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National Inttttigtmce Eifimale
Cuba: The Outlook for Castro and Beyond (cnf>
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Cuba: The Outlook for Castro and Beyond <cnf)
Tension, and uncertainties in Cub. arc so tale lhat significantdeicrioraiio* of hu health, or plottingine military could provoke regime-threatening iruUbility at virtuallytime.elter than even chance that Fide! Castro's government will fall within the next few yean.f)
Thes, /udgmerus ar, bard on the following underlying premit
Fidel Castro will not voluntarily relinquish
The Cuban economy wilt not benefit from some domestic economic bontsnia. neck as discoveryarge oil deposit
Thereirect correlation between severe economicon and political InsiaMtty. ft tn>)
^ "choccur, US interests
will be challenged in complex aod possibly unprecedented ways.
,UCCCMIOn ,cenaflM are likely to entail substantial androtracted .ratability and large-scale emigration to tha United States, while generating demands for US involvement fj nf)
The demise of Castro's govemzne. will be the sujnalin what is
[ZrZlf lh> JT-econc.li.tion among pro^ and anti-Castro dements on u* Uland and the Cuban
diaspora. The new era will be marred by retributor, and other violence.
New Cuban| be poorly prepared to deal with the catraord.-nary economic and social problems they will face.articular.
regime committedigh degree of statism and reformer, attracted to free market models,f)
With Tew exceptions, exile political leaders are likely to find scant support on ihe Uland and will probably be greeted with suspicion and hostility if they are perceived as trying; to seiie control. Demands by exiles to purge Castro-era officials, or to put some on trial, would arouse fierce opposition. Similarly, exile efforts to recover properties seized inould be highly contentious-f)
Cuba's economy has contracted by more thanercent9 and will probably continue to decline. Virtually without foreign subsidies, credits, or assistance. Cuba faces severe fuel, food, and other shortages,f)
But. even with the survival of bis regime at stake, Castro remains rigid in bis hatred of capitalism, rejection of meaningful political reform and large-scale private enterprise, insistence that Cuba not be overwhelmed by US culture and economic power, and loathing of the dominant groups and attitudes in the exile community, is Nr)
His strategy for survival hingesmplementing limited economic reforms to ameliorate internal dissatisfaction and attracteeking accommodation with the United States to win relief from tbe embargo;ontrolling dissidents, critics, and potential opponents oo the island. Castro retains considerable strengths,the loyally of the military and security services,r)
But. as economic conditions deteriorate, antiregjmethus far has beenlikely toarge uprising would prompt Castro to devote whatever force necessary to repress it. even at the riskloodbath. If public disorder continued to spread he would have to call upon the military, whose willingness to carry out the order would be questionable.P)
In general, military units are not trained for riot control and have never been used against civilians. Many miliury personnel probably would desert if ordered to fire on civilians, and some might oppose the regime. In suchnit or units probably would turn on the government and forces still loyal to it.r)
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Serious instability in Cuba will have an immediate impact or the United State*:
00 Cabana .oold be able to flee on small craft available in Cuba, and larger number* would leave if boat! arrived rrom tbe United States.
Pressures for urgent oumanitarian rescue efforts at tea would be intense.
