PROSPECTS FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRANSITION

Created: 1/1/1994

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Prospects for the Sftuth African Transitio;

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Prospects for the South African 1

for the African Transitio

ANC Headed Tor Big Electoral Win

The African National Congress (ANC) will win the forthcoming national electionargin wide enough to ensure that it will control the interim, power-sharing government. We judge therepercent chance that South Africa will hold itipril election on schedule. Even if the election slips, therehree out of four chance newer-sharing system will be implemented by the end of I*

Range of Electoral Outcomes. The size of the ANC's margin of victory will be determined largely by two factors:

Voter registration. UpillionANCnot be given required documentation in time.

Blackigh black turnout would favor the ANC. The radical Pan-Africanist Congress, which could receive as muchercca^of tj^oic total, would also benefitigh black tumour- 'j

An electoral loss by theestimated oneush South Africa to the brink of anarchy. Unlikely circumstances, such as an extremely low turnout of black voters, could result in the Freedomnd the National Partyits Colored and Indianenough votes toloc that would control tbe interim government. ANC supaggfcers ajauld resort to large-scale violence to protest such an out

Threats to the Election. The two central actors arc well-aware of the difficulties that could disrupt the election but are commuted io making the transition work. Therehree inhance, nonetheless, that the following developments could cause an electoral postponement or derailment:

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Logistic problems. The most likely causeelay is lhe myriadproblems associated wiih registering overillion blacks to voteational election for the first time. Authorities arc far behind schedule in producing enough temporary voter identification cards to satisfy demand.

Violence. There is an eight inhance lhat violence will surge immediately before and during the election, when emotions are at their highest. Potential catalysts for an escalation in violence include an electoral boycott campaign resulting in active resistance by Freedom Alliance members, an assassinationey leader,by homeland leaders to reincorporation efforts, and terrorism by extremists.

Coup bid. Coup plotting by rightwing elements is underoup would be difficult to coordinate and seems unlikely io occur under current conditions,limate more conduciveoup could develop quickly, andailed coup attempt could disrupt the electoral schedule.

Further talks. The ANC and NP might reluctantly agreerief electoral postponement if it ensured that the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and its partners in the Freedom Alliance would participate in the transition process. If he fears that an electoral boycott would end his potWcal career. IFP President Buthelczi may opt for IFPparticipat"

impact of an electoral postponement would largely depend on the cause of the delay, the timing of its announcement, and itsrief slippage that is approved by the ANC might not havc^riot repercussions,rolonged delay could lead to anarch*

If the Transition Is Derailed

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The collapse of the current transition process would leadivil war that ultimately wouldess conciliatory black government to power. If white rule continued as the resultightwing coup, blacks would mount an insurrection characterized by mass protests, violence, and guerrillaby internationa^ncsioji^ndeven military posturing by neighboring stai

Violence would ensue if rightwingers or black conservativesetermined bid toward forming their own states before or after the election. The degree of turmoil would depend, in part, on whether both groups were involved and working together. The scenario could range from the current rale of bloodshed and fightingigh-intensity

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ccnflic: inentral government, vastly superior in militar> resources, aot involved. The harsher lhe measures used by the ceniral government to controjjhc situation, the higher the risk of serious international censui

A civil war would impose costs on neighboring countries in cross-border refugee populations, arms trafficking, and disrur^tonsjn the flow of vital commodities from and throughjj

ANC Government Spreads Its Wings

Once elected, we judge thereine inhance an ANC government will survive any challenges it will face duringontinued feuding among political leaders, lofty Mack economic ejpeculions, tnd tensions stemming from tbe formationew miliury make it likely that political unrest willprobablythe postelection period. An ANC government, in our view, will face even more severe tests sometime beyond the one-year period of this Estimate as black euphoria over an ANC victory wanesand white disenchantment with certain government policies

wanesand

Consolidatiii Pol,ncal Pomtt. The mosl pressing businessew ANC government will be to defuse hostile black conservative and while rightwing extremists. Il is unclear which group will pose the greater threat:

IFP will tootent regional and ethnic force. Fighting between ANC and IFP supporters will persist4 despite potentially harsh countcrmeasures by the new government.

