INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS REVIEW

Created: 12/1/1993

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

International Narcotics Review

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Perspective

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AMougk ihe ultimate measure of the success olcomemarcoticsprc-

eduction in tht mpty cfdmgshe

strikeningation democratic processes and institutions. Thishich does notoordinated Directorate oflntelli-gence assessment. Is intended to be speculator aad to generate discussion

domestic

POtmeal dividends from pursuing aggressive antidrug polide* These government, po.itic.lty benefit bycltolzltor their coamrdesnase. from drug lords who* power and wealth hm corrup?-edecurity, and judicial institutions and drained gove-nmcni aathomy. AlAough governments remain plagued byraticnd politicaltenweouc* programs are

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dence and capability of government* l0eel of other serious proNems^Hncfciding insurgencies and tcrrorismT

Moat of tbe Latin American governments are gainingaWl.nes of their security force, .ad finding there hpubHc and

andBolrvia, the policeecent years have demomtrated they can mount aggrcssrvc caenpa.gna against traffickers, even though penetrationsroblem Bogota'* dramatic access in hunting down

orale,remand Prestige of the Colombian police antidrug units-and those in other

1 ^ and with -idespread public andO.un for getung Escobar, some high-level officials ia Bogota are past, TejOMtwrc aggressive law enforcement tacticsre Call Kingpins.

ColccnbUrt military uf-ts tbat hare received antidrug training g their tactical praficitat) aad operational citcirjuflc. mcading reapect for humanbam deployed ia couBtertn**rgency opera tkan.1

With the iir.proied capabilities of antidrug security foreea. regional govtrnmemi hare afrsrroaatratcd they can aaaert lalboritv hi rraaoae area*

where they have long hod little or do influence Although maiaiainintimited presence ia the remote Beni and Chapare legion* of Bohvia. police counurnarcotica .weep* hare denied tfahVkeri unconiuained use of theae traditional trafficking areas, disrupting their narcotic* activities and keeping them ofT-balance. In Peru, increased security force deployment* and more sustained law eafcrcerneat efforts againtl the drug trade in the Huallaga Valley haw not oafy caused much trafficking activity to shift elsewhere but ebo have forced the Sendero Lomutoao and other insurgents toower profile and aeakxned their support bate

mere*led determination and effectiveness of goversment* to confront the dorneiuc Impact of the drug trade strengthen* public faith inpolilical Institutions. COmastion and violence, for example, hat become point paUtscal haae* throat bout Utfn Aaserica, with populace* expecting governmenti toeo sflrrwhmg about both. In1 year, public reaction to evidence of ceereptioney factor in the resignation rf Brarilian Prraideat Collor and the iirmeachmeai of Preasdeat Perer ib[violenceWitical nam in I

Teerorut violence, whether by traScaer* or by insurgent or other group* with politicals also of growing, when it threatens tourism and other businessogota aad strong support foe iu crackdown against Ihe Medellin traffickers because of their pcncbanl for violence, and the Mexican Government is increasing pressure on drug organiraiioni that are responsible for gang wars lhal have resulted in the death* of leveral tourist* and the Archbishop of Guadalajara.

Judicial rr/orou undertakenornerstone of counternarcotics policy In Colombia have itTrntlbened the criminal JtrstJce system and rnhaaccd IN credibility. With US support, Colombia is putciai in place tn adversarial system of justiceseai eriaarnal procatures cede that are improving Its ability to im-otigate and prcsccatc nircoticsncluding drug-related corruption- Because of measures tc caaurc the protection of judges, investigators, and witnesses, the judiciary hu mostly wilhatood effort* by traffickers to mtirnidate or corn pi iu officials. Although trafficker iafltKACc has dekjrd aattdrag legislation and led to key rwtraiom in tbe crimiaal code that allow fee lesneW tenseocc redKtioss* fee drug criminili who imraScate their ion federates, theystem luelf ss stronger and more resistantribery andeanwhile, Venezuela ha* passed tough law* and sanction*oney laundering, and Chile will icon follow auit.n

meet important, Ihe integrity ofpolitical procette* Inerle* ha*Ian be at Sited from laerteatd emphasis oa eoeawttrnsree-

Irallicker declared hi* support foe Simper.

bca. AHhough they remain able to mUtrate the police and otheraad to bay Jaffa after with luring praitlcaans, iraaVaer*peaeteafly eWreeaed in meat Latin Aaserioan crjurstriea.increasingly are viewedhreat to govwnrnenlnown trafficker* no longer can openly competedid Pablo Ficobar in tbe tartydominatea* tsappcaed ia Bceh-a* daringSI GarciaAllegations of ue* to drug kingpins aredamagxi to politicians. Indeed, Colombian ptesi'enliulRmeiio Sampcr-j

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and sometime* signifkaat perinealemain major impediments to ece&ternarcoticsnd Latin American gc-ernroer.ilemain largely oreeeeknl on U'Seport aad corn hoc to looktrong US antidrug commitment.trong counter-narcotic* program* boliter democratic bnitutMni and increase the raped-ty of government* to cope with other threat* to liability and prosperity. Revogm/ing tie bene (its. Latia Americas uiuaaMnt* are likrly to rsaasare their latatrag eaTerrs as thei try to enhance their on credibility with potM.alien increavng.'y look.ng lor integrity and competency in government. P

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