The following intelligence organisations participated in the preparation efi mute:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations al theol State and Detente, ond the NSA.
Vice Aiin. Rufut L. Taylor, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Mr. George C. Denny,or the Diroctor of Intelligence and Reiearch, Department of Sloto
Vice Ac in Vernon L. Lowrortce, for the Director, Detente Intelligence Agency U. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, the Director, National Security Agency
Dr. Chorlei H. Reichardl, lor the Assbtont General Manager. Atomic Energy Coev mnuon and Mr. William C. SulDvon, the Assistant Director. Federal ftoreav of Inseengotkon, the subject being outside aficWi.on
I. RECENT NORTH KOREAN
A. NeMh MTM
ANNEX: Ninth Korean Military Capahilitirs Willi Respect To South Korrci
NORTH KOREAN INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH KOREA
A. We believe that Ihe recent, more vigorous activities of North Korea against the South Imve several motivations: to create new pressures on the Pak government; lo tie down large HOK forces; to strengthen the Communist clandestine apparatus in the South; and Io heosition to exploit any new and major disruption in the ROK. The liming of these tactics has been strongly influenced by theWar, for example by such factors as the absence0 HOK Hoops in South Vietnam.
H. The Nor lb Koreans will almost certainly continue theirof military harassment in the DMZ, at current or even increased levels. We believe that North Korea undertook its program of violence of its own volition, not under pressure from either Moscow or Peking, and thai this program does notresent Communist intention to invade South Korea. Pyongyang is conscious of the risks inherent in such an action and would be reluctant to accept them. Similarly, there is probably no intention of escalating ihe DMZ attacksoint at winch open warfare might result. The North mighthowever, and raise the ante alongZ until tbe HOK resolves to strike back ineries of actions and reactions might ensue which could lead to open hostilities.
C. North Korea will also continue attempts Io infiltrate guerrilla-lype teams into rear areas of South Korea. Communist chances of establishing viable bases for guerrilla operations are probably poor, but some teams will be able to carry Out short-term terrorist and saltotage missions.
1 Sincehere hasarked increase In North Kuecan tiidence igalnsi HOK and US loin Inince Mayugcr laimmore Iscasllv-arrned North Korean agent, lutetiled in rear areas of South Kutca with orders to test the gnnrilla cnviiouiniiil AikI since early September, time lust; been two instances ofhulagainst Soutli Korean trains. Iltese developments raise importijhcs-turns; Why ha* North Korea, uflcr mureecade of relative quiri, cm-balkediugram of violent action agaimt the South? What does Pyongyang hopechiever" And what are its chances?
I. RECENT NORTH KOREAN ACTIVITIES
' Captured agents have tcatuted lhat Nurth Korean plans to mhvrfl South EfBtai itrxhrss'i-nt signiBcanI changes <hinng the winterlWai Thereubstantia] enlargement of agent (raining facilities by the ruling Korean ludu*ison Rurtati. PyonQang't primary fcgtncy for Bitclngcnrc and Milmi'Hi's in South Korea, and instruction tn guerrilla (actio was added tu the cuiiiitdum. At the same time, the North Korean Army'si Hureau set up several new training 'liases" and, perhaps mine significant, mx ins to have been assigned at least paitial responsibility for covert operation* in rear ureas of South Korea.1
hr DMZ Area. From mid-Oetolicr t" early November lilfifl. there werenull-stale but deliberate North Korean attempts to kill or capture L'S and IK ik personnel in or near theikmbushes inotalSOK soldier* werection alongih-long DMZs usual over the winter Inowever, it flaredtrauadm.il> lesels. So far this year, some .TfiO incidents of all types base beenn comparison:MZ iwiih-iils were reported5
' The HowmuiiiAiiinrr Bun-niiilton iiuiuaike Brigade, Willi tin dtiiiulvdJ-nbin Aubnnir Itcxonnaltsaiice Battalion, these Hiiil.iI* aw trained h* hetund. Ihr .lineiuiiii hi tV vviail tit war. In addition, thi-re htooluln- lit. with an tatimatril ilteiicth. whkh has hitheltu Ivm in-ni.il outy wilk die arnotsMkintastkal rrulilsey) bytemiuiO> hiMZ arm.
fi bW -r* li iuvn rvttasetorv. for cusbptr. uV aaa to wtMca Ik l>- i> kitted .tcBiil Dm- "id afterm naded tfapftslNorth Korean.