Pressure would also increase for US or international intervention in Cuba, especiallyrge nvmber of eiilcs became involved there
If be believed that his or his regime's survival were imminently threatened. Castro might try to provoke an incident with the United Sutes in an attempt to arouse nationalist fervor and deflect popular hostility from himself,f)
Finally, if faced with tbe certainty of his fall. Castro might lash out agauut the United Sutes. Itremotely possible he could order an sir
attack on an installation on the IIS mainland, the miliury occupation
ofGuantanamo. or terrorist attacks,f)
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with the survival of his regime at stake. Fide) Castro remains rigid in his hatred of capitalism, rejection of meaningful political reforms and large-scale piivale enterprise, insistence that Cuba not he overwhelmed by US culture and economic power, andof the dominant groups and attitudes io the Cuban exile community,f)
esult of the loss of more than S4 billion in annual Soviet and other Communisteconomicfell by aboulercentndlikely to contract by anotherercent this year. And. if Castro manages to reubi power, and leaves present policies essentially unchanged, the economy will probably continue declininghe period treated in this Estimate, (si
The impact on the population already has been devastating. Food shortages andproblems have caused malnutrition and disease, and tbe difficulties of subsisting will intensify. Public health, sanitation, and other services will further deteriorate,factories will be idled (more than half already have curtailednd those unemployed or underemployed will rise above the current SO percent of the labor force. Severe shortages of fuel, now causing daily blackouts of up tooours in Havana, and the virtual collapse of public transportation, will persist and possibly worsen, (c)
Largely because this year's sugar harvestillion metric tons is tbe smallest inears, total export revenues will fall to6 billion. There is little chance, moreover, that they will surpass S2 billion annually
Exports of sugar will be constrained by lhe lack of fertilizers and herbicides, lhe decrepitude of mills and equipment, and mounting transportation problems.
Earnings from nickel and other traditional exports arc unlikely to rise much above the levels of recent years.
Nontraditional exports, such as biomedical products, have only marginal prospects, (c)
Hard currency inflows from other sources will not offset declining export earnings:
Gross revenues from tourism will rise0 million last year tout net income may be only about half that because of the highcosts.
Foreign investment, mostly in0 million annually02 and seems likely lo rise0 million this year.
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If implemented soon, expected policy cringes to increase remittance income and facilitate visits by Cuban exiles couldseveral hundred million dollar* by the end of this .year, (c)
Foreign economic assistance is unlikely to exceed0 million annually. Russia is providing construction creditsO million, spread over several years. Although Moscow denies giving Cuba any trade subsidy, preliminary trade data3illion balance in Havana's favor. Spain, Cuba's only other significant benefactor, hasreditillion for food purchases. Butnew credits arc unlikely because debt to Western creditors of more thanillion has been in arrcare since thelcijing rebuffed Cuban entreaties for aid ibis year, and Castro has also been stymied in efforts, to0 million in Western financing to complete the nuclear power plant at Juragua. (snf)
esult of these financial constraints,declined by9all anotheroercent this year. With food and petroleum constituting nearly two-thirds of import spending, only several hundred million dollars will be available for all other purchases abroad Sharply curtailed imports of industrial spare parts, machinery, snd equipment; transportation goods;Inputs; snd other critical commodities will further undermine the prospects forrecovery And. even if CastroanotherillionCuban exile remittances, forimports of food, petroleum, and other critically needed goods would not reverse Cuba's economic decline, (c)
Castro's Sarrrval Strategy
As nessures mount. Castro will pursue hb surma! strategy, which emphasizes three key elements;
Implementing limited economic reforms to ameliorate internal dissatisfaction tad attract foreign economic relief
Seeking accommodation with the United States to win an easing or lifting of the economic embargo.
Intimidating, harassing, exiling, and, when necessary, repressing dissidents, critics, and potential opponents. (S)
He will also seek to retain the support of the Cuban public by portraying US policy as hostile and driven by an exile commueiiy determined to reclaim lost properties, seize power, and undo tho social gains of his regime. At the same time, by allowing increased family visits he hopes to eare additional bard currency while sowingin (he exile community. He will also try to preserve the illusion that he alone can rule Cuba and defend its interests,f)
Castro willargely unitaryAlthough he relics on younger officials, especially in economic affairs, none appears willing to push credible alternative views, as respected officials did in the past. Few of Castro'$ subordinates from the early years retain top civilian posts, while many others have been disgraced or retired Even bis younger brother Raul, Minister of tbe Revolutionary Armed Forces, wouldonly if Fidel Csstro were in steep physical or mental decline.ew vague and qualified bints that be might consider retiring, we believe Fidel Castro will not voluntarily relinquish power.f)
his regime By overreaciing wiih excessive force io antiregime dernonstrations or civil unrest or by underreacting and allowing disturbances lo spread. Castro wouldmore serious challenges to hisThus, his continued good health and the constancy of his leadership will be thevariables affecting lhe survival of his regime,F)
Feeding tbe Trojan Horse
The greatest potential for serioms error tics in the implementation of economic reforms:
With living standards plunging. Cuban leaders have acknowledged that no end of the hardships is in sight, and manythat significant economic reform is essential.
