MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

Created: 7/20/1967

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CONTENTS

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THE PROBLEM

CONCLUSIONS

HE BACKGROUND OF SOVIET MILITARY

II. THE STRATECIC 7

The Soviet View of the US Posture

NATO and the Warsaw

The Sino-Soviet

Support of Foreign

III MILITARY POLICY AND NATIONAL 13

Poliricai-Mihtary

Economic Com idem14

Mihrary Research and 15

TRENDS IN FORCE16

Forces for Intercontinental

Forces for Strategic Attack Against Eurasia

Strategic Defense Forces

General Purpose

FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICIES 21

Arms Control Pcxrsibihties

o(7-

7h* followingorganizationi porficipoftd in the) preparation of this erf/more:

TheAgency one theorgan.iot.oni of rhe Deport-menn ofond Defense, ond the NSA

Concurring'

Dr. R. J. Smith, for th* Deputy Director. Control Intelligence

Mr. ughes,ctOf ol Intelligence and Research, Deport mam ot State.

Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Corroll, Director, Defente Intelligence Agency

U. Gen. Marshall S. Corttr. the Director. Notional Security Agency

Mr.rown.rhe Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Com-

Abstaining.-

Mr. Wman O. Cregar. tor rhe Astason* Director. Federal Bureau ot Inveviga-Hon. the wfafeo being outside ot hii (urlsdichOn.

MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

THE PROBLEM

To review significant developments in Soviet military policy and programs, and to estimate main trends in Soviet military policies over theoears.

SCOPE

This estimate assesses broad trends in Soviet military policy and doctrine. It does not attempt to recapitulate existing NIEs on Soviet strategic attack, strategic air and missile defense, and general purpose forces. Our most recent detailed estimates on the size, composition, and capabilities of these principal components and the supporting elements of the Soviet military forces are as follows:

NIESoviet Capabilities for StrategicatedOP SECRET. RESTRICTED DATA (LIMITED DISTRIBUTION).

Capabilities of Soviet General PurposeECRET.

. "Soviet Strategic Air and MissileatedOP SECRET.

CONCLUSIONS

IT- yi/

A. In the past year, there has been no major change in the broad trends of Soviet military policy, which continues to place primary emphasis on strategic weapons. Outlays for defense have accelerated with the continuation of large-scale deployment of strategic missiles, both offensive and defensive, and continued research and development) on new strategic weapon systems. The Soviets are building

forces which we believe will give tliem. in die next year or two. greatly increased confidence that theyetaliatory capability sufficient to assure the destructionignificant portion of US industrialand population. They will probably also seek, through both strategic attack and defense programs, to improve their ability tothe damage tlic US can inflict on the USSR should deterrence fail and war in fact occur We believe that the Soviets would not consider it feasible to achieve by thetrategic capabilities which would permit them toirst strike against the USreceiving unacceptable damage in return.'

most important issues of military policy at presentthe strategic relationship with the US. Certain majorprograms are either slowing or nearing completion. Theare probably now considering further development andof strategic systems for. For the present,the chances as less than even that they would agree to anyprogram of arms control or disarmament.

Soviets almost certainly bebeve that their strategicto that of the US has unproved markedly. In the nextso they will approach numerical parity in ICBM launchers,believe to be their present goal. They are aware, however,improvements in US strategic offensive missile forcestheir view would threaten to erode their strategic position.responses could take the formonsiderable increase inof ICBM launchers, development of mobile ICBMs. aon ballistic missile submarines, or qualitativeas the development of very accurate ICBMs. possiblymultiple independent reentry vehicles (MlRVsk

1 Miia Ceo. Jack E.fc* Ajauum CW of Staff. Intelligence. USAf. would mb-retuts ior rhe last >ecteace ofbe folk-winr.

"Tbe Soviets may oof cvnaldrr it feasible to achieve by tbe mid- IBTO'i inategic capaholitjei wtueh would permit then) torit stole attack seamst the US without receiving unacceptableeturn. On the other hand, the sustained Intensity with which the USSR fa pumung Its maiilveffort* and the pace of lU strategic lystaroisuggest the Soviets could be seeking, over theombination of caps-bilibc* which couldredible fine itrike capability against the US. Even If tbe Soviets considered that thu roll would nor nuke rational deliberate initiation of nuclear attack against the US. they might well believe that achievement ofcredible cm strike capability would be word) the cost aa view of the IQong backup this would provide for agxressnc pursuit of objective* so other areas of tbe world."

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Soviets have probably concluded that if no armsisS decision to deploy ABMs will soon beand are probably concernedS ABMdegrade their retaliatoryS decision to de-either heavy or light ABM defenses would probably lead theto develop and deploy penetration aids and possibly MIRVstheir ICBM force, or they might increase the size of that force,designed to elude US ABM defenses, such asor space weapons, might be given greater emphasis. their specific responses to developments on the US side, wethat the Soviets will hold it essential to maintain what they wouldto be an assured destruction capability.

continue to believe that the Soviets will deploy ABMsof areas other than Moscow, but their decision mayavaUabihty of an improved system. In any case, given the lead-involved. ABM defenses will probably not become operationalthe Moscow area before the, We woulddelect construction of such additional defenses two to threethey became operational.'

in the general purpose forces indicate awith meeting contingencies short of general war and aof the possibility oflimiting, or avoiding the useweapons. In part thiseaction to the USstrategy of flexible response, but it alsooreinterest in broadening the range of Soviet militaryand airlift have been considerably expanded. We do not be-however, that the Soviets are developing the sea and air combat required for distant limited military action against opposi- They evidently see advantages in wars fought by proxy with '

Ceo. jom* F. Carroll. Director. Defense Intelligence Agency; Brut Gen.oIliBt. Jr. Aeraog Deputy Chief of Staff for InteDicence.of tbe Amy. and Me, Geo.i, tbe Assxtant Uurf of Sraff. InteUieence. CSAF. note thai tb* paragraph SMSJfaaMoaow ABUhe only ABU ryvaen enrresdy being de-ploved end don not ascribe an ABU capability fee the TaBisn system. They believe that the Information available atill lorornckrnt to estimate widt confidence the full upuhilitiee snd motion of the Tallinn tyiteai Tbey agree that Ihe available evidence doeionduston thnt the Tallinn *iteiefentlve minion against the aerodynamK threatagainst low altitude threats. However. they abo believe that the system, where iiuriaentecl by the Hen Houar type radar,apabiliTy against halliitlc latMuesuhoinbal portion of the deployreenr area, and thai the lytteei hat coeatdetable grcwdi potential. Tbe> therelare would evaluate iu cor^asoaag de-elopaaeat and depioyraewl with tho capabiliiy in moid.

