be increasingly concerned with tbc potential threat posedostile China and its emerging -strategic capabilities. Beyond these specific areas of concern, they will consider the general utility of military power and the mix of forces best suited to sup-pott foieign policy. Finally, in deciding how best to meet the wide range of requirements that can be foreseen and how best to provide against contmgencies that cannot, tbe Soviet leaders will be heavily influenced by such domestic factors as the interplay of forces within the bureaucratic establishment, tbe opportunities opened by technology, and tbe constraints of economics.
It. THE STRATEGIC SETTING
The Soviets currently see in trie US tbe principal obstacle to the growth of their influence in world affairs and Ihe only significant military threat to their security. Tbey do noteliberate US attack on the USSR,that tbe US is deterred for political as well as for military reasons, and for the same reasons they arc deterred from attacking the US. Indeed, their consistent pobcy has been to avoid situations which carried any serious risk of nuclear war. But if general nuclear war is in their view inadmissible as aact of policy, they are nonetheless keenly aware of rhe political anddisadvantages of the position of inferiority in strategic weapons that they have occupied for the pastears.
With the growth of Soviet offensive and defensive forces during recent years thc Soviet position has improved markedly. In numbers of mtercontlnental
delivery vehicles the US remains much the stronger, but completion of Current Soviet deployment programs In the next year or so will significantly reduce lhe US numerical advantage and in the number of ICBM launchers the Soviets will approach parity with the US. Completion of present ICBM deploymentwill give the Soviets much greater confidence in tneir ability to deter the US by virtue of their capability to inflict mass destruction on the US even if they arc attacked first. Moreover, the Soviet leaders may see an opportunity approaching toore substantial improvement in their strategicwith the US, presumablyiew to translatingosition into political advantage. They must recognize, however, that as they move to alter this relationship thc risk increases that tho US will act tn match or overmatch their efforts; tbe end result mightew surge of competitive arming which they almost certainly would wish to avoid.
The Soviet View of lhe US Posture
ho Soviet leaders bring to any consideration of thoasic attitude of suspicion and distrust In assessing thc current US political and militaryset of policies, actions, andundoubtedly find elements which In their view range from the conciliatory to the downright hostile,of both strength and weakness. Which aspects of US policy will have the most influence on the formulation of Soviet military policy will depend upon the strength of the signals as they are received and understood in Moscow.
LO. Thc Soviets are aware that US deployment of strategic missiles Is leveling off, giving them an opportunity to match or even surpass the US in numbers of ICBM launchers. They probably believe that attainment of numerical parity would notS reaction. Such parity would have political andadvantages, but it would not alter the basic situation of mutualIt would in fact leave tbe USSR still inferior in heavy bombers andmissiles. Moreover, the Soviets probably realize that even this improvement io their position might be short-lived.
or tbe longer term, tbe US has announced programs for qualitativein Its strategic missile forces whichoviet point of view would threaten to erode the USSR's strategic position. The US is developing more advanced missiles for deployment Ins which will menrporate belter accuracy, multiple mdependeotly targeted reentry vehiclesnd penetralion aids. If these programs are carried to completion, the Soviets willS missile force equipped with several thousand RVs which can be designed cither foi maximum effect against hard targets, thus threatening Ihc Soviet ICBM force, or to saturate and overcome ABM defenses. Tlie Soviets have responded to previous improvements in US strategic offensive forces with heightened efforts to improve their own strategic offensive and defensive forces, and might do so again. But they might find in their present strategic situation and their future outlook incentives for arms control that would permit aof elforf
is too early <othe Soviets' view of the US arms controlearly this year. Initially they almost certainly viewed withreeze on ABMtrategic aica in which they held aand US readiness to discuss other strategic missiles as well. Somemay see the US position as an indication of weakness caused bydrain of the war in Vietnam. Most of them, however,that, even with the Vietnam war, the US economy can morean intensification of the arms race than can the Soviet economy.
Soviet leaders are aware that the US could begin ABMany time, and have undoubtedly followed the discussion of this subjectUS. Tbey have probably concluded that, if no arms control agreementsubject isS decision to deploy will soon be forthcoming.it wouldajor new program with potential impact on thethe US decision would tend to lead weight to interests in tbepress for larger military programs.
The Soviets would be concernedS ABM deployment seriously degrade their assured destruction capabilities. From the Soviet point of view, either light or heavy US ABM defenses would threaten eventually to erode the deterrent power of tbeir strategic attack forces. This it because ABMarc damage-limiting inis, tbey are designed to protect die population and property in major cities which are the prime targets ofbecausemall program, once Initiated, could leadarger one. The Soviets would considerssential to respond by improving their stratcgic attack forces to tbe extent required to maintain what they would consider to be an assured destruction capability.