'" tbe DMZ,"luciitfnt" itroad mir lo imm anythingV fifth! Imtwurn upynmf, fixers lit th" ilntonsUoiiorth [cnr.ii ii.liie or the'S or ROK wbihid- Iintruder.ticideiiliie>iiiW>iie li^lit. in widthS and ROK Miklfem have hern killed amiinmlV-d. Vui"Hi Ninth Korean utsiiiHii- have heuiiilled!tphired,
W inn cum- in DMZ incidents reported this year is comprised ol'Ihc increased alt*tnes* ut US and ROK forces following IhoMr IMOO, hnpiuved. reporting of DMZront line units tuund lln availability of new detection equipment probably iiitanigreater proportion of infill rat ions arc being spotted.uch higher titan in the. past.ercent nfi.issmeNK of tlie type tnflf sited Listindnf patrols. Other incidenls are attributable tu prob-
ing and sliallos* rrciMtiuiwaiKv actions by North Korean ; pn '.
1MB is evidence that litis lue. recently become part(Jjrlr training. Asorlkr vastly howvrr, many DM/ incidenti imnho lite detection ot agents,in small tcuim. moving in or out of South Korea on iiitclugc nee ordifference i. that they an1ggrcsaisv
dun Inline. Tin- tssu train satxifcigc missions of September otittrredhe DMZ and may haw been the stork of agents recently Infiltrated from the North.
ft. Hinr Akoi.. the North Koreans may have stilted up sea itiullrj-Uaai ul rigs-nls Into Mi anaa of South Korea. Since Maytht sre has hocnnithii iiKiiiise in landings and. more important, tlx* scope of activity haa cliuiigcd. Thrt North Koreans have begun landing larger tennis, inoie Iteavily iirmed and iuchtiliugumber of tinny officers; at leastnch learns,en, have landed. Their primary mission has been to see II certain icmote highland* could .wive as lwse areas for guerrilla war. They li.ul no orders lo initialo violence, otlur than to engage in small DMZ hnnisimenlsilli.it-iug. Tliey sverc to return North heforc winter.
(J. So farlie teams appear to have had little success in an omplishmg tlieir stated mivskin. ROK securityandirpurtedl andROK losses have beens SO killed and hTiouth Korean civilians have cooperated by piumptly repotting uuptcitntf activities. "Ihe Communist agents have proved toOrlyll une native laiitlkriHis ullh speech iilentioahlr at such; many aiiparerrtry lacked edequate local knotvksigi. and some teams wen- so short of uipplM* that tliey degenerated into food-gathering eipnhlKsns.
elative handful of these men. including some centers, remain at large, und there may bearns which have not been discovtred.aluBtion of the effecti vents* nf this new North Korean tactic, therefore, mutt necessarily Ih1 liul.iiive There will be sumc gains to the Commtmiols in hilclHgeiice and operational experience, which can he applied to future training. Rut tl may be that their chief gidn from roar-am* activity tlds ye.ii* will he psychological. The inlilli.ituni iinipied with DMZ harassment* and bellicose propaganda from Pyongyang. ha* worritd Ihc Pak government and exposed il lo domestic criticism. In iiddition, u* many0 ROKnd military may have Utome involved lo some degree In tlie detection and pursuit of (he infiltration trams.