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indigenous forces rather than by their ownractice which reduces both military risks and adverse political reactions. Intheir influence abroad they will continue to give economic and military aidarge-scale, and to use political and diplomatic means.

5oviets now describe Chinaower with nhostile" to the USSR. They have increased theirin areas close to the Chinese and Mongolian borders, andto strengthen the defenses of Mongolia. At present theyto regard the Chinese as posing moreorder securitya major military threat, but they almost certainly see theof China as increasing over the longer term. So long asconflict persists, Soviet military planners will have toof the possibility of large-scale war with China andstrategic nuclear capabilities.

internal situation appears generally favorable totrong military- effort The present leaders seemthan was Khrushchev to the opinions of tbe militaryEstimated, rnilitary and space expendituresncrease ofercentarked change from thelevel of spending. The adverse effectseconomy of large military and space programs will exert someinfluence on military spending We believe that militarywiTJ continue to rise, butate generally consonantgrowth of the Soviet economy.

strong effort inill be continued despiteallocation problems. The Soviets probably regard suchas imperative in order to prevent the US from gaining aadvantage and also to gain, if possible, some advantageBut in deciding to deploy any new weapon systemhave to weigh the prospective gain against the economicthe capabilities of the US to counter it.

J. Soviet foreign policy will continue to be based primarily upon political and economic factors, but the military capabilities that the Soviets are developing and the rnilitary relationships that are evolving will affect their attitudes and approaches to policy. They will probably seek to gain some political or propaganda advantage from theirrnilitary position, and mayarder line with the US in various

crises than they have in the past. We do not believe, however, that their improved military capabilities will lead them to such aggressive courses of action as would, in their view, provoke direct militarywith the US. The Soviet leaders recognize that the USSR as well as the US is deterred from initiating general war, and willto avoid serious risk ofar.*1

For tbe longer term. Major Ceo. Jack E. Thomas, the AJiatnnt CW of Staff. Intelligence. USAF. believes his footnote tot perrUicnt.

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discussion

I. THE BACKGROUND OF SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

The overruling concern of the Soviet Union, as of other countries, is national security. Beyond this, the USSR seeks greater recognitiona preeminent world power with corresponding prerogatives and seeks to upaod its influence and icadesihip on the world scene. As taught by Communist doctrine. Soviet leaden calculate the "reUbon of forces' in any particular situation with regard to raalHtal economic, and psychological as well as military factors They value military strength asdeterrent to any attack on Ihe Soviet Union or its allies,initcit.ition of tlte success and growing power of the Soviet system, andupport for Soviet foreign policy. To serve theseoviet forces must of course be made capable of fighting effectively if war should occur. The means to be devoted to military preparedness, however, must be calculated in the context of all iho demands upon Soviet resources, in short. Soviet military policy does not existhing apart, but is only an as poet of the totality of Soviet policy.

In contrast to the fluctuations which have characterized tbe military policies of other powers. Soviet military policy bas been remarkably stable. Tbo military establishment hasigh priority in the allocation of national resources since the very inception of the Soviet regime. This stability can be attributed in part to such basic factors as geographic positionense of insecurityostile world. It also reflects the historic role of the military as one of the main supports and preferred instruments of tbe Soviet state, from the imposition of the revolutionary regime on Russia to the commumzation of Eastern Europe. To some extent, liability has fostered rigidity; great military forces, once created, have tended to become vested interests. This tendency, however, has beenby other forces at work in tbe postwar era.

At the close of World War II the USSR moved into tho front rank of world power and directly confronted the opposing power of the US. Soviet military planners for the first rime were forced to think in intercontinental as wellhange of focus that has profoundly affected priorities within the military establishment. The building of capabilities for intercontinental artaci and strategic defense has claimed an increasing share of the mditary effort Moreover, tbe series of cold war confrontations with tbe US. both political and military, have revealed brruSations on Soviet military power, indicating at the same time additional mditary requirements.

Another major force for change has been the rapid postwar advance of military technology, particularly in nuclear weapons, missiles, and electronics The Soviets pushed research and development) on all aspects of the new technology (io some cases, ahead of thend deployed the new weaponsarge scale. Outlays for defense rose as new advanced weapon programs

were sur^imposcd upon the large general purpose forceseing The Soviets were quick to C'avp the importance of the new weaponry, but they wcrtr slow to adapt their forces to it. roolurtonary implications for warfare Not unril theere these trrrpikabocu refected In basic changes in Soviet strategy and doctrine and in force posture.

A consequence of the advance of military technology hai been theof Icadtime* for modern weapon programs, rcquinng ever earlier dccisiort* from the political leaders and military planners.umber of majoras to the lire and composition of the Soviet military cstabluhmcnt in the* must already have been taken, and decisions for tlie period beyond are probably now under consideration. Thij is not to say thatannot be modified and force levels adjusted as the leaderships assessment of militarv requirements changes; the making of military policyontinuum rather than clusters of isolated, unalterable decisions- Moreover, the Soviets haveertain boldness Ln curtailing or even abandoning programs tint in their view no longer met their needs But thisostly business, and the Soviet leaders, facing difficult problems of resource allocation, must carefully weigh decisions to launch expensive programs to counter threats that may arise up toears hence.

