Policy and Politics in the CPSU Politburo:4 to7
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POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE CPSU POLITBURO: OCTOBER4 TO SEPTEMBER7
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POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE CPSU POLITBURO:4 TO7
PART ONE: PATTERNS OF POLITICAL ALIGNMENT IN
Power And Policy
Conservatism In The Party's General Line. .6
Brezhnev And The Power
PART TWO: PATTERNS IN POLITBURO LEADERS POLICY
Brezhnev: Hostility Abroad, Discipline At Home. .
The Hard Line Toward The United
Defense And Vigilance At
Kosygin: Cooperation Abroad, Reform At Home. 6 Improving Relations With Tho United States.7
Balancing The Domestic
Podgornyy: Firmness Abroad, Weil-Being At Home. , ostility Toward America, Cooperation With Europe.58
Personal Prosperity And
Suslov: . Main Foreign Danger, Party "Impurity"
Shelepin: Militancy Abroad, The Hard Line At Home. 71
Polyanskiy: Reform At Home, Caution
Voronov: Production And
Mazurov: Ideological Discipline andhelost: Organizational Discipline And Defense. .
Kirilenko: Reform And Weil-Being
Polshe: The Cautious
Candidate (Non-Voting) Mombers: Andropov,Grishin, Mzhavanadze,Ustinov,
POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE CPSU POLITBURO:4 TO SEPTEMBER7
Cone 1uS ions
A Majority of the politburo members have echoed General Secretary Brezhnev's position on most foreign and domestic policy matters. The emphasis in Brezhnev's overall position is on the persistence of international dangers. He has. "imperialism" as on thein various parts of the world, and has stressed the need to build Soviet strength to increase theof Soviet policy in the external world. Some-members of Brezhnev's politburo majority have enthusiastically taken up his platform, others have lent him only lukewarm support. However, the salient feature of this majority is its complex mixture. That is, while certain leaders support Brezhnev on major policy matters, the same leaders have chosen to back up certain key segments of Premier Kosygln's domestic and foreign policies. Kosygin has struck optimistic notes on long-terra international trends. He has tended to leave more room for further improvementSoviet relations,ondition favoring major efforts at overcoming economic imbalances at home.
Divergent treatment of the nature of the Vietnam war highlights the contrasting world outlooks of Brezhnev and Kosygin. Brezhnev has pictured the Vietnam war as only one of many obstacles blocking any substantialof relations with the United States. In his various speeches he has presented the Vietnam warymptom ratherause of what he regards as aperiod ofnd "complications" inaffairs. On the other hand, the Vietnam war has been the central problem for Kosygln's line on foreign policy in general, and policy toward the United States in particular. The implementation of his major foreign and domestic policies has suffered reversals which have coincided with the intensification of the Vietnam These goals, suchoduction in the Soviet military's share of the budgetubstantial expansion
Soviet trade, which he outlined during his first months as premier, have been sidetracked. During the first few months of his incumbency, Kosygin's statements on Soviet aid to North Vietnam fitted his detente-oriented outlook, while Brezhnev'sendency to minimize prospects for improving relations with the United States. For example, in Decemberthe. military effort in North and Southline on aiding the North was made conditional on what unspecified "aggressors" might do; Brezhnev's line pointedlyto render military assistance to the North on the basis of. aircraft and naval vessels had already done in early August and Subsequently, Brezhnev repeatedly. efforts to bring the Vietnam Issue to the negotiating table, while Kosygin expressed favor for the exploitation of opportunities-to commence talks. This past spring, Kosygin was indirectly criticized for being "naive" on this score byconsistent advocate for Soviet defense interests.
Regarding the matter of Soviet defense allocations, Kosygin has employed the Khrushchevian argument that an East-West war "would inevitably be" thermonuclear and
fatal for many countries. Brezhnev has argued thatar "could become" thermonuclear and he has stopped short of spelling out the consequences. Brezhnev'sis the one used by the Soviet military high command in Justification of its effort to expand the conventional branches of the Soviet defense force rather than reduce those forces which (in Kosygin's view) would not be put to use in the East-West cataclysm. Accordingly, Brezhnev has placed great emphasis on the priority development of the heavy industry-defense sector of the Soviet economy and has regarded consumer well-beingutureof industrial and agricultural successes. Kosygin on the other hand, has generally placed consumer welfare before defense and heavy industry in listing the domestic tasks of the party.
The complex character of Brezhnev's majority is manifested by the other politburo leaders' treatment of
the sensitive matter of resource allocations.* Thus, while Podgornyy, PoLyanskiy and Kirilenko have (with varying degrees of warmth) generally hewed to Brezhnev's hard line toward the United States, those same three leaders make an about-face with regard to Brezhnev's line on the preferential development of the heavy-defense industries sector. On the issue of industrial priorities, six of the eleven politburo members have clearly expressed favor for the continued dominance of the heavy industrySuslov, Shelepin, Voronov, Mazurov, and Shelest; four haveore balancedPodgornyy, Polyanskiy, and Kirilenko; only one, Pelshe, has skirted the problem. And while Voronov has sided with the "metal eaters" on this domestic issue, he has voiced, along with Podgornyy and Polyanskiy, Kosygln's emphasis on the influence of domestic economic example for the "world Communist revolution."