Afrikaners will resort to terrorism, among other tactics, to ANC government and to try to gain greater autonomy.

ostelection honeymoon period, lhe moderate ANC leadership will find it increasingly difficult to rein in party militants, who will be inclined to ally themselves with the Soulh African Communist Party and black labor counterparts. Good working tics to the NP would be valuable to an ANC government, but thean eye towardill be highly critical of many ANC policies.

Economic Pragmatism, An ANC-lcd government will Chan aeconomic courseandela has repeatedly told foreign and domestic businessmen an ANC-governmcni willargely market-oriented economy and honor private property. An ANC government's top economic goal wilt be to increase black employment. The economy probably will continue to grow moderatelyut economic growth is unlikely to prevent the unemploymentcurrentlyorsening. In any cascjrfconumic factors are likely to be of secondary importance this yearn

and Risks for the United Stales

The ability of the United States and other foreign actors to affect major developments in the South African transition process is limited. The top parlies welcome international election observers, but ihey do noi favor using UN peacekeepers to safeguard the election. If key parlies, most notably the ANC, suddenly changed their stance on this issue, we judge that the cosL^and risks ofshort-fuse" mission would be prohibitively

The West's mosl effective source of leverage will continue to be the perception held by most South African leaders thai US and other foreign investment and aid canew interim government survive amid formidable challenges:

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Several majorhave announced new investments in South African plant and equipment in recent months.

An ANC government almosi certainly would accept assistance from countries such as Libya and Iran, but lhe influence of such potential benefactors be greatly limited by the importance the ANC places not only on ties to Washington, but also to the Commonwealth, the EC. the United Nations, the World .Bank, the. InternationalFund, and the Frontline Stat

The United States is recognized by all of South Africa's parties as the most important externalerception Washington may be able to use to affect the thinking of rightist and conservative leaders.will continue to have good access to these leaders, allowing il to suggest options to them during the inevitably stormy periods ahead.

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On balance, tics between ihe UnitedJSlates and the ANC probably_will_.

grow stronger this yearX* *

. J The ANC. mindfulatent ami-among most of its militant supporters, will lookto assert its independence on foreign policy, issues^wjihout alienating the

Discussion

election, met for

South Africa's transitionajor milestone last July when multiparty negotiators established4 as the dateational election to the five-year transitional government. The move gave the transition process newin November, the two centralthe ruling National Party (NP) and the African National Congressinally agreed on the shapeewultipartyExecutive Councilreated to prepare for the election, met for the first lime in December!

Our3 Estimale concluded that therewo in three chance ofeventually leading to an elected interim system for power sharing, despite serious violence and social turmoil. Because ofprogress that has been made by the key players, the likelihood Ihat the new system will be implemented (his year has increased to at least three oui of four. Nonetheless, political unrest is persisting at record levels, fueled in part by anger among white rightist and black conservatives over ihc prospect of an ANC-led government. Many NP and ANC supporters, meanwhile, arc concerned ihat their respective interests will be "sold out" by moderate leaders perceived as too cjger lo compromise. These trends and others form the backdrop for this Estimate, which will assess the prospects for theion prejeesi during the nextonths.

Key Estimaiite Questions

What is the outlook for violence and the chanceoup?

What would be the potential effects of an electoral delay?

What are the prospects for an elected interim power-sharing systemostapartheid economy?

What can the United States or other external actors do totable

Key Assumptions

' Both President de Klerk and ANC President Mandela are sincere in leading their parties Into the electionower-sharing government.

survive

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* De Klerk and for the next

emerge in South Africa?

Electoral Stakeslance

Under current accords, the election willew Interim, "power-sharing" governmentive-year term. Each voter willingle ballot forrepresentation in one of ninelegislatures andeat national legislature. The latter will tied aby simple majority and willwo-year deadline lofinal" The second-largest party in the national legislature, as well as each party obtaining at leastercent af the vote, caneputy president. All parties receiving aterceni of the vote will be entitled to posts in the Cabinet of the government of national unity. Regions will have concurrent powers with the central government inonstitutional couri. comprising Judges and lawyerssolely by ihe president, will serve as Ihe highest court In the land and will settle disputes between the centraland the regions, (v)

is bxa large rr.