The Soviets' determination of future military requirements will be based in the first instance upon their assessment of the political and military relationship with the US and of the situation in Europe. They will, however, be increasingly concerned with (be potential threat posedostile China and Us ernerguig strategic capabilities. Beyond these specific areas of concern, they wiD. consider the general utility of military power and the mix of forces best suited toforeign policy. Finally, In deoding how best to meet the wide range of requirements that can be foreseen and hen* best to provide againsthat cannot, the Soviet leaders will be heavily influenced by ntch domestic factors as the Interplay of forces within the bureaucratic establishment, the opportunities opened by technology, and the constraints of economics.

II. THE STRATEGIC SETTING

Soviets cunently see in the US rhe principal obstacle to thetheir influence in world affairs and the only significant military threatsecurity. They do noteliberate US attack on the USSR,that the US is deterred for political as well as for military reasons,the same reasons they arc deterred from attacking the US. Indeedpolicy has been to avoid situations which carried any serious riskwar. But li general nuclear war is in their view inadmissible as aact of policy, they are nonetheless- keenly aware of the political anddisadvantages of the position of inferienrv in strategic weapons thatoccupied for the pastears.

S. With the growth of Soviet offensive and defensive forces during recent years the Soviet position has improved markedly. In numbers of infer continent .ii

delivery vehicles Ihe US remains much the stronger, but completion ot current Soviet deployment programs in the next year or so will significantly reduce the US numerical advuntuge and in the number o( ICBM launchers the Soviets will approach parity wilh the US. Completion of present ICBM deploymentwill give the Soviets much greater confidence Ln their ability to deter the US by virtue of their capabdity to mfJict mass destruction on the US even if they are attacked first. Moreover, tbe Soviet leaders may see an opportunity approaching toore substantial improvement in tiicir strategic reb-tjortihip with the US. presumablyiew to translatingosition into political advantage. They must recognize, however, that as they move to alter tint relationship the risk increases tbat the US will act to match or overmatch their efforts; the end result mightew surge of competitive arming which they almost certainly would wish to avoid

The Sovwt View of the US Posture

Soviet leaders bring to any consideration of theasic attitudeand distrust. In assessing the current US political and militaryset of policies, actions, andundoubtedly findin their view iimge from the conciliatory to the downright hostile,of both strength and weakness. Which aspects of US policy willmost influence on the formulation of Soviet military policy will dependstrength of the signals as they are received and understood in Moscow

The Soviets are aware that US deployment of strategic missiles is leveling off. giving them an opportunity to match or even surpass the US in numbers of ICBM launchers- They probably believe that attainment of numerical parity would notS reaction. Such parity would have political andadvantages, but It would not alter the basic situation of mutualIt would in fact leave the USSR still inferior in heavy bombers anduncbed missiles. Moreover, the Soviets probably realize that even this improvement in their position might be short-lived.

For the longer term, the US has announced programs for qualitativein its strategic missile forces whichoviet point of view would threaten to erode the USSR's strategic position. Tin-eveloping more advanced missiles for deployment inhich will ^corporate better accuracy, multiple Independently targeted reentry vehiclesjetratJon aids. If these programs are carried to completion, the Soviets willS missile force equipped with several thousand RVs which can be designed either for maximum effect against hard targets, thus threatening the Soviet ICBM force, or to saturate and overcome ABM defentei- Tbe Soviets have responded to previous improvements in US strategic offensive forces with heightened efforts to improve their own strategic offensive and defensive forces, and might do so again. But they might find in their present strategic situation and theu future outlook incentives for arms control that would permit aof effort.

It is too early to assess the Soviets' view of the US arms control initiatives made early this year. Initially they almost certainly viewed with suspicion the ideareeze on ABMtrategic area in which theylear lead, and US readiness to discuss other strategic missiles as well. Some Soviet leaders may sec the US position as an indication of weakness caused by the economic drain of the war in Vietnam. Most of them, however, probably recognize that, even with the Vietnam war. the US economy can more easily sustain an intensification of the arms race than can the Soviet economy.

The Soviet leaders are aware that the US could begin ABM deployment at any time, and have undoubtedly followed the discussion of this subject in the US. They have probably concluded that, if no arms control agreement on thu subject isS decision to deploy will soon be forthcorning.it wouldajor new program with potential impact on the strategic situation, the US decision would tend to (end weight to interests In the USSR which press for larger military programs,

The Soviets would be concernedS ABM deployment seriously degrade their assured destruction capabilities- From the Soviet point of view, either light or heavy US ABM defenses would threaten eventually to erode the deterrent power of their strategic attack forces. This is because ABMarc carnage-limiting inis. they are designed to protect the population and property in major cities which are the prime targets ofbecausemall program, once initiated, could lendarger one The Soviets would consider it essential to respond by improving their strategic attack forces to the extent required to maintain what they would consider to be an assured destruction capability.

Tbe Soviet reaction would probably be much the same to the more austere US ABM programs that haveefenseossible Chinese threat in thes,efense of US ICBM forces. Their rnilitary responses, however, might be tempered by the lesser impact of these programs on their retaliatory capabw'tics.

The Soviets are also concerned that below the strategic nuclear level US military powerange of military capabilities and options, both nuclear and conventional, that the USSR cannot match except on its periphery. These have enabled the US to project its military power in support of policy overseas, and to intervene or threaten intervention in situations that might otherwise have been turned to Soviet advantage, The Soviets have undoubtedly seen the US intervention in Vietnam in this light

Soviet concern with the war in Vietnam is overwhelmingly political: bow to render aid to an embattled fraternal state, as is politically imperative in the context of the Sino-Soviet struggle for Communist leadership, without bc-corning involvedirect military confrontation with the US. There are, nevertheless, significant military implications. The Soviet military leaders arc aware that the war has produced significant qualitative improvements in US field forces; invaluable experience has been gained and new equipment and

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bave been tasted under combat conditions. For their part, it has presented them with difficult problems such as their inability to prevent the bombing ol" the North and tbe risk that the US may mine or blockade North Vietnamese ports. Moreover, as the rerull ol the buildup caused by the war. the US now has, for the first time since World War II. about as many men under arms as the USSR. Even though these developments present no direct threat to the USSR, they probably tend to reinforce the advocates of large general purpose forces in the Soviet mditary establishment

