Created: 8/25/1967

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CS Historical Paper

. ;



Other copy held by: DDP Copy No. 2 2

Controlled by: Dateate published: Written by:



1 ftdtinnmiifl













nalysis of the Reasons for the Discovery of the Tunnel

ecapitulation of theDerived

ypical American Press Comment

ast German Press Comment

Base,; and

D,, were intimately associated with the planning and implementation of the project at the policy level and very kindly offered suggestions for the preparation of this manuscript. Their comments have been incorporated and are greatly appreciated. Several other individuals,

who wereosition to offer valuable

advice were absent from Headquarters during the period the paper was being prepared and thuB unavailable to assist.

When this project was first discussed with the then Director of CIA, Mr. Allen Welsh Dulles, he ordered that, in tho Interests of security, as little as possible concerning tbe project would be reduced to writing. It is probable that few orders have been so conscientiously obeyed, and yet there

reat many cubic feet of files connected with this these files mainly concern technical and administrative matters. only those details which, in the opinion of the writer, are necessaryroad understanding of the manner in which the project's objectives were accomplished have been included ln this paper. those interested in additional data may wish to consult the files.

in addition to hotting forth significant developments, the writer has attempted to provide insight into the reasons for certain courses of action. at times thispeculative approach. the judgments derived from suchwere shared by all those actively concerned in the management of the projoct, and it is the writer's hope that they are accurately expressed in the following paper. any error ln this respect, however, is tho sole responsibility of the writer.

AUgUSt, 1OT7






t .


- Detail Map of Rudow Seotlon, Berlin

- Aerial View of Rudow Section, Berlin

- Dirt In the Basement

- Vopos Studying the Installation

- East German View of the Compound

- Blinds on the Shield

- Excavating Using the Blinds

- View of the Completed Tunnel

- Construction of the Vertical Shaft

- Completed Vertical Shaft

- View of Cables and Taps

- Shaft and Tunnel Entrance in Warehouse Basement

- Converted Fork Lift and Dirt Box

- Target Cables Exposed

- Schematic View of Tunnel

- Initial Stage of Construction of Prc-Amp^Chamber

- Pre-Amp Chamber

- Tapping Bridle

- Lead-Away Lines

- Soviet Press Briefing


The exact moment when the idea emerged ofunnel to Intercept Soviet and East German communications is somewhat obscure,' umber of factors must be considered, among them the following:

a. As early. Intelligence Officers became Interested in the benefits to be derived from tapping Soviet and Satellite landlinoscale not previously considered necessary. The loss of certain

sources during this period created gaps in ourcoverage which were particularly unfortunate during this period of Cold War escalation. It became evident that the tapping of certain selected landlines mightthe information needed toumber of the gaps in our overall intelligence picture.

b. In thes andshrough the briefings of "returnee" German scientists (those who were taken by the Soviets after World War II to work in Russia) and other sources, became awareew Soviet voice secrecy device which the Soviets referred


usually as "VHE CHE.

soon became evident that

In normal usage "VHE CHE" means "high frequency". The Soviets, however, in context, used this termpecial speech scrambling device developed to provide security to their high level communications.


In thea the Office of Communications, in the course of its continuing efforts to provide secure communications for the Agency( became awarerinciple which, when applied to target communications, offered certain possibilities. Plans to exploit this technique were immediately formulated.

These factors then served as additional incentives (above and beyond our normal collection requirements) to focuson Soviet landline targets. Inxploratory discussions were held in Washington to plan the mounting of an attack on Soviet landllnes in East Germany with specialto be placed on the Berlin area.esult of this conference,

an agent network was set up which was successful In penetrating the East Berlin office of the East German Post and Telecommunications network.

Vital Information

first became available

during the latter partnd by2 all of the pertinent technical material had been assembled andanalyzed to permit the pinpointing of the moot important Soviet circuits.

Subsequent events proved this information to be completely correct.

Various methods of tapping these circuits were explored and one sampling operation was run in the East Zone,with negative results. Byowever, the effectiveness of the penetration network

had become suchmlnute sample

was obtained of the prime target circuit. This was accomplished

cable pair to the West Berlin Post Office where it was recorded.

This operation continued for some six monthsj

otal of almost two hours. The longest continuous sample obtained wasinutes and most samples were of two to three minutes' duration. Special mention should be made of the fact that lt was necessary tohour watchix-month period on "our" end of the cable to record these



At this pointe knew it could behe next step was the problem ofermanont tap on the target lines.

Precisely at what point the ideaunnel for the purpose of tapping the target cables began to come into focus cannot be pinpointed.' he British advised CIA that they had for some years been tapping Soviet cablesystem of tunnels in the Vienna area and offered to share the take with. The suggestion was made by the British at


the time that similar opportunities might be present in the Berlin area. While it should perhaps be possible to credit one individual with the initial concept, it appears toit difficult to do so. At anyhe British and CIA continued to pool collateral information, and by3

the ideaunnel to

tap the target cables began to take definite shape.

s ee t


Inspection of all sites from which it might be possible to tunnel from. or. Zones to the target cables served to narrow the choices to two spots: one in the British and one in. Zone. The site actually used (see figs., andas selected after careful deliberation which included, but was not limited to, the following factors: a. The location of the permanent water table (which is normally relatively high in Berlin) wasto beeet below ground surface. It wasthat this fact would obviate the necessity for the use of compressed air, watertight locks, andconstructionorresponding reduction in the attendant engineering problems.

b* The length of the tunnel was considered to be not impractical although it far exceeded anything which had been done by the British ln Vienna.

was available on which to constructfrom which to begin the tunnel.

collateral information on theavailable, including the target cable plans,and the plans for all utilities serving

At this point the following major quostlons remained unanswerod:

Was lt indeed possible tounnel of this

magnitude0 feet) clandestinely,the fact that the border at this point was heavily and constantly patrolled by the East Germans, and hit the targets?

the answer to the abovo waswas to be done with tho spoil (reckonedons of sand)?

type of cover Installation couldemote area (this portion of Berlin was ata "squattersville" of shacks and hovelsrubblo by refugees from the East German Zone)?

In rotrospect tho first question, "Could the tunnel bo

as neverebatableconcerned more

or less decldod that given sufficient money and personnel the job could be done. (This judgment fortunately provedhe second question, "Where do we put theaunted tho minds of project personnel for many weeksreat many ingenious ideas were brought forth and discarded for oneor another until the suggestion was made facetiously that weole and put the dirt Inhis in effect was the solution. At this time no convincing cover story had

suggested itself and the current consensus favored making the cover compound an element of the Quartermaster Corpsather vague mission of housing items that should be dispersed for one reason or anotheremote area of Berlin. Space requirements for the recording and associated equipment were suchuilding of warehouse proportions was needed; so it was decided towo-story warehouse. Local engineers were told that it had been decided to experimentew type of warehouse, one which would be half above the ground and half belowamp suitable for running fork lift trucks from the basement to the first floor. Berlin had been selected as the site for this warehouse becauseould be cheap due to low labor rates and (b) the work would benefit the Berlin economy. So the basement was dug under the eyes of the local border guards and we had "our hole


to put the dirt in." (See

While the "warehouse cover" was adjudged sufficient to solve the temporary problems of construction, it was not deemed solid enough to carry the project for an extended period. At this particular time the intelligence community was becoming Increasingly interested in the potential of

As an interesting sidelight,'we heard later that the Quartermaster Corps became seriously interested in this type construction because the ratio of cost to storage space available was amazingly low. We do not know if any follow-up ever occurred.


For example:

a. Excuse was provided for maintainingphysical security and tight compartmentation.

in the Top Secret

category at this period in its evolution.)

in the area.


riority target, was argued that presenting the oppositioneason

the site provided the opposition with an explanation for the site's existence. In spite of the fact that any form of


the site's existence would makeess prominent target than leavingmysterious something." The




did In fact

the sight of the Soviets and East Germans standing on top of the tunnel with binoculars focused

on the roof of the installation provided

considerable amusement to personnel at the site. (See

U.K. planning for .the project continued3 and in December of that year the Directorentral Intelligence approved the terms of reference which covered formal negotiations with the British for theof the project. eries of conferences in3 and4 led to the following decisions:

a. . would:

ite, erect the necessary structures, andunneloint beneath the target cables;

be responsible for the recording of all signals produced


rocess in Washington all of the tele-

graphic material received from the project.