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The ANC agreed to five years of "powern part because of lessons learned from2 electoral debacle in Angola. Nonetheless, black conservatives and white rightwingers still view thein South Africawinner-take-all" event favoring the ANC The NP agreed to abandon its pursuit of aveto power over government decision making in exchange for some formal guarantees on regional powers In the final. constitution. Actually, while thenterim government will have multiparty representation, the new systems "power-sharing" aspects will be very limited If the ANC winsarge^margin at the polls as Is likely

have dragged on for three years, ihe NP and lhe ANC are likelyemain committed to the current itmeiablef* ".

Threats to the Election. The two central actors are well-aware of the difficulties that could disrupt the election but are committed

to making the transition work. Therehree inhance, nonetheless, that the following developments could cause anpostponement or derailment:

Logistic problems. The mos; likely causeelay is the myriad logistic andproblems associated with registering overillion blacks to voteational election for the first time. Authorities are far behind scheduleroducing enough temporary voter identification cards todemand.

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- Violtnct. There is an eight Inhance that violence will surge immediately before and during the election, when emotions are ai their highest. Potential catalysts for an escalation in violence include an electoral boycott campaign resulting in active rcsis-unce by Freedom Alliance members, an assassinationey leader, resistance by black homeland leaders to reincorporation efforts, and terrorism by extremists. The plannedikely to be smaller and will be unableontain the violence.

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Coup bid. Coup plotting by rightwingwithin (he security forces is underoup would be difficult toandunlikely lo occur under current conditions,limate more conduciveoup couldailed coup attempt could disrupt (he electoral schedule.

- Further talks. The ANC and the NP might reluciamly agreerief electoralif ii ensured that the Zulu-based

Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and it*in the Freedom Alliance wouldin the transition process. If he fears that an electoral boycott would end his political career, IFP President But he leri

The impact of an electoral postponement would largely depend on its cause andBecause of logisticrief slippage that is approved by the ANC and managed well by the multiparty TECwould not have seriousrolonged delay, however, could lead to an-

Range ef Electoral Outcomes. We judge that the ANC will win the electionargin of victory wide enough to ensure that it will control the interim government. The ANC might even win more than two-thirds of the seats in the new national legislature, which would allow it to rr->nopolitt the drafting of the final constitution- The chance thatAhe ANC will lose the election is one

The size of the ANC's margin of victory will be determined largely by two factors.

Voter registration. Upillion eligible blackANCmight not be given required documentation

in time.

tigh black turnout.

Blackigh black turnout would favor the ANC. The radical Pan-Africanist Congress (PACl. which could receive as muchercent of the vote total, would

If the Freedom Alliance holds togetherwhich is doubtful due to tactical differences among itsdoes not boycott

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the conicst. it could ouipoll the NP and emerge as the official opposition. The IFP on its own probably would receive more thanercent minimum of lhe vote needed fcr representation in the new Cabinet. The white rightwing Conservative Party (CP) mightabinet seal, bul only if it ran jointly with ihe Afrikaner National Frontroad feder^on cj^svhite rightist and extremistgovernment. ANC supporters would resort to large-scale, violent resistance to protest such an outcome. The bloc in power would be forced cither to use draconian security measures to try to hold on io its position or toojgrical deal highly favorable to the AN(

If the Transition Is Derailed The collapse of the current transition process would leadivil war that ultimately wouldess conciliatory blackto power, If while rule continued as the resultightwing coup, blacksount an insurrection characterized by mass protests, violence, and guerrillabuttressed by international sanctions and perhaps cuf mjjuary posturing bystaicsTc

Internal violence would ensue if white rightwingcrs or black conservativesetermined bid toward forming their own states before or after the election. The degree of turmoil would depend, in part, on whether both groups were involved and workingThe scenario could range from the current raie of bloodshed and fightingigh-intensity conflict inentral government, vastly superior in militarygot involved. The harsher theused by lhe central government to control the situation, the higher thc_rjsk of serious international censur

electoral loss by the ANC would push South Africa lo the brink of anarchy.circumstances, such as an extremely low turnout of black voters, could result in ihe Freedom Alliance and theits Colored and Indianenough vote? toloc lhat would control the

A civil war would impose costs oncountries in cross-border refugeearms trafficking, and disruptions in the flow of vital CjgjnniQdiiics from and through South Afric

