FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH5 Chestnut Street Philadelphia.1
Jotu OUrey Chrtaty.
Sunnbarg AJeamoder It Half.in Ron*Id S. Lauder Jean r.
Ronald J. Napeea Iraae B. Nana Frank N. Ptaaacki Daniel Pip-Harvey Skaerman Edward M Snider Robert Stnuai-Ilupt Mama Wunnan David V. Wacaaeil Albert J. Wood
Board of Advtaora Jaraea Ceurtar Midge Decter David. Glineo Samoa! P. Huniinjru*
tNeUl Martin Perec. Jamee R. Toompeon Dkk Tbornburgb Murray WeKktibeum
Finn ji (II
Our conversaiioQ last week was most enjoyable and, having been
Assistantery active Secretary of State, your experiences remind me of (NI my own.
As threatened, please findrief list of proposals that might be of interest: several concern key political developments in Russia and the NIS; one concerns China and the longer term strategic implications of its economic growth and one concerns Cuba, where our proposalnique comparative analysis to other communist transitions. The scholars who have prepared these ideas are outstanding in their fields aod short bios of them are also included. We have full-scale outlines and budgets available should any of these strike the Director's interest.
I appreciate your wUlingness to convey this material as you see fit. Please call upon me for any further informatioQ or for that matter, any "special assistance"ormer special assistant.
With best wishes.
VPIMOfSRIUUSE UTL OCT IIIS
Foreign Policy Research5 Chestnut Street Philadelphia,5
APPROVED FOR RE1FASE DATE:9
THREE PROPOSALS ON RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA
For these three proposals, the principal hivean'gtfor is Martha Brill Okottniversity ofA specialist on Russia, Central Asia, and Islam, Dr. Olcott has spent many yean in theespecially in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan. Sbe has authored or editedincluding Islam in Everyaayhe
Kazakhs (Hoover Institution. and The Soviet Multinational State.. Sheenior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Instituterofessor of political science at Colgate University.
CURRENT POLITICAL TRENDS IN KAZAKHSTAN
Kazakhstan is one of tbe most important "fault-line*ven perhaps the mostn the NIS. Kazakhstan has the potential to be wealthy and stable; if political and economic problems prevent the republic from achieving that potential, what hope do other, less "gifted'1 states have? The current political and social situation in the republic is extremely delicate. The immediate and short-term fete of Kazakhstan will be indicative not only of the future of Central Asia, but of Russia as well.
This project would seek lo answer five specific questions:
Arc the ideologies of Kazakhstan's major ethnic and political communities moving farther apart?
To what degree is Kazakhstan developing regional interests?
What impact will this emerging regionalism have as Kazakhstan begins local elections
Can the existing unitary political system deal with Kazakhstan's growing list of problems?
Can Kazakhstanational identity which can serve as the basis for domestic stability and formation of international policy?
THE TENSION BETWEEN CENTRALISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERALISM WITHIN RUSSIA
Russia began its succession of the Soviet Union committed to decentralization, the stalemate with Parliament and subsequent events has swung political indicators (WNWEMffjljlJitt. toward tbe severe centralism of the past. However, the regional needs and interests afjfctttftaeateen articulated in the various localities of Russia will still have to be met. This study would monitor the tensions between regionalism and centralism, in four critical localities: tbe North Caucasus; Western Siberia; tbe Far East; and the Karelia, St Petersburg, and Pskov regions.
First, this study would describe each of the areas in detail, explaining why each region is of importance to Russiahole. Second, the study would then attempt toumber of question for each region:
Are there significant legal difterentialions among rhe regions?
What arc the current political agendas in each of the areas, and what will become of these agendas under the new constitution?
Is there any significant leverageegion can exert in pursuit of local interests?
What likelihood exists of the growth of separatist seotirnent of movements, and around what issues?
To what extent are policies in each area designed to facilitate an aggressive Russian foreign in the region across the border?
What impact do these domestic regional issues have upon the formation of Russian foreign policy?
What arc the implications for US policy of the development of regional interests in these border area?
THE PROGRESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE FORMER USSR. AS MEASURED BY PROTECTION FOR ETHNIC MINORITIES
This project does not seek to duplicate the efforts of international human-rights monitoring organizations. Rather the thesis is that elaboration of mechanisms for safeguarding rights of minoritieseliable indicator of the process of transformation from ethnic to legal definitions of citizenship, and so measures the degree of political maturation. The study will survey de jure and de fact? treatment of three sorts of minority populations, for each ofincluding Russia):
Minoritiesiven state whoitular state elsewhereussians in the other NIS, Tajiks in Uzbekistan, Poles in Lithuania);
Peoples who have never had states, but who have been minority members of local populations since pre-Sovict times'ighurs and Dungans in Kazakhstan, Cossacks);
Peoples who have been moved into existing populationsesuh of Soviet policiesussians again, but also Meshket Turks in Kyrgyzstan, Lezgins and Avars in Kazakhstan).