his efforts to manage the domestic crisis. Castro often functionsractical,and flexible manner. Recognizing, for example, that Cuba can no longerarge military or indulge in costly foreign adventures, he has slashed military programs and personnel and shelved active support for subversion in Latin America. And,the challenges he has facede has borne the strains with outward equa-nimily. He hasusy public schedule, traveled abroad at leastnd made no serious tactical errors.
But, as his options narrow, Castro will be more likely iothe odds risingerious error would be fatal for
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But profound changes, like thosein the Soviet Union and other former Communist countries, areto Castro because they would undermine his aulbority and eventually cause his regime to unravel.
Even economic reforms legitimizing large-scale private enterprise !lkt thoM adopted by China and Vietnam, are unacceptable because Castro could not abide theneeigorous privaie sector.
He will have no choice, therefore, but to maneuver warily in the narrowing space between these irreconcilable imperatives.
The cautious implementation of economic reforms highlights Castro's problem Despite harsh denunciations of "neo-capitalist" exploiters, he grudgingly permitted foreign investment and large-scale foreign tourism in
ublished interview last February, then Foreign Minister Rlcardo Alarcon was askedoreign reporter ifand foreign investment tn Cuba might turn out toestabilizing Trojan korse. (Uj
Alarcon responded that: "We have no other choice but to feed the Trojane muste are familiar with the social and political price, but the real danger is the economic crisis."Ill}
the.1 heey clement of Asian Communist reformby authorizing small tradesmen to operate. But relatively few have been licensed, and none can buy supplies openly. Castro will probably open new areas of the economy to foreign investment and broaden experiments in wage and price reform. He may even relent in his longstandingto farmers* markets but only if they were strictly regulated. Such measures may alleviate dissatisfaction and sustain the hopes of prorcfonn officials, but they are unlikely to attract substantial amounts of hard currency, (c)
In contrail, Castro's boldest economic move yet, his recent decision to legalize theof US dollars, will attract large amounts of foreign exchange by making it more attractive for exiles to send cash to family members in Cuba. Remittances of cash0 million annually in recentprobably increase to as much0 million to
SI billion annually, with most of it tn dollars. Dollarizalion will help the regime acquire large amounts of illegal foreign currency now circulating, stimulale consumption, and probably aggravate divisions within the exile community.f)
Doilarization also entails significant risks:
benefits will be unevenly spread,new tensions between those who receivea minoritymainly of the better educated, urban, and predominantly white segment of thethose who do not.
Regime loyalists are the least likely to have relative* wDling to send them money, and thus they become relatively disadvantaged by the new policy.
Remittance recipients will have little incentive to work in the official economy, as the real value of peso salaries erodes even more rapidly.
The dollar will become the primary medium of exchange in the black market and in the informal service economy,both and increasing individualindependence from the state.
The ability of dissidents to hold dollars willey legal instrument of repression and could enable them to operate more effectively.f)
Moreover, the regime will be able to recap-lureortion of the inflow of dollars for its own purposes. In order lo induce Cubans to spend their remittances in official dollar
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stores, they must hare goods to sell, and most of these will have to be imported, requiring expenditure of hard currtney Prices instores will doubtless be much higher than the true cost of the goods sold, but the black market and pressure from the foreignshould impose some limits,T]
Additional hard currency will also be acquired as Havana allows larger numbers of Cuban exiles to visit the island. This tooigh-risk change of policy.xiles were allowed to visit Cuba89ime of serious economic hardship and demoraliration. Their cumulative impact was highly subversive andto the Maricl exodus. Conditions today are far worse thannd leaders can have no misconceptions aboul how destabi-lieing visits by largeofexiles woaid be. (c)
Seeking Relief From lhe US Embargo
With the kiss of Soviet economic aid, relief from the US trade embargo has gained importance for Castro. He hu redoubled his worldwide lobbying effort against theand continues signaling readiness for comprehensive bilateral talks. Even in more straitened drcurrnrlassces, however, there is virtually no chance Out be would negotiate the essential structure of his regime or agree lo free elections, as specified by ibe Cuban Democracy Actor example, he would make no concessions with respect to his regime's absolute monopoly over the media or its prohibitions on independent political parties, labor unions, pressure groups, or others that could be critical of Ibe regime,F)
Rather, he hopes to build support in the United Stales and the internationalfor circumventing the CDA and to
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s engage in talks on an agenda restricted lo normalization of trade relations, settlement of claims, and perhaps the Guantanamo Naval Base, as well as some peripheral issues such as narcotics interdiction andAs part of such an effort, he may make cosmetic economic and political reforms and release additional prisoners, particularly if Ihey agree to leave the country,f)
If the United States lifted tbo embargo, either unilaterally oresult ofCuba would benefit in lhe following ways:
Savings on lower prices and shipping costs.
