ACCURACY OF RUSSIA'S REPORT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Created: 3/9/1994

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I understand Chat tbe United States government dots not believe Russia baa been eomplately aocrurato in the data lt has given ua regarding ita oooaical and biologicalstockpile. Sen* accuratetbe data Rueeia ba'a given ua about ita chemical and biological stockpile? Can you describe ecaae ot tbe aajor inaccuracies in the data Russia baa given ua?

We suspect that Moacow has significantly understaeod the size of its chemical agent stockpile and that the Russians have been burning, burying or dumping their older agent stocks to get down to0 metric tons declared. Russian scientists Involved in the CW program have atated in pr-ss reports their belief that the stockpile isetric tons. One of then, Vladimir Uglev. has alleged that atocks were being destroyed at the Shikhany chemical weapons teat facility--Rusaia's primary open air CW teat site. | |

The intelligence Community's latest estimate off stockpile

sizeetric tons.P

' He nave low-to-moderate tcr.fider.eethis

-esrurara. stater-enta by authoritative Russian spokesmen during US-Russian bilateral negotiations in the Spring3 indicate that w# were correct in distrusting the stockpile data provided by the Sovietsata which remainod essentially unchanged in4 declaration. During3 bilateral talks, the Russlana indicated to tho US delegation that multi-ton quantities of CW-related chemicals stemmingecent development program were stored outside ofeclared storage sites.

Furthermore, they indicated theae chemicals were not under

Ministry ot Defenae control.r

Alao missing from the exchanged data is information on new binary chemioal agents which the Soviets and, more recently, the Russians have developed. mall stockpile of binary agents was said to exist and was storedite in Bryansk Oblast, according to Uglev.

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Regarding Russia'a lnoocurate data concerning its chesilcalbiological stockpile, does the Intelligence ccanaunlty believe that President Tea-tela isf this aUslnforaatioo campaign? Who does ths latSilligoc.ee ccaraualty believe is reeTponsible for this false data?

We have no conclusive evidence to indicate that Boris Yel'tsinarteliberate misinformation campaign. He nay be unable or unwilling to ensure that subordinates are carrying out his orders to terminate the offensive Of and at* programs. Because of his precarious political position and the panoply of problema facing tain, ha may be unwilling toonfrontation with military supporters of these prog rasas. | |

The Russians claim that thehwith day-to-day management of the military's offensiveabolished

Since the firing of. General Anatoliy

last April, tbe President's Corcnittee on Chemical and Biological Weapons Treaty-related Issues has been largely relegated to the role of managing the recent US inspections of five, production and atorage sites."1

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dmiral Studaman, what ia tbe assessment of the Intelligence Connrunity regarding the inspection and monitoring provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention? Will ratification and Implementation of the CWC significantly Improve the monitoring of ohamical weapons proliferation? Axe non-signatories, including Iraq and Worth Korea, likely to sign the Conventions, and if not, will CWC sanctions be fully enforced by all signatories to the Convention?

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Of Che countries Chat have not signed the CWC, Egypt, Iraq, North Korea, Mb/a, Serbia, and Syria are assessed aa having active CW programs. There has been little indication that any of these countries are likely to sign the Convention in the near future.

Under the provisions of the CWC, sanctions, or prohibitions, on tha transfer of chemicals are applied in varying degrees according to the Schedule of chemicals. The transfer ofhemicals is prohibited immediately upon entry-into-force 1SIP) . hemicals may be exported to non-States Party up to three years after rip, with end-use certificates, but is prohibited thereafter. There is no ban on the transfer ofhemicals to non-States Party, although end-use certificates are required. It is premature to predict which countries will not fully enforce these restrictions since many are still developing export control procedures. However, since the effectiveness of export controls will vary by country, lt ia plausible that soma of tha prohibitions will be circumvented, j j

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Q.l. Russia ieod to amhaait information on its "htalgal weapons stockpile and ita chemical weapons facilities under tha Bilateral Destruction Agreement and tha Wycaaicg Kecaoraoctun of Ondaretandiag. Ita lateat data dec1aratlose (submitted to tha United Statesumber of dlecrepanalea regarding its obemlool waapona production Caailitias and etooxpiAo- Russia has alsosomeasically. Russia is not in compliance with these two agreements. etailed description of these discrepanciesurrent assessment of issues that have been resolved and those that xsavain outstanding. Also, to the extent possible, provide an assessment of why Russia has provided false data.