NATO ond the Warsaw Pod

hile Soviet interest and political engagement outside Europe hasgreatly since the ond of World War IX, Europe remains an area of primary concern. Soviet European policy ts directed to the reduction orof American influence in Europe, the isolation and contanirnent of West Germany, and the weakening or destruction of the AtlanticA measure of Soviet erjocem is ro be found in the massive forces deployed against Europe, which together make up the major part of the USSR's military establishment. The influence of tradition remains strong, particularly in the large ground forces, but the USSR's posture and its strategy have also been affected bywithin NATO.

be efforts of the US to reorient NATO planning and capabilitieslexible response strategy bave evidently been among the considerations which have caused rhe Soviets to give more attention to contingencies short of general war. Authoritative Soviet militarv writings have continued to emphasize the requirements of general nuclear wax, but the view held by Khrushchev that any limited wax between nuclear powers must inevitably escalate into general war no longer prevails. In its place the view is advanced that the Soviet armed forces should be rjtepaxed to meet all lands of emergencies up to andge-icalo conventionai conflicts and limited nuclear wars.

rion of nuclear weapons in modern war.

he Soviets almost certainly consider rhe recentestern Europe as favorable. The withdrawal of French rnilitary forces from NATO, theof the elaborate NATO infrastructure, and the general weakening of the alliance bave not only reduced the military threat to the USSR, but have offered political opportunities as welt On tho whole, however, they have tended to move cautiously. Tbe Soviets have apparently learned that any assertion of militancy from the East has historicallyorresponding reaction in theand they have continued to encourage the general relaxation of tension between the two camps.

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sible that the Soviets, in response to reductions in NATO forces, will come to see advantages in reducing their own forces in the forward area.-They may a'ao conclude that these reductions, together with the withdrawal of French forces and tbe denial of French territory tn NATO, reduce tlic capabihtv of NATO to wage conventional warfare, thus shortening any nonnuclear phaseash with Warsaw Pact forces and pushing NATO backtripwire" strategyinimum,onclusion would lead the Soviets to reexamine the concept of flexible response, and it might lead them to increase their tactical nuclearhe forward area. But if the situation in NATO i> changing the Soviets' view of then military renuiremenla in Europe, such change bas not vet affected the structure or deposition of their forces.

Itaradox of the past few years that while the USSR's East European allies have increasingly asserted their national independence, the USSR has significantly strengthened their military capabilities. Although the Soviets arc apparently relying on the East European armed forces to perform important nulitary tasks in the event of war in Europe, their policy bas been based in large part on political consideration* The Warsaw Pact has served and will pcobahJv continue lo serveonvenient framework within which the USSR can work to limit tendencies to independence among its East European allies. But the Soviets nowew assertiveness on the part of these alliesew, more imaginative, effort by the Western states to ploy on the national interests which this assertiveness reflects.

The USSR is apparently prepared to accept some diversity within the Pact and to adjust its policy objectives to this reality. Io the past two years it has tolerated repeated instances of Rumanian noocooperation in Pact military activities or even in expressions of Pact political solidarity. Bulgaria hasto be reliable, and Hungary isarger part in Warsaw Pact affairs. But the Soviets are evidently putting their main reliance on the "northern tier" states (Poland, East Germany, andhosebecause of their geographical positionommon fear of West Germany, coincide more closely with tbe interests of the USSR

The Smo Soviet Dispute

Soviets now describe Chinaowerolicy "clearlythe USSR. Since3 they have gradually increased militaryareas close to the Chinese and Mongolian borders (byndordernd they are moving todefenses of Mongolia The Soviets have also sharply increasedcollection agamst

liscusiioo of the Soviet attitude toward mutual reductions in Europe, see, Imputationsutual Reduction of US and Soviet Forces inECRET.

measures taken to date, however, indicate that at present they regard the Chi-

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nesc as posing moreorder security problemajor military threat. We believe that they will continue gradually to augment their conventional forces in the border areas.

Soviet leaden almost certainly see the potential threat ofmcreaslng over the longer term. Events of the Cultural Revolutionelements of irrationality and unpredictability into the alreadyof China, adding to Soviet uneasiness and uncertainty. The Sovietsthat Mao will be supplantedore rational, conservative regime,must recognize the possibility that his successors may be even morehe. So long as the Sino-Soviet conflict persists. Soviet militaryhave to take account of tbe possibility of large-scale war with Chinaemerging strategic nuclear capabilities.

Support of Foreign Policy

The Soviets have learned that even great military power does not auto-rnatically translate into political gain. Nuclear strategic forces arc an obvious prerequisite for great power status, and great power confrontations take place against the backdrop of mutual deterrence. But indispensable as Soviet strategic farces are in the political and military relationship with the US, they are less directly useful for most foreign policy purposes than are the conventionaladjuncts of traditional diplomacy. These include at the lower level such tune-honored moves as the military demonstration,ilitaryand shewing the flag and. at the upper extreme, large-scale intervention.

The USSR has shown over the past several years an increasing concern with its position and prerogativesreat power,ensitivity that probably goes back to its status in the interwar years as an international pariah. Its proffer of good offices, which led to the Tashkent Conference, was an example of this concern. Tbe Soviets have used Moscow parades as demonstrations of their military power, and over the past several years have builtaval presence Ln the Mediterranean. We believe that tbe USSR will continue to assert coequal status with the USorce in mternational affairs, and that this consideration willrowing influence on future Soviet military policy.

2S. In the postwar era Soviet military forces have been directly used inof policy only in Eastern Europe, except for the brief adventure with missiles in Cuba. Elsewhere the Soviets have sought to extend their influence by large-scale programs of economic and military assistance, and by encouraging subversion and revolution or "wars of nationalarticularly in the former colonial areas of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. By furnishingsupplies of weapons to selected countries and providing training for personnel, they haveumber of client states dependent upon the USSR for continuing support of their military establishments, and demanding always more advanced and costly weapon systems. The USSR itself, however, lacks capabilities for distant limited military action against the oppositionajor riulitary power. It apparently sees advantages in wars fought by proxy

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with indigenous forces rather than by its ownractice which reduces both rnilitary risks and adverse political reactions.