Increased tourism revenues possibly amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.
Some additional foreign investment and possibly increased emigre remittances. (snf)
Some Intelligence Community analysts believe the economic impact of an end to the US embargo would be substantial. They hold that lhe benefits ssould probably generate minimal economic growth and relieve many of ibe worst shortages and other pressures the regime faces, in large part becausehas shown increasing flexibility in its efforts to generate economic relief,f)
Other analysis bebeve the sum total of Cuba's gains would be relatively minor and probably would not reverse its economic slide. An end to the embargo might slow further decline and generate some growih in specific sectors such as tourism and assembly industries. But infrastructure bottlenecks
high import costs in the tourism industry would limit real net income from that source. Moreover. Cuba's principal export, sugar, would be excluded under the current terms of the US sugar Import quota system,f)
Proponents of both views agree thai Cuba's insistence ontate-conirolled economy and efforts to contain the political impact of foreign-owned and -managed enterprises will likely continue to restrict investmentew enclave indastries,the attractiveness of Cuba to US investors,p)
The embargo gives Castro politSvalboth domestically and internationnlly. HU incessant claims that it is primarily to blame for economic hardship continue io find credence among tbe Cuban public, and he has used the CDAcapegoat for increased deprivations during the past year. Catholic and Protesiant leaders cenpose the embargo on humanitarian grounds. Most political dissidents also oppose it. saying that it limits their efforts to broaden ibeir appeal by enabling the government to tie themostile US policy that hurts the average Cuban. Castro uses the embargo to drum up sympathy in Latin America, Canada, and Europe, where its extraterritorial aspects arc resented and resected.p)
Lifting the embargo would present Castro with new political challenges. Although be wouldajor victory, he would be unable in satisfy popular expectations for rapid economic improvement. Moreover, blame for continued austerity would rest solely with his government. Mounting, unmet expectations would increase thefor instability and violence that Castro would be unable to control,f)
The governmentumber of residual strengths- Castro benefits from his isennf.-caiion with Cuban nationalism. Many Cubans still view him with awe andalthough the younger generation lends to be apolitical or alienated. Most important, he is buoyed by the apparent loyally of the military and security services and Iheof senior civilian lechnocrats and Parly officials, who generally believe their fate Is Inextricably tied to his. Theis continually told of how badlyin former Communist countries have deteriorated, aad stability and continuity are enhanced by the historical tendency of Cubans to endure adversity withstoicism.f)
ctivists and morepportets are involved with organired dissident groups that span tbe ideological spectrum. Over tbe last year or so they have modestly increased theirorganizing more foreign press conferences and joint activities, including in recentmall march and ibe issuanceeclaration calling for political and ccoriomic reforms,f)
these groups will remain small, dispersed, and iniimidatcd by Castro's security forces. They are unlikely dirco lv to provoke regime-threatening events. The mosl prominent leaders are committed io nonviolence, and some continue naively to hope that they will be permitted lo organize openly. In addition, the dissidents' ability to influence even Is wille Umited by rivalries,harassment, the difficulties ofsince few have paying jobs, ihe lack of
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Bm unpredictable developments would increase the prospectsissident leader or croup would become lhe focus of popular dissatisfaction. If promineni leaders broke publicly with tbe regime and embraced
respond toarger rupture in the leadership. Bui. under such circumstance, his response mighi be harsh andopular backlash. One or more dissident leaders might increase the viability of their cause by attracting significant international support or funding, (c)
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Antiregime disturbances moil likely will occur spontaneously- Violent unreil hu been lire, bul the number and siie ol* incidenu have increased. Disorders have occurred in receni monihs in Camagucy and ai Cojimar (on ihe outskirts ofn the latterrowd of Cubans rioted after police killed at least three personsroup from Florida arrivedpeedboat to extract relatives. As conditions on the island further deteriorate, violent incidenu arc most likely to be sparked by mountingover shortages of electricity,aad food; the use of excessive force by the regime, and provocations by militant exilesr)
