CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS8
MEMORANDUM
Special Assessments on the Middle East Situation
SOVIET PREMIER KOSYGIN'S UN SPEECH.7
Secret
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence7
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Soviet Premier Kosygin1s une
1. Kosygin's speech at the General Assembly yesterdayevere attack on Israel with an effort to appear statesmanlike and generally moderate* The aim seemed to be to pull as many Assembly members as possible toward the Soviet position on the Arab-Israeli question withoutto bombast assuming extreme poses.
*2. Throughout, Kosygin spught to portray Soviet policy around thes consonant with the objectives of the UN, in contrast with the US, whose conduct in the Middle East, in Vietnam, and elsewhere endangered international stability- His presentation was undramatic, however, and did not bring any new or more serious Soviet charges against either Israel or the US.
3. The Soviet leader made it clear that he did not regard' the General Assembly session as an end in itself or as the place for bringing forward constructive proposals with regard to the Middle East., The draft resolution he put forward called on the Assembly to condemn Israeli "aggression,-demand Israeli troop withdrawals, call for Israeli restitution to the Arabs, and to return to the Security Council for further "effectivee ducked two of the roost pressing immediate issues; the question of direct Arab-Israeli talks and Israeli access to either the Suez Canal or the Gulf of Aqaba.
Note:' This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence.
4. Kosygin's references to the US role in the Middle East were on the whole temperate and unprov-ocative. While charging that "imperialistook practical action which might have beenby Israeli extremists solely as directto commit acts ofe came nowhere near alleging that the US had intervened directly in the hostilities. Whether Kosyginto keep the door open for private talks with the US, he seems to have chosen his words so as not to raise obstacles to such talks. eneralto the undesirability of arms races, he indicated Soviet concernroblem whichJohnson had mentioned earlier in the day. Kosygin may also have been intimating the possibility of US-Soviet conversations when he said that it would be good if the great powers mfound common language to reach decisions meeting the interests of peace in the Middle East and the interests of universal
5- The Soviet premier made aconcession in the direction of Israel when he said that "every people enjoys the right toan independent national state of itstherwise, for the benefit of the Arabs, Kosygin was harsh and unrelenting toward the Israelis, even to the point of accusing them of behaving as the Nazis did. He said nothing to encourage the Arabs to be conciliatory.
6. Kosygin made it clear that the chief Soviet aim is to bring pressure on Israel to withdraw its troops from captured Arab territory. From the Soviet point of view, a good outcome in the General Assembly wouldimple resolution calling forithdrawal. Tho Soviet resolution goes well beyond this, probably in the hope that the Assembly will, by way of compromise, deliver an acceptable half-loaf.
Original document.
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