II. NORTH KOREAN MOTIVES
recent tactics appear lotyle of approach lo
what we tlill beheve Ii its long-term objective: the rrunifk at ion of Korea underile The adopthai of thesetm toeaction to tivo
-i'he war in Vietnam and the growing political ant! re-atomic strength of South Koreais tin- North. In the cimiv of time. Korean dV-vrln-penents alone might liave I'd the frustrated and hard-line Kim ITsong regime to mow
:is ilagaiusl llie Soulli. Bul ihe war in Vietnam probably caused North
Korea io act when it did.1
A. North versus South
Ecxnumilc Sfiufliii/n. The past few yenis have nol laeu goixl onesKorea, particularly io the economic sphere. I'nanheiii'i- ltd its goab of rapid iiid'isthaluatiou and the
mentigh degree of sclf-suiacicncy. This progrru aroused admiration among tome South Koreans, parts*ulaily stiidents ami utlilh-ctuaK whoiil liy their own relatiseh-nomic id vara e* under ftbee and by the prospect ofcTalcnce on the VS. Itajor thetne in Conn: mi est imifii ation propaganda.
iM-ouragod by lis wiccess and with the prommn nlassistance, North Korea launched an ambitious Scvrn-Ycar Plan,rogram lo raise living standards while coulinning Ihe rapidof heavy industry. Within Iwo oi three years, however, it becamethe plan had failed, particularly the effort to raise living stundards.esulteduction in Soviet aid when North Korea, in lateitself with Peking in ihe Sino-Sovietlie failure wasat the Korean labor Party Conference in earlybe plan was postponed7he ma for reason adduced for this
leadju-timill of lempooprflent of tla- nataaial eciaaanv" was the threatggn-sskm and llse con-sequent need lor strengthening defense ea-pahilities.
contrast.onomy of South Korea began to grow morend, thoughapita gross national product itiNI'i is stillthat of North Koiea,5 the South was surpassing Northern ratesin must industrial sectors and probably in agricultural production assii.ttainetl rise lu living standards was also perceptible. In thesepropaganda appeal North Korean economic achievements oncethe South has been largely dissipated.
BriS- tea. We-lrr V. Kranilm. UV Aittnc Amrt.nl QM of Mil farttiVKt mat tba inrcnr1 MreVl thvIn VMun< fieKarat meat actSoas. lie brbVse* (hit wtaV tV svu k< VfctBKa knjml nxuirnl NorthVcMoanp| mst brtn JCXc-rrfn ilk Lmtnbahy nttnulMtir.
'SorWi.IttOS ettnn-vwtosinattam nf neutrality
it h to |Mr( tieilit t- aam
The Political Secne. Political development* in the Suulli have been equally frustrating lor 1'vimgyang. 'Ihe years05ime of ilnmestie political tnrmnil in South Korea.song and hi* associates must have hmi encouraged an lltey viewed, in rapid succession: the "studenthich toppleilear olnd tolerant parliamentary uVmocracy; the coop by disancetrd nationalistic officers; their ilai repressivend.atter imhtaiv-citilian political struggle for control of the gostm-iiKirf. Yet today, after two nationalms tbc firmly- i:i n! iir.lidllecrged audtnifei. i" ItOta] Bt]tohe support, or at hast the acquimeoce.ajority ol liar 'latino.
t>rtainly, all South Korean political problems have not been solved.1lection* has led to eoiwidrruble dissatisfaction with the- regime. And there are other, lunger range, problem* even more difficult to cope with. Including Die developmentiable political opposition.the outlook lor political .liability in South Korea is good, so long as economic improvement continues and the governmenteasonable degree of sensitivity in handling [Hjpular grievances.
ihe apparent iualaluy ol North Korea to exploit unreal in the South inluongh Hi usualaial politicalprobablyactor ia it* decision to adopt violentropaganda ap-peals for nnificatiou <ai tlorinniauist leims had some impact In lla- emotional andatmospherectiimpaiiicd the lallhee, bul such proposals were categorically rejected and tin ir advoiales Mip|iressed after the military toup ofu any case. pri-Asuirs for unification seem lo have diminished amiaig South Koreans in recent years. Nor has the North Korean campaign ol political subversion demnnstrated much effectiveness. Mine are perhapshundred clandestine Communist agents in (he country (and almost certainly manylaiimuiiistut lla'y seem to have made no significant iirogrevi in subverting the pnpulatiiai or in penetrating tlat- higher lesch of lla- government and the inilitart-.