The Soviet reaction would probably be much the same to the mote austere US ABM programs that haveefenseossible Chinese threat in thes,efense of US ICBM forces. Their military responses, however, might be tempered by the lesser impact of these programs on their retaliatory capabilities.
The Soviets are also concerned that below ihc strategic nuclear level US military powerange of military capabilities and options, both nuclear and conventional, that the USSR cannot match except on its periphery. These have enabled the US to project its miliiary power in support of policy overseas, and to Intervene or threaten intervention in situations that might othertvisc have been turned to Soviet advantage. Tlie Soviets have undoubtedly seen (he US intervention in Vietnam in this light.
Soviet concern wiih thc war in Vietnam is overwhelmingly political: how to render aid to an embattled fraternal state, ai is politically imperative in the context of lhe Sino-Soviet struggle lor Communist leadership, withoutInvolvedirect military confrontation wiih thc US. There are, nevertheless, significant mditary implications. The Soviet military leaders arc await that the war has produced significant qujhtative improvements in US Held forces; invaluable experience has been gained and new equipment and
techniques have been tested under combat conditions. For their part, il has presented them with difficult problems such as their inability to prevent thc bombing of the Noith and thc risk that the US may mine or blockade North Vietnamese ports. Moreover, as the result of tlie buildup caused by thc war, thc US now has. for tlie Grst time since World War II, about as many men under arms as the USSR. Even though these developments present no direct threat to the USSR, they probably tend to reinforce lhc advocates of large general purpose forces in the Soviet military establishment
NATO and the Warsaw Pact
While Soviet interest and political engagement outside Europe hasgreatly since thc end of World War II, Europe remains an area of primary concern. Soviet European policy is directed to the reduction orof American influence in Europe, the isolation aad containment of West Cermany, and the weakening or destruction of the Atlanticeasure of Soviet concern is to be found in the massive forces deployed against Europe, which together make up the major part of the USSR's military establishment. The influence of tradition remains strong, particularly in tho large ground forces, but tlie USSR's posture and its strategy have also been affected bywithin NATO.
The efforts of thc US to reorient NATO planning and capabilitieslexible response strategy have evidently been among the considerations which have caused the Soviets to give more attention to contingencies short of general war. Authoritative Soviet military writings have continued to emphasize the requirements of general nuclear war. but the view held by Khrushchev that any Limited war between nuclear powers must inevitably escalate into general war no longer prevails. In its place the view is advanced that the Soviet armed forces should be prepared to meet all kinds of emergencies upto and including large-scale conventional conflicts and limited nuclear wars.
ese developments obviously carryfor Soviet force structure and contingency planning. They also indicate recognition of thc possibility of postponing, limiting, or avoiding theof nuclear weapons in modem war.
he Soviets almost certainly consider the recent trends in Western Europe as favorable. The withdrawal of French military forces from NATO, theof the elaborate NATO infrastructure, and the general weakening oflliance have not only reduced the military threat to the USSR, but have offered political opportunities as well. On the whole, however, they have tended to move cautiously. Thc Soviets have apparently learned that any assertion of militancy from thc East has historicallyorresponding reaction in the West, and they have continued to encourage the general relaxation of tension between the two camps.
t ts possible (hai the SovieU, in response to reductions In NATO forces, wilt come lo see advantages in reducing their own forces in lhe forwardhey may also conclude thai these reductions, together with Ihc withdrawal of French forces and the denial of French territory to NATO, reduce the capability of NATO to wage conventional warfare, thus shortening any nonnuclear phaselash with Warsaw Pact forces and pusliing NATO backtripwire" strategy.inimum,onclusion would lead the Soviets to reexamine the concept of flexible response, and it might lead them to increase their tactical nuclear capabilities In tho forward area. But if the situation in NATO is changing the SovieU* view of their military reouirernenU in Europe, such change has not yet affected the structure or disposition of their forces.
taradox of the past few years that while tbc USSB's East European allies have Increasingly asserted their national. independence, the USSR has significantly strengthened their military capabilities. Although the Soviets are apparently relying oo the East European armed forces to perform Important military tasks in the event of war in Europe, their policy has been based In large part on political considerations. The Warsaw Pact has served aod wtl] probably continue to serveonvenient framework within which the USSR can work to limit tendencies to independence among Its East European allies. But the Soviets nowew assertiveoess oo the part of these alliesew. more imaginative effort by the Western states to play on the national interests which this assertiveoess reflects.
he USSR is apparently prepared to accept some diversity within tba Pact and to adjust iU policy objectives to this reality. In the past two years it has tolerated repeated Instances of Rumanian noncooperation in Pact military activities or even in expressions of Pact political solidarity. Bulgaria hasto be reliable, and Hungary Isarger part in Warsaw Pact affairs. But tbe SovieU are evidently putting their main reliance on the "northern tier" states (Poland, East Cermany, andhosebecause of their geographical positionommon fear of West Cermany. coincide more closely with the InteresU of the USSR.