III. MILITARY POLICY AND NATIONAL POLITY

military policy of the USSR, like that of other states, is made upscries of compromises that emerge from the policymaking process inparticular challenges and requirements. Soviet policy is likely,reflect the strategic situation only imperfectly and incompletely, and lopartial solutions to the problems it poses. This is true, in large measure,neither the USSR nor any other state has the resources to meet allmilitary requirements and to provide against all possibledisparity, however, is also in part tbe result of subjective judgments asandresult of the policy miking process itself and ofof forces within it

Political-Military Relations

The internal political situation appears generally favorable totrong military policy. The present Soviet leaders seem more responsive than was Khrushchev to opinions of the various specialized interest groups including the rnilitary hierarchy. Moreover, the traditional Soviet concern with security and the very size of the military establishment enhance theof the high command's influence in top level deliberations on basic decisions. We do not believe, however, that any single group outside of the party apparatusre^minant role in determining Soviet national policy.

Over the next few years, we doubt that Soviet military policy will be characterized by the boldness and the striking initiatives which reflectedstyle and approach to problems. Strong, innovating leadership seems to be lacking among both civilian and military leaders, The older generation of Soviet military leaders continues to dominate the high command. Marshal Crechko, appointed to succeed the deceased Malinovsltiy as Minister of Defense, was the logical successor, his reputation indicates that be is likely to support the official establishment, defending both governmental policy and the institutional interests that heonsiderable number of promotions andwill probably be announced in connection withh anniversary of the October Revolution, resulting in an infusion of younger blood into thehigh command, but not, we believe, in any decided change in its basically conservative orientation. These new leaders will undoubtedly be hand-picked by the old guard on the basis of past reliability and cortformity.

At present, political-mihtary relations within the leadershipeasonably peacefulotential source of discord, however, is to be found in the natural conflict between the totalitarian impulses of the Communist Party, which cause it to suspect any other center of power, and the professional impulses of the military establishment. In the past, clashes between these opposing impulses have primarily concerned such problems as

questions of loyalty and party indoctrination. Today, problems arising out of this dichotomy are more likely to concern mntterv of military policy.as decisions on military matters come to depend more and more on expert technical knowledge, the influence of those who command this knowledge, the technically trained officers, is bound to grow. How to utilize this knowledge without becoming captive to it. and how to insure the continued dominance of political considerations in military matters of vital significance to the nation, have evidently become questions of some concern for the Soviet leadership.

In contrast with the situation in the, when Khrushchevs strong innovating leadership provoked public clashes with his military leaders, there have been few signs of controversy over military policy under the current regime. We believe, however, that this relative harmony reflects the general satisfaction of the military leadership with current policy rather than anyrelaxation of political-military tensions. On several occasions over the past year there have been indications that the military has sought topolicy derisions. In the fallor example,ime when tbe annual economic plan was presumably being prepared for approval, the military presstrong stand on the need for heavy military allocations. Morethe military have probably been concerned lest the proposedbetween the US and the Soviet Union on the curtailment of strategic weapons deployments might lead the Soviet Covemment to postpone ormeasures for ABM defense. We believe that the Soviet military has been pressing the Soviet leadership totrong ABM policy.

Some elements within the military are dissatisfied with the presentfor the ejeercisc of supreme authority over the Soviet armed forces, which is probably now exercised by the Politburohole, or atommittee of theumber of articles have linked the emergence of rocket and nuclear weapons and the consequently enhanced importance of surprise to the needormal, permanent command authority which could function in time of peace as well aj war and which" would have the power to initiate retaliatory action in case of attack. We doubt, however, that there will be any significant change from the present command arrangements so long as the Soviet political leadership continues to functionollective.

Economic Considerations5

problem of resourcebalancing of claims fromof tbefundamental in the making of Soviet militarySoviet leaders recognize, as Khrushchev did, that the large and growingfor military and space programs haveajor factor in the poorof the Soviet economy and its relatively slow growth rate inWhere he sought dramatic solutions, however, they have temporizedhigh prioritiesariety of competing claimants. This has meant

uller dHCutsMa of general Soviet economic policy, see. "Soviet Eco-nomk Problem! andatedECRET.

in military policy that they have supported both die buildup of strategic forcesontinuation of large outlays for general purpose forces.

We estimate Soviet expenditures for military and space programs7 atillion rubles. Of this total we believe that aboutercent goes to the strategic attack and strategic defense forces combined, nearlyercent to the general purpose forces, more thanercent tond tho space program, and IS percent to command and general support Outlays for the military and space programs have been rising lor the past two years. The estimated expenditures7 represent an increase of aboutercent over thosearked change from the more stable level of spendingbe current expansion of the strategic attack and defense forces and the rising costs ofnd the space program are responsible for this increase; spending for the general purpose forces has been relatively stable for several years.

The rjfirscrpal effect of the expanding military and space programsheir increasing demands for the scarce, high-quality resources needed to sustain economic growth The machine building industry, for example, bears the brunt of production of advanced weapons systems, it also faces heavy civilian demand for advanced production equipment, which in turn requires advanced production technology, electronic components, special metals, and machining skills. In another criticalfforts are urgently required by Sovietand agriculture, but military and space programs continue to draw off ihe best scientific manpower and the bulk of tbe budget.

Our knowledge of military programs currently underway suggests that military expenditures will continue to rise, butlower rate than that of the last two yean. If their growth rate does not exceed the rate of growth in national output (which we have estimatedear, the economy will also be able to provide increasing support to the large-scaleinvestment program, to the modernization of industry. and to the various consumer programs. The Soviet economy could, of course,uch greater erpsruioo in the military- effort, butost to unportaot civilianthat the leaders would probably be reluctant to pay-Military Research and Development *

as been and will continue to be one of rhe highest priority undertakings in the USSR. The Soviets regard such an effort as imperative in order to prevent the US fromechnological advantage, to gain, if possible, some advantage for themselves, and to strengthen the technological base of Soviet power. Most Soviets directed toward theImprovement of existing kinds of weapon .systems, but we believe that much is also devoted to the Investigationroad range of new and advancedhaving potential military applications.