British would:

ertical shaft from the tunnel's

end to the targets;


effoct the cable taps andsable signal to tho hoad of the tunnel for recording; and

provideointlyU.K. center in London to process the voice recordings from the site

It was jointly agreed thai each side would keep the other advised in detail on all aspects of the project. It should perhaps be said hero that the bilateral aspects of this operation (with one notablo exception which will be discussed later (see BLAKE,) caused few, if any, problems. The skills developed by the British during the Vienna operations stood us in good stead and the distribution of effort andproved in the end to bo reasonably equitable.

Activity thus proceeded on throen Berlin steps wore taken to lease the necessary land and right-of-wayents for the siteontract was leterman The compound, which was roughly the size of ancity block, was fenced with chain-type high security fencing and contained the main operations building (the one story with basement type warehouse previouslyombined kitchen-dining facilities and barracks, and another building which housed three diosel driven generators to provide power for all facilities. (See Sanitary



provisions consistedesspool. (The logical placement of the cesspool was such that it was situatedew feet from the tunnel site. It later developed whon the tunnel was dug that this wbb quite unfortunate because working conditions in tho sector adjacent to the cesspool wore, to say the least, highly unpleasant.) Planning called for tho completion of this work on

For assistance in actually digging the tunnel lt was decided to request help from the Army Corps of Engineers, and to this end the Chief of Staff and. Army, were briefed on the project. The initial contact with the Army was made personally by Mr. Allen Dulles to General Matthew B. Rldgway. Fortunately General Arthurrained engineer, had just been.. From the first moment he learned of the operation, General Trudeau was an enthusiastic supporter of the concepts Tho Army soloctod Lt. Colonel Leslie M. Gross (tho only available member of the Englnoering Corps with any experience in tunneling) to head the project. This proved to be an excellent choice for Lt. Colonel Gross turned in an outstanding Job. By mid-summer4 he had firmed up the engineering plans,rew of engineering personnel, and actuallya mock-up tunnelards long working under operational conditionsigh security base


Some mention should be made of the actual method ofthe tunnel. Studies of the soil structure in the Berlin areaigh percentage of sand. For this reason it was decided that the tunnel should be lined with steel. Ihe same sand content contributed greatly to the danger of cave-ins at the face of the tunnel, and to eliminate thishield was devised (seendith horizontal "blinds" so arranged across its face that should even dry sand be encountered the danger of cave-ins was virtually eliminated. The tunnel liner was formed of sections of heavy steel plate so constructed that, when bolted together, five sectionsteel ring approximately six feet in diameter andnches long. Provision was made for bolting these rings together toontinuous tube of solid steel. The men worked under cover of the shield described above (which was slightly larger in diameter than the steel liner) and when sufficient material had been excavated, the shield was forced forward withjacksew section of liner was bolted in place. Since this methodoid of approximately one and one-half inches around the liner (remembering that the diameter of the shield was greater than that of thecrew-type removable plugs were built into every third section of tunnel liner. This permitted removal of the plugs and the forcing of grouting material under high pressure to fill the void

after the liner was in placo. It was calculated (andproven to be true) that this Method of construction would nol permit settling of the soil and detection of the tunnel from the surface. (See


Meantime in. British engineersock-up of the tunnel's terminal end and fabricated an ingenious device which worked in principle like the tunnel "shield" described above, with the difference, of course, that the blinds (which closelyonventional Venetian blind) were horizontal but so hinged as to-permit vortical excavation. This permitted excavating cautiously across the upper face of the vertical shaft in small areas and then Jacking the entire structure up at the optimum rate. (See fig.) Availablo plans indicntod that the cables were buried somenches deep along the sideeavily traveled highway. The top of the vertical shaft (seehen needed to be approximatelyonches below the surface of thein order to give the tapping crew room to work below tho celling of the shaft, and the whole structure had to be capable of supporting the weight of heavy trucks since the tunnel and tap chamber lay directly beneath the highway. (See) Considerable care was devoted to Insulating the

tap chamber to prevent Its actinguge drum.

Considerable thought was given to the quantity and content of the material available from the target and the manner in which it was to be processed. It was In this field, perhaps, that we experienced some of our greatest problems. It had been decidod vory early in the project's planning stages to maintain the strictest possible security measures. inimum precaution security checks were mado on each individual who in any way became knowledgeable of the project's mission, and tho same standards in force forfor Special Intelligence wore utilized. ist of briofod personnel was maintained, special secrecy agreements wore executed, and special briefings wore given to allpersonnel. It was In the assemblagerocossing team that we experienced our greatest problem In maintaining security standards. Since the material to be processed was largely Russian voice, it was thought that we would noed linguists with near native fluency in Russian. It is axiomatic that native fluency is usually available only in natives, and


In spite of the insulation, iteird sensation to be in the chamber when an iron-shod horse trotted across it. We also suffered some anxious moments one foggy morning when the microphone in the tap chamber gave forthontinuous series of dull thuds. After the sun burned away the fog, visual observation showed that the East German police had setemporary automobile checkpoint directly over the chamber. The "thuds" the microphone picked up were caused by the police officer in charge stomping his feet on the road surface to keep warm.

natives were not clearable for the project. Although we were never successful in obtaining as many linguists as we needed, we were successful, through careful screening and intensive language training, lninimum crew for the job. This necessitated screening each personnel file in the Agency of those individuals who claimed any knowledge of German or Russian, arranging interviews and language tests, andtransfers to the project. The Agency's languagethen were considerably less than now and some of the negotiations proved, to say the least, difficult.


By4 things were beginning to take shape and the situation was as follows:

German contractors had completedand we were in possession.

of the basic supplies, equipment,were in Berlin ready to start construction

on the tunnel. This in itself Involvedons of steel tunnel liner from the ZI to Berlin. The initial shipment across the East Zone to Berlin consisted of one and one-half freight trains, the loss of anyof which could have blown the project. For security purposes alltems, such as the tunnel liner, were double crated and banded and subjected to severe drop tests before they left the ZI. Similar items were differently packaged for deception purposes.

at Headquarters was secured andof Communications hadrew andunder way in fabricating the uniqueto process the anticipated telegraphic traffic.

personnel had been selected andprocessed for both the Main Processing UnitLondon and the Technical Processing Unit (TPU) in

Washington. It should be noted that personnel andwere programmed initially to exploit approximately ten percent of the anticipated take. In retrospect,this could be considered overly cautious. In justification of this decision it should be said that no one had evereet under clandestinewith the expectation ofarget two inches in diameter andnchesain German/Soviet highway. There were those who manifested certainon the feasibility of so doing, and it is greatly to the credit of those senior officials, both civilian and military, that, in spite of these reservations, the project was permitted to proceed.

In lateertical shaft someeet in diameter was started in the warehouse basement floor (seend ground water was encountered ateet instead of ateet. Such examination as could be safely undertaken under the steady observation of East German border guards and Soviet officials indicatedlay lens existed in this particular spot,perched water table" the magnitude of which was unknown. Available information indicated that the clay lens possibly sloped down in the direction of the target and it was decided to proceed with the tunnel even though the top cover was to be less than half what had been anticipated.

Careful visual observation was maintained and tunneling operations stopped each time the German guards walked over the tunnel on their regular patrols. Pumps were installed to take care of the excess water. Observation logs were maintained, and since the highway under observation was the main road from East Berlin to the Schoenfeld Airport,Order of Battle information was obtained. It was also possible to estimate quite accurately the relative lmportanco of individuals visiting East Berlin by observing the security precautions taken by the East Germans and the Soviets.

Both sides of the tunnel were lined with sand in bags as the tunnel proceeded and the excess spoil was hauled back to the basement of the warehouse. To facilitateooden track was laid on the floor of the tunnel and aelectric fork lift was used totring of rubber-tired trailers back and forth in the tunnel. (See) Cool air was supplied to the face of the tunnel throughfrom an air conditioning unit located in the warehouse. The tunnel was completed on Construction of the tap chamber commenced5 and was completed, with the three target cables exposed, on (See


To appreciate this accomplishment it is necessary to romember that the tunneleet long (roughly the

length ol* the Lincoln Memorial reflecting pool) and thathalf sloped down and the second hall* sloped up. ) The lack of an adequate base line made theproblem especially difficult. The engineers decidedpoint that an object of known size in the East Zoneusefuleference point,aseball game waswith the objective ofaseball as far intoZone art possible. This scheme was frustrated byof the East German guards who kept returning Nonetheless, the engineers expressedthey knew their position when the tunnel wasa point which could be containedix-Inch cube.