The Sino-Soviet Dispute
he SovieU now describe Chinaowerolicy "clearly rsostuV to thc USSR. Since3 they have gradually increased miliury strength in areas close to the Chinese and Mongolian borders (by0 combat troops andordernd they are moving to strengthen Ihe defenses of Mongolia. The Soviets have also sharply increased military intelligence collection against China, f
measures taken to date, however, indicate lhal at present they regard the Chi-
'iscussion ef the Soviet attitude toward manasl redu<Uons la Europe, see1 implicationsutual Reduction ol US and Soviet Forces inulyECRET.
ncso as posing moteoidet security problemajor military threat. We believe that they will continue gradually to augment their conventional forces in tbc border areas.
Soviet leaders almost certainly see the potential threat olincreasing over the longer term. Events of the Cultural Revolutionelements of irrationality and unpredictability into the alreadyof China, adding to Soviet uneasiness and uncertainty. The Sovietsthat Mao will be supplantedore rational, conservative regime,must recognize the possibility that his successors may be even morehe. So long as the Sino-Soviet conflict persists, Soviet militaryhave to take account of the possibility of large-scale war with Chinsemerging strategic nuclear capabilities.
Support of Foreign Policy
lhe Soviets have learned that even great military power docs nottranslate Into political gain. Nuclear strategic forces are an obvious prerequisite for great power status, and great power confrontations taxeyjlace against tbe backdrop of mutual deterrence. But indispensable as Soviet strategic forces are lo tbe political and military relationship with the US, 'they are less directly useful for most foreign policy purposes than are tbc conventionaladjuncts of traditional diplomacy. These include at the lower level such time-honored moves as the military demonstration,ilitaryand showing tho Gag, and, at the upper extreme, large-scale intervention.
The USSR has shown over the past several years an increasing concern with its position and prerogativesreat power,ensitivity that probably goes back to its status in the interwar years as on international parish. Its proffer of good offices, which led to the Taslikent Conference, was tn example of this concern. The Soviets have used Moscow parades as demonstrations of their military power, and over the past several yean have builtaval presence in the Mediterranean. We believe that the USSR will continue to assert coequal status with thc USorco In international affairs, and that this consider at for. svillrowing influence on future Soviet military policy.
In the postwar era Soviet military forces have been directly used Inof policy only In Eastern Europe, except for the brief adventure with missiles in Cuba. Elsewhere the Soviets have sought to extend their influence by large-scale programs of economic and military assistance, and by encouraging subversion and revolution or "wars of nationalarticularly In the former colonial areas of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East By furnishingsupplies of weapons to selected countries and providing training for personnel, they haveumber of client states dependent upon the USSR for continuing support of their military establishments, and demanding always more advanced and costly weapon systems. The USSR itself, however. Lacks capabilities for distant limited military action against the oppositionajor military powef. It apparently sees advantages in wars fought by proxy
with Indigenous foices lather than by its ownractice which reduces both military risks and adverse political reactions.
III. MILITARY POUCY ANO NATIONAL POLITY
military policy of the USSR, like that of other states, is made upseries of compromises that emerge from the pobeymaking process foparticular challenges and requirements. Soviet policy is liVely,reflect the strategic situation only imperfectly and incompletely, and topartial.solutions lo the problems it poses. Thb is true, in large measure,neilher the USSR nor any other state has the resources to' meet allmilitary requirements and to provide againit all possiblodisparity, however, is also in part the result of subjective judgments asandresult of the policymaking process itself and ofof forces within it
The internal political situation appears generally favorable totrong military policy. The present Soviet leaders seem more responsive than was Khrushchev to opinions of the various specialized interest groups Including the military hierarchy. Moreover, the traditional Soviet concern with security and the very size of the military establishment enhance theof the high commands influence in top level deliberations on basic decb.ous. We do not believe, however, that any single group outside of the party apparatusredominant role in determining Soviet national policy.