A large uprising would prompt Castro to devote whatever force necessary to repress it, even at the riskloodbath anddamageolitical legitimacy. He would make no meaningful concessions to dissident demands and would ignorecriticism. If public disorder continued to spread, however, his efforts to hold power would enuil mounting costs, and he would have to call upon the miliury whoseunder orders to confront unarmed citizens would be questionable,fj
Ibe Role of the Military
In general, military uniu arc not trained for not control, have never been used against civilians, and would be called on to confront civilian protesters only if the security services and special troops of the Interior Ministry were unable to contain tbe situation. By that lime, regime survival would be in doubt. Anxious to avoid associationegacy of brutalityoomed cause, many military personnel probably would desert, and *ome might even oppose ihe regime. In suchnit or unilS probably would
turn oa the government and forcea still loyal to the government. The loyal uniu most likcy would include ceruin special troops and High Command Reserve units, (sst)
A significant spill In the miliury would increase pressure on the United States to become involved Anti-Castro rebels would be likely to seek foreign support andand. if theyignificant portion of the island, would probacyagnet for exile volunteers. If military rebels faced extermination by pro-Castro forces, there wouldmall chance tbey would attempt to sUge provocations against US urgcts lo toucharger conflict. (cnf)
Miliury Coup Ponibililiti, Like the rest of society, the military has acceptedreduced resources, including the loss of Soviet support. Once famous for operations in Africa and Central America, attaining self-sufficiency in food production isey mission. Raul Castro has described the military as loo large and too costly" for Cuba, and it is evolvingeanerwith two distinctcombat-ready corereater mass devoted to economic production. (Seei)
Dissent in the miliury appearse as formless and disorganized ai it is in civilian institutions,ilitary-led coup is less likdy than an assassination attemptebellion touched off by an unpopular order. Officers who have experienced or wbo have been prepared for battle may resent service as agriculturalut reports ofare limited to grumbling about lost missions and perquisites and privateabout tbe need for greater economic reform,f)
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h of the acttve-dutyCuba's best fighting forces and continue to be well provided for. Nont. however, would be key tooroup attempt against Castro. Most are small and are based away from tke seat of government in downtown Havana. The few largerdeployed near the capital are not trained In commando-style operations and could not move on Castro's office orwithout attracting attention. The attitudes of Interior Ministry personnel guarding Castro would be key. and we have no reason to believe their loyalty has waned.p)
Elite formations include the HighReserve; various Armed Forces Special Troops entitles; the Navalthe Navy's Special Missionand tht Interior Ministry's Special Troops. The High Commandprimarily better grade groundand the airborne-Qualified Armed Forces
Special Troops Mobile Brigade are tasked with defending Havana in the eventS invasion. Under those circumstances, they almost certainly would mount adefense, fs nr/
The loyalty of individual units Isto assess. Despite somewhat higher morale than that of regular troops, elite units have not been Insulated fromincluding downsizing and agricultural labor. The Interior Ministry Specialfirst Cuban unit to Intervene intodayew hundred strong. The former Naval Infantry Regiment was downsized and broken Into three tndependem. regionally basedThe Special Troops Mobilethe Landing and Assaultnumbers no more than half itsan total, fs tit)
ost of whom have followed Castro for decades, arc well represented in important political posts and meet routinely with civilianlend ofloyalty to Castro, nationalism, andof the post-Communist future, the extensive counicrintclilgence apparatus, and exile intentions-has kept the officer corps in line. Given the difficulty of keeping an anti-Castro conspiracy secret, dissident officers are more likely to opt for defection innumbers.F)
onspiracy develop, however,would not risk contacting the United States in advance, and we probably would not knowoup until il was under way. Factors conduciveoup are already in place:
Deteriorating conditions for soldiers and civilians.