Excess humidity is probably one of the greatest enemies of electronic equipment. To guard against this problem the section of the tunnel immediately adjacent to the tap chamber was insulated and sealed with marine-type plywood to form, inlosed room. (See figs.nd IB.) Vapor barriers were erected and, ineavy "anti-personnel" door of steel and concrete was constructed to seal off the tunnel someards from its terminal end. From the beginning it was realized that the duration of this operation was finite. Considerable thought was given to the postureould adopt upon the tunnel's discovery and to those

Figurechematic View of Tunnol




PLsurechematic View oi' Tunnel

measures which would be taken at the site. The following position was finally approved:

posture of. would be one ofof any knowledge of the tunnel.

tunnel was mined at the point itEast-West Zone border with demolition chargescaving in the tunnel liner should the Sovietsentry into the cover installation.

"anti-Personnel" door described above

was agreed that the installation wouldagainst forcible entry with all means atthree cables were tapped on1

All equipment for isolating and preampli-fylng the signals and passing them down the tunnel forwas in place before each tap was made so that monitoring of each pair could begin as soon as lt was tapped. (See figs.) Careful check was kept of the temperature and

_'Tliis door bore the following inscription neatly lettered in Gorman and Cyrillic: "Entry is forbidden by order of the Commanding General." It was reasoned that this sign might give pause to Soviet and/or German officials and gain time. atter of fact, there were those Communist individuals who considered the posting of this sign as one of the mostaspects of the entire undertaking.

humidity in the tap chamber to prevent the possibility of the Introduction of moisture into the target cables thus causing faults. The moisture in the air caused by the breathing and perspiration of the technicians doing the tapping operation forced the suspension of the operation several times to permit the air conditioning equipment to dehuraidify the chamber. All the components in the electrical isolationwere individually selected and subjected to rigorous tests to insure maximum reliability, and the lead-away cables were constructed of the best available materials, sheathed In lead, and handled in accordance with the highest telephone company standards. The strictest possible visual watch was maintained with the tap crew. In short, in this, as in all aspects of the operation, every effort was made to guarantee success even though in many Instances it meant delay in achieving the objective.


The tunnel was discovered (see1fteronths andays ofemorandumon6 (reproduced in Its entirety as

Appendix A) examines in detail all evidence available as of that date on the reasons for the discovery. The conclusion reached was that the loss of this source was purely the result of unfortunate circumstances beyond ourof the fact that one of the cables was in very poor physical condition (this was known from the beginning)ong period of unusually heavy rainfall. It appeared that water entered the cable in sufficient quantity to make itthus necessitating digging up sections of the cable and causing discovery of the tap.


Subsequent developments offer an alternative reason for the demise of the operation. InI-6that George BLAKE, case officer In their service, had been recruited by the Sovietsrisoner in North Korea2 and had continued under Soviet control. BLAKE was privy to all aspects of the tunnel from the earliest planning stages. BLAKE stated that he had informed his Soviet contact of the planned tunnel at the time the final decision was made on its location in the latter part The

question then arises as to why the Soviets permitted the tunnel to be dug and to operate for nearly one year. Many theories have been advanced, but it is most probable that we will never know the exact rationale behind the Soviet moves.


The following statistics may be of Interest In evaluating tho project:

cablos wore tapped. They containedpairs capable ofotalommunications channels. The maximumchannels in use at any one time. averageelegraphic circuitsoicerecorded continuously. 0 reels

of magnetic tape wereomeons.


London processing centereak

numberersons. Twenty thousand Soviet two-hour voice reelsonversations wero fully transcribed. In addition,0 German two-hour voice reels were receivedeels0 conversations wore processed. Seventeen thousand of these conversations wore fully transcribed.

Washington centereoplepeak. Eighteen thousand six-hour0 six-hour German teletype reelstranscribed. It should be borne Inmany of these rools contained as many ascircuits, somo of which utilizedto croato additional circuits. Thoany given six-hour teletype reel washours of teletype messages. Both plain text and

encrypted traffic was received. The dally output waseet of teletype messages. Printed in book form, these messages would havepace ten feet wide,eet long, and eight feet high.

d. mall processing unit (two to four persons) was maintained at the Berlin site to permit on-the-spot monitoring of engineering circuits for the protection of the project and scanning of the more productive circuits for the "hot" intelligence. Daily reports of sufficient value to warrant electrical transmission to Washington and London were produced.

c. Processing of the backlogged materialuntil8 and resultedotaleports0 translated messages or conversations.

f. The total cost of the projecthe information from this material was disseminatedlosely controlled system called "REGAL." onsistsummary of the value of the material received together with typical customer comments. Despite ourof the fact that certain elements of the Sovietwere aware of our plans to tap these cables, we have no evidence that the Soviets attempted to feed us deception material through this source.


As previously noted, considerable thought was given during the entire life of the project on the result its discovery would bring. In retrospect lt is probably correct to say that, among those most actively concerned with the project'sonsensus developed that the Soviets would probably suppress knowledge of the tunnel's existence rather than admit to the world that Free World intelligence organs had the capability of successfully mounting anof this magnitude. In other words, lt was felt that for the Soviets to admit that. had been reading their high level communications circuits would cause the Soviets to lose face. Perhaps fortunately, fate intervened, andossible consequence the Soviet course of action was exactly contrary to expectation.

The Commandant of the Soviet Berlin Garrison, who would normally have controlled the handling of the situation when the tunnel was discovered, was absent from Berlin and the Acting Commandant. Colonel Ivan A. Kotsyuba, was ln charge. There is some reason to believe that he (for whatever reason) was forced toersonal decisionourse of action without benefit of advice from Moscow. At any rate his reaction was unexpected In that he invited the entire Berlin

press corpsriefing and tour of tbe tunnel and its facilities. esult the tunnel was undoubtedly tbe most highly publicized peacetime espionage enterprise in modern times prior to thencident." Worldwide reaction wasfavorable in terms of enhancement. prestige. Non-Soviet Bloc sentiment can be generally summarized as follows: a. There was universal admiration (and this included Informed Soviets) on the technical excellence of the installation and the Imaginative nature of the undertaking.

non-Communist world reacted with surprise

unconcealed delight to this indication thatlmost universally regardedtumbling neophyte in espionage matters, was capableoup against the Soviet Union, which had long been the acknowledged master in such matters.

c. Coupled with regret that the Cold Warsuch measures, thoughtful editorial comment applauded this Indication that. was capable of fulfilling Its role of Free World leadership in the struggle.

ampling of. press accounts and editorial comment on the tunnel. Predictably the Communist press treated the tunnel as an outrage and an


intolerable indecency. onsiststudy of

East Gornan press reaction to the incident.

For their contributions to Project PBJOINTLY awards


wore made to the following Individuals:

Distinguished Intelligence Medal Intelligence Medal of Merit Intelligence Medal of Merit Intelligence Medal of Merit

Mr.ntelligence Medal

Intelligence Medal of Merit Intelligence Medal of Merit Distinguished Intelligence Medal Intelligence Medal of Merit

After the project went into the production phase lt was necessary toreat many people to properly utilize the product. In all. personnel were cleared for the project, in additionery large number of British

^Unfortunately the writer has been unable to locate an exact redord of those persons who received other recognition from the Agency for their participation in this project and any omissions are regretted. It should also be noted that0 people participated wittingly or unwittingly in this undertaking. In fact thereare very few, if any, of the elements of CIA that were not called upon for assistance, either directly or indirectly (such as providinguring the life of the project.



subjects. With the exception of BLAKE (as notede have no indication that thereingle security leak during the life of the project. It Is also interesting to note that compartmontation was good enough, even at the Berlin site, umber of individuals actively engaged in working with the REGAL material were unaware of the exact source until they road about it in the press.

NOTE: This assessment was prepared by the PBJOINTLY staff immediately after the discovery of the tunnel and is based on pertinent information available. At the time the report was prepared BLAKE's activities had not been surfaced.



Analysis of all availableraffic passing on the target cables, conversations recordedicrophone installed in the tap chamber, and vital observations from thendicates that the Soviet discovery of PBJOINTLY was purely fortuitous and was not the resultenetration of.. agenciesecurity violation, or testing of the lines by the Soviets or East Germans. Aof the events leading to these conclusions is contained in this paper.

Following heavy rains in the Berlinumber ofand telegraph cables were flooded and began to fault between Karlshorst and Mahlow on the night ofhe first major fault was discovered on cablet Wassraannsdorf onpril. The fault was repaired by cutting the defective stretch of cable and0 meter lengthemporary replacement cable. Betweennd 22

April, when the tap was discovered,,ere inoperative at various times. During this period Soviet signal troops and East German Post and Telographworked frantically to re-establish and maintain Telephone lines serving Marshal Grechko, the Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germanynd General Kosyakin, Malyi, Tsarenko, and Dudakov failed,depriving those officers of communications. Faults on cableut the Main Soviet Signal Center in Germany out of communications with Moscow, and the Soviet Air Warning Control Center in East Germany similarly lost its communications.