Over the next few yean, we doubt that Soviet military policy will be characterized by the boldness and the striking initiatives which reflectedstyle and approach to problems. Strong, tanovating leadership seems to be lacking among both civilian and military leaders. The older generation of Soviet military leaders continues to dominate the high command. Marshal Crecbko. appointed to succeed the deceased Malinovskly as Minister of Defense, was the logical successor; his reputation indicates that he is likely to support the official establishment, defending both governmental policy and the institutional InterosU that heonsiderable number of promotions andwill probably be announced in connection withh anniversary of the October Revolution, resulting in an infusion of younger blood into lhehigh command, but not, we believe. In any decided change In its basically conservative orientation. These new leaders will undoubtedly be hand-picked by the old guard on the basis of past reliability and conformity.-
At present, political-military relations within the leadershipeasonably peacefulotential source of discord, however, is to be found in the natural conflict between the totalitarian impulses of the Communist Party, which cause it to suspect any other center of power, and the professional impulses of the miliiary establishment. In the past, dashes between these opposing impulses have primarily concerned such problems as
qu est ions of loyalty and patty iiidoeblnatlon. Today, problems aiislng out of this dichotomy arc moro likely to concern matters of military policy.as decisions on military matters come to depend more and more on expert technical knowledge, the influence of those who command this knowledge, the technically trained officers. Is bound to grow. How to utilize this knowledge without becoming captive to it, and how to insure the continued dominance of political considerations in military matters of vital significance to the nation, have evidently become questions of some concern for the Soviet leadership.
In contrast with tho situation in the, when KhrushclieVs strong innovating leadership provoked public clashes with his military leaders, there have been few signs of controversy over military policy under the current regime. Wc believe, however, that this relative harmony reflects the general satisfaction of the military leadership with current policy rather than anyrelaxation of political-muitary tensions. On several occasions over the past year there have been Indications that the military has sought topolicy decisions. In the fallor example,ime- when the annual economic plan was presumably being prepared for approval, the military presstrong stand on the need for heavy military allocations. Morethe military have probably been concerned lest the proposedbetween the US and the Soviet Union on the curtailment of strategic weapons deployments might lead the Soviet Government to postpone ormeasures for ABM defense. We believe lhat the Soviet military has been pressing tlie Soviet leadership lotrong ABM policy.
Some elements within the military are dissatisfied with the presentfor the exercise of supreme authority over the Soviet armed forces, which is probably now exercised by the Politburohole, or atommittee of thoumber of articles have linked the emergence of rocket and nuclear weapons and the consequently enhanced importance of surprise to the needormal, permanent command authority which could function In time of peace as well as war and which would have the power to initiate retaliatory action in case of attack. We doubt, however, that there will be any significant change from the present command arrangements so long as the Soviet political leadership continues lo functionollective-Economic Considerations '
The problem of resourcebalancing of claims from all sectors of (hefundamental in the making of Soviet military policy. The Soviet leaders recognize, as Khrushchev did, that tbe large and growing out-lays for military arid space programs haveajor factor in the poor overall performance of the Soviel economy and its relatively slow growth rate in recent years. Where he sought dramatic solutions, however, they have temporized by assigning high prioritiesariety of competing claimants. This has meant
uller discussion of general Soviet economic, "SovietProblems andatedECflET.
in miliiary policy lh.it they have supported both the buildup of strategic forcesontinuation of large outlays for general purpose forces.
We estimate Soviet expenditures for military and space programs7 at someillion rubles. Of this total, we believe that aboutercent goes to the strategic attack and strategic defense forces combined, nearlyercent to the general purpose forces, more thanercent tond the space program, andercent to command and general support. Outlays for the military and space programs have been rising for the past two years. The estimated expenditures7 represent an increase of aboutercent over thosearked change from thc more stable level of spending. The current expansion of the strategic attack and defense forces and the rising costs ofnd the space program are responsible for this increase; spending for thc general purpose forces has been relatively stable for several years,
The principal effect of the expanding military and space programs lies in their increasing demands for the scarce, high-quality resources needed to sustain economic growth. The machine building industry, for example, bears thc brunt of production of advanced weapons systems; it also faces heavy civilian demand for advanced production equipment, which in turn requires advanced production technology, electronic components, special metals, and machining skills. In another criticalfforts are urgently required by Sovietand agriculture, but military and space programs continue to draw off the best scientific manpower and the bulk of the budget.
Our knowledge of military programs currently underway suggests that mib'tary expenditures will continue to rise, butlower rate than that of the last two years. If their growth rate does not exceed the rate of growth in national output (which we have estimatedear, the economy will also be able to provide increasing support to the large-scaleinvestment program, to thc modernization of industry, and to the various consumer programs. The Soviet economy could, of course,uch greater expansion In the military effort, butost to important civilianthat the leaders would probably be reluctant to pay.
Military Research and Development0
as been and will continue to be one of the highestin the USSR. The Soviets regard such an effort as imperativeto prevent the US fromechnological advantage, to gain,some advantage for themselves, and to strengthen theof Soviet power. Most Soviets directed toward theimprovement of existing kinds of weapon systems, but we believe thatalso devoted to the investigau'onroad range of new and advancedhaving potential military applications.