The composition of Brezhnev's policy majorityfurther complicated on examining each individual leader's support for certain politically-related issues, such as the apparent effort to circumscribe the executive authority of Kosygln's Council of Ministers by strengthening
*The chief responsibilities of the other politburoare as follows: Podgornyy, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (the titular head ofolyanskiy, one of two First Deputy Chairmen on Kosygin's Council of Ministers (Polyanskiy's chief responsibility isirilenko, momber of the secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee in charge of RSFSR party affairs;ecretariat member in charge of foreign affairs and Ideology;ecretariat member demoted in July this year to head the Soviet tradeember of the Council of Ministers and Chairman of the Soviot Union's largest republic, the RSFSR; Mazurov, the other First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Mazurov's chief responsibility ishelest, the First Secretary of the Ukrainian party; and Pelshe, in charge of party control (discipline).
Podgarnyy's parliament, the Supreme Sovlot. On this score, for example, only five of the oleven full Podgornyy, Sholest, Suslov and Pelon the record endorsed proposals to increase the role of the Supreme Soviet In its dealings vlth tho Council of Ministers. The line-up in the oligarchy on the parliament-versus-mlnlstry matter perhaps bestone type of restraint Imposed on Brezhnev's drive for power. That Is, that Brezhnev must act with caution because any move that would result in sudden and major gains in his personal powor could precipitate adverso and (politically) fatal reactionajority in the "collective" leadership.
The fact of the matter remains that Brezhnevtrategic advantage organizationally over his actual and potential competitors. All the signs suggest that he has gradually strengthened his position. The signs alao suggest that Brezhnev, at least for the near future, will continue his hard line toward the United States (but avoid high risk in genuine crises) and continue his effortWestern Europe aimedemoving. presence from Western Europe, ragmenting NATO,the Soviet position and influenco in the Warsaw Pact,
xpanding CPSU influence through the agency of
local parties in West European politics. In this connection, Brezhnev has been speaking of the applicability of the peaceful coexistence concept to the European continent, desplto his tendency to downplay tho concept in general and in particular with regardSoviet relations.
POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE CPSU POLITBURO: OCTOBER4 TO7
Israel's lightning-swift and massive victory over the Soviet-equipped Arab forces in the recent Middle East crisis was one of those sudden and illusion-shattering external events that caneep but unpredictable impact on the internal politics of the Soviet At the least it has already produced an unprecedented degree of turbulence and visible strain within the.post-Khrushchev oligarchy. The leading group had succeeded relatively well inublic image of effective, though uninspired, "collectivity" despite internal Throughout the crisis, indeed, there was no change in the leadership's most notable characteristic. It was militant in theory but careful in practice, harsh in word but restrained in action. In the Middle East crisis Moscow's tough statements and hackneyed diatribes against Israel and "imperialism" were counter-balanced by Kosygin's talks with President Johnson at Glassboro and the avoidance of high-risk in the heat of the crisis. This pattern was rooted both in the closed system of politburo* politics which emerged after Khrushchev's fall and in the strong reaction in the party apparatus and the state bureaucracy against Khrushchev's brand ofrisk-taking and dynamism. Such factors havo tended toind of conservatism marked by aof ideological orthodoxy but not genuine militancy,olitics of compromise, log-rolling, and coalition among the oligarchs. The result has been action by the
presidium of the CPSU Central Committee waspolitburo atd Partyarch-8
in those policy areas where its members have found common denominators among themselves on practical if not theoretical grounds, but also inaction andstalemates in many other spheres of policy as well. This state of things and the prevailing mood of the oligarchy came under challenge during the Middle East crisis. Moscow party chief Yegorychev's apparent sally against the top leaders' handling of the crisis at thea fiasco for this youngwho was sacked for hisa symptom of disagreement within the party over the direction andof post-Khrushchev policy.
The obvious and most difficult question is whether the repercussions within the leadership of Israel'swill move Soviet politics off its present resting point. No direct answer can be given for the simplethat it depends on the course of factional struggles within the leading group. Itime when theof politics carry more weight than normally: when the persuasivenesseader, his ability to graspopportunities, his skill in tactical maneuver andinning faction, his accumulated assets and liabilities, and his luck are thrown into the political balance. However, it is possible to some extent to discern
une Yegorychev was replaced byandidate (non-voting) member of the politburo. Then onuly, Yegorychev's presumed patron Shelepin was demoted to the trade union chieftaincy (formerly held bynother member of Shelepin's clique, KGB Chief Semichastnyy, had been removed onayrior to the Middle East war).
the outlines of the leadership conflict, the issues at hand, the policy courses that could be taken, the strength and weaknesses of the main contenders, and where various leaders stand in terms of policy, power and influence.
PART ONE: PATTERNS OF POLITICAL ALIGNMENT IN THE POLITBURO
POWER AND POLICY ORIENTATIONS
The struggle under Khrushchev over the question of whether "politics" and "ideology" on one hand, or "economics" on the other hand, should determine policy still remains the underlying issue in the post-Khrushchev leadership. The conflict divides the members of thegroup roughly into an ideologically-oriented and an economically-oriented wing. Where Khrushchev gave the lead to "economics" over politics, tho ideologically-oriented forces--the defenders of the primacy of "politics" and "ideology" in formulating the party generalbeen pre-eminent since Khrushchev's fall. However, this broad division of the leadership into two wings is quite loose, despite its usefulness. Some further sub-divisions must be distinguished if the post-Khrushchev pattern of leadership politics is to be adequately understood.