German techniciansesting program based at Karlshorst and Mahlow and working north from Mahlow. ajor fault onas discovered and repaired at Wassmannsdorfpril, and onecond major fault on the same cable was discovered at Schoenfeld only two kilometers south of the tap site. It appears that the faulty section.;of cable was replacedew stretch during the early hours ofpril, but communications remained unsatisfactory, par-


ticularly on nd the testing and repair program


aused project personnel considerable concern from the day that the cables were reached. It was physically in very poor shape, with brittle and cracking Insulation. The actual tap ofas delayed almost three months in deference to its poor physical condition.

continued. This general situation was noted by personnel at the site who checked the tap on the morning ofpril and found it to be in good condition with no faults present.

Berlin notified Headquarters of this fact on the evening of

pril, noting, "available precautions taken including primary one of crossing fingers."

Throughoutpril Soviet operators at Karlshorst. the Mahlow cable chamber, and Zossen/Wuensdorf checkedairs carrying circuits serving high ranking officials and made switches where necessary or possible. Nothing was saidthe testing being conducted to discover the faults or work being doneoviet labor force lent to the Germans to assist in digging up bad stretches of cable. Onarlshorst technicianolleague in Zossen/Wuensdorf thead not yet been repaired and that another two days' work would probably be necessary to clear up the trouble. Testing and rerouting of circuits were stepped up during the evening ofpril, and the Soviets showed considerableover the failure of the Moscow-GSFG Air Warning telegraph channel which had been transferred tonpril. Lt. Colonel Vyunik, Chief of the GSFG Signal Center at Wuensdorf, telephoned Major Alpatov, Chief of the Karlshorst Signal Center, at his apartment to inform him of the failure of the Air Warning circuit. They agreed that communications had to be

established before morning and Alpatov left for his duty station.

There is no significant information available on the actual progress of the testing and repair program proper0 hours onpril0 hours onpril. On the basis of available information, however, it seems probable that (a) the testing program continued northault was located near the siteecision was made to replace an entire section of cable which embraced the tap site; or (b) thefaulting coupled with the age and physical condition ofed the opposition to the conclusion that the only effective remedy was to replace the cable, section by section, and that this program was inaugurated somewhere south of our site and continued northward until the tap was discovered.


At0 hours onpril,ren were seen on the east side of Schoenefelder Allee, deployed along the entire area observable from our installation, digging at three to five foot intervals over the location of the cable and, incidentally, the tap chamber. At0 hours the top of the tap chamber was discovered, and0 Russian speech was heard from tho microphone in the tap chamber. The first fragments of speech indicated that theof the tap chamber aroused no suspicion among those present. mall hole was broken in the tap chamber roof

permitting limited visual observation of tho chamber, and a


Soviet captain was brought to the spot. After someall agreed that the discoveryanholeepeater point, and the working crew began enlarging tho hole to gain access to tho "repeater point."

While the working party waa uncovering the tap chamber, Major Alpatov and Lt. Colonel Vyunik discussed thesituationambling telephone conversation at0 hours. They indicated relief at theof Air Warning Communications with Moscow, and Vyunik went on to express suspicion about the continued trouble on. In context it appears that this suspicion was directed at the failure of the Germans to clear up theonnce and for all. In any event, Alpatov clearly did not share his colleague's doubts. The general tone of this conversation was relaxed and casual, completely in keeping with the character of the two men, both of whom wc know well. The conversation appears tolearthat, as0 hours onpril, neither of these responsible officers was aware of the existence of the tap,

U Presumably Captain Bartash, an engineer who later received an unspecified award from Marshal Grechko for the discovery of the tap.



Meanwhile back at the site the work ofole to give full access to the tap chamber continued. ours an unidentified Soviet Colonel arrived on the scone, presumably in responseequest for guidance by the working party. The Colonel did not appear toignal officer since he took no active part in theand remained on the scene onlyhort time. Having enlarged the hole in the tap chamber roof, the workers saw for the first time the cables and the trap door on the floor of the chamber. They assumed the trap door to be "some sort of box" and had no suspicion of the true nature of the At0 hours barriers were erected to keep inquisitive onlookers away from the excavation and it was suggested that someone be sent to the Signal Directorate, presumably to obtain relevant cable data. At the same time the first German voice was heard, ln conversationerman-speaking Russian. The German stated that two trucks must have passed the spot without locating it. The Russian answered that "Soviet troops are coming asnd added that they must wait "until morning" for the decision as to what further work would be undertaken.

While these developments were taking place, Vyunikelecon with the Air Warning Center in Moscow in which he referred to the move of the GSFG Air Warning Center and

discussed, in detail, communication arrangementsby this move. This revealing teleconference tends to support other evidence indicating that as0 hours the true nature of the installation had still not been established.

The work of excavation continued, and fragments ofconnected with it were picked up by the tap chamber microphone, erman-speaking Russian commented thathas come from there and there are fewer workersuggesting that similar work was in progress at another point. The Russian gave instructions that*nothing in the installation was to be touched. erman remarked that the chamber might be connected with sewage work and proposed that plans of the 3ewage system be obtained from the responsible authorities. The Russian answered that they already had this information and that the plans showed "that chamber" toeters away from this point. At0 hours, when still more of the tap chamber was revealedetter view of theobtained, those present began to speculate vaguely about its exact nature and the time of its construction. One of the Soviets, probably an officer, suggested that it might have been built during the war> possibly for "Vhe Che" (Russian abbreviation for "high frequencyut usedto denote anything connected with securehortly0 hours, the Soviets left the site by motor


vehicle, presumably to report their findings. Forone and one-half0o sounds or voices were recorded.

At5 hours Vyunik telephoned Alpatov's apartment in Karlshorst and asked Alpatov if ho had spoken with General Dudakov, Chief Signal Officer, GSFG. Alpatov said that he had, that he was getting dressed, and that ho would go to his signal center as soon as possible. Vyunik told Alpatov to telephone him at tho GSFG frame room at Zossen/Wuensdorf, adding, "When we speak we must do so We know what tho matter Is, so we will spoak This indicated clearly that5 hours the GSFG Signal Directorate and General Dudakov, the Chief Signal Officer, had been informed of the discovery of the PBJOINTLY

chamber, viewed It with extromo suspicion, and planned tocircuits passing over the target cables. This coincides neatly with the departure from the tap site of the Sovlots 0 Vyunik telephoned Alpatov at the Karlshorst Signal Center and informed him that Lt. Colonel Zolochko, Deputy Chief of the Lines Department, GSFG, had left Wuonsdorf

5 to go "there." Vyunik,esigned tone, then added that all that remained for him and Alpatov to do was to sit and wait.

In due course Lt. Colonel Zolochko arrived at the site, accompanied by an unnamed Colonel and Captain Bartash, the

Commander of the working party. By this time the Soviets apparently had brought circuit diagrams to the site and were aware of the pair allocations on the affected cables. There was considerable discussion of the discovery, and one of the crew actually entered the chamber anduperficial and inconclusive examination. Shortly afterwards the statement, "the cable isas made for the first time on the scene.

At about thisours) Lt. Colonel VyunikMajor Alpatov and asked whether he had received the "task" and whether its meaning was clear. Alpatov replied that he had received and understood the assignment. Speaking in unusually vague terms, Vyunik instructed Alpatov to take over two low-frequency channels, presumably provided by the KGB signals organization. (These channels would providecommunications between Berlin and Wuensdorf via overhead line and would by-pass the tapped cables.) Vyunik added that they could continue necessary technical discussions on the new facilities.

Although teletype traffic continued until the tap wires were5 hours on Sundayhe lastcall of any interest was placed sometime00 hours onpril, when an agitated General speaking from Marshal Grechko's apartment attempted to contact Colonel

Kotsyuba, who was then acting for General Dlbrova, Berlin Commandant. Unable to locate Kotsyuba, the General talked to Colonel Pomozanovskll, Chief of Staff of the Berlin Garrison, stressing the urgency of his call. Pomozanovskll promised to find Kotsyuba at once and got him to return the call. The return call was not Intercepted, but there appears to be no doubt that Marshal Grechko had by this time been Informed of the discovery and wished to discuss it with Colonelew telephone calls wore attempted after this, but therefused to place the calls, and in onearlshorst operator said,on't put you through to anyone. Don't ring, that's all. on't answer you any more. It's in the order."