*uller <jjscu*sroo of this subfect lee., "Soviet Mditary ResearchOP SECRET.
ith thc rapid tcchiiological advance of the postwar era, there hasreat expansion in the fundi, personnel, and facilities devoted tond the space program. We estimate that06 expenditures for these purposes increased tenfold. It is impossible toreciseof US and Soviet expenditures: our analysis suggests that ifnd space programs at their present levels were purchased in the US, they would generate an approximate annual expenditure more than three-fourths the amount of US outlays (or the same purposes. And the Soviet effort restsonsiderably smaller economic base.
Soviet advanced research in fieldj applicable to military developments is probably now about equal to that of the West. Despite excellent theoretical work, however. Soviet military hardware frequently has not reflected the most advanced state-of-the-art In the USSR. In large part, this can be attributedonservative design philosophy which emphasizes proven technology and favors rugged, relatively simple equipment. In part, however, this Soviet choice may have been forced by deficiencies in manufacturing aod fabrication techniques. Soviet production technology generally lags behind that of the US, although the Soviets are taking steps to correct theso
It is almost certain that the Soviets have some typenderway in every important field of military technology. Tbe Soviets will continue to press their search for new technologies and syitems that offer the prospect oftheir strategic situation. We see no areas at present where Soviet technology is significantly ahead of that of the US. Considering the size and quality of theffort, however, it is possible that the USSR could move ahead of the US in some particular field of strategic importance. The Soviet leaders would certainly seek to exploit any significant technological advance for political and military advantage, buteciding to deploy any new weapon system they would have to weigh the prospective gain against the economic costs and tho capabilities of the US to counter it.
IV. PROBABLE TRENDS IN FORCE POSTURE
military requirements as probably seen by the Soviets,of the economy, and tbe present influence of the military, weunlikely that there will be any significant relaxation of tbe Soviet militarythe other hand, the SovieU probably see no major requirements of suchas to justify large new programs that would seriously retardand development. We believe, therefore, that tbc Soviets willstrong military effort that will increaseate consonant with thethe economy.
e have weighed the important possibilityoviet attempt toombination of offensive and defensive forces which wouldirst strike sufficient to limit damage to tbe Soviet Union to acceptable proportions. Considering the number, hardness, and reaction times of targets to be struck in such an attack, and the likelihood that many would escape dot ruction, such a
Soviet, effort wouldarge, highly sophisticated missile force, widespread and effective air and missile defenses, and an effective antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability. Civcn tbe technological and economic magnitude of such an enormous task, and the probability lhat the US would detect and match or overmatch the Soviet exertion, we believe that tlie Soviets would not consider it feasible to achieve by thetrategic capabilities which would permit them toirst strike against thc US without receiving unacceptable damage in return."
Soviets will continue to face difficult choices in tlie allocation ofamong the major force components and even within thosemany cases, thc Soviet decision will depend upon US decisions as to itsIn turn await evidence of Soviet decisions that are yet to be made.future Soviet ICBM programs will be Influenced In part by thoand .types of MIRVs programed for the US Minutcman andwhich will depend primarily on the nature and scopo of Soviet ABMIn considering future trends in the Soviet force posture, weto take account of this interaction. We have also assumed thatbe no arms control agreement in the period under consideration.
Forcos for Intercontinental Attack
development and deployment programs of forces forit is dear that the Soviels are giving primary emphasis to the ICBMbelieve that the ICBM force now building is intended to provide aretaliatory capability against US population andirst-strike, countcrforce capability. The Soviets are continuingtheir missile submarine fleet, and will probablyew classmissile submarine into service neat year; the buildup of thishas been very slow. The heavy bomber force will probablyto decrease through attrition and retirement of older models; webelieve that the Soviets now plan to replace themollow-onHowever, the priorities evident in the development of thesechange fn response to developments in US forces.*
'For view of Major Cen. Jack E. Thomas, the Aaitstant Chief of Slafl. Intelligence, USAF. see hit footnote to ConeJuiion A.
Cen. Jack E. Thomas, the Assiitant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. USAF, believesseriously underestimates the threat to the US from manned aircraft. Hethe pewIUrnste sentence and lutntitutc the
"The heavy and medium bombers of LRA remain an important pen of Soviet tolrreoo-tlnentel attack forces The degree oi future Soviet leliance oo bombers will depend laigely on the numbersf other strategic systems deployed and on Soviel wartime objectives, bul they will piobably continue to relyilied force of bombers and misiHes. Although the numbers ol* medium bombers will probably decline somewhat, continued production of medium bombers, the maintenancethe current heavy bomber force level, and the probable Introducoof) of new heavy and mediesn bombers will enable (he SovieU to retain thekIn lei continental aircraft attack capability."