'Forfuller div.nuiL.itiubee,. "Sovwt Military FWmicti aadOP SECRET.

illi the rapid technological advance of the postwar era. there hasreat expansion in the funds, personnel, and facilities devoted tond the space program. We estimate that06 expendrtures for these purposes increased tenfold. It is impossible toreciseof US and Soviet expenditures; our analysis suggests that ifnd space programs at their present levels were purchased in the US. they would generate an approximate animal expenditure more than three-fourths the amount of US outlays for the same purposes And the Soviet effort restsonsiderably smaller economic base.

oviet advanced research Bi acids applicable to military developments is probably now about equal to that of the West. Despite excellent theoretical work, however. Soviet rnihtary hardware frequently ha* not reflected the most advanced state-of-the-art in the USSR. In large part, this can be attributedonservative design philosophy which emphasizes proven technology and favorsrelatively simple equipment In part, however, this Soviet choice may have been forced by deficiencies in manufacturing and fabrication techniques. Soviet production technology generally lags behind thai of the US, although the Soviets are taking steps to correct these deficiencies.

t is almost certain that the Soviets have some typenderway in every important field of military teclioology. The Soviets will continue to press their search for new technologies and systems that offer the prospect oftheir strategic situation. We see no areas at present where Soviet technology-is significantly ahead of that of the US- Considering the size and quality of theffort, however, it is possible that the USSR could move ahead of the US in some particular field of strategic importance. The Soviet leaders would certainly seek to exploit any significant technological advance for political and military advantage, but in deciding to deploy any new weapon system they would have to weigh the prospective gain against the economic costs and tha capabilities of the US to counter it.

IV. PROBABLE TRENDS IN FORCE POSTURE

onsidering military requirements as probably seen by the Soviets, the capabilities of the economy, and the present influence of the military, we think it unlikely that there will be any significant relaxation of the Soviet rnihtary effort. On the other band, the Soviets probably see no ma for requirements of suchas to justify large new programs that would seriously retard economic growth and develop merit. We believe, therefore that the Soviets willtrong military effort that wul increaseate ronsonant with the growth of the economy.

e have weighed the important possibilityoviet attempt toombination of offensive and defensive forces which wouldirst strike sufficient to limit damage to the Soviet Union to acceptable proportions. Considering the number, hardness, and reaction times of targets to be struck in such an attack, and the likelihood that many would escape destruction, such a

RET

Soviet cSort wouldarge, highly sophislicated missile force, widespread and effective air and missile defenses, and an effective antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability. Given the technological and economic magnitude of such an enormous task, and the probability that the US would detect and match or overmatch the Soviet exertion, wc believe that the Soviets would not consider it feasible to achieve by thetrategic capabilities which would permit them toirst strike against the US without receiving unacceptable damage in return.1

Soviets will continue to face difficult choices in the allocation ofamong the mator force components and even within thosemany cases, the Soviet decision will depend upon US decisions as to itsin turn await evidence of Soviet decisions that are yet to be made.future Soviet ICBM programs will be influenced in part by theand types of MIRVs programed for the US Minuteman andwhich will depend primarily on the nature and scope of Soviet ABMIn considering future trends in the Soviet force posture, weto take account of this interaction. We have also assumed thatbe no arms control agreement in the period under consideration.

Forces for Intercontinental Attack

development and deployment programs of forces forit is dear that tbe Soviets are giving primary emphasis to the ICBMbelieve that the ICBM force now building is intended to provide aretaliatory capability against US population andirst-strike, counterforce capability. The Soviets are continuingtheir missile submarine fleet and will probablyew classmissile submarine into service next year; the buildup of thishas been very slow. The heavy bomber force will probablyto decrease through attrition and retirement of older models; webelieve that tbe Soviets now plan to replace themollow-onHowever, the rjriorities evident in the development of thesechange in response to developments io US forces."

' For view of Major Ceo. Jack E. Thomas, the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF. see hi. footnote to Conclusion A.

' Major Cem Jack E. Thomas, the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF. believer this paragraph seriously urrcWestiinarcs the threat to the US from manned aircraft, He would delete the penultimate sentence and substitute rhe fouuwuyj:

The heavy and medium bombers of LRA remain an Important part of Sovietattack forces. The degree of future Soviet reliance on bombers will depend largely on the number! and types of other strategic systems deployed and on Soviet wartime objectives, but they will probably continue to relyixed force of bombers and rruSslles. Although the numbers of medium bombers will probably decline somewhat, eootinued production of mediumhe maintenance of the current heavy bomber force level, and the probable tatroductjoo of new heavy and medium bombers will enable the Soviets to retain their rig. niafant ia terpen Unco tai aircraft attack capability."

he Soviet ICBM force withunchers operational or under construction ii ariproaching numerical parity with the planned US forceaunchers. Wc believe that the Soviets nee political and psychologicalin having an ICBM forte roughly the same size as that of the US and that tho is Uie goal of their current deployment programs. New construction starts of ICBM launchers appear to be slowing, and it is possible that, in their view, the Soviets will have reached their goal when the current deployment programs are complete We do not belirve that they areubstantial numerical superiority at this time, and consider that the most likely Soviet goal, at least for the present phase of deployment, falls within the previously estimated maximumtmchers. The Soviets are continuing to develop follow-on ICBM systems and we believe that some of these will be operationally deployed. Such further deployment, however, may haw little effect on the total number of launchers. It ts possible that new systems wul be retrofitted into older sites, and additjonal construction of new sites would probably be somewhat offset by the phase oat of the old first and second generation sCEMs.*

he Soviets have been conducting tests that we believe relate toepressed trajectory ICBMractional orbitsystemr both. Either weapon could degrade elements of the US retaliatory capability by circumventing existing detection systems and complicate the US problem of developing effective ABM defe nses. If either or both of these weapons become operational, they would probably bein relatively small numbers to supplement the ICBM force We have no evidence as to how either would be deployed: whether in hard or soft sites, whether new construction would be required, or whether retrofit into somesites would be feasible.