At the extreme of the ideologically-oriented side of the political spectrum are the militants who have been led by Shelepin up to now and have included such younger figures as the hapless Yegorichev. These 'young turks" have fallen on bad days of late. Next in orderery influential, old-line conservative element bestin the person of the ideologue Suslov. Brezhnev has deferred to this element and has himself ratheradheredonservative, ideologically-oriented position. He has been careful not to expose himself to the vulnerabilities Khrushchev assumed when he pursued policy lines which tended to alienate party conservatives and the military. On the other side of center Kosygin has represented the economics-oriented and reform-minded elements in the leadership who are more concerned with
the balanced growth and modernization of the national economy than with revolution abroad. The more radical Khrushchevian variant of reformism which envisaged the party rather than the government becoming the main economic manager and which promoted basic and rapid shifts infavoring consumer economics has faded from the present scene. (Of course there are variations, eventhat complicate the placement of someof the leading group in the political spectrum. thereignificant number of fence-straddlers.)
The caution of the leadership majority both in the Middle East crisis and in other situationseflection of their awareness of the realities of American power since Cuba rather than an attachment to "moderation" in policy. Excluding the militants, both the conservatives and the reform-minded members agree that this has noteriod to test the United States by force or the threat of force. Nor is the majority disposed to allowoviet power to be drawnirect confrontation with the United States through the actions of its clients, as was underscored by its flat rejection of Nasser's attempt to do Just this.
However, party conservatives are at serious odds with the reform-minded on what general policy line should be pursued in response to the American power advantage. For the conservative thisime for keeping one's powder dryime for internal consolidation while building Soviet strength for the future. During this period the party conservatives are concerned withany blurring of the hostile divide between the "enemy" and themselves. Thus, it isime for getting along with the United States; but neither isime foror in Soviet parlance, "adventurism."
It is worth recalling in this connection that Molotov and even Stalin were disposed to caution. It was Khrushchev who was disposed to "adventurism." From the point of view of the party conservative, Khrushchev's risk-taking not only undermined the efficacy and credibility of Soviet policy In world politics, but in the Cuban crisis even endangered the Soviet Union itself. On the other side of the coin, Brezhnev suggested atd Congress that Khrushchev's concentration on an over-ambitious, consumer-
oriented domestic policy also involved another kind ofhe neglect of Soviet defenses. Mostto the present leadership's conduct in the recent Middle East crisis, it is worth recalling that theindictment of Khrushchev inharged him with "dangerous rashness" in the Suez crisis6 for "committing the Soviet armed forcesossible intervention, bringing the country thus to the brink of war, without having consulted with sufficient clarity the high executive organs of the USSR." It was widely rumored at the time of Khrushchev's4 central committee "trial" that Suslov had delivered the Indictment. In sum, conservative principles demand that militancy be temperedudicious weighing ofresources and of the actual opportunities inpolicy goals. For the party conservative the cardinal virtues are patience and careful calculation in the struggle with the "class enemy"
The ill-fitting term "moderate" makes somewhat more sense when it is applied to the reform-minded and economics-oriented wing of the leadership. Unlike the conservatives, they see internal consolidationrime goal in itself dictated by pressing internal needs rather than by the demandsong-term struggle with an increasinglyimperialism. Theyolicy of limitedwith the United States and the West as desirable not so much for its own sake, butondition favoring major efforts at economic reform and at overcomingin economic growth. While not renouncing support of revolution in the underdeveloped world, they balk at commitments that wouldonstant drain on resources that could be used at home, and they emphasize the line on influencing the world revolution through Soviet economic "example." Kosygin has been the leading representative of this viewpoint in the post-Khrushchev leadership. Among politburo members, he was the most explicit endorser of the "mutual concessions" theme that Khrushchev employednd subsequently used to cover his backdown in Cuba; he pressed an abortive policy of "mutual example" in reducing military costs in the months after Khrushchev's fall; he has struck optimistic notes on long-term world trends while Brezhnev has stressed the persistence of international dangers; and he clearly tends to leave more room than Brezhnev for future improvementSoviet relations.
CONSERVATISM IN THE PARTY'S GENERAL LINE
While the Kosygin-led econoaica-oriunted wing of the leadership has not been without influence, it has had to work within the restrictive confineseneral party line which has largely been deflnod by tho party The latter have had tho main say in framing major party pronouncements. They have established the broad context within which foreign and domestic policy is made. ronounced conservative trend has beenin the editorials in the party theoretical journal KoRimunist devoted lo ihr*h anniversary ol otxr Revolution and also in the central committee's anniversary "Theses."* The Thesesomprehensive statement of the party's current general line andlearin doctrinal formulas of the conservative'The Theses were approved at the7 plenum of the party which dealt with the Middle East crisis. They were undoubtedly drawn up well in advance of thethey were obviously altered in places to take the crisis into account. It is still perhaps rather early to tell whether the impact of the crisis onpolitics has been such as to produce significant shifts of lino in one way or another. So far there has been no sign of new elemonts in regime statements since tho crisis. Nevertheless, an acquaintance with the basic formulations of the Theses canseful gauge against which future signs of change or continuity in line can be measured.
Tho central committee Thoses mark theears of Soviet ruleather somber pictureorld full of dangers. They offer little more to the Soviet citizenry than the prospectong and bitter struggle ofdurationily class enemy. Gone from the Theses is any trace of the Khrushchevian theme thatis just around the corner In the USSR along with
further evident Handbook for Secre-The revisions.