The second part of this project would then survey ethnic minority-related issues as factors in foreign policy formation within the NIS. This would permit comparison of expressed concern over other states' treatment of minorities with actual treatment of minoritiesiY-fJ ^ta'e, fcr purposes of determining the degree to which policies of supportingtmLyf* populations are genuine, and the degree to which they are dictated by other
CUBA'S ONGOING TRANSITION: LESSONS FROM EASTERN EUROPE
For this propsaJ. the principal jpvcsiiKalor is Michael Radaolumbiae is author or editorooks on international affairs, including Violence and the Latin American Revolutionaries (Transaction) and Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals, Methods (Pergamone has served as Principal Investigatorontracts with DIA andormer editor of Agora, FPRTs Romanian-language journal of culture and politics. Dr. Radu specializes in post-communist nationalism. Heesident scholar at FPRI and has taught at the University of Pennsylvania and Temple University. Dr. Radu has monitored elections in Cambodia, Romania, Peru, and Guatemala. He is fluent in Spanish and Romanian.
The experience of most of Eastern Europe and the former USSR9 strongly suggests that the collapse of communismolitical, economic and ideological system did not necessarily translate into the collapse of communism's entire institutional base. While significant variations from country to country are noticeable, in most instances the government and economic bureaucracy, the military, intelligence services and in some cases even the secret police and the communist party have survived largely intact. The very ubiquitousness of this phenomenon suggests that while "communism"hole is not reformable. some of its institutional parts possess enough flexibility and are capable to successfully adapt to changings demonstrated by the fact thatajority of East European and former Soviet republics prominent members of the communist nomenclatura are still inia elections. This institutional resilience, combined with the lasting appeal of at least some aspects of communism, has facilitated the survival of some institutions of the communist era and proved that change without reform is possible.
Based on the admittedly limited and often circumstantial data available, it appears that recent developments in Cuba suggest important parallels with those of Eastern Europe during the last few years of communist rule. The Cuban case is important in this respect since itnique opportunity to test thensights on communist institutional adaptation capacitiese-revolutionary environment. To simply declare Castro's regime as an ideologies! dinosaur is by now insufficient and misleading at best, particularly in light of the adaptative measures (as distinct from bona fide reforms) taken by Havana recently. Thoseegalization of private hard currency holdings and of limited self-employment, de facto tolerance of Western capitalistay not, and probably will not save the Castro regime as is, but they suggest that Castro does try to adapt to the newnternal as well as external. At the same time, his regime's individual institutions, such as tbe PCC. the military, youth and women's organizations,re doing the same and, most importantly, are doing so at varying paces, thus weakening the system's monolithic nature. Simply put, the post-Castro transition has already started, is in the process of definition and it shows incipient signs of going bevord Fidefs ability to
wrnroi or even wterrartv it
The question then is the extent to which various institutions, autonomously, by learning from the East European experience oresult of prodding by Fidel are showing signs of adaptation to change, and what that means for their survival in the post-Castroew examples are relevant:
The Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)ood example of such adaptation without reform.oyal pillar of Cuba' regime, they have bceVWWM (rrMWHSfc became massively involved in the civilianource WJlMf 'Ma1 disciplined laborrocess analogous to that of Ceausescu's Romania during.rocess of de-professional ization set in. doubts over the military's loyalty grew at the same time as their surveillance by tbe secret police intensified.avorite instrument of Castro's foreign policy, the FAR mission is now increasingly seen as imposing internal law and order in ann competition with but less trusted than the Interior Ministry.
The economic policy bureaucracy is yet another institutionalized group which is trying to adapt to new circumstances, as the legalization of hard currency holdings and self-employment limits its power and the scope of its activities.
ore general level, the economic crisis and the general weariness and apathy it has led to has resulted in an extensive effort by the propaganda apparatus, including all the Communist Party's ancillary organizations (youth, women, artists,o redirect and reframe their efforts, from abstract slogans coming from the top toward references to daily life, the economy and participation. Superficial as those efforts may be. they may well change the relationship between the population and regime in unexpected ways and for the first time allow some inputs from below. That is precisely what happened in then places like Bulgaria and even rhe USSR under Andropov.
Finally, institutions outside the regime's structure, and thusong dormant potential for independence, are beginning lo actualize lhat potential. In Cuba that now applies to the Roman Catholic Church, just as it applied to the Lutheran and Orthodox Churches in Eastern Europe during.
The main issue under examination is not the probable success or failure of Castro's conscious attempts to reform the system, but their unplanned impact, actual or probable, upon existing Cuban institutions. The analytical framework is defined by the experience of Eastern Europe duringecause, as Fidel Castro himself has admitted, there are strong similarities between Cuba's present situation and that of its erstwhile allies in the Warsaw Pact. Most importantly, whether the present developments within Cuba will resultelatively peaceful transitionost-Castro regime oriolent convulsion will have quite different implications for. role and interests in the island.