mprovements planned for US strategic missile forces inill almost certslniv impel the Soviets to further efforts toa large, assured retaliatory capabiLrv The trscorpoeaboo of MIRV, and improved accuracy into US missiles could lead the Soviets to deploy greater numbers of ICBM launchers, possibly dispersed over wider geographicor to deploy ABMs in defense of some portion of their ICBM force. Alternatively, the Soviets may

Major Con. Jack E. Thomas, the Assistant Chlof at Stall, Intelligence.levei tho Snvwu -Ol either esploit their laru* musllo throw woiefat by introducOon ofor otHittmie to erpanrl tbe numbers ol leunchon. Ho would add tbe following to the cad of the paragraph:

-IfUDstanUal number of MIRV. see introduced wuh those new systems or are retro-Btred ro old systerw. the tool number of ICBM. will probably cot: otherwi* iho loul probably would be ognlfecaiitly

-Ai as -ample of their demonstrated cspabdiry. if they decided to Sep up the paco ofstarts to me level of about aago. the Soviets could bave so ICBM forceutchers By tbe

choose to develop and deploy mobile ICBM launchers, or to expand andtheir ballistic missile submarine force. Tbe Soviets may also sec the need to improve (he damage limiting capabilities of their force and they might do so by irKjeasing the deployment of very accurate ICBMs, possibly equipped with MIRVs.

S decision to deploy an ABM defense would probably lead the Soviets to develop and deploy penetration aids and possibly MIRVs for their ICBM force or they might increase the size of that force. It could lead them totheir efforts toICBMOBS. The Soviets might also step up the construction of cruise missile submarines, possibly equipped with longer range missiles, for the intercontinental attack mission, and they might give new consideration to the further development of manned bombers for this role.

Forces for Strategic Arrack Against Eurasia

e believe that the Soviets will continue to maintain massive strategic forces against Eurasia. These are now deployed primarily against Europe, an emphasis that will probably continue, but with the further development of Chinese strategic capabilities the Soviets may deploy additional strategic forces against China. We anticipate little change in the strength of the Soviet MRBM/IRBM force, but there will probablygriificant improvement in flexibility and survivability; by thebe force will probably consist of new missile systems deployed in hard and mobile launchers. The number of medium bombers will probably decline, but this reduction will be offset to some degree by equipping some of tbe medium bombers in Long Range Aviation with ASMs. and rjossibry by the mrroducuon of improved medium bombers.

Strategic Defense Forces

be Sovietsigher priority to strategic defense than does the US, due In part to their longstanding preoccupation with defense of the homeland, but more to the great size and diversity of US strategic attack forces. For more thanean, they have badarge-scale and costly program for development of ABM defenses, and fur tbe last five years they have beensuch defenses around Moscow. We have no evidence that deployment of the Moscow system has begun at any other location in tbe USSR. We continue to believe that the Soviets will deploy ABM defenses in other areas, but their decision to do so may await the availability of an improved system. In either case, given the leadtimes involved, operational ABM defenses will probably not appear outside the Moscow area before tbe. We would expect to detect

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construction of such additional defenses two to three years lielorc they became operattonal."

Soviets have steadily improved theu- strategic defenses againstvehicles over (he last decade by upgrading their air surveillanceby developing and deploying both manned interceptors and SAMsystemsormidable capability against aircraft attackingand high alntudes. but are less effective against standoffhave an cxtrrrnciy limited capability against low-altitudeextensive deployment evidently planned for the Tallinn system, whichtoong-range SAM. will considerably improve capabilitiessupenoruc aerodynamice cannot at presentminimum altitude capabilities of this system: we do notbe Soviet answer to the tow-altitude threat. We believe that thecontinue to work on the problem of low-altitude defense We know oflow-altitude SAM system under development, but they are nowinterceptor with improved low-altitude capabilities. The Soviets arenew all-weather fighters with unproved intercept capabilitiesgreater range than present models; one of these may now

general purpose forces

tbe near term, we think the Soviets have probably determinedtheir genera! purpose forces at about the present composition,strength may edge up slightly. Over the longer term, we foresee

" Lt Ceo- }eeeph F.he Dvector, Deft me Intelligence Agency. Bug Coo. James L. ColuDs.cting Deputy Cluof at Staff for JateOigence, Dcpartnaeeit of the Array, and Motor Cen. Jack E. Thomas, the Atststant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, note that this paragraph coruiden the Moscow ABM system tt the only ABM system currently being oV-ployed and does not ascribe an ABM capability for Use Tallinn ryrtem. They believe that the ioformartofi available at present ia soil insufficient to estimate with confidence the full capabilrtliai and minion of the Tallinn system. They agree that tit* available evidence doesm tin! ion that the Tallinn ntaiefensive maissOa against tha aerodynamic threat except against low-elUtuJe threats. However, they alio believe that the system, where aucmeneed by the Ken House type radar,apability agauiat ballistic musdeejtotjsqx portion of the deployment area, and that the rftbm has coaudersble growth pceeaaal. Theywould evaluate id cceibpuing devea-taaernedeployment with tha capability aa aatnd.

eBear Adrn E. B. Fhackay. the Asststant Chief of Naval Operatwoiof the Navy.that tha pan graph conveys (be ebspretskm that Walctudeof Soviet air space could be accceorilisbed with relmive impunity. He believes mat toil is sot the case, that the total weight of Soviet airmanned inrercepSors. anOaircraft artillery, and aaaocialed tire controla better capability against low-alrjtudr penetraboe than is Indicated in tbe text partirsuarly Intber and to some sea approaches.