*The pervasiveness of this trend is by the revision early this year of the taries of Primary Party Organizations.
effect, instruct the low-level party secretaries to give first place to "Ideology" and "politics" and not toquestions in their party activities. Nonetheless the revisions call for "more effective" control over the economic apparatus in view of the freor hand "economic leaders" have been given under5 economic reforrs.
tho idea that the Soviet people would be entering an era of peace and plenty Instead, the Theses dwell on the long drawn-out nature and the complexity of tho process of building Communism. Rather than tying party policylueprint for the future, the Thesos reflect tbe leadership's stress on thend "unresolved' tasks facing the party at home and. In effect, say that there is no shortcut to Communism,
The postponement of the Communist Utopia at home is implicitly but unmistakably connected in the Thesos with the burdens of the class struggle abroad. to the Theses the increased aggressiveness ofthe world over, American imperialism in, is responsibleeriod of intensifiedtension. The Theses do not suggest that th-is condition is temporary but that it arises from ahistoricalthe sharpening of the general economic crisis of world capitalism. According to this theme, the imperialists are led to take desperate measures to prevent further deterioration of their onsequence, they pursue "adventurist" policies in world politics. . involvement inis citedymptom of the crisis. While the Theses speak of imperialism's Increasing inner weaknesses, the document doos not suggest that the enemy has become an easy mark. Rathor, according to tbe Theses, capitalist monopolies have united and joined their power to that of the state and have been able to mount menacingon the revolutionary movement at various points around the world.
On the basis of this perspective, the Thesessubordinate welfare goals to the main business of increasing the economic and military "might" of the country. The Theses reassert tho line that narrowing the gap between consumer and heavy industrial productiondependent on the preferential development of heavy industry. One of the "main conelusions" of the past SO years, according to the Theses, is tbe primary importance of building Soviet military strengthrealto an aggressive imperialism. Where Khrushchev
once emphasized building Communism atsuch an extont that Molotov accused him of neglecting the party's world-wide revolutionaryTheses stress theof the party's international and national aims. Honce the Theses closely tie building Communism in the USSR with tipping the balance of forces against imperialism and providing the basis for the world-wide victory of socialism abroad.
Tho conservative tenor of the Theses is perhaps nowhoro more apparent than in their revised formulation of tho "state-of-the-whole people" (or "all pooples'octrine originally introduced under Khrushchev atd Party Congress Khrushchev intertwined that doctrine with the prospect of increasing internal relaxation and decreasing external danger as the Soviet Union moved toward Communism. At the time ofd Congress last yoar there were clear signs that the doctrine was under critical reappraisal, it was conspicuously ignored at the congress and in the May Day slogans. The Theses noweformulation of the doctrine which fits in more harmoniously with the present political line.
Tho Khrushchevian version of the all-peoples' state was focused almost entirely on its domestic functions. The present version gives equal emphasis to the Soviet state's external and revolutionary functions. The Theses add the themes that the all-peoples' state "continues the cause" of the dictatorship of the proletariat and "wages class war" together with other socialist states against imperialism in the international arena. Thus the continuity of tho doctrine of the all-peoples' state with theof tho proletariat doctrine is underscored rather than tho Khrushchevian idea that tho Soviet state hadew stage which marked the end of tho proletarian dictatorship in the USSR.
Tho influence of Suslov's thinking in the revision is unmistakable. He was at odds with Khrushchev on the question of the Soviet state befored Congress. He had promoted the concept that the USSR andictatorship of the proletariat for the world
revolutionary movement but failed to get this notion into the new party Program atd Congress. he did have some success in toning downline that the Soviet state was now "withering away" insofar as its internal role was concerned.* Now in the Theses Suslov seems to have gained both points. The Theses re-emphasize the Soviet state's revolutionary mission abroad and say nothing about the withering away of the state at home. Rather, the Theses stress the argument that the state must be further developed as the way to "publicline that bears kinship with what the Yugoslav's ridiculed as Stalin's theory of "the state that doesn't wither."
In harmony with the renewed emphasis on therevolutionary function of the Soviet state as well as on the needtrong state internallyiluted neo-Stalinist formulation on the contemporary ideological struggle. (Ins, Stalin introduced the thesis that the domestic class war increases in intensity as the Soviet Union proceeds toward the building of socialism. Stalin's thesis, which was used to justify his purges ins, came under harsh attack by Khrushchev in6 "secret" speech and again at1 Party
*At1 Congress, both Suslov and Khrushchev stated that the dictatorship of the proletariat had fulfilled its mission of buildingnd that thedictatorship had been transformed into the "state of the whole people" whose mission was to buildut Suslovhat state apparatus would be strengthened during the period of the "state of the whole people"hat the state would create the "material and technical base of Communism." Khrushchevhat the existing state apparatus would wither during the period of the state of the whole peoplehat the party would be called upon to create the material andbase of Communism. The party program, adopted at1 Congress, reflected Suslov's more conservative conclusions on the "state of the whole people."