fnfrrwristniai Urlaltom. Suolh Korea has abo mad- gains on the inter-nabonal scene in recent years Most nnpeetaut was the establishment of thplo-ni.ilu relations withan, which opCBtsd the way lor massive mjections of Japanese eeonomir aid. Uul lo ibe North Korean leadership, the Implication* ol (lieiigierinriil fin exceeded the likely economic gains to South Korea.inimum, iteduced Japanese Interest in mollitying North Koiea or assisting itsore important, in Ihe North Korean view, ll would lead inevitably to lia.reus.xl Japanese political Influence. In South Korea
"Io lUMl. Japan ipive ruitiix' ofixli>ii nol tn9 iigrceiiH'iit withiinlir flili.li ton*Kouait residentsJapan had herno miguti1 to Noitliuring 1SBHortti Korr-ju economic clili'KiitJua founi! itlllaVult InJnp-jn; ai ii rcmill, at ImikI one important deal, for the wlv of anul tu North Korea, tell through.
and. possibly,OK Japanese iiulitaiyhe North has been lev.iii lit in (dual tonal dealings Whilr il began Io athlete mktscn rtxitgnitiou hyi't states3snit gums of
Olt Ii'-' il
B. Theo muse War
star in Vietnampmhubty the pmsiniate cause of the Northlu tactics id violence agaimt Southnvtth thenf regular IS bomlxng uf North Vietnam and the dispart) of -nnn-
tOK troops lo South Vietnam, tlie ennftid there earno Inentral pl.ne iu Pyongyang's thinking. In July, nbnut the time that US ground combat hoops began to arrive tu South Vietnam in furce mid Seoul announced tliat it wouldull combat division. Kim Il-soug adupttxl die line that Vietnam had lievrinte "tlie fixul point* in the world struggle. At lha partyulim tsiiit further and mlled upon Communists every-svhere to grt lottgh with tbeu order tu "distjicrse" its forces. He urged the neorKvlly of destroying, in Vietnam, "illusions" about American strength andHi' slated that if this were accomplishod. il tvonld constitutelear setback for the Pak governmentoweifid buust for Oimmunlstts in the South, (Conversely, in Pyongyang's view. II Hanoi did not succeed in unifying Vietnam on Communist terms, prusjuiti for eventual unifkalion nf Korea on South Korean terms might be enhanced. I
lias also been apprehensive tliat the conflict ineastspread to China and theme ultimately lo Korea.hethe relatively unstinted support of both Moscow snd Peking, lnIt still lias security pacts with both, Pyongyang has become lesstheir response would be in the eventt.hr war involving Korea.count on help from tbe USSH and China if North Korea wereit an Moscow, as in (asl* and Vietnam, niiwdiing to confront theor. indeed, lo sacrifice wluit Pyongyangolicy of SovietHie West. It is lOuecnicd over the failure of Communist China andto close ranks in support of Hanoi. And ll must regard China, inof the Cultural Hevolutlon. as something shoitholly reliableconsideration* may underlie North Korea's adoptionmplusi/ingtancc.ilitary strategy ofwarfair which recjutrrs among otheruildup in local
'Citucifn im thu ciiunl ii Itei^htt-ncd by nidi political development!apan's tlecuaon in ItPOfl to jotn tlx; Smith Korean-.tpemsnred, nnti-Gmniiuulst Asian and TVltiv Coitix-i)nd by tlie talk* tn1-vtween hidi-lcvel reprexufc.Nvr* of tlx-lnis.ui. Ih* CRCX .nutn tlie waan ol I'n-sldeot Rile'* inangaiabon ini7.