he Soviel ICBM force wiihaunchers operational or under cotiirxuctioo ii approaching numerical parity with the planned US forceauncheri. Wc believe that the Soviet* see political and psychologicalin having aa ICBM force roughly the same size as that of the US and that this ii the goal of their current deployment programs. New cc-mtructioo starts of ICBM launchers appear to be slowing, and it is possible that, in their viow, the Sovieis will have reached their goal when the current deployment programs are complete. We do not believe that they areubstantial numerical superiority at this time, and consider that the most likely Soviet goal, at least for tbe present phase of deployment, falls within tbe previously estimated maximumaunchers. Tbe Soviets are continuing to develop follow-on ICBM systems and wc believe that some of these will be operationally deployed. Such further deployment, however, may have little effect on the total number of launchers. It is possible that new systems will be retrofitted Into older sites, and additional construction of new sites would probably be somewhat offset by the phase out of the old Erst and second generation ICBMs.*
he Soviets have been conducting tests that we believe- relate toepressed trajectory ICBMractional orbitsystemr both. Either weapon could degrade elements of the US retaliatory capability by circumventing existing detection systems and complicate the US problem of developing effective ABM defenses. If either
or both of these weapons become operational, they would probably bein relatively small numbers to supplement the ICBM force. We have no
evidence as to how either would be deployed: whether in hard or soft sites,
whether new construction would be required, or whether retrolil into some exJit-
tng sites would be feasible.
mprovements planned for US strategic missile forces inill almost certainly impel theurther efforts toarge, assured retaliatory capability. The incorporation of MIRVs and improved accuracy into US missiles could lead tbe Soviets to deploy greater numbers of ICDM launchers, possibly dispersed over wider geographicr to deploy ABMs in defense of soma portion of tbeir ICBM force. Alternatively, the SovieU may
Major Cen. Jaek E. Thomas, the Assistant Chief of Staff. loicDigeoce, US AT. believesSovieU will either exploit Ihek largehrow weight by Introduction of iraalUpla RVs or continue to eipand the numbers of launchers. He would add lha following to lhe nd of the paragraphs
ubaUnUal number ol MlBVi are inttcdnced withew lyitema or areto old systems, the total number of ICHMi will probably not;he total probably would behigher."
"Aa an ciaxnple of their dei-toni bated noatnhty. at ehey decided to step up the pace of toi.itruction starts to the level ofear ago. the SovieU could have an ICBM forceaunchers by the.
choose to develop .nd deploy mobile ICBM launcheri, or to expand andtheir ballistic missile submarine force. Tbe SovieU may also sec the need to improve Ihe damage limiting capabilities of their force and they might do sopl0ym<mt *ccurateossibly equipped with
US decision lo deploy an ABM defense would probably lead thedevelop and deploy peoetrafJon aids and possibly MIRVs for theiror they might Increase thc size of that force. It could lead them totheir efforts toICBMOBS. The SovieU mightup the construction of cruise missile submarines, possibly equippedrange missiles, for the intercootincnla] attack mission, and they mightconsideration to the further development of manned bombers for this role.
Forces for Strategic Attack Against Eurasia
believe that the SovieU will continue to maintain massiveagainst Eurasia. These arc now deployed primarily against Europe,that will probably continue, but with the further developmentslrategic capabilities the SovieU may deploy additional strategicChina. We anticipate Lido change in the strength of theforce, but there will probablylgrslfieant improvementand survivability; by thebe force will probably consistmissile systems deployed in hard and mobile launchers. The numberbombers will probably decline, but this reduction will be offsetdegree by equipping some of lhe medium bombers In Ung RangeASMs, aod possibly by the introduction of improved medium bombers.
Strategic Defense Forces
SovieUigher priority lo strategic defense than does (hein part to their longstanding preoccupation with defense of tbemore to the great sire and diversity of US strategic attack forces.ears, they have hadarge-scale and costly programof ABM defenses, and for tha last five years ihey have beensuch defenses around Moscow. We have no evidence that deploymentMoscow system has begun at any other location in the USSR. Webelieve that the SovieU will deploy ABM defenses In other areas, butto do so may await the availably of an improved system. In eithertbc leadtimes involved, operational ABM defenses will probably notthe Moscow area before the. We would expect io detect
lie Soviets have steadily improved their strategic defenses againstvehicles over the last decade by upgrading their air surveillanceby developing and deploying both manned interceptors and SAMsystemsormidable capability against aircraft attackingand high altitudes, but are less effective against standoffhave an extremely limited capability against low-altitudeextensive deployment evidently planned for the Tallinn system, whichbelieve toong-range SAM, will considerably improve capabilitiessupersonic awodynamice cannot at presentminimum altitude capabilities of this system; we do not believe,it is tho Soviet answer to the low-altitude threat. We believe lhat thecontinue to work on the problem of low-altitude defense. We know oflow-altitude SAM system under development, but they are nowInterceptor with Improved low-altitude capabilities. The Soviets arenew all-weather fighters with improved intercept capabilitiesgreater range than present models; one of these may now
General Purpose Forces
or the near term, we think tbe Soviets have probably determined to maintain their general purpose forces at about thc present composition, though personnel strength may edge up slightly. Over the longer term, we foresee
-Ll. Cen.anoll. the Director, Dei'rue Intelligence Agency; Brig. Cen.ollins,cting Deputy Chief of Staff Tm Intelligence, Department of the Army, and Mafor Ceo. Jack E. Thomas, the Assistant Chief of Stiff. Intelligence, USAF. note thai ihis paragraph loi.ixJen the Moscow ABM system Is the only ABM system currently beingand does not ascribe an ABM capability (or the Tallino system. They believe thai the Information avadable at presentil truufficlent to estimate with confidence theies and mission of tbe Tallinn system. They agree that the available evidence doesonclusion lhat the Tallinn sitesefensive mauioo against the aerodynamic threat eieepl againit low.altitude threats. However, they alio believe that the system, where augmented by lhe Hen House type radar,apability againit ballistic mlarileiubstantial portion of the deployment area; and that the system hai considerable growth potenUat They therefore would evaluate IU continuing cWveloprnent and deployment with this capability in mind.