A.l. Wyoning MOO* Phase II provisionswo-parc declaration of the entire former Soviet/Russian chemical weapons program, including development, production and storage facilities as well as size and composition of their CW stockpile. The Russians delivered both parts of their declarations after the prescribed mou deadlines ln April and Hay. Overall, the Russian data are Incomplete, inconsistent with the Sovieteclaration asas several Russian officials' statements, and

inaccurate,

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The RussiansW stockpile7 metric tonnes (MT), which is significantly smaller than the IC estimate00 MT, and understated their production capacity.

The Russians acknowledged some previously undeclared munitions and provided information on declared storage facilities that is generally consistent. holdings. However, they did notull declaration of CW munitions and agents assessed to be in choir stockpile, including soma traditional munitions and agent-fills as well as possibly novel agents and binary systems..

The Russians did not declare many of their known CW clevelopeient, production and storage facilities, including sons of which the former Soviet Onion declared undernd. subsequently visited.

On those production facilities declared, the Russians failed to provide complete diagrams, equipment lists, descriptive narratives, and conversion and destruction plans.

Russians did not declare moat of their developcne.it facilities, including those associated with their new

ants and binary weapons program, j

Some aspects of the Russian declarations contradict previous statements made by Soviet and Russian officials. For example,3 visit to the Volgograd Khiraprom productionussian official stated that. would be able to inspectlong suspected of being involved in research and development) under Phase II inspection provisions. However, that building was not declared under Phase XI and was, therefore, off-limits. inspectors during Phase II inspections.

In responding. concerns about theMoscow has maintained that its declarationswith its understanding of KOU requirements. Russians' reinterpretatlon of the definition of aproductiono Include only thoseproduction and/or filling equipment at the timeinconsistent with the long-standingU.S. interpretation. Aa defined in the CWC and thea chemical weapons production facility means anywell as any building housing such equipment, thatconstructed or used at any timeanuarynarrow Interpretation of the requirements to declarefacilities, although legallyuch. interpretation. Incurrant Russian positionajor shift fromwhich was similar to Washington's, used by theUnion during the negotiation of the HOU and throughof Phase X.

. continues to pursue resolution of these concerns through the MOU's provisions for subealttlng questions on each side's declarations and for conducting consultations. Russian responses. questions, while clarifying some minor issues, have not raaolved. concerns andew new ones.. and Russia have since4 conducted four rounds of consultations in Moscow on MOU implementation issuas. During the first round of talks, tha Russians indicated that thair past research and development efforts on CW bad not led to tha construction of new binary production facilities or to stockpiling of binary weapons. This statement, however, did not preclude the use of existing CW productionroduction and stockpiling off binary components.

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In Mrlyirector John Holummall delegation met with Russian officials in Moscow to "brainstorm" on means for resolving outstanding concerns about HOD implementation. Although tha Russian officials were notosition to cosmic to specific proposals, they did agree in principle toupplemental declaration of CW production9 under Phaseut omitted by the Russians in their Phase II declaration. However, the supplemental declaration would not include all production facilities currently assessed by the rc to have been involved in the Russian offensive program. The declaration would alao be made inay as not to prejudice either side's interpretation of the provisions. The Russian officials were reluctant toroader interpretation of the declaration requirement for CW development facilities, but did agree to. proposal to draft languageossBOn understanding of the requirement. They were also unwilling to. proposal to resolve concerns about binary CW weaponsutual exchange of information on each side's program.. bas proposed further discussions in Washington with Russian officials at the end of Pebruary. P |

Regarding inspections,. ability to conduct meaningful inspections in Russia was hampered, in part, by the incomplete nature of the Russian data. Since inspections were reetricted to declared facilities, the Russians effectively limited potential inspection sites by excluding from their declaration some facilities of highest concern to. In addition, the lack of detailed and complete site and process flow diagrams, equipment lists, and descriptive narratives hampered the Inspectors' ability to effectively use their inspection time. The Russians did allow. to conduct its five designated inspections. However, as with their data doclaration, Moscowore restrictive approach to inspections, which in come cases was inconsistent with MOU provisions, than did. Q

The implementing documents to the Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDAI nave not been finalised, and hence, the Agreement has not yet entered into force. In. and Russia agreed to what. believed to be the final draft of tbe implementing documents. However, Moscow indicated shortly thereafter that several changes needed to be made. During the4 consultations, Moscow stated that it is unwilling to discuss iconcerns at this time and that it is considering whether CMC provisions would be more advantageous to them than the sDA. Should the BDA enter into force, Russia's Phase IX declaration would serve as the basis. monitoring and inspection of Russian destruction activity. | )

President Yel'tsln established the President's Cxxnmlttee on Convention-related Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons (PC) In2 to handle the implementation aspects of various chemical and biological weapons agreements to which Russia is party. Alchoughthe role of this committee has