A spreading perception that Castro cannot reverse the downward trend.
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substantial ongoing reduction inmanpower and resources.
Midlevel officers with fewer personal bonds to Castro may be more inclined to revolt, especially if they suffer most from personnel downsizing,f)
Implications for the United States
Serious instability in Cuba will have an immediate impact on the United States:
Castro has maintained relatively effective bordermajor brake on illegal seabornepreserve domestic order. If Cuban authorities lose control, massive, panicky illegal emigration toward the United Slates will occur.00 Cabins would be able to flee the island with little or no preparation or warning on small craft. Larger numbers would leave in the event that boa is, captained by private individuals from the United States or elsewhere, participaled.
Pressures on the United States to mount urgent humanitarian rescue efforts at sea would be intense. Groups on the island and in exile probably would call for large-scale humanitarian aid to Cuba.
There would also be pressure for US or international militaryarge number of exiles became involved on the island in abetting theof Castro's regime,f)
Moreover, if he believed that his or his regime's survival were imminentlyCastro might try to provoke anwith the United States in an attempt to
arouse nationalist fervor and deflect popular hostility from himself. He might, forfabricate an "attack" by exilewould certainlyealorder to mobilize military andmilitia units and confuse domesticUS military exercises, US Coast Guard patrols, reconnaissance flights, and operations from Guantanamo Naval Base might offer opportunities torisis. In extremis, he might suspend all efforts to prevent illegal emigration in the belief lhat the turmoil resultingassive exodus would be more confounding to his enemies than destabilizing to his regime.f)
Finally, if faced with lhe certainty of his and his regime's fall, Castro might lash out against the United States. He would be constrainedariety of factors including uncertainties that subordinates would in fact carry* out extreme orders and his desire to be viewedositive historical context.the following extreme developments arc remotely possible: Castro could order an air attack on an installation on ihe US mainland, ihe military occupation of Guantanamo, or terrorist attacks,f)
The Outlook for Post-Castro Cuba
Tensions and uncertainties in Cuba arc so acute lhat significant miscalculations byeterioration of his health, or plotting in the military could provoke regime-lhreatening instability ai virtually any time. Thereetter than even chance that Fidel Castro's government will fallthe next few years.f)
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These Judgments are based an thtunderlying premises:
Castro will not voluntarilypower.
' The Cuban economy will not benefit from some domestic economicsuch as discoveryarge oil deposit.