ear Adm. E. B. Ftuckey, lhe Assistant Chief ol Naval Opct-abonsepart.of the Navy, believes that this paragraph conveys the Impression ihatpcae-Irallon of Soviet air apace could be accomplished with relative Impunity. He believes thai Ihis Ii not the case, thaf the total weight of Soviet airmanned Interceptors, untkairtraft ailUteiy. and associated file conlrola belter capability against low-altitude penetration than la indicated ia the leal, particularly in good weather and In some sea approaches.
"U. Cen. Joieph F. Carroll, the Director. Defease Intelligence Agency; Brig. Cen. Jimes l_cting Deputy Chief offoe InteUigence. DepaiUncDt of the Army, aad Mays*. Thomas, 'the Assistant Quel" of Slat, Intril.gence. USAF,ifferent view concerning the Tallinn system. See ibeir footnote lo paiagraph SB.
somc change in force levels, organization, and deployment. In the ground forces wc expect an eventual transition to smaller numbers of larger divisions with better support, more capable in conventional combat as well as in tactical nuclear situations. In any event, we think improvement will probably be gradual, without drastic changes in funding or manpower strength.
will probably be no significant reduction in the force levelAviation during the next few years. Over the longer term, thoTactical Aviation wiU depend on several considerations: how seriouslyview the contingency of nonnuclear war and tbe consequentfor tactical aircraft, the advent of newer and more capablethe probable introduction of improved SAMs to relieve Tacticalsome responsibility for air defense of ground forces. On balance, weprobable that the number of operational aircraft will decline in ticthat tbo overall capability of Tactical Aviation will increase" Thehedge against contingencies byool of older aircraftractice they have adopted in thc past few years.
The tempo of Soviet naval operations is accelerating. Soviet submarines and surface ships arc operating far from home bases in increasing numbers and with increasing regularity. Soviet concern about the Polaris threat isby almost constant intelligence trawler patrols off US Polaris bases. We expect operational and material improvements In Soviet ASW forces, tut their capability in thc open ocean will piobably remain severely limited for the next several years. In our view, the long-term trend in Soviet naval general purpose forces will emphasize missile armament, nuclear submarines, surface ships capable of sustained long-range operations, long-range aerial reconnaissance, and improved ASW capabilities.
As we have noted, the USSR Is limited In its capability to apply conventional power in areas beyond its periphery. Soviet capabilities for airborne andassault remain tied to support of Eurasian operations. Naval Infantry still appears designed to fight primarily on the coastal flanks of larger land formations. The expanded merchant Seet and the new large transport aircraft provide improved lift capabilities, but the Soviets lack the sea and air combat capabilities necessary for distant operations against opposition. There is no perceptible Soviet program to achieve such capabilities.
V. IMPIICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICIES
foreign policy will continue to be based primarily uponeconomic factors, but the military capabilities that the Soviets arethe military relationships that are evolving will affect their attitudes and
"Major Cen. Jack E. Thomas, tha Analant Chiel ol Staff. Intelligente. USAF, would delete this senlenc* and nibiUrute the rotlow-jig:
"On balance we think It probable that the number of operations]eand may even tnctcate somewhat in the ITItfi, and that the overall capability of Tactical Aviation wUI increase."
approaches to policy. Considering-thc development of all their military forces, Ihey are probably coming to regard their military situation as more favorable than it has been for many years. They will probably seek some political or propaganda advantage from this impiovemenf, exploiting those aspects of their military posture in which they have achieved rough parity, such as ICBMs. or superiority, such as MRBMs aod IRBMs. Tbe Soviets have no present prospect of seriously challenging US superiority in capabilities for distant limited military action. But they may consider that the broader range of military capabilities that they are developing, Including the Improvement in their strategicwith thc US, will enable them toarder line in various crises than they have In the past.