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9

ANC Government Spreids Its Wings Once elected, we judge thereine inhance an ANC government will survive the inevitable challenges it will face during the remaindern ANC government will come into powerave of black euphoria and will have broad regional and international support. After the initialcelebrations die down, the newwill stillengthy honeymoon period that could extendnit will take control of the country's formidable security apparatusby Africanstale coffers. But continued feuding among politicallhe new government's inability to meet lofty black socioeconomic expectations, and tensions stemming from the formationew military make it likely thai political unrest willprobablyin the postelection period. An ANCin our view, would likely face even more severe tests sometime beyond the one-year period of this Estimate as blackover an ANC victory wanes and white discnchanfmer^with_ccnain government policies grows

Consolidating Political Power. The mosl pressing businessew ANC government will be to defuse hostile black conservatives and white rightists. It is unclear whether white extremists or the IFP will pose ihe greater threat. The two forces might act in jandem.to undermine an ANC government.

The IFP willotent regional and ethnic force. Fighting between ANC and IFP supporters will persist4 despite potentially harsh countermeasurcs by the new government. Violence would soar tf

An ANC government will face siifffrom intransigent white rightwingers. Up to half of whites currently back rightist groups. Moreover, lhe NP's liberal gunand longtime white conscriptioninrequiredyear-old males to serve one to two years followed by varying periods of reserve duty up to ageavearge pool of well-armed and at least rudimentarity trained men for rightists to draw on. The right wing wouldajor boost if mosl whites quickly came to view an ANCas grossly incompetent or intent on misusing state power to benefit iis constitu-

Militant Afrikaners will resort to terrorism, among other tactics, to harass an ANC-led government and io try io gain greaterIf the AVF opts for active armed resistance, its leaders, by virtue of their superior skills and wider credibility, probably

Buthelezi 'i Bottom Line

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IFP Presidentottom-line conditions for participating in theprocess are likely toe might soonthat the IFP will boycott the election and will never a'low itsto be ledhosa. such as Mandela, at the central governmentJudging byecent record, however, he seems more likely toigzag course. After the election, he might lead the IFPoalition wiih the NP andait-and-see stance. He may devise somesuch as filling only the IFPs regional legislatureshow histo an ANC-led central government or reject the poll results and refuse to participate in the new system. Buthe-lezi. an egotistical and authoritarian-style leader, has hinted that he might resign his post atop the IFP and waich ihe proceedings this year from thealmost surely with the hope that most IFP supporters would Insist on his reentering the.

would sain preeminence over olhcrrightwing leaders.P's strong support among white civil servants who fear the loss of iheir jobs wouldajor assethowdown with an ANCMoreover. AVF sympathizers in key positions throughout South Africa's economy could wreak havoc by sabotaging power, transportation, and industrial facilities. No matter which path the AVF chooses, one of

its members, the neo-Nazi Afrikanerhas0 supporters and several thousand well-trainedther white extremist groups wil tions and conduct

Good working ties to the NP will be valuable to an ANC government, but the NP will be highly critical of many policies:

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Even if the ANC emerges from thewith an effective monopoly on power, it will likely focus public attention on thepower-sharing aspects of the interim gov>-crnment and present key decisions andthe finalas productsonsensus-building process in which the NP was influential. .

The NP will seek an independent political role rather than risk being perceivedeak sister of the ANC. The decision to pursueole, however, might lead some NP members who favor working more closely with the ANC to defect. Although the Nationalists expect the ANC to win the election in April, they believe they can'triumph in the next election by gaining the support of many blacks whose cxpectation^re.ntjynct by the ANC in the interir

Internal ANC Pressures. Moderate ANC officials, led by Mandela, have held the fractious group together; but they will find it increasingly difficult to rein in militantsostelection honeymoon period. No government could fulfill the aspirations of

y

for Nuclear Terrorism

.

The chanceuclear terroristoccurring in South Africa4 is perhaps one. Some white rightwingers reportedly have considered seizing about SSO kilograms of highly enriched uranium fHEU) stored at the nuclear complex near Pretoria; theis subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Prospects for defeating the physical security at the complex would be enhanced ifthere, some of whom areof while extremist groups bul are closely monitored and precluded from working in "sensitive"positions, were co-opted as accomplices. If rightwingers somehow succeeded In stealing the proper amount and type ofHEU. they could use it to blackmail theeither byrude nucleanmkveapog^pr by claiming to have done.