00umber of additional Soviet officers arrived at the excavation, including Colonel Guscv of the KGB Signals Regiment. ussian-speaking German was heard to remarkcommission" was expected,oviet officer said that they would await the arrival of thisbeforeecision as to what the next step would be. In answeruestion as to whether anything should be

disconnected, the same officer stated that nothing should be done beyond making motion pictures of the chamber. He added, however, that the hole providing access to the chamber should be enlargedetailed inspection should be carried out. The general discussion continued, and the possibility of some

form of explosive booby trap in the chamber was discussed at some length. There was widespread belief that the trap door, which in fact provided access to the tunnel proper,box" or "battery box" possiblyooby trap. One of the Soviet officers, probably Zolochko, suggested that, afterhad been carefully noted andrappling iron could be attached to the "box" in order to tear it away. "If there is noe said, "then we can calmly go ahead and deal with it."

Several Individuals, presumably German cable splicers, agreed that the cables were fully tapped and discussed the method employed. They agreed that it must have been done inay as to render the tap undetectable by measurements, although one of them failed to understand why the actualof the cables was not detected. He added that at that time "everyone must have been quite drunk." The Germansto speculate on the nature of the "box" and about the means of access to the tap chamber. One of them said, "They themselves must have some means of entering this place, but naturally it's highly improbable that they haveassage for getting from here to there I"

Some of those present apparently believed that the tap was an old one and had been abandoned due to recent faults on the cable. During this discussion the microphone was

twice noted, but was not recognized for what it was. In the first instance the speaker said, "That isnd in the second it was described aslack ball."

The general discussion continued, with speculation as to the nature of the "battery box" and with soveral comments that it should be possible to Identify the tappers "from the make of the materials" and the techniques employed. While thebegan work enlarging the hole around the tap chamber, the Soviets discussed in some detail the order in which technical experts and administrative representatives would carry out their inspection. The Soviets identified the lead-off cable as "notndicating that after the inspection they planned to disconnect the lead-off cable and to "check how far it goes fromrobably by means of electrical measurements. It is evident that at this time0 hours) the Soviets and Germans were still unaware of the existence of the tunnel, the means of access to the tap chamber, or thosefor the tap.

At5 hours one of the German crew was heard to exclaim, "The box is an entryhaft!"


From the tenor of the ensuing conversation it would seemmall hole had been made near the still-intact trap^ door. The Germans debated the removal of the trap door, but continued to work at and around it despite the alternate

suggestion that "we should open up the road opposite until wo reach the cable or the shaft." By0 they had removed the hinges and entered the lower part of the tap chamber. The padlock which secured the trap door from below was examined and was identified as "of Englishailing to open the door separating the tap chamber from the equipment chamber, the Germans, after approximatelyole through the wall and gained visual access to the equipment chamber, which they described asong passage." 0 they evidently had enlarged the access hole and describedompletedelephone exchange.

An installation for listening in /Aohoeranlage7."


Additional motion pictures were made and frequentof wonder and admiration were heard. oviet Colonel, probablyerson addressed as Nikolai Ivanovichi probably Major Alpatov; aptain, presumably Bartash, entered the chamber and discussed the method used by the tappers in gaining access to the cables. Zolochko evidently still believed that this was done "fromonversations indicated that the Joint Soviet-Germanmentioned earlier, had already visited the site and established the nature of the Installation without going into technical details.

Measurements of parts of the interior were then taken, discussion of tho installation became general, and theclearly indicated that the means of access and fullof the operation were finally appreciated. Conversations reflected that all present realized that the planning of the tunnel approach to the cables must haveery detailed study of relevant maps and plans. The stress to which the roof of the chambers would be subjected and the necessity of preparing the lead-off cables beforehand were mentioned,erman was heard to exclaim, "It must haveretty penny." ussian-speaking German added, admiringly, "How neatly and tidily they have done it." It was decided that work on the tunnel must have been carried out during the day when the sound of the street traffic would drown any noise, whereas the actual tapping was done "during the night, between one and two o'clock, when the traffic on the cables is slight."

One of the Germans rather Indignantly exclaimed,ilthy trick. And where you would least expect it."to which another replied, "Unless one had seen it for oneself, nobody would believe it."

50 hours the tap wires were cut, and at5 the attention of the Germans began to concentrate on the microphone itself. One of them assumed it to be an "alarmo give warning of

approaching motor traffic, and added that it ought to be photographed. 0 hours work began on dismantling the microphone. Shortly afterward the microphone went dead and, afteronths andays, the operational phase of PBJOINTLY was completed.



Set forth belowecapitulation of intelligence derived from the REGAL material and some typical consumer comments.


The REGAL operation provided the United States and the Britishnique source of current intelligence on the Soviet Orbitind and quality which had not . and British officialsPBJOINTLV, during its productive phase, to be the prime source of early warning concerning Soviet intentions in Europe, if not world-wide. Following are examples of items of intelligence for which REGAL wasnique or most timely and reliable source.


Throughout the life of2e were kept currently informed of Soviet intentions in Berlin; REGAL provided the Inside story of every "incident" occurring in Berlin during thetory which was in

each case considerably at variance vith accounts of the same Incident as reported by other sources. KEGAL showed that, contrary to estimates by other sources, the Soviets at that time did not intend to relinquish their prerogativesthe other three occupying powers despite continually increasing pressure from the East Germans to assert theirin East Berlin as well as in the rest of East Germany. REGALlear picture of the unpreparedness, confusion, and indecision among Soviet and East German officials whenever an incident occurred in East Berlin involving citizens of one of the Western powers.

The Soviet decision to implement the establishment of an East German Army was disclosed by REGAL in in time to notify our representatives at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva to that effect.

REGALetailed account of the Soviet program for implementation of the decisions ofh Party Congress, including measures to suppress unrest among Soviet nuclear scientists resultingoo-literal interpretation of the new theory of collective leadership and the denigration of Stalin.

The progress of Marshal Zhukov's attempt to curtail the influence of the political officer in the Soviet Armed Forces (which led to his subsequent downfall) was traced in REGAL

material from the autumn5 to

REGAL provided considerable intelligence on thebetween various key military and political figures of the Soviet hierarchy and on relations between the Poles and the Soviet military forces stationed in Poland.



of the Soviet Ministry

plans to implement tbe Warsaw PactSoviet-Satellite military coordination.

of the publiclyto reduce the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces.

of several thousandpersonnel.


of an improved nuclearin the Soviet Air Army in East Germany.

of the Soviet Air Army inwith new bombers and twin-jetan airborne radar capability.

of the Soviet bomber strengthand the appearance thereew fighter division.

d. Identification and location ofoviet Air Force installations in tbe USSR, East Germany, and Poland, umber of key aircraft factories. Ground Forces

of battle of Soviet ground forcesUSSR not previously identified or not locatedyears by any other source.

training plans for the spring6 in East Germany and Poland.

of several thousand Sovietnumbers (usedo produce Soviet orderintelligence).


in the status and personnelthe Soviet Naval Forces.

and administrative proceduresHeadquarters of the Soviet Baltic Fleet andBases on the Baltic Coast.


Identification of several hundred personalities associ- -ated with the Soviet Atomic Energy (AE) Program.

Association of certain locations in the USSR with AE activities.


s eNi ret

Organization, and activities of WiBmuth 3DAG (mining uranium in the Aue area of East Germany).


Organization, functions, and procedures of the Soviet Intelligence Services in East Germany; identification of several hundred Soviet Intelligence personalities in East Germany and Moscow.



REGAL has provided unique and highly valuable current information on the order of battle, training, organization, equipment, and operations of the Soviet and East German Ground Forces. In addition, the scope and variety of the types of information found in REGAL have confirmed that lt is our best source of early warning of Soviet attack."

The numerous productions received from the REGAL project havo been an extremely valuableto the Intelligence Community in our common8


REGAL has provided valuable information on atomic energy activities in East Germany, including

organizational relationships, personalities, procurement details, and uranium ore shipment data. The number of hitherto unknown atomic energy localities, personalities, and activities disclosed ln REGAL traffic is impressive."

In referenced memorandum we indicated our great interest ln financial material of all kinds which was available in REGAL material. Thanks to yourwe are exploiting the material with great success."


