RECONNAISSANCE COVERAGE OF NORTH KOREA (W/ATTACHMENT)

Created: 9/27/1967

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Reconnaissance Coverage of North Korea

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attached memorandum on the subject from theon Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX),need for photographic reconnaissance of North Korea andwith respect thereto in paragraph 8. Attentionto the reservations expressed by the State member of COMLREX7.

URGENTCTION REQUESTED

Members arc requested to advise the Secretariathours today,f their concurrence in oron the recommendations inf the attachment. If it

is not possible to obtain concurrence today it is planned to place this matter on the agenda for consideration at the USIB meeting tomorrow,eptember,

executive aecrecary

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCECoverage of North Korea

memorandumecommendation for Support

of the CINCPAC requirement for increased coverage of North Koreaecommendation for use of high altitude, very high performance aircraft and/or drones to obtain current photographic coverage of that area.

The intelligence communityist of targets in North Korea of current intelligence concern. At the present time there are fifty-nine priority targets on this list. These ncluded in the CINCPAC requirement. Since the approval of the long range program fox reconnaissance in the Far East ine have been attempting toequirement to cover fifty percent of the North Korean targets quarterly and essentially all of them Semiannually, We have never been able to meet this requirement with the reconnaissance assets employed. This problem has been under constant scrutiny in COMOR and COMIREX sincehen it became apparent that we were not meeting the requirement. The Committee has on several occasions reaffirmed the need for coverage of North Korea by the TACKLE program. Because of conflicting priority and operational considerations, the TACKLE program has not been able to provide the required coverage. In fact. North Korea was covered lastn In any case, the presenceubstantial number of SAM sites would seriously limit the areas accessible to. .

have been used heavily and have provided all

of the useful photography obtained on targets in the interior of North Korea. Coverage byas been useful to identify SAM sites, ground force installations, new construction,nd can provide air order of battle information. It does not h

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provide ground force order of battle and related military information. Coverage of North Korea byas last attempted by3 in Photography of seventy.five to eighty percent of the country was attempted but heavy cloud cover was encountered.

4. High resolution satellite photographic systems havea limited amount of useful photography. |

nine high priority targets.

of Defense reconnaissance assetscontrol have attempted to supplement national These, however, are confined largely to oblique photographytracks and do not satisfy all of the Commander's requirements.

the requirement was established in Januaryhasubstantial reorganization of North Korean militaryfrom COMINT. The effects of this reorganization have notcovered in photography. In recant weeks there has beenin tension along the Demilitarized Zone and an increase inclandestine penetration of South Korea. This has led tofor the state of our knowledge of the North Korean militaryconcern has caused CINCPAC to propose the deployment ofaircraft over North Korea. The problem has been reviewedand it is our conclusion that we are unlikely to meet ourfor high resolution photography unless very highare employed or unless we are willing torogram lorof drone aircraft over North Korea. In this connection, it shouldthat BLACK SHIELD has demonstrated the capability to coverareasery short period of time and that severalmissions would be required to provide comparable coverage. that acceptance of the CINCPAC recommendation that theaircraft be employed would result in an earlier fulfillment of

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discussing the situation, the State Department member

of COMIREX recognized the deficiency in meeting existing roquire-mpnts, but noted that Che deficiency had existed for some time. He did not feel that the current situation was sufficiently critical to justify political risks involved in the introduction of new overhead reconnaissancein the area (BLACK SHIELD snd Drone). He also expressed reservations concerning the wisdom of exposing BLACK SHIELD to Soviet tracking. The Chairman has examined this concern and notes that tracks can be planned so as to minimise tho provocative aspects.

view of the considerations outlined above, it is recom-

mended that Iho USIB accept and support the CINCPAC requirement, and seek permission to employ high altitude, very high performance reconnais sance aircraft aod/or drones over North Korea to acquire necessary photographic coverage.

t-nairman

Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation

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