'Wesleyrarddln, the Ailinghief of Stall for Intclliigcnee, Di'iiail-nienl iJ die Army. Ix-hrvcs tliat this sretriKC overemphasize* ihe war lo Vietnama cause Ifl increased North Konan viiA.nte agamstSouth. Hebelieve* that Ilw lanfanccuisLadini! in that it Indicates fl Niiith Korean dtfft to tactics of vdifcrx* when in I'aetiave wed violent tallies along
IS. Tlii' Ninth Korean regime is also disluilnil ul Ihr thought ihat lens ui tliousunds ul HOK troop* are gaining combat experience in South Vietnam.ware ol the increased military aid which the HOK is receiving from the L'Sotiseijurtier ot its service in Vietnam. And It is conscious uf the prestige accruing lo the Pak government at home and abroadesult ofgood performance of Ihe South Korean expeditionary force. Tlie lime and content of Kim*oupled with other official aial piisale North Korean statementsake it apparent that the1f the regime i> irnhurratied by its failure to (or est all the dispatch of HOK trswin, to South Vietnam aial Us inability to provide substantial inatirial asustarae lo Hanoi*
bafltatN lhal North Korea iirtdertook its program of vkdencc ofvolition, not under pressure from eitliei Moscow or Peking WhetherPeking would like to become involved in Korean nll.dis at thisiuKucnce with the Pyongyang regime is severely limited. Mourn tslo accept Pyongyang's initiatives, svith the understanding thatwill move cautiously, avoiding acts likely to trigger majorThe Soviets probably have no desire toajor conllict onKastern burden.
III. CAPABILITIES AND PROSPECTS A. Capabilities
totk*a. We do not behevr dial Northntention lo invade the South. Tlie Northotustamed attack against il" South without aoi materia} help from onlside. mehiding substantial troop reinforcements
iomnder present rimirmlames, nnii ci Peking nor Moscow is likely lo provide the soil of support which would la' requited.so long as Pyongyang believes that tbe US will defend Sutith Korea,retaliatory air attacks on the North, it would he extremely reluctant to attack.'"
Iiifiiimiu.il For tlvc sltort term, the number of trained Nordiimmediately available for infiltration into the Soutli dependstwo fatten: the length of the training cycle atew bases andof more iirunrtliatr ugnifieance, Ihe extent to which regular militarytl> luicamaisxance brigade, could be tapped for experienced per-
'Mafreiat wMkr (run Ncatti Kona to llama ba* braWtT Wave tunruxi-iil> nt utdllampial and iiaMiuctau rqalpinrnt. aacl probably tame medical TupjJtri. (halinipr ami (Be.mxififaiery and tumb may ako basr hen*inlni aiI it ifniH'Inm Without publicity. Itrl. Kmran jtl Slittertand ci.-iti.training) bi Hip HanM arrn. 'Iline an;nrllinibUiy ads-Urn nnd Initniclnic In NinlliIn.nn. mid tbiie maymuni in Soiitli Vtetimiii.
". iivaliaitbin ta* North Korean mill tiny ca|*hlliUV4 with trtpuct to South I. in,.
Minrk'l. It ut regardless of Ihc numlicr of trained personnel available, ihc primary problem inonduct of North Korean guerrilla operation* in tho Sooth wouldi fi:nd survival within South Korea.
The phyvu.il ciivinmrnent in South Korea provides some advantages for guerrillas. Om* (rf litem isndeloug coastline wfth its thousands of small idatids. many uninhabited Ibis rnakit rnlikratioo and supply by sea rclatis-efy easy. Another potential guerrillais tlx; pnedominatnv of rugged terrain. On the other hand, vegetation in these highland* is generally sparse und concealment difficult iu niuler when freeing weathervenroblem. During the warmer seasons, vegetation is dense only In the most ilWCCCKMble mountains; elsewhere, ground movement Ls comparatively easy to oliMTve from the air. Such physical factors <oniributcd to the failure of Com munist gu"TrtIIa moveiwnr> in South Korea9.