Congress byormer confidant of Khrushchev's who lost his presidium membership and Supreme Sovietin) The Theses, asserting that the ideological struggle has become "extremely acute" in the external world, warn that the greater the successes of socialism the more insidious become the efforts of the imperialists to lure the people away from Marxism-Leninism and infect them with "bourgeois ideology," Hence the partyserious" task in fighting the influence of "alien morals andnd overcoming "negativein the consciousness and behavior of theere, of course, is an Indication of the deep disturbance within the party apparatus over Western Influence in the USSR. The above formula also obviously relates to the regime's troubles with the uncowed liberal intellectuals who are seen as being corrupted by"apolitical attitudes."
BREZHNEV AND THE POWER STRUGGLE
predominance of conservative themes in the Theses
once more the handicap Kosygin faces inpolitics. At present Kosygin and his supporters do not hold the high ground which gives Its occupiers the prime advantage in defining the party line. This ground of course is the CPSU central committee secretariat and is now held by Brezhnev and Suslov. The Theses weredrafted under their directthe contents of the document suggests. While this does not mean that Kosygin has not succeeded in having any of his positions on specific questions incorporated into partyexample, the Theses section on "economicdoes reflect the fact that Kosygin's views haveistinctly secondary place. But if his views are to make real headway, command the attention of the officialdom, and be adopted In other than piecemeal fashion, he and his supporters must beosition to shape the basic formulations of the general line as well. Such.incidents as the
y TASS through editorial alterations ofstatements57 press conference in Newlikely under guidance from the secretariat-underlines his predicament.*
ahead, pageiscussion of the highlights of the TASS censorship of Kosygin's pressremarks.
Many observers (and they nay be correct) have been persuaded that Kosyginong-time technocrat has neither acquired the skill nor is disposed by character to alter the situation by factional political struggle and to aim at ultimately acquiring Brezhnev's job. Indeed, there have been few signs that he has been ongaged in such an effort.
However, Brezhnev has often acted as if he regarded Kosyginompetitor ratherrusted collaborator. (Evidence for this proposition is examined at length in part two of this report.) Further, quite asldo from tho personal motives of Brezhnev and Kosygin, tho division of executive authority between thornource of cleavage within the leadership structure itaelf. Add to this the many Indications that tho two leaders do not soo eye to eye on policy and the fact that Kosygineader with his own base of power andependent of Brezhnev, and the potential for conflict is Intensified. Khrushchev solved the problem of shared rule by downing Malenkov, thon backing Bulganin's appointment to the post, and finally taking on the post himself in addition to his party Job, after Bulganin had gone over to thepposition Brezhnev night be tempted to do tbe same, but here he would have to move carefully so as not to arouse the fear and provoke the opposition of his fellow oligarchs In the "collective leadership" against his drive for powor. While it must remain conjectural, Brezhnev may have alreadytep in this direction last year, but then thought better of it, when rumors were circulated in Moscow on the eve of the August Supreme Soviet that Kosygin was ready to resign."
that"Premier Kosygin is to be removed worecirculating again in high govornmont circles iii Moscow, accordingate July piece of Information
inff to the-report, Kosygin's expected removal is due to severe differences (which the report did not elaborate upon) between Kosygin and Brezhnev occasioned by the (footnote continued on
The Tact of the natter remains, however, thatholds the main track in the political arena of the leadership. He has somethingtrategic advantage organizationally over his actual and potential competitors. If anything, all the signs suggest that he has steadily, strengthened his position, especially in view of thodecline of Shelepin and his entourage in tho past eighteen months.
Shelepin's Unsuccessful Struggle
Up to now. at least, Brezhnev rather clearly has regarded Shelepin rather than Kosyginoro immediate and more dangerous rival for power. Some of the major reasons for Brezhnev's Judgment are quite evident. Shelepinhreat from within the party apparatus, not from without as is the case with Kosygin. He had emerged from Khrushchev's fallwhich heeya position of strength second only toithin the party. Heoot in both the presidium (now politburo) and the secretariat, was deputy premier
(footnote conLinued from
former's recent visit to the United States. Despite the fact that tho sources of rumors cannot bo easily pinned down, it should not be forgotten that rumor-spreadingime-worn device in factional politics. The former Bulgarian Premier Yugov and his faction, for example, were accused by the victorious Zhlvkov faction of having spread rumors of Zhivkov's impending fallertain Juncture. It Is tempting to speculate, therefore, that Shelepin's faction was behind another flurry of rumors in the summer of5 that Brezhnev was about to fall.
of the Council of Ministers and chief of the party-state control apparatusnique organizationreat potential for exorcising power over both the officialdom of party and state) androtege (Semlchastnyy)as head of the KGB as welloterie ofin influential positions In the party apparatus.
Not only Brezhnev, but probably other senior leaders,ommon danger in tho youthful, militant and ambitious Shelepin. Shelopin apparently had not taken his colleagues' concern sufficiently into account and moved too quickly and boldly to gain power. During the summer in any case, tho rumors that Shelepin
was scheming and intriguing to get Brezhnev's job were followed by leadership action curbing his (Shelepin's) power. In5 the party-state control agency which he had headed was abolished and by the time ofd Party Congress he was deprivedirect role in cadre appointments in the party.