irect correlation between severe economic deprivation andinstability, is nf}
Almost all succession scenarios involve the likelihood of substaniial and possibly pro-iracted instability on ihe island, large-scale emigration,ariety of other challenges to US interests. Fidel Castro's fall will be the signal event in what is likely toengthy and confllctive process of nationalamong pro- and anti-Castro elements on lhe island and the Cuban diaspora. The new era will be marred by retributory and other violence and powerful animosities and will generate demands for costly and energetic USinvoWcmenMsNF)
The longevity and composition of anygovernment will depend on the way in which Fidel Castro leaves power. Raul Castro would almost certainly succeed if his brother died of natural causes, and he wouldface growing and probably conflicting demands for change. Lacking Fidel Castro's charisma, determination, and political skills, he would probably not seel to replace his
brother as an all-powerful leader, preferring instead toivil-military coalition. Unlike other potential players, be would be torn between the need to implement sweeping reforms and the desire to preserve as much as possible of Ftdel Castro's legacy. In that environment, other coalition members would promptly begin plotting against him and the odds are better than even he would be unable to retain control for as longear,f)
Raul Castro's accession would be much less certain if Fidel Castro were assassinated or fellilitaryuccessful, bloodless coup against both Castros that preserved the unity of the armed forces would be the only succession scenarioood chance ofelatively stable and flexible new regime,f)
New leaders will be poorly prepared to deal with ihe extraordinary problems they will face. They are handicapped by their lack of experience In exercising responsibiliiy,goals, or resolving conflicts because of Fidel Castros decades of micro management and distrust of subordinates. Heightenedexpectations for systemic changes will be exposed by Communist Party aod other bureaucrats and leaders of the securityseeking to salvage maximum personal advantages. Tensions will intensify between stalwarts of the ancien regime who aretoigh degree ofand reformers attracted lo free market models,f)
Most of Cuba's technocratic establishment will survive, if only because there is nothing to replace it. Most technocrats are likely lo be apolitical and may be favorably disposed
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to economic and political reform. They are. therefore, likely to adapthantingand some will probably push for change once they are no longer repressed by Fidel Castro. Despite fearsMiamiechnocrats are likely to pursuecs to the United Stateside range of issues,f)
I mproviag relations and opening of economic ties to the United Sutes willop priority for any successor government. But that objective will be complicated becausewith tbe exile community willoarce of intense dispute. With fewexile political leaders are likely to find little support among the population on the island aad will probably be greeted with suspicion aod hostility if they are perceived
as trying to seize control. Demands by exiles to purge Castro-era officials, or to put some on trial, would arouse fierce opposition.exile efforts to recover properties seized inill be highly(C)
The Ciban miliuryood chance of surviving largely intact into the post-Castro era. assuming it can avoid being drawnebilitating civil war. The post-Castrosmaller andew generation ofprobably evolveodernizing force. Officers would probably seek improved relations with the United States and Latin Americanand eventually would be likely to lend their support toemocratic system, (s)
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aimed farces have declined over ihe pan several years, and there is no prospecteversal as long as the economyio slide. Eveneversal were lo occur, an upturn in the military's capabilities would not necessarily take place because much of its equipment is antiquated and would have to be replaced. The armed forces can no longer mount muchonventional defensearger and more sophisticated force,f)
The military has placed redundant and ua-necessary systems in storage, and training is at an alltimeowever, the miliiary can defend against eiile attacks, and defense doctrine has been restructured to preserve the government's abilityefend itself through unconventional means. Periodic small-scale exercises and training activitiesdesigned to sustain minimal operational readiness (snf!
Castro's "War of all the People" callsrotracted guerrilla war in the event of an attack. The Cuban plan is to inflict maxi mum casualties on attacking forces in hopes ofithdrawal, while at the same lime trying lo gaia international political support. This plan would relyilitia force of moreillion people. The military has stockpiled massive amounts of weapons, contracted underground facilities throughout the island, and built anindications and warning system,f)
Ground Forces. As the largest of Cuba's armed services, the ground forces have taken the largest cuts in personnel. We estimate itsOIIIIILIASE DATUM !M1
tolul strength (active and reserve) to0en, or about one-third lis peak size In. The ground forces will shrink stall further in the next two to three years as units further contract. Except in the highest priority units, the Cubans have dramatically curtailed training, mainly due to fuel and replacement part shortages. In most units, training is limited to basicskills and small-unil tactics. We have not seen lhe Cubans practice brigade-level maneuvers, used effectively ia Angola, for nearly two years,f)
Air aad Air Defeme Forces. These forces probably have declined to0boul one-half of their peak strength in. Many Cuban tighter aircraft are inmoref them; pilot training is minimal, and readiness is low. Only about one-half of Cuba's surface-to-air missile sites areHavana remains heavily defended, however.f)
Tka Navy. The Navyteady decline.hird of its ships have had their weapons removed and partsto repair active units. The Navy has notew shipnd Ihe frequency of operations continues to decline Cuba') three submarines, for example, have not conducted submerged operations over three yean, and two are inoperable. As the number of working ships has declined so has the number of personnel. We estimate the Navy now hasctivereserveecline of over one third sincesnf)
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