In1 ilium against irifiltntWm teams, tbe South Korean Covernuient has ofilsaiH.ige-s. The Communists can count on assistance from established agents iim hiding radio (nmniimiiommunist sympathiw.i. and in some cases, relatives. ItuI Ibe overwbehning majority of South Kureou* are unlikely to ussist then any way. There is widespread dislike of communism and Communists, based on bitter memories of (lie Korean War. lo addition, then-are broad aiiti-Oimmuutst laws, rigidly enforced; even suspicions must he reported. Aunt tier major HOK asset Is the Wig and apparently successfulof its intelligence and security forces in countering Communht
'n. riiMiit secisrity forces were alerted atear ago to tbeof tlie planned changes in Ownmiinirin late lUOO, ai Oiminand Center (CCC) was cstablidvisl in Seoul undci (he leadership of the HOK Central Intelligence Agency to improve coordination between military and police Ion is in operations against Communist agents in rear areas. Pruvin-cial siibceiiters weie established. 'Hie CCC alsoleariughmtse lor intelligence on all forms of infiltration.
i. too, tlie Korean National(KNP) fore, was bxreawd in sure tuUU. and ism utter guerrilla training waa Instituted in certain arras. Spceusl iiitte-man potior "sweep teams" secrc enalrd, trained, and equipped tu cover potential guendla air-as in tlaii twine districts HOK Wniv Spuiil PiNtca units sverc designatid tn In: I. up the police ellort. Additional boats were assigneil to Ihe KNP's coastal patrol fiwce,ew new coastal radars were* provided. Several new patiot croft were added tu the ROK Navy. 'Ihe ability of military aircraft to detect Infiltration by sen whs enhanced. Along the DM/ then*igher state of alert, and detection was improved by various new wanting and surveillance desM-es. and by the constructiimomplex liarrier system iu Some sectors.
espite these und other impnmtnents. dicrc are still important dtsfk-iencfes in IEOKapabilities. In rcciit operations. Ibe police required heavy support hum the army for manpower, weapons, and tiausjtort .md com-muiiicntlon facilities. is has caused serious governmeiit enneern, not oti'y
about th*ofibttantial portkni of itstlntigtli In internal vanityut with the problem oftheae forces Then'istory ofmi o overcome,
.mil ii in Iiv im means dear Ihat Ihr newly established OOC mrehanisiii is doing the fob. lnilllrntlou hy sea continues, in part lieeause available patrol craft are generally nol us fast nur as well armed as Ihe boats North Korcn has assigned lo its sea iufiltrutinii units. There are alsu dcflelencles, particularly among the police, iu levernl typo uf communications equipment, ground and air transport, and uitornatic Wii-
orth Korea will almost certainly continue its campaign ofiu the DMZ area at cuiicnt or even increased levels. Tlieoth in lives and materiel, are small Whether the actionsor nut, they engender fear and apprehension among the Southand thus put certain pressures on the KOK Government, conned ion withiM"iin.
Communistlong the DMZ will prohabh/ increase as US and HOK Irainiiig is impnised and new detection and other protective (levtcestalled. NotMlheten, il will probably not la- possible to press-nt sulntuntial casualties mi ihe US/HOK side if the Omimunists remain willing to accept thru losses, however
'Ibis is not to say thai the Communist commitment toamssmonl tactics Is open-ended. Just :is we consider it unlikely that North Korea intends to startorean War, we believe It unlikely that it plans at present In escalate It* DMZ jttaeksoint at whaharfare might it-stilt the North might niisc-al. .'. He, hos*eVcr. and raise liar ante along llie DMZ until the KOK iisorso lo strike back ineries of actions and react mm it might ensue which could lead to open he^ilities.
Hear area infdtration of guerrilla-Ivim- Irams couldore serious pniblcinS, alnMist regardless of the outcome of lids year'sn- inosl vigilant naval pahol and the most cfficicnl radar network would prnhulily not lie able toelennined effort tn infiltrate teams by sea.