Tha Tumid of Love

The Cni'.eJ E',ilfj CoveruiMRl hit aa!made any olticUl rep!/the Soviet and Eail German allocations and protests concerningardi American inlallkRcitca operatives amto have built underneath tltc border bet ween Weat aad East Berline purposes. Steanwiule. assuming the alary la bocannot help thinking the CommunUls haverievous mUlako to rail* so much fuss aboul Ihoir discovery. Tbey ato even said lo have conducted special propaganda lours through the tunnel and lo hate estutnicd tho wiretapping and other record' ine apparatus thai the Americans an supposed to have Installed iniida il.

The probable result of all Dm has been lo give the anti-Caprauniit resistance in Eastood deal of amuKxent asd must have served to strengthen the I> rent on of American resourcefulness and thereby In reilore sonto measure of our prestige--which apparently had been deteriorating since thoaltitude lakea hy tha American attnoriliM ia lhe East German uprisingsJune,the caplivo population. The reaction of their kinsmen in Weal Germany Igretty good index lo their out..

la Wett Gerauay tbe flory haa beca accepted at race value- wirh astonishment and delighiai an evidence lhat (ho tradition of Yankee resource-fulnesi and ingenuity iayth after all. Espionage is one game in which the Communists were deemed, even by their enemies,eexpert and our own side to b* dumally inept. Very few Germans, aa tho Frankfurter h'rtio Press* exultantly observed, even suspected that the Americana -were capable, of so muchnd It would be even more deva*Uling to Commucislt il wero disclosed lhat tin espionage tunnel had been la operation for soma lime before the Comniunisls became aware of It,

Indeed, if the li:nne1 episode turns out lo have beea ibe product ef Yanfceo ingenuity, there is an Interesting parallel in American tiiMory. During the siege of Petersburg in 'Mi, an enterprising Union officer from the Pennsylvania coal fields conceived the idea of mining the Confederate positionsuooel under them. Tho tunnel wai dug and trie mines were anally set off; and though the operationiasco in part because of the failure ofcommanders lo execulo orders, Ihe boldness of tha stroke, has compelled

, --



BERLIN Wonderful Tonnol

Merlin. diy;md

iafashionablyhi the trey iIjihwIli-.iii Avenue, smvr wiih atntiiii hoi--ii-rf.nder Mm-lo MliiiVii-n: ilieife'H's .ire up lit.

wlin iherv i-ni" iIit llii'li".ik Mhrini- oli'-rncr known

lh tlie'.'I'- a*i in Ibei /otic, juit over Ihc way, as Alt* (Slifnii'ki'. Sell .important ilnrks and thicken* Mml like commissar* ini'uhhli'illrilin's only woikine windmill nuns luily tn ilic lirt-rxc iM'.iriml flow- ioiiniljryI'ast ami Wcsln<Is. st'ii, Itnulin?reticubr car lo ilic invi.iium- in i'jM Merlin's busy Silioneirld Airport. Twoui batlicil wire- niuid tlie lonely radar poll, and

' ui suiter fiw am! sinpi-don. In Kickvkly mysterious bouse* lurk hcliittd hicli wire fence*.if darker ami more mysterious within. Ncwoiicii recently com1'id jj tejuiJU agi-nuc* oiknown io be at work in Berlin.

ellar. Forania, the *uitcr-tca'ciy surrounding lhe eon-slru.iioit and nfrmion oiadar station bad led ihe rof bored Aiwr-in ihe otropird rily. There wrrchow whomc: hired< the j- Ji; he badffipit bnauw ihc Mdcprintiso traay, "Whycllar hie enooshrive through nithumpeand win toldindonriOther* recalled serins friends whom ihey knew lo I* rneinrrn suddenly ap-|njno(i insignia ol.nalhy? Aa amused .krj< wa< the only uiiwrr iwm-limeneek ihe Buv aian* ihooLhl they hadiellerne nighti. an angry, khuiiky Suikt culuod uaiuid Ivan Kotsi-ubareii conference in Em Dtr-

A Lot of Money. Truckloadt of Red army troop* and squad cars crowded wiih

IWiiawfcfVtiy. Mfdwkui.t ra'

iKIOMnn jwd M Ihr innm lit jr

ilnc In Ihc RmmL ahi lhe1 in 'ttmi mil" wan on kiml inII all. Ten feciiUni in ihe roof by ibr Ru^inv by iW lu-nwluiim. tUr aluut hiock too uiiNwithj*rntilalini!ntii< andi Itiith Krillnli and Amnion mile. AlMnwl. uhl" kd

Mil nf Ifactc ol Ihc tunnel

, ihcy acre Imktd loii j'i cal4rshxd

1hy he

American end' IV nt'w>men werenim-,Ihey crawled wtn-

lurrirr lutiol lhe nit ilk |wi|iiwnal liritioM:air iuw* mlrnrac ihc AwamM nxlor."

'Thnm! lin* Russian:ote.ulliiy rrsixui-iiiletl ol nmnry."

Whon-j.Vwlaon.c Hqudmrnl.I'enlral iAeowy. wa> My*

int asi-lolly wiih ihc news, one Ifrrlin.'l knuw wheibrrr due lhallywwel ot not.whonrr il waa. art aacbtnkad waa fwund. It's the best publicity. hat had la Berlinong lime."


Hope It Is Trua ^

Soviet charges that American intelligencea tunnel In Berlin,elephone cable,conversations over the Red communicationwhich the Reds, ntado wilh considerableandonducted tour of the spy tunnel forrespondents, gives ns some faint

wt dldn't'know* that American Intelligence! ^agents were that smart. In fact, wo wero beginning to [think thate CentralJnjclljjjcncc Agency needed

;wSS'S' le'w'Io-Csoris^ on the fundamentals of espionage^

" soeet cd_Itussian agent.acjcTif the'Soviet charges are (ruT, Americanagents Twvc'actually. coUectcoVSoweWnUtta'X. orVratjcnsinstallations^in' We' Hopo that American intelligenceoviet department of foreignwestern sympathizers in the heart of theandtream of microfilmedimportant Sovietall this because that is preciselyspy network did and is probably doing righttha Unitedhis Is not Just tit fora

] stark necessity In the world of cyrUcaj pjswer

fioM til* 9ti*

pecial commlUcc. appointed' by tho President, did nako'a survey of tho agency's activitiessatisfied that it wis efficient. Soo tho activities of this -group that oven tho amount of money it spends is unknown. Ac--eounums have estimated that there Is roughlyillion In budgetsther departments which Is diverted to the CIA.

Naturally enough. Congress worries from lime to time that this money may not be well spent. Last week some news came out of Berlin which should jcalm sueti fears.

The Russians discovered that their 'three main telephone cables from 'East Ecrhn to points east were tapped.


A tunnel from the western zone,with the tapped lines and wires, led to sandbags at the zone boundary. The Russians were greatly disturbed. They claim that allfor several years have beenThey biamo this violation of privacy on American Intelligence.

Our officials nave expressed horror at the charge. They haven't, they say, tho slightest idea 'of whore the lines lead or by whom they were laid. Tho .'tusslans arc )ust old mcanics to claim we wire-tapped.

West Berliners ara laughing. Good' for American Intelligence, theyhey hope, and so do we, that tho Russians havo only disrcvcred ono of several taps. At least, the expose shows that some of the money spentji by CIA may havo been very well spentji



Alox Droior. ovor WMU) (Chicago) andadio Network!

"And now undor tha heading, special roport, part one.

'spy"who turnod "out to bo notiincjss^nlothing-on-ua. We bm atunnel wo dug undor tho communist sector of Borlin and which tho rods exposed to tho light of day, as you probablyhort whila ago. Woll, our NEC correspondent, good friond and colleague, Frank Burkholzor, has investigated tha atorythe wiretap tunnel ond he aays there's just one conclusionit's our3. Wo dug it, wo equipped it vrith electronic equipment to liston in on comrainiot East German converaatlonahole year boforo they found ua out.

wo should bo enbarrassod but nobody in Borlin ia. In fact, theroint of American and Wost German pride inthat wa pullod off an espionage trick on tho Rodshange. Of courao, tho East Germans areood thing of it bytours through tho tunnel to irflpreos their people with thoof the African spies, but that may backfire on thorn because tha East Germans are not beyonduiet chuckle at this outwitting of their cceramist rulers.

"Surkholzor tolls ua that the United States ia stampod oil ovor tho listening post tunnel. Now, tho tunnel io on tho outskirts of town with our end being locatedo-called experimental radar stationarbago dump. It runs straightlowed field that has white border marking posts above it. The Russiam have raado throo openings for tho tourists. One ia near tho tfirotap, anotherointards out in the field. When arrcno aeks an Anorican why thoro isn't any radar at tho experimental radar ototion, the uaual answer, according to Burkholzor, ia, wo said it was exporlrwntal, didn't wo? Want to mako something of it?"