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millions of impatient black urban youths who have little formal education or job skills. Over time, these youths likely will be drawn toward the militant activists in the ANC and its ally, the South African Communist Party, or even the PAC. These activists probably will derive even more potent support from leading black labor groups, which might quickly adopt an adversarial stance toward an ANC^ovc^ament despite their current alliam

oderate Economic Course. We judge that an ANC government willoderate economic courseheand deterioration of socialist economies elsewhere in recent years have sobered many ANC officials with leftist sympathies. For several years the ANC has been publicly downplaying its commitment toand other radical economic policies, despite their popularity among black youths and unionists. Mandela has repeatedly put his credibility on the line by stressing to foreign and domestic businessmen that an ANC government will honor privateandargely market-oriented economy. While acknowledging plans to bring more blacks into government positions. Mandela also has publicly assured white civilh^ their jobs and pensions wilt be

Despite their occasional hardline rhetoric. Mandela and other moderates who control the ANC leadership clearly recognize that policies promoting rapid redistribution of wealth would risk economic disaster bywhite flight, discouraging foreignand alienating Western donors.the ANC. which is short on administrative and technical expertise, has acknowledged thai it will depend on selected economic policymakers from the NP and many white civil servants, ensuring much in economic decision making.

The ANC's top economic priority will be to increase black employment; in addition, it will work to improve education, housing, and health care for blacks. The ANCwill look to businesses to help finance development programs, perhapsreconstructionax specificallyto fund development projects. The

Likely Policies afan ANC-Led Goremment

Policy. Cultivate lies to states best positioned to offer financial andaid. which would strongly favor therend toward pragmatism in choosing allies and business partners willill not, however, break bonds to longtimehe West, such as Cuba and

Internal Security. Use government's new legitimacy among blacks to movemilitary whentry to reduce violence in worst affectedpproach towarddominance in IFP strongholds, however, probably will be biased and heavyhanded, possibly exacerbatingand causing international concern.

ill inherit significant nuclear Infrastructure thai has in past produced nuclearapability tomaintain and operate thatunder existing internationalcontrols is important concern, as Libya and Iran may try to exploit past and present linkages with ANC to obtain ted materials and assistance.

Fiscal. Continue to reorient spendingblack development withoutwhites andillnew taxes to facilitateof risingrobably

.will rjtiain Finance Minister Derek Keys.

Budget constraints and absence of foreign threats probably wilt preclude military expansion or major procurements of newill institute limited affirmative action policies while trying to avoid alienating white-dominated officeright increase foreign military ties through training assistance. Jointand participation in multilateral ^international peacekeeping missions.

Nuclear. ANC says ii will abide byNon-Proliferation Treatyretoria disassembled its nuclear weaponsigned NPTnd has placedilograms of weapons-xrade uranium under InternationalEnergy Agency supervision in South

Monetary. Central bank will rely on many current officials and will remain largely independent and heavily focusedill facilitate blackommercial bank

Socioeconomic Development. Invest into createork to build or subsidize newrimary health care and education.

Land Reform. Set up programs to help blacks acquire and develop property but without expropriating white-heldxpand available land for redistribution

(continued)

Likely Policies of an ANC-Led Government (continued)

by buying private properly on openrepossessing state-financed farms in default, and offering tracts of publicrovide restitution for many dispossessed blacks.':

Trade. Emphasis on export promotion will continue, including push to gain preferential accessower protectionist barriers

to avoid job losses in shorterceived favorable response by United Slates to recent ANC appeal for support on Soulh African GATT offer might have given Washingtond leverage on trade policy issues.

Foreign Investment and Finance. Guar-

protection for foreign investment against expropriation, allowof profits and dividends, and grant tax breaks on investment in depressedill maintain two-tierrate and capital controls,to discourage capital flight...

take advantage of country's "un-

derborrowed" status to boost foreign debt to fund black development^ '.

AIDS. Press for more activist approach to halt rapidly spreading epidemic that has reached significant proportions in urbanas catted for stronger educationrobably will retain key healthNC already oyi national anti-AIDS committee.