Kven w. Communisl prospcd* Imase of operations tor guerrilla ;icttvity are probably poor. I'uder present eircumstaia-es. prospects for recruitment uuick South Korea are also poor. At best, the teams may survive hy earning adequate food and othernd moving quickly from one temporary baton lo another through remote and sparsely settled districts. While doing mi, some teams will be able lo carry out acts of terror and salaMage Soon afterward, however, tlay could expect to become tlaf obfeet of intensive Mssinty operations. We do not believe, iherelore. that7 ororth Korean teams will he able tn organise guerrilla operationscale sufficient to undermine existing local authority
oreover, even il (In* North Korean effurt were to cause Mime localflu- (iirrrnt alternative at the national levelan op[>asilion panstlers areocally antt Cotnrnunivt than the present. ilenw, suvsesdul political manipulation tn the North of any unrest which might ba generated by their activities in the South seems unlikely at this time.
t may lie that Pyongyang itself lias little expectation ol achhvilig much success in this rear area effort. The North Koreans are aware of the odds againstn the South, the heavy Investment in manpower and materiel re-quired i"poapiWnd Ihe risk Us Iheir own territory shouldt'uertiHas show evidence of success, ll wins likely, therefore, thatnvisages rear area opciufious as yet another method ot upsetting then the South, with the added virtue of lying down large HOK forces. Ihc North Koreans probably bopc that. In time, reur area operation* will yield additional dividend* in the form of increased support and recruit* tor llmr existing clandcstuic apparatus. By thus increasing aibscrdvr capabilities, they would hope to Im- inlatter position to exploit any new and majoi upset in South Korean political lile
NORTH KOREAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH KOREA
I.v-Vr than thai ol South Korea. The North Korean Navy isoastal patrol -ixl inshoic deft use force. Its main oAcinisc strength includes at least 2davsKOMAR* class guided missilemither motor torpedohere are also alruise missile coastal defenseTheKOMAIls" were probably provided by the I'SSH during HJfifi under the term* ol an arms pact negotiated In mid-IPAj.
lie North Korean Air Force is superior to that of South Korea. Itetet fighter* -VIi/-odern aircraft inventory which probably. Farmers andtshbrds. About half of themiave probably been delivered during the past year. Sincelie number of surface-to-air missileites has increasedo
f which about half arc occupied.
North Korea will prolxiblv continue to receive limited amounts of modern air anil sea defense equipment from tlie I'SSH so long as Pyongyang remains reasonably mnlral in the Sino-Soviet (unli.it We do not know to wlutthe Soviets are replacing or augmenting North Korean heavy groundartihVry and arrnond vehicles. It is unlikely, boseevcr. that Soviet military sbrpnients will be tugc enough mrr the next few yean toignificant slult its ibe current balance of uuhraiy loeccs in the Korean peniiisula.
HOK giound (one. in Korea now numliern addition, durermyarine brigade, and supportingtola) ofJsUOUUSouth Vietnam. Despite tlie niimerlcal ailvantage ol the HOK ground forces, we do not believe (hat tliey or the North Koreans would enjoyj11'i 1'in "Ii: uohkely eoulliigciicyar fought without externa! support for either side. The HOK Army is well trained, but much of itsii "Id and its purely indigenous logistic back-up is probably leu well de-vA^uped than thai io the North. US logistic support would be essential to sustain HOK i'imliat capaluhties in any situation in which North Kotcau force* wttc recusing uipplie* from external Sources.
The effectiveness of tlie ROK Ait Force is limited- thereredominance0 firghlcii. and aircraft control and warning systems are inadequate ami olisolcsont. upersonic fighters are lielng iulroduced, bul iu the event of
hostilities, ItOK air defense would probably require augmentation by US Air Force units. The ltOK Navy isoastal patrol force of abouthips,estroyerast attack transports,inesweepers,atrol ships, andmphibious sliipv. There isarine force of. The capabilities and confidence of KOK forces arc bolstered by tho presence of approximatelyUO US military personnel,S infantry divisions.
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