The circumstantial evidence suggests that Shelepinrincipal in what wasold but abortive attack on Brezhnev's handling of the Middle East crisis at the7 plenum. This affair led not only to the ouster of Shelepin's presumed ally Yegorychev as head of the Moscow party but to his own demotion to chief of the tradeaction that most probably portends his removal from the secretariat, and, possibly, his eventual downgrading from voting-member status on the politburo. However, the Yegorychev affair may have beenrime causeretext for Brezhnev to take one step further in his gradual effort to dispose of his adversary. Before the Middle East crisis broke Brezhnev had already succeeded in forcing Semichastnyy out as KGBSvetlana Stalin's defection came as amoving an ally, tho party specialist in Soviet bloc affairs, Andropov, into his place. The latter action not only strengthened Brezhnev's grip on the police apparatus, but along with Andropov's elevation into the politburoandidate member, raised the political status of that agoncy to its highest pointhen itajor reduction of its powers after Beria's execution. Thus, in this connection, it is difficult to credit the idea offered recently by some Western analysts thatstillajor threat from the Shelepin forces other than perhaps in the sense that they may survive to fight another day. Rather, Brezhnev seems to have succeededarge degree in defusing the threat from his most dangerous challenger.
It is important to keep in mind that while there hasistinct cleavage in the policy outlooks of Brezhnev and Kosygin, the notable aspect of the Brezhnev-Shelepin rivalry has beon that both sought to occupy much the same political ground--with the difference that Shelepin
hasore clear-cut militant stand,uzzier position, in short, Shelepin has been holding out the promise to the ideologically-oriented wing of the party that he could do what Brezhnev was claiming to do with greater dynamism and efficacy. Brezhnev has repeat-odly represented his policy as one which would Increase the "effectiveness" of party efforts in the struggle against "imperialism" and in building economic andstrength ata contrast with the alleged ineptitude of Khrushchevian policy. Yegorychev's apparent sally against the leadership's cautious actions in the Middle Eastperhaps, with Shelepin'sup to accusing Brezhnev himself ofofard line withoutulnerability to this complaint of the party militanta basic weakness of the kind of cautiousnesshas adopted so far. While Brezhnev nonetheless has strengthened his grip on the organizational positions in the leadership, he is undoubtedly seeking for ways of making more credible his emphasis on making party policy "effective."
With the successive defeats the Shelepinsuffered, Brezhnev would now seem to enjoy moreand beetter position to consolidate hisline. But how he shall move remains in question.
Involved in the answer are both the disposition of forces with which Brezhnev must reckon within the leading group and the very difficult matter of his own motiveseader.
Despite Shelepin's decline, there remains theinfluence exercised by Suslov on the side of While probablyirect contender forposition, he can acttrong restrainingon the general secretary from his position in the While Suslov would be close to the young militants on broad ideological grounds, he probably considers them immature and adventurist as other senior leaders who also
may agree that they need to be hold in chock. On the other hand, he probably does not want them drivenrom the field, inasmuch as the young militants may beseful check to Brezhnev's expansion of power. Moreover, he also stands guard against any dilution of tho basic conservatism of the overall party political line. Brezhnev may also be currently held backurely tacticalas was Khrushchev in his struggle against Malenkov4 ando move too obviously away from this conservative-leaning stance, would Inevitably make it appear as if he were "me-tooing" Kosygin. Further, the strength ofopinion within the party, may make it imprudent in Brezhnev's eyes to change line.
Finally, Brezhnev's rather consistentwith the ideologically-oriented wing of the party since Khrushchev's fall may arise from personal conviction as well as from his judgment of the balance of forcesthe regime. So far, at least, he has shown no sign of shifting from his positionsesult of his defeat of Shelepin and concurrent gains in organizational strength. His7 speech to military graduates some two weeks after the June plenum was an emphatic restatement of his previous line. He fitted the Israeli-Arab war into the picture he has drawn of coordinated attempts by theespecially the Americans, to regain lost positions through countor-attacks against themovement- He rejected the notion that the crisis was the result of national strife between Israel and the Arab states. He professed to see it as another engagement in the world-wide class struggle and asserted that theof the imperialists required "still greater"to building Soviet military strength.
Brezhnev, in any case, has three broad options for his future course: urnigh risk militancy in foreign affairs,ontinuing his present hard line toward the United States but avoiding brinkmanship in genuine
crises,ore relaxed relationship with the United States and giving greater attention toproblems.
The first course has been rejected by Brezhnev and the pressures in its favor have been reduced for now by Shelepin's steady decline. Correspondingly, movementthe third option Is now easier for Brezhnev but the fact that Kosygin has so far preempted this line actseterrent as long as he remains premier. Theat least for the near future actually seems toontinuance of the second course perhaps with somoto one side or tho other. At the same time, this course leavos some room for flexibility in developing strategies for various local situations. Brezhnev has evidently been trying to developtrategy toward Western Europe aimed at drawing Europe away from itswith the United States and increasing Soviet political leverage In tho area. In this connection, Brezhnev has been speaking of the applicability of tho peaceful coexistence concept to the European continent, despite his tendency to downplay tbe concept in general and in particular with regardSoviet relations.