"Naturally thond the government in Washington aren't going to admit anything unices they havo to. No one tella who ordered tho eavesdropping tunnel built or who paid for it or who did the listening and tho digging. Perhaps it was the workocal 3erlin outfit,urioua bunch of boys. Or perhaps it was dono cccretly on ordors direct from tho Pentagon or the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Anyway, it was dono well bocause it wasn't discoveredear and new tho Russians nay bo wondering hew much we learned froa recording all the phono talks, possibly includin, ovorything that want through tho switchboard of tho noarby Soviet airfield. So thanxa for tho information, Trank Burkholaor, and now wouestion for you. Why donH weourist entranco at our end of the tunnol and cash in on tho publicity? Stop up, one and all. uartor. See modern oepionago in eloctrcnio form and all undorGround, and who knowo? Porhapo you will meet an occasional cocrainlot tourist.*

nsw york elzrald tribune

bsrik keds flock'to.u. s,asj tisunsef


"We have no fault whatsoever toh thene


i JVoin tho cariernwalk westwardhap* ion yards jmttrietlto tunnelsector border. Thenbarricade Isn voice calls out "halt**

, Il Is clear lhat It the visitor, iould continue westward pact llie ban lea dewould emerge, soonow but

ajtosi'jWirelcn to (he IleratdTnbuilcleraldTrtbunclnc. "UKUUtt, May of IhcsirJits of ihe colli |U'.irie "American spynow on cxhioiuoa asertin.

-capacity lor dailnc undertakings.

Tlie SOO-vard tunnela vcnluie ot extraordinarystud ot which thriller rums nrc made. If it wa* due by Americanthat Is Hip scseral is

|*UCiiii:: example or their AnlP,;cfln Twuldine

ere ci if) cull operation

eiiiiipment on Die jcof. Tbei

.orzani ration. -and

nine and guarded constantly by, American raMlm. Sums In Gcr-I

Seldom has an. J

Complr* Fontpment Beyond theompart-saven leet lour housinc.


aairrounded by barbed]

thai accomplished by the


he upplna cdlforblddenCommunistlldy of lhe

telephone lines runmnirther liiwnl wground in Berbn, The line, g

IHu^tly Included Tho ruWWl

iUU Inwas nceeaary to pio*ei

*rca well aiHankd Awaj [dclieate equmsimt in the otner-


snen who dear the tunr.elw.t* dap* and ecad Hi

-- - labored under twd nnally. there ta the eorna.rx

5naekhey had tejuppint

' Tbe thevery nlcaCyee Bntisba anonih oco and. lection, and ihey had taen Includes elcht raekatbe mam MiMaretnesecretly the thouiandi ollo eany Ihe tappedin Berlin, can bo vutted ton* ol clay they due out. ttnc* venation bit! toweniy-tnmute bW piles ol earth near the ere tor eivd ol the tunnel and alsoirarn thef Herlin border would have alerted Ui* help prevent detection olthe southeast comer ol lhe

ciiy, Anpaientiy the eneovntrd- There are three power-eontro'.

rculpmcnt Into which

A mooilebar Itas hauledin ciosrditmiu near two lone racks of

MmejCommunMt line! lead from

ihreo main cables. Iloie lhe in-dividual' manltorhii;re'.iuir it io opposite wall[ of the tunnelow of benches with fiuorcjceiith line over-Ibe compartmentultleshlp gray.

Considered Great Eapcrt* Atnd of the eastern coramtimrnl thrtc is another) ateel door, ont nf ttis on* ni-'iv imiinyu ium

ii tlnivinn* bmlncs* nearroucnt Into tbe radarcud ol the tunnel, ealer-l'iuildlnc. Possibly tho

'line lo Eart^ German'botisht in lhe sections olbrourhl to see the '

Americanlter Inspecting Hie tunnel. Uhe factory workers record the

corrugated lion tubing which line Itic tunnel. The tllmost secrecy muat have bren ur,caavoid alltrins Up localndiEnation"isitors*ommunists estin.te lhat The boo* conlnim the,fnor* UoKtiirc* of lorctcncr* on bothonths, of tlie Iron Curtain. EveUh uveompleted Sudnnew officialuted,Mnic- Tbe mnnel. six lect inomlotlnc cnuipinriit, Ap-


Bian aeetor. The westernmtnt trance .Ileapariely-popu-Uted locality called Rudow.


: was

Ihrourh lhe tunnel X. oc Mrihero won d'

m ^ j

olor.f: two

nVnr-ler aHfl with its roofIhlso bebelow the surface, washp CommuiiSlaards jnaidc-ff !lId be tapped Becauseof'ullra-sennUraAmerican sector? equiRmenl had the PnmaiyVbich would havewJt runs conward. even line detection oj.mll,lty3C0 yard* ln*.de lhefom lops.rna? nf

in lheidy,


Only Ibo'ea-Mempen'^lzs. exut.iment ol ofwg nheeta*

* m U of work.

Jiktll ol ifteir*(oJeci'a_bullderaI,

evervrifuuhe CommunUI. .ay the Bal tunnrra nicest

m Ru*^an and. ^Icraweral naoaira helort

man: -Entry foibldder.iscovered.o explanu-o( Ihe Cc<nma_ncUnB.otIt wa*

i-j* driven'out loy Robert

the borders of the German! democratice

flunk You Our answer, in haltingexplalncu lhat owner* ship of tho tunnel has not field; been established, but lhalimehe rigM-ness or wrongflcts depended upon.the tide of the fence from Un operation was viewed.

lie showedook in which tunnel visitors wore, asked to intcrjbo their opin-J

site ureau chief. Barbed wire surroundedtation and lis permanent-type buildings. '

. s. reporters} tour eerie bore

', Wo could sec knots ofround mounds of earth exc-i*atcd to reveal two sections of BY JOHN* II. TlKMlfSON the tunnel.

American newsmen, today stoodeet underground in tiio allcgad "American spy

i Watched by Yanks 7GHflC nrrf'mi American soldiers in'sentry'hru field" glasses as wo sauntered to* ward the clearly marked corn-dirt

urrowed 3CC yards under Berlin's little Jron Cur* lain, snd peered into ihe

' toommunist rmovio of

yCcrman communist e^ ^wuh to ifta**

irectly undcrabhc,n? now paved road leading from Ber-tin to the Russian air base at

. gunners.

r Volkspoliiei.


^ who declined to -give his.

itted western reporters since 'f lhrc0"blcswerc


Our host In asl* ting as'was ever devised by awriter,ooted officer of tha BM

Ihe Lth

Chicago Tribunoay 55

here announced discovery of minatcd a'switchboard, banks ihc tunnel and equipment iturrent boosters. arapll* said was USCd for wire lap-^fiers, apd cables, 'Aujfl^uc-J

; German worker delegations, .'the Communists said. ; Germans Admire Feal

Situated In lint wilh anAmerican army radar station (thoayummy],of the tunnel has not .been officially admittedha American command here .'or In Washington.

West Derllncri eon-

then the "spyn iho equipmentlabeled by ihc Russians and in English. Some HemsGermans, has been vis. the labels of Brillshorby more0 East

' Itcds Man Guns] Pumps senl hot and cold! water* to an air conditioning! utill. Other long jtrpes held! oil or air. The tunnel was' niade of bolted sections nfu'talod si cel. lined on the' sides with sandbags.Walkingards, we-reached ihe east-westhero"bebind sandbags two-young Vopos crouched wilh.'

in on Red armyince]

.'vinccd tho Americans built theirjpmsowerful-the unncl equipped it. with-aimed up theapparatus, andnd" lne American sec*



No oneight of.

i the tunnel loday whon War-



NOTE: nils analysis was prepared by the PBJOINTLY staff as part of the wrap-up of the operation.


(Sources as Indicated)

The following is an analysis of the East German press reaction to the discovery of the wiretap tunnel at the sector border between West and East Berlin. During the period under4 tootal ofallies per day and four weeklies were available for scrutiny; however, only the dailies reported and commented on the incident.


Mostly concerned with reporting and commenting on the incident were the East Berlin papers which, in some instances, devoted full pages of their local sections to reports andon the tunnel in addition to their front-page or second-page accounts of developments. The* provincial press gavetreatment to the matter only in few instances, generally refrained from large articles or commentaries, and often carried pictorial material with only brief explanations. The least coverage was noted in the provincial press of other

than SED (Sozlalistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands -Communist Party Germany) affiliation; none of these papers published any commentary, or any cartoon of their own, on the subject up topril, in fact.