Cen. Joseph F. Carroll, the Dueetor, Defease Intafllgencv Agency. Bng. Cen. fames L. ColUni,cting Deputy CI.f Staff for Intelligence. DeTMrOrvaDt of the Army, and MjfOr Cen. Jack E. Thomai. ihe Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. L'SAF,ifferent view concerning the Tallinn ivrteoi. See their footnote to

se^t

some change in force levels, organization, and deokryment. In the ground forces we expect an eventual transition to smaller numbers of larger divisions with better support, more capable in conventional combat as well as in tactical nuclear situations. In any event, we think improvement will probably be gradual without drastic changes in funding or manpower strength

There will probably be no significant reduction in the force level of Tactical Aviation during the next few years. Over the longer term, the size of Tactical Aviation will depend on several considerations: how seriously the Soviets view the contingency of nonnuclear war and the consequent large requirement for tactical aircraft, the advent of newer and more capable aircraft, and the probable introduction of improved SAMs to relieve Tactical Aviation of some responsibUity for air defense of ground forces. On balance, we think it probable that the number of operational aircraft will decline ins, but that the overall capability of Tactical Aviation willhe Soviets may hedge against contingencies byool of older aircraft not in operationalractice they have adopted in the past few years.

The tempo of Soviet naval operations Is accelerating. Soviet submarines and surface ships are operating far from home bases in increasing numbers and with increasing regularity. Soviet concern about the Polaris threat isby almost constant intelligence trawler patrols off US Polaris bases. We expect operational and material improvements in Soviet ASW forces, but their capability in the open ocean will probably remain severely limited for the next several years. In our view, the long-term trend in Soviet naval general purpose forces will emphasize missile armament, nuclear submarines, surface ships capable of sustained long-range operations, long-range aerial reconnaissance, and improved ASW capabilities.

As we have noted, the USSR is Urriited in its capability to apply conventional power in areas beyond its periphery. Soviet capabilities for airborne andassault remain bed to support of Eurasian operations. Naval infantry still appears designed to fight primarily on the coastal flanks of larger land formations. The expanded merchant Beet and the new large transport aircraft provide improved lift capabilities, but the Soviets lack the sea and air combat capabilities necessary for distant operations against opposition. There is no perceptible Soviet program to achieve such capabilities.

V. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICIES

foreign policy will continue to be based primarily uponeconomic factors, but the military capabilities that the Soviets arethe military relationships that are evolving will affect their attitudes and

" Major Cen. Jack E. Thomas, tbe Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF, would delete this lenience and substitute tbe following:

"On balance we think II probable that tbe number of operational aircraft wOl beand may even increase somewhat Ht, and that the overall capabtoy of Ticticil Aviation wiO iiwreaie."

SI

approaches to policy. Considering tbe development of all their military forces, they are probably coming to regard their military situation as more favorable than it has been for many years. They will probably seek some political or propaganda advantage from this improvement, exploiting those aspects of their military posture in which they have achieved rough parity, such as ICBMs, or superiority, such as MRBMs and IRBMs. The Soviets have no present prospect of seriously challenging US superiority in capabilities for distant limited military action. But they may consider that the broader range of military capabilities that they are developing including the improvement in their strategic relatiou-wirh the US, will enable them toarder hoe in various crises than they have in the past

Over the longer term, the effect of military developments on Soviet general policy will dependeries of US and Soviet moves and countermoves which have not yet been determined. If there is no arms control agreement and if the arms race continues, the strategic relationship between the USSR and the US will become much more complex. Large-scale deployment of MIRVs and ABMs would introduce new variables into tbe equation. The continued strengthening of strategic forces would tend to raise tension, particularly insofar as they increased the importance of surprise and tbe related need for quick response. But increasing complexity would also produce new uncertainties on both sides which would probablyenerally deterrent effect.

The gradual improvements in the Soviet general purpose forces which we have estimated above will make them somewhat better suited than at present to conduct sustained conventional and tactical nuclear operations. This is not to imply that the Soviet leaders have decided to prepareeliberate limited assault on Europe under the umbrella of nuclear stalemate. Their estimate of Western capabilities and determination will almost certainly continue to deter them fromourse.

We believe the Soviets will continue to recognize that any conventional conflict with the West, particularly against NATO in Europe, would carryrave risk of escalation to general nuclear war. Should the Soviets becomeinonflict, we think they would seek to limit its scope and duration, and would vigorously attempt through political means to resolve the issue. For the same general reasons, we consider It highly unlikely that the USSR would initiate the use of tactical nuclear weaponsimited conflict with Western forces. If the Western Powers were to do so, the Soviets would probably not escalate to general war, but rather would retaliate in land while seeking to end the conflict quickly by political means. Nonetheless, inapidly moving situation, the chance of miscalculation by either side would be great.

The Soviets will continue to encourage revolution and subversioneans of exercising their influence abroad. Soviet support for such local struggles need not and often docs not go beyond political support. The USSR hatmilitary assistance in selected cases, but always in ways which limited

tie Soviet commitment. The encouragement of these wars is not always to the Soviet national interest, and the USSB will continue to exhibit cautionirect military confrontation with the US is possible.

Arms Control Pctsibililies

oscow has seeo political and perhaps military advantages in concluding certain limited agreements, such as the Test Ban Treaty and. more recently, the treaty governing the exploration and use of outer space. It has also apparentlyonproliferation treaty, though its efforts to extract political profit from the difficult negotiation process suggest that it does not view this matter as one of great urgency. Tlic present Soviet attitude toward US proposals to discuss measures tourther escalation ol the arms race is less clear: the Soviets have not specifically refected the notion of such talks, but they have also avoided aoy indication of serious immediate interest. It may be that, in addition to normal caution and distrusteluctance to engage in this kind of dialogue with the US while the Vietnam war continues, the Soviets are themselves of two minds concerning future limitations on armaments- Some-may see an opportunity to reduce tbe long-term econorrtic burdenontinued arms race.including thefear that an arms control agreement would have the effect of perpetuating the military superiority of the US. or perhaps of worsening the relative military position of the USSB. It is possible the Soviets will decide to negotiate, but for the present we rate the chances as leu than even that they would agree to any extensive program of arms control or disarmament.

Original document.

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