Over the longer term, the effect of miliiary developments on Soviet general policy will dependeries of US and Soviet moves and countermoves which have not yet been determined. If there is no arms control agreement and if the arms race continues, the strategic relationship between the USSR and the US will become much more complex. Large-scale deployment of MIRVs and ABMs would mtroducc new variables Into the equation. The continued strengthening of strategic forces would tend to raise tension, particularly insofar as they increased the importance of surprise and the related'need for quick response. But increasing complexity would also produce new uncertainties on both sides which would probablyenerally deterrent effect
The gradual improvements in the Soviet general purpose forces which we have estimated above will make them somewhat better suited than at present to conduct sustained conventional and tactical nuclear operations. This is not to imply that the Soviet leaders have decided to prepareeliberate limited assault on Kurope under the umbrella of nuclear stalemate. Their estimate of Western capabilities and determination will almost certainly continue to deter them fromourse.
We believe the Soviets will continue to recognize that any conventional conflict with the West, particularly against NATO In Europe would carry the grave risk of escalation to general nuclear war. Should the Soviets becomeinonflict, wc think they would seek to limit its scope and duration, and would vigorously attempt through political means to resolve the issue. For tbe same general reasons, we consider it highly unlikely that the USSR would trutiate the use of tactical nuclearimited conflict with Western forces. If thc Western Powers were to do so. Ihe Soviets would piobably not escalate lo general war, but rather would retaliate in kind while seeking to end the conflict quickly by political means. Nonetheless, Inapidly moving situation, the chance of miscalculation by either side would he great
The Soviets will continue to encourage revolution and subversion uimeans of exercising their influence abroad. Soviet support for such local struggles need not and often does not go beyond political support. The USSR hasmilitary assistance in selected cases, but always in ways which limited
thc Soviet commitment. The encouragement of these wars ii not always in the Soviet national interest, and the USSR will continue to exhibit cautionirect military confrontation with the US is possible.
Arms Control Possibilities
oscow has seen political and perhaps military advantages In concluding certain limited agreements, such as the Teat Ban Treaty and, more recently, the treaty governing the exploration and use of outer space. It has also apparentlyooproliferation treaty, though Its efforts to extract political profit from the difficult negotiation process suggest that it docs not view this matter as one of great urgency. The present Soviet attitude toward US proposals to discuss measures tourther escalation of tlie arms race is less clear: thc Soviets have not specifically rejected the notion of such talks, but they have also avoided any Indication of serious Immediate interest. It may be that, in addition to normal caution and distrusteluctance to engage in this kind of dialogue with the US while the Vietnam war continues, the SovieU are themselves of two minds concerning future limitations on armaments. Some may see an opportunity to reduce the long-term economic burdenontinued arms race. including the mllftary--might fear that an arms control agreement would have the effect of perpetuating the military superiority nf the US, or perhaps of worsening the relative military position of the USSR. It Is possible the Soviets will decide to negotiate, but for the present we rate the chances as less than even that they would agree to any extensive program of arms control or disarmament.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AtiENCY
document wos disicminclcd by the Control Inlulhgene* Agency. Thiilor Iho inlormotion ond use ol Ih. recipient ond ol persons undo) his prediction onbosh. Addttionol essenhol disieminollon mo, he authorised byofficiaU wilhin their respective depottmont.!
of Intelligence and Research, lor lhe Oeportmenl of Slow
Defense InMligenc.or the Office ol the SecreWy o*
Defense ond the orgonleoiion ol the Joint duel* ol Siofl e. Assistant Chiel en* StoH lor Intelligence.he Army, tor tbe Department of me Arsny
Chie* Ol Novol Opeeotlom (lnt.Og.rKo) (or the Department of the
CWStall.or lhet ol the Air
I. Direcior of ir-enioxmot. AlC torErwgT Ccrasnsionaor. FM. lor the Federalof mwrrkjemon h. Olmooc of NSA. for rhe National Security Aoency
L Director of CentralIA, foe ony arhe* DeaartrrertT or Agency
document may be retained, or dentroyed by burning in ocerxdonce with applicable security reoulolions, orto the Central Intelligence Aoency byiih Iho Ofnce of Central Reference, OA.
When rhlt document i> disseminatedtho overseas recipientsoin lieriod no*cn ol one year. Al tho end o( ihis period, lhe document ihould either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding ogency, or per-mlulon should be requested ol the forwarding agency to retain it In occocdonce with2
The litle ol this documoni when used separately liom me test should beWfl otnaAl USf CHI
Whit. House Notional Security Council Oeparli-nent ol State Oeportmenl of Defense Atomic Energy Commission Federal bureau of InvestigationOriginal document.