CI NIB Al INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ntelligence Information Cable
N ISfOWMATlGs REr-OHT. NO-a iV'LUATtO E
COUNTRY JULY7 .
SUBJECT ANALYSIS OF TKE PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE SCHISM IN THE AULLIST MAJORITY
1. THE DIVISION OF THE GAULLIST MAJORITY INTO TWO RIVAL GROUPS MAY BE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION. THE REFUSAL OF THE INDEPENDENT REPUBLICANS TO ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH THE MAJORITY GROUP HASARALYZING EFFECT ON GAULLISTS IN GENERAL AND ON THE GAULLIST PARLIAMENTARY BLOC OF THE UNIONIQUE DE LA CINQUIEME REPUBLIQUE (UDA'R -DEMOCRATIC UNION FORIFTH REPUBLIC) AS WELL AS ON THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ITSELF. THE
ROGERCKEL DEBSEj ELYSEE AFRICAN AFFAIRS OFFICER,AND INDUSTRY MINISTER, OLIVIER GUICKARD.) THIS HASTHE GAULLIST MILITANTS AND EVEN THE GUALL 1STWELL AWARE OF THE MARROW LIMITS CF ITS AUTHORITY AND OF UP TO THE PRESENT TIME, FEW PROJECTS FORCOHESION AND MORALE OF THE MAJORITY HAVE BEEN INITIATED ANDBEEN LIMITED IN SCOPE. FOR INSTANCE, THE OFFICIALWILL APPEAR AFTER THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER
ARGER FORMATULLETIN FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF ITEMS OF HE:LL BE CREATE:. mi^h c
3. IS SPITE OF THE DIFFICULTIES PREVALENT IN THE GOVERNMENT AT TKE PRESENT TIME, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT AT LEAST UNTIL THE END OF "THE YEAR, THE PROBLEMS ARE NOTSERIOUS ENOUGH TOINISTERIAL CRISIS, ALTHOUGHST AIM PROBABLY COULD, IF HE SO DECIDED, BRING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, BEFORE ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY
overnmental crisis, giscard realizes that he must undertake several time-consuming political tasks. he must resist any increase in the strength of the centre de*ocrate since the centre and he compete for the same voters. at the same time, he must seek to gain tke supportarge part of the moderate right-wing vote which normally votes gaullist and also begin tooothold among the gaullists themselves, since in the event of premature legislative or presidential elections, he would be dependent, as in the last legislative elections, on gaullist support. moreover, the time to precipitate a governmental crisis is not at hand for two immediate practical reasons: first, because unpopular measures, economic difficulties, and dislike of de gaulle's foreign policyreat risk for all those who support the government. if the elections were to take place before too long, tkey would bring about the defeat of the gaullist majority and the seats lost by the majority would not necessarily be recuperated byeiscard d'estaing will be obliged to wait until the majorityosition of authority for which giscard d'estaing can claim credit in the eyes of the public, or until he appears in the eyes of the
PUBLIC AS AN ALTERNATIVE. SECONDLY, THE MEMBERS OF THE INDEPENDENT
PUBLICAN GROUP, WHICH CONTINUE TO VOTE FOR THE MAJORITY, ARE
DOUBTLESS DISPLEASED, DISAPPOINTED, AND WORRIED, BUT THEY DO NOT DARE PROTEST FOR FEAR OFRISIS AND NEW ELECTIONS. THEY WOULD NOT FORGIVE GISCARD D'ESTAINGREAK VITH THE MAJORITY AT ANY TIME IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. ON THE OTHER HAND, MANY OF THEM APPEAR TO SUPPORT HIS EQUIVOCAL POSITION WHICH CONSISTS INOVERNMENT WHILE AT THE SAME TIME CRITICISING IT STRONGLY. FORVE REASONS GISCARD D'ESTAING WILL NOTINISTERIAL CRISIS BEFORE THE VOTE ON THE BUDGET IN THE FALL.
A. ACTUALLY WHAT SEPARATES GISCARD D'ESTAING FROM THE GAULLISTS ARE TWO FACTORS; FIRST, HE DISAGREES WITH de GAULLE ON THE ROLE OF THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AND SECONDLY, AND PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT, ALTHOUGH SISCARD D'ESTAING SUPPORTS de 6AULLE'S POLICY OF INDEPENDENCE FOR FRANCE, HE IS CERTAINLY OPPOSED TO THE MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY OF - E GAULLE WHICH IS OPPOSITION TO THE DOMINATING POWER IN THE WORLD: THE UNITED STATES. THUS, GISCARD D'ESTAING PROBABLY WOULD COMPLETELY ABANDON THE MAJORITY IF DE GAULLE WERE TO SEVER HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH TKE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE II
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