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broadened over time, ic still haa aoc demonstrated the clout or apparent authority to pushnified policy from the Interagency quagmire. Moreover, recent information suggests that the degree to which the PC has influence over Moscow's decision-malting process has declined significantly einceM when Aaatoliy Xuntssvlch was removed as bead of tbe PC.[

The eoncant of Russia's data declaration likely was influencedumber of organisations and issues. At least portions of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) appear to be exerting the most realstance on CM Issues. Other ministries also ara operatingonsiderable amount of autcooory and are aeeklng to advance their own interests as they struggle over control of Russia's Cw policy and che allocations and influence that flow from chat policy. There are indications that several individuals within che MoD--particularly wiehin the Chemical, Biological and Radiological Troops--and the State Committee for the Chemical and PeCrochemical Industry (formerly pare of the Mlnistrypf Chamlcal Industry) oppose abandoning che Russian CW program.T"

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Q.2. Rueaia appears to ba aaintalQisg an offensive biological weapons prograa despite2 Biological Weapons Convention and2 agreement vlth the United State* and ths United Kingdomcraiaate such prograao. On whata.i ase its cleima that Ruaala la continuing^ to develop offensive biological weapons? etailed assessment of the Russian BW prograa,escription of all facilitiesisting of all agents currently being maintained or developed.

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Despite repeated assurances that Russia has been in full compliance with tha BWC sines. Intelligencejudo/as that some key offensive activities continue in Russia and that Yel'tsin has been unable or unwilling to terminate then. We are confident that support forobilisation base for wartiiu production and the scaled-down efforts aimed at developing new agents resides in tha highest echelons of the Ministry of Defense. The continuing refusal of that Ministry to be open about past BW offensive activities, whether in declarations to tha UN or in trilateral and bilateral discussions, only reinforces our doubts, about its intent to terminate all offensive BW.activicies

Q.J. Iran siynnd the ctanical Weapons Convention Inespite tne fact that It la concealing chemical weapons. Do we know tha slse, nature and location of Iran's chaaloal prograa? What ccmncrlaa. IC any, are aiding Iran with Ita development and production prograa? Doesl. expect Iran to ratify the CWC and declare, accurately or otherwise, its chemical stockpile and facilities?

ranarge offensive CW program that has grown dramatically since it began Iran isarger, more advanced, and virtually self-sufficient program, which we believe will soon emerge as perhaps tha largest in tbe Third World.

Iran is now in the midst of an eight-year plan in which it la seeking a'broad range of large-scale CW agent and precursor production facilities.- It haa continued to upgrade and expand its chemical weapons production infrastructure and chemical munitions arsenal, even after signing the CWC In

These facilities and existing cw agent plants will allow

Iran to produceons of agent perthan Iraq produced at the height of its CW program.

Iran's development effort also includes facilities to produce virtually every precursor lt needs, thus lowering the risk to Tehran of export controls and interdictionefforts,

s part of this expansion, Iran is spending large sums of money on long-term capital improvements to its chemical warfare program, which suggests that Tehran intends toW capability well into the foreseeable future.

Furthermore, Iran isrive among lesser developed countries to link ratification of the CWC with elimination of Australia Group export controls, which are more comprehensive and stringent than CWC controls.

f these sfforts are successful, Iran would be able to acquire more easily the precursor chemicals and production equipment it needs for Its cw program. I

We assess that Iran has produced as much as several thousand tons of CW agents, including blister, choking, and blood agents. Xt has been attempting to produce nerve agentsut we do not know if it has yet succeededarge scale.

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Iranasic chemical munitions arsenal, which it most likely will continue to diversify and improve. The size of Iran's chemical weapons stockpile is difficult to assess, but it may be substantial.

ran's arsenal probably consists of standard lone- and short-range chemical munitions, including aerial boobs, artillery shells and rockets, and etortar rounds.

e believe that Iran ishemical warhead for its Scud missiles and may have received some assistance from North Korea in this field.

At the4 Preparatory Commission (PrepComl Plenary in The Hague, Iran stated that the PrepCom'S' lack of commitment to remove preexisting export controlsajor obstacle to its ratification of the CWC. This hard-line position may. be primarily for negotiating purposes, however, and is likely to soften, as the number of ratifying countries approachesnd entry into force Is close at hand. Tehran may then move forward on ratification in order tolayer within the CWC arena, specificallyember of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Executive Council. Should Iran ratify the CWC, it is unlikely that, given its push to expand its existing CW program as well aa its efforts within the PrepCom to restrict CWC provisions, Iran will fully disclose its CW program or fully adhere to the Convention.

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