ANC will also appeal to foreign donors for assistance in funding and managing such programs.

Coping With Black Economic Expectations An'ANC government will not fully satisfy the socioeconomic expectations of blacks, but it might be able to persuade many that their living standards will improve gradually. Most blacks believe almost every aspect of theiremployment, housing, education, and healthget better under an ANC government. Whilethai major progress will take years, the new government will have the wherewithal to provide tangible benefits to many blacks within its first year:

- The ANC isillion plan lo finance black development: the sum is equivalcni touarter of South Africa's current GDP. Continuing an NP policy, an ANC government could also sell strategic oilaboul SIfinance black socialThe oil reserves are no longer needed because mosl oil sanctions have been lifted,

ceremonies involvingwillallmark of an ANCkeen on focusing public attention on new housing, school, and health care projects.

South Africa has some of the cheapest electric power in the world, nearlyercent of black households lackAccelerating electrification efforts that arc now hampered by violence would boost black development: the state-owned electric utility now has lhe capacity to

hook up an0 blackpjj.monih bujonly actually

Economic Oullook and Impact

The economy probably will continue to grow moderatelyanel of prominent localone from theforecasted growtholight reduction in inflation, which now runsercent.erformance, however, would be unlikely to prevent theorseningr

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obust economy is critical to the longer term viability of South Africa's new political system, economic factors are likely to be of secondary importanceven stronger-than-cxpected growth would not generate enough public and private resources io dramatically boost socioeconomicefforts. Alternatively, the political pressuresharp economic decline would be muted because of lhe honeymoon periodSC government inevitably will enjoyf"

Opportunities and Risks for lhe United Stales

The ability of lhe United States and other foreign actors to affect major developments in ihe South African transition process is limited. Soulh Africans will continue tointernational advice and aid for party [raining, voter education, and electionLarge-scale financial and technical assistance in these areas has the potential to help create an environment more conduciveree and fair election, but domesticthe strategies of black conservative and white rightist leader, in comingultimately determine

how well the contest goes. Despile iheof thousands of internalional monitors, wc judge lhat followers of many white and black panics, including the NP and the ANC, will use political Intimidation tactics widely, affecting rural dwxllers^nd black township residents wt

While the top parties welcome international election observers, ihey do not favorN peacekeeping force to safeguard ihe election. If key parties, most notably the ANC. suddenly changed their stance on this issue, we judge that lhe costs and risks ofshort-fuse" mission wouldarge-scale UN peacekeeping mission almost certainly could not be pulled logether in time and, even if it could, wpuld not guarantee thai lhe election would be free. fair, or peaceful. Moreover, lhe mission oforce would quickly becomeif ihe security siljyilion^bcgan lo deteriorate significant!

The United States is recognized by all of South Africa's parties as the most important externalerception Washington may be able to use to afTcct the thinking of rightist and conservative leaders. Chief Buthelezi and other leaders in the Freedom Alliance are angry al Western recognition lhat good working relations between the NP and the ANC have been and will continue toleast until themajor force driving progress in South Africa. Nonetheless. Washington probably willto have good access to these leaders that will allow it to suggest options to them and help keep communications open among the various players during the inevitably

stormy periods ahead. Moreover,steady drumbeat that nonparticipants in the transition process wit! be leftin its wake wiU rtinfcuxe these leaders' fundamental

The West's most effective source of leverage will continue to be the perception held by most South African leaders that US and other foreign investment and aid canew interim government survive amidchallenges. Net foreign purchases of South African stocks and bonds exceeded SI billion last year, as compared to lessillioneveral major foreign-includinghave evennew investments in South African plant and equipment in recent months. The ANC in particular is painfully aware of the need for foreign training of South African administrative, security, and diplomaticin the posiapartheid era. Although an ANC government almost certainly would accept assistance from countries such as Libya and Iran, the influence of suchbenefactors would be greatly limited by the importance an ANC government places not only on ties to Washington but also to the Commonwealth, the EC, the Unitedthe World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Frontline States.

i,

Although we judge that on balance ties between the United States and the ANC probably will grow stronger this year, there emains ample cause for concern?