UPPBOVIDfOR RIlrJISE MTtOCillll
THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH
For this proposal, the principal invcstJBator is Ron H. Monro. Mr. Munro joined the Foreign Policy Research Institute0esident scholar and head of its Asia Program,istinguished careerournalist and foreign correspondent. Mr. Munro served as Peking correspondent for The Toronto Globe and Mail. Canada's leading national newspaper, and served as Bureau Chief for TIME Magazine in Hong Kong. New Delhi, and Bangkok. His recent articles on China and India have appeared in Policy Review and The National Interest. He has also written for Foreign Policy and Commentary.
China's explosive economic growth has strategic implications thai are difficult to grasp. History has never before witnessed an economy of such size (the world's third largest GNP and its largest workforce) growing atapid rateoercent) forustained period ofears so far. with only one significant pause).
With most of the global economy flaccid at best, the magnitude of China's growth compels the attention of rhe world's major corporations and financial concerns. Convinced that many of the world's best economic opportunities will be found in China for years to come, most major business groups in Asia, Europe and North America are now courting China's powerholders. The impact on the foreign policies of all OECD members is already discernible, in Asia today, we arc seeing the emergence ofhat is, business groups willing to do China's bidding in return for preferential treatment in trade and investment. This is most obvious in Hong Kong but it is also taking root in Southeast Asia and,ore subtle way, Taiwan.
Meanwhile, largely unnoticed, an economically expansive China is rapidly establishing trade, investment and infrastructural links across its southwest and northwest land frontiers that presage the creation of new spheres of influence. On its southwest frontier, Chinese influence is growing rapidly in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; Burma is already firmly ensconsed in China's sphere of influence. On its northwest frontier, China's trade with the five new Central Asian republics is second only to Russia. Significantly. China is proposing joint development with the republicsew Silk Road of highways, railways and pipelines that would ultimately link China with Iran.
While the Japanese economy still far outstrips China's in size and sophistication, the increasingly serious problems that beset Japan's economy raise questions about its long-term effectivenessalancer or challenger to Chinese economic power. Talk of an Asian yen block, for instance, is dead.
China's economic power is magnified throughout Asia by rhe military weakness of its largest neighbors. The military effectiveness for Japan's expensive self-defense force is problematic; Russia's huge nuclear edge is less significant than the sad state of its army; India this year effectively abandoned its pretense of being China's military rival.
The United States, concerned primarily with human rights and proliferation issues in recent yean, has not yet focused on the implications of China's growing economic power. Those implications, both immediate and long term, are profound. Already, the current scale of China's economic growth, combined with the Chinese authorities' eno-mercantilist economic strategy, islood of low-priced, often effectively subsidized, exports. Simultaneously, China hashicket of indirect import barriers. The resultapidly. trade deficit wiih China, the largest by faron-ally!
Even the normal workings of market economics will prove disrupMR OiMttarge and rapidly growing Chins, for instance, has the economic fundamentals favorable to building modem, giant-scale petrochemical complexes with production costs significantly below current world levels.
Wetudy that will document and explore these trends and discuss their implications for the United Stales, Asia and the world.
FOREIGN POLJCY RESEARCH5 Chestnut Street Philadelphia,51
k was most enjoyable and,.having been Special Secretary of State, your experiences remind me of
on runRonald J. Ntpfea Ihh E. Nana Frank N. Piaaeckl DanM Plpa* Hal-ray Sicharman Edward M_obert Strmn-Hup* Marrtn Warhman.anial W. WriJ Aba* J. Wood
Board of Advisors JajoM Courier Midas DaeUr David Eiaanhoww Erwia A. OUkaa Sanwal P. Hoflttngton Barnard Ltwta William H. IfcHaOlick Tbornburgh Murray Waldaabaum
rief list of proposals that might be of ey political developments in Russia and the NIS; uie longer term strategic implications of its economic growth and one concerns Cuba, where our proposalnique comparative analysis to other communist transitions. The scholars who bave prepared these ideas are outstanding in their fields and short bios of them are also included, We have full-scale outlines and budgets available should any of these strike tbe Director's interest.
I appreciate your willingness to convey mis material as you see fit. Please call upon me for any further mfonnatiou or for that matter, any "special assistance"ormer special assistant.
With best wishes,
FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH5 Chestnut Street Philadelphia,51
tor CIA cy
HFPLACES FORM WHICH WAY BE USEO
k was most enjoyable and,.having been Special Secretary of State, your experiences remind me of
rief list of proposals that might be of cy political developments in Russia and the NTS; uiE concerns mina and me longer term strategic implications of its economic growth and one concerns Cuba, where our proposalnique comparative analysis to other communist transitions. The scholars who have prepared these ideas are outstanding in their fields and short bios of them are also included. We have full-scale outlines and budgets available should any of these strike the Director's interest.
I appreciate your willingness to convey this material as you see fit. Please call upon me for any further information or for that maoer, any "special assistance*ormer special assistant.
With best wishes.