Describing the tunnel as inspected by the journalists after the Soviet press conference, the papers pointed out that the installation was well designed and constructed, that the installation was costly and equivalentodern teler phone exchange, and that thef Britishsed in the installation was of such quality as to guarantee long service.


The East Berlin papers, which were leading In the reports on the issue, treated the matterbitterly seriouswhich represents an "international scandal"breach of the norms of international law." The papers, in their commentaries, addressed the West Berlin Senat,an all-Berlin understanding and stressing the necessity for united action, and insinuated that Berlin is being kept divided merely for the purpose of providing the espionage centers in West Berlinase for launching provocations against the GDR. Other commentaries by central and provincial papers contained calls for vigilance and for defense Only one paper printed an editorial on the incident. In commenting on the incident the press did notine

between the different developments, such as the pressthe Soviet protest, the GDR Government protest,ut,ule, the commentaries dealt with the incidenthole. Later, when tho first reaction of the West Berlin press was available, the central press swooped down upon the West Berlin press for attempting to belittle the incident and to divert attention from the "seriousness of the matter."

The few caricatures published by the papers were designed to slander the Americans.

Day by Day Reaction


On6 six East Berlin papers printed the ADN (Allegemeines Deutsches Nachrichteneneral German News Office) release of individual reports on the Soviet press conference, reported on the inspection of the tunnel by the journalists, and carried excerpts from General Zarenko's letter of. DER MORGEN and BERLINER ZEITUNGndrinted only the abbreviated version of the ADN release. Six provincial SED papersarried announcements of the discovery, brief reports on the press conference, and merely an announcement to the effectetter of protest has been sent to the American Chief of Staff. Only NEITER TAG, Frankfurt/Oder, printed the long version of the ADN

se t

Provincial papers of other party affiliations carried no



Onprilrovincial papers came out with the ADN version of the report on the discovery of the; the six provincial SED papers which hadriefthe day before followed up their reports by more extensive accounts of the press conference, the letter of protest, and the inspection of the. Papers of other party affiliations joined in the reporting campaign on this day. Only MAERKISCHE VOUCSSTIMME, of all provincial papers, published an "eye-witness" reportescription of the tunnel and quoting individuals who had voiced their "outrage athing" which produces new material for conflicts in foreign' SCHWERINER VOLKSZEITUNG, which printed the long version of the ADN release, reproduced the first picture of the

Meanwhile the central press, In addition to supplementary reports on the discovery of the tunnel, descriptions of the tunnel, and pictorial material showing sections of the tunnel such as the amplifier station,ame out with the first commentaries. otal of five commentaries appeared on this day. The press treated the matterbitterly serious affair" which represents an "international scandal" and a

"breach of the norms of international law," pointing out that the United States violated the Buenos Aires Treaty onon the one hand and the GDR'a sovereignty on the other hand . NEUESew, hitherto unsurpassed "gangster act" of. secretATIONAL ZE1TUNG termed the incidentsensational internationalEUE ZEIT stressed that there is no word "strong enough to brand suchnd JUNGE WELT declared that "this had to happen Just to those who always babble about Communist infiltration but can never prove All commentaries were addressed to the West Berlin Senat, demanding an all-Berlin understanding for the purpose of discontinuing the "stubborn adherence to NATOchieving the withdrawal of the "cold war experts of allissolving the espionage centers in the "frontierndnormalization in the situation in Berlin." Three papers reportedeeting held by the National Front at Alt-Glienicke, at which the populationesolution protesting against this "provocation." Franz Fischer. First Secretary of the Kreis Treptow SED Executive Board, was reported to have said at the mooting that the people of West Germany and West Berlin have to pay for this installation through the occupation costs and to have termed the tunnel as "an appendix of the cold.

TRIBUENE, moreover, referredeport by the HAMBURGER ANZEIGER to underscore the fact that the Installations in the tunnel were not of provisional nature but designed for long DER MORGEN, describing the tunnel, added that West German correspondents who inspected the tunnel noted with satisfaction the declaration of the Soviet Lieutenant Colonel that "quite obviously, German quarters have no part inhile NATIONAL ZEITUNG briefly referred to anmade at the Alt-Glienicke meeting to the effect that the tunnel was open for public

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND reproduced the first caricature on the issue. The cartoonarden which is divided into two partsign indicating the "Democraticull of flowers, and the oppositearren piece of landolehill toppedlag with the dollar sign. trong arm is pulling outole in the Democraticole wearingarked earphones, some sort of Army trousers with plugs and pliers showing from the pocket,. Army cap bearing the legend "Espionage." The cartoon is captioned, "Do Not Burrow in Other People's66

Onprilapers continued reporting on the. Innstances the reports were supplemented with pictures as outlined above. otal ofapers

printed the text of, or large excerpts /rum, the press release on the GDR Government. Six papers reported on the inspection of the tunnel by the population, the press, and representatives of the diplomatic. Four papers referredeport carried by the Vest Berlin TAGESSPIEGEL according to which Western Journalists were prohibited from inspecting the mouth of the tunnel on the Western, and four papers referred to FRANKFURTER ALLGEUEINE which had epokon of an "eloquent silence" about the affair on the part of the. otal of four papers reported on the Alt-Gllenicke. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND gave excerpts from Fisher's speech, quoting him to the effect that the people of West Berlin, in particular the SPD members, will be invited to inspect the Three, six papers, and one paper came out with an Three East Berlin papers, through their commentaries, swooped down upon the West Berlin press for its attitude toward the incident. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND accused the West Berlin papers of attempting to belittle the incident and of lauding the efficiency of the American "goblins, adding that the West Berlin press is thus making vain attempts to divert attention from the seriousness of the



JUNGE WELT lashed out at the West Berlin DER TAG, saying that, by its opinion, the West Berlin paper manifests its total loss of any sense of decency. Besides, DER TAG is not in the least disturbed about the violation also ofBerlin's NATIONAL ZEITUNG held that DER TAG now admitted what it has been denying at all times, namely that West Berline facto part of NATO, adding that DER TAG now regards as "customary" the military espionage of the United States on GDR territory in addition to the "customary frontier-cityhe "customary" partition, and the "customary" diversionist activities of the KGU and other underworld organizations. The paper stressed that all Berliners fully agree with the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE which said that the people must demand the discontinuation of "suchEUE ZEIT, carrying the only editorial, said that theposteature of West Berlin's misuseATO base. The paper emphasized that GDR policy will continue to serve all-German understanding and relaxation of international tensions. "But it must be kept in mind that the success of this policy will not only depend on the volume of the appeal for peace but also on our preparedness to defend our homeland as well as on our vigilance regarding the prevention ofresulting from the fact that one part of Berlin hasa frontier city againsthe paper added. "What

we need are contact points above the ground and ln full light, namely all-German talks, and not underground trenches in the cold

The first commentaries carried by provincial papers dealt with the Incident as an example of proof for East German press reports on hostile espionage. VOLKSSTIMME, Karl-Marx-Stadt, pointed out that the tunnel representsocument" which is quite apt to dispel all doubts of those who have hitherto been inclined to regard East German press reports about the underground activities of Western espionage services as NAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME quoted several workers who voiced their indignation overileness" which makes German unity more difficult to demonstrate that the "Western side" is Just as quiet about this "unpleasant affair" as the population is And LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG stressed that unyone reading about the discovery of the tunnel will inevitably weigh the Soviet attempts at maintaining peace against the efforts made byervice, adding that this "breach of international law" also places the West Berlin administrationeculiar light." The paper reminded its readers that war preparation, which "formerly marched on Prussian Armys now marching on "American rubber soles, chewing gum, and tapping telephone

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND's caricature ahowed an American soldierin vain toisconnected, oversizeducket marked "CIC" while another soldier is thoughtfully standing JUNGE WELT reproducedole. Array cap on its headelephone receiver on its back haltingign which warns that "spies are now facing danger." The cartoon is captioned, "The Underworld that Shuns thend"Damned, we did not put up that FREIES WORT showed rats wearing . Army caps being disturbedussian soldier in the operation of what looksommunication center. Two rats are shown facing the soldier ln surprise, another standing with arms raised, and still another escaping through an opening in the wall. The caricature is entitled, "Unpleasantnd footnoted, "It is an Effrontery of the Russians to Disturb Us in Our (Burrowing)




















VOLK, Erfurt
























DAS VOLK, Erfurt












VOLKSSTIMME, Karl-Marx-Stadt














Original document.

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