Brezhnev's problemeader, even more so now than before, has been his difficulty in maintaining forward momentum for his foreign and domestic programs. He rode to power on tho wave of reaction in the oligarchy toleadership, but the time has long since past when Khrushchevonvenient whipping-boy. must take the rap when things go wrong.* It is Just
if he were in soarchcapegoat, Brezhnev went out of his way to defend politburo policy during the Arab-Israeli war; he did not defend past Sovlet'policy for the Middle East inuly address. In thisin what appeared tolassic KGB effort to try to shift the blamelaring failure from their ultimate boss, Brezhnev, to his competitor,known KGB agent claimed in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war that the dismal failure of the UAR to moot Soviet expectations "may put Kosyginad position." One month later the same KGB agent seemed to provide an apologia in Brezhnev's defense. The agent stated that the USSR "would prefer an Egypt which is defeated butocialist countryictorious Egypt which would beeapitalist country and no longer need Soviet aid."
as trueoviet Communist leader as othernot morehe must sustain the appearance of forward movement in his policy. Otherwise he can become prey to other pretenders to power around him. (Khrushchev's fall, for example, came after his own program had been His Cuban venture, two years earlier, itselfesperate attempt to restore momentum to hishile the Middle East setback was not hishe outcome of that war did not help Brezhnev. The problem of forward movement remains.
PART TWO: PATTERNS IN POLITBURO LEADERS' POLICY STATEMENTS
The following textual analysis of the publicof Soviet leaders reveals basic differences on major foreign and domestic policy issues. The analysisemarkable degree of consistency in thetreatment of major issues by the leaders. emerge which permit the identification of distinct policy preferences of the individual Soviet policy-maker, which, in turn, throws light on Kremlin policy cleavages. (The patterns alsoital political functionthe Soviet power environment--that is, theof an individual leader's line to the lower-ranking party and government members.)
It is apparent that, as in the past, speeches are frequently subjected to coordination by members of the politburo. The early November revolution anniversary addresses appear to be heavily coordinated. But other speeches, in particular the annual election speeches for the Supreme Soviet (parliament) speeches at the party congresses and plenums and at Supreme Soviet sessionsconsiderably divergent formulations on various issues. And on the whole, the conscious effort atoordinated line makes the differences that do appear the more noticeable.
The following section, which concentrates primarily on policythan on political alignaents perthe patterns derived from the politburoremarks since the fall of Khrushchev.
BREZHNEV: HOSTILITY ABROAD, DISCIPLINE AT HOME
From the outset of his incumbency Brezhnev hashis policy lines around the theme that the Soviet Union mustorld full of dangers for an indefinite future. He thus has tacitly but unmistakably dissociated himself from Khrushchev's optimistic themesteady, if uneven, trend of declining danger of war and theof "removing war from the life of society." Brezhnev has sought to give new life to the sense of external danger which has animated Soviet politics but which was dulled by Khrushchevian doctrines. While not going so far as to renounce Khrushchev's pronouncement that theencirclement" of the USSR has ended, he has sought to provide somethingunctional equivalent of that discarded doctrine by stressing that the Soviet Union remains inostile capitalist environment."
Where Khrushchev turned the party toward internal ideological goals focussing the new party program more on building Communism at home than on revolution abroad, Brezhnev so far hasore traditional course. He has tried to draw the party's attention back towards its external ideologicalthe "anti-imperialisto restoring unity in the Communist movement and among bloc states. Correspondingly, he stresses the primary need to develop the economic and defensive "might" of the Soviet Union in order to cope with the "world-wide aggressiveness" of imperialism, especially of the United States.
A. The Hard Line Toward the United States
Unlike Kosygin, Brezhnev pictures the Vietnam war as only one of many obstacles blocking any substantial improvement of relations with the United States. In his various speeches he has presented the Vietnam warymptom ratherause of what he regards as aperiod of "danger" and "complications" inaffairs. The underlying cause in Brezhnev's view. "imperialism" which he pictures as being on the offensive in various parts of the world. The recent Arab-Israeli war is seen simply as another front in the current imperialist offensive. In short, Brezhnev has taken radically different situations and made them fit into his simplistic conception of an imperialist master
Brezhnev hasonsistent tendency to minimize prospects for improving relations with the United States. This tendency was evident even prior to the stepped up American involvement in Vietnam inithin three weeks of Khrushchev's political demise, Brezhnev devalued the coexistence theme. The peaceful coexistence line so heavily stressed and singled out by his predecessor now appeared far down the listix-point foreign policy formula which subordinatedto other Soviet external goals. This major change was introduced under the guise of continuity, but ita significant reshuffling of priorities in policy in which the themes of anti-imperialist struggle andliberation rose while the theme oforld war fell. Brezhnev called for:
guaranteeing peaceful conditions for constructing socialsm and communism, for strengthening the unity and cohesion of the socialist countries, theirandourse directed towardsof revolutionary liberation movements, toward every possible development of solidarity andwith the independent states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, toward affirmation of the principles of peaceful coexistence with capitalist states, toward the deliverance of mankind from world war.
Brezhnev's six-point "general course" of Soviet foreign policy was repeated almost verbatim two-and-one-half years later In the CPSU central committee Theses onh anniversary of the Communist revolution.
A notable omission from Brezhnev's formulations on Soviet foreign policy has been any assertion of the Kbru-shchevian corollary that the policy of coexistence involved mutual concessions. Rather, Brezhnev has been disposed to give the doctrine ofilitant cast. And in4 he began to redefine the themeefensive, negative form: "Just because we are convinced supporters of peaceful coexistence, we resolutely and Implacably speak out against those who want to violate this peaceful coexistence. Weebuff to theof the imperialists and to their encroachments on the peaceful life of the peoples of the socialiston the freedom and independence of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America." The tone of militancy was present in his first major foreign policy speech; he stressed that "in implementing the policy of peaceful coexistence we base ourselves on the might of the countries of the socialist camp." Hethis statement with the assertion that "we shall maintain our defense potential on the highest possiblestrongest presidium-level pledge for support to the Soviet military These statements set the pattern for Brezhnev's position on foreign policy right up to the present.