_ Theof latent anti-mericanism among its militant and young supporters, and affectedense of loyally that Mandela and other top officials feel toward sutes such as Cuba that actively supported theuerrillawill look for opportunities to assert itson foreign policy issues without completely alienating the West. At the same time, some of the party's ideological,racial, ethnic, and class fissures will widen under Ihe strain of applying state resourcesost of serious political, socio-conomic, and security problems.

Annex A

Key Groupslance

Parties Committed To Participating in Election

African Nationallack, left-of-centertrongest support amongillionnlikely to receive moreercent of whiteormal electoral allies are Congress of South African Tradelabor federation withillionSouth African Communistecretary General Cyril Ramaphosa or National Chairman Thabo Mbeki. both moderates, probably would succeed Mandsu^iformed1

Naiioaal Partyuling white partyirmly controls preelection0 has distancedfrom apartheid via fundamental racial reforms, now occupying whiterobably will garner less thanercent ofolored and Indian supportay forge pact with IFP before or after election despite current coldonstitutional Development Minister Roclf Meyer and PublicMinister Dawic de Villiersop contenders to succeed de Klerkf ii

0*

Pan-Africanist Congressadical, bluck-exclusivist rival ofercent ofefuses to join Transitional Executive Council despite recently renouncing armedargely autonomous military wing. Azanian People's Liberation Army.illattacking whites j

South African Communist Partyongtime formal ally oflectoral candidates will appear on ANCemain prominent, influentialof ANClaims0inanciallyargely in organizational, orientationalay since collapse of Sovietas not -abandoned goaj of^ventual democraticstate)

Major Groups Threatening Electoral Boycott Inkatha Freedom Partyelongs lo Freedomonservative, stronglyillion members, predominantlyas Utile slrength outside of Natal Province, except in many urban hosiels where Zulu migrant workersnlikely to receive more thanercent of ballotslightly less-than-cven chance of defeating ANC in Natalopular^among small percentage of white voters |^

Conservative Partyightwing member of Freedomfficial opposition in while parliamentaryouldas many aswhiteplit fromNPinl'

(RPftRSE BUNK)

Afrikaner Nationalederation of white rightist groups, including CP and extremist Afrikaner Resistance Movemented by charismatic retiredGeneral Constand. Freedom Allianceormed3 in bid to unify white right wins;

Annex B

The New Military

a result of multiparty negotiations, the new National Defense Force (NDF) will be structured similarly to the current South African Defense Forceutchanges will occur in force composition, sire, and recruitment policy. The ANCretention of the current reserve-based force structure in exchange for otherthat will dilute and eventuallywhite dominance of the military. The ANC initiallyarger, all full-lime force, but it succumbed to SADF arguments based on costs savings and Ihe need for experienced, skilled whites in reserve ranks.

The racial balance in the military will change greatly under an ANC government, as blacks will comprise lhe majority of the regulars for the first time.0 ANC military cadre and homelands troops will become regulars, and other blacks will enter the NDF via the new all-volunteer recruitment system. In the near term,whites will retain numerical and rank advantages in both the officer corps of the SADF andJn thejescrve or parl-iimcForced

Racial frictions undoubtedly will arise from:

ANC affirmative action programs, even if implemented gradually.

Politically motivated appointments ofANC military personnel and the placement of white troops under direct black command.

Current Security Balance of Power

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The rejection of "unqualified" blackas well as white officer demands for ipliance with hiring standards.

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Despite gradual changes in composition and size. South Africa's defense force will remain the most powerful miliiary in Sub-Saharan Africa. The NDFs overall militarywill be diluted somewhat by theof inadequately trained andblack opposition and homeland troops and further budget cuts that could curtail new equipment acquisitions or forceThese factors will be offset, however, by

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Information

Sources or Methodi Involved (WN INTEL)

Uiuutbofiinl Disclosure Subjectriminal Sanctions

Ceoint InuU^erKcThe Defense Intellietrice Ajeney Tha National Securit; The Bureau of Intelligence ind Research. Department of Slate The Director of Intelligence. Department of Slat* The Director of laicllignscc. Depanmem of Encray

Tbe Deputy Chief ef SlatT for Imdlnrecc.

Department of the Army

The Directoral Inielliaence,

Depanment of ibe Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intell'sence,

Department of the Air Forte

The Director of Intelliience.

Headcwanen. Marine Corps

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