Renewed Emphasis On The World Revolution
Brezhnev's upgrading of the line on supporting national liberation movements was combined with histo mention Khrushchev's strictures against attempts to export revolution.* onth of his assumption
*This line has not disappeared entirely. It hasin the key "consensus" speeches, that is, in5 revolutionary anniversary speech (in the wake of the abortive Indonesian coup) and6 speech on tho same occasion.
of pover, he followed up his formulations with actions which clearlyeterioration of relations with the United States. And during this period he sounded tho callsingle anti-imperialist front" to counter what he said. "encroachments" on socialist states and underdeveloped states in Asia, Africa and Latin America4 Kremlin speech)
Tho most obvious move in this diroction at the time *as Moscow's decision to send military support to therebels allegedly in response toBelgium rescue offort at Stanleyville (now Kisangani) in late The only generally comparable provious Soviet move to directly aid indigenous forces came duringhase of Khrushchevian bellicosity toward the West when military equipment was sent to combatants In Laos. Tho aid to the Congolose rebels was accompanieditriolic. propaganda attack as well as by Soviet-staged demonstrations at. embassy in Moscow. Inecember speech Brezhnev made the first presidium-lovel attack by the post-Khrushchev leadership against the Johnson Administration. Brezhnev charged that "the bloody slaughter perpetrated in Congolese towns by the Belgian paratroops, brought. aircraft with theof the White House and with the approval of the NATO Council, triking example of the collective piracy by the colonialists." He went on to alludo to Soviet armed support of Africans, who, ho said, were no longer "unarmed" in the face of the Imperialists.
An emerging divergence between Brezhnev and Kosygin on the question of world revolution was reflected in Kosygln's comments in4 on the Congo crisis. In his comprehensive discussion of Soviot foreign policy at the Supreme Sovietosygin, unlike Brezhnev, made no allusions to strengthening the Congolese rebels and claimed only that thethan the USSR In"profoundly Indignant'over the actions of "certain (unnamed) Western powers." (This was tho same speech in which Kosygin calledolicy of mutual example between the United States and the Soviet Union in reducing military budgets.)
That these early differences were not merely tiedpecific situation but entailed distinct outlooks was underscored atd Party Congress* ore pragmatic,ore orthodox position regarding the goal of world revolution. Kosygin cited-Lenin as authority for the statement that the Soviet Union "exercises its chief influence on world revolution through its economicnd he predicted thatinconomic plan would "secure further changes on the world scene in favor of peace and socialism" and would "unquestionablyar-reaching influence on the world situation." Diverging from Kosygin's emphasis on winning the world byrezhnev's Congress report did not refer to Soviet economic policy as the "chief" or basic contribution to world revolution. Rather, Brezhnev forecast that success inconomic plan would serve to "consolidate the unity of the world socialistould increase the Soviet Union's economic and defense might and, lastly, would bolster its international prestige.
The Congo crisis was not, of course, the onlyBrezhnev exploited to justify his developing hard line toward the United States during the first months of his leadership. (But that matter,. actions in the Dominican Republic beginning Inas used as an element in Brezhnev's portrayaln all fronts.) Of course, the issue of Vietnam was soon to become another example cited by Brezhnev in support of his hard line toward the United States.
Characteristically, it was Brezhnev who initiated the post-Khrushchev condemnation. actions in North and South Vietnam4 speech) and who first spoke of Soviet readiness to extend military aid to North Vietnamn advance of the
ood examination of this issue atd Party Congress see
actual intensification of the Vietnam war in (The contrasts between Brezhnev and Kosygin on Vietnamese-related Issues will be discussed in the section dealing with Kosygin's policy positions.)
Renewed Emphasis On+ "Threat" in Europe
Brezhnev, however, has not treated Vietnam as the central issue for Soviet foreign policy. He has given particular attention. military activity andIntentions inthan dwelling. activity in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. He has drummedictureserious threat" to both Soviet and general European interests raised. collusion with West German "revanchism." This line soens to be intended to advance four goals of Soviet policy emphasized by Brezhnev: emoving. presence from Western Europe, ragmenting NATO,trengthening the Soviet position and Influence in tho Warsaw grouping,xpanding CPSU influence through the agency of local parties in West European politics.
In an effort to justify these objectives interms, Brezhnev hasovel amendment to Khrushchev's doctrine of peaceful coexistence. has pushed tho coexistence line with regard to Wostern Europo--and only Westernordor to "prove" that there is no neod for NATO.
Removing. Presence From Western Europe: Thus, Brezhnev in7 election speech stressed that:
In its relations with the capitalist countries of Europe, the Soviet Union steadfastly follows the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.
He did not, however, apply the notionSoviet relations. To thr same effect, Brezhnev's singleto peaceful coexistence in his7 Karlovy
Vary (Czechoslovakia) speech was made in one of hisarguments for tho removal of.. political and economic influence in Europe. Among the arguments were, for example, that. had "fabricated the myth" of Communist aggression in order to impose its will on Wost European governments through the NATO pact; that theillion dollars" the European states belonging to NATO had spent on military preparations had slowed down their economic, scientific and cultural progress; that the "brain drain" ofuropean scientists to the U&ean policy; that tho large areas used to. forcesurden on the West European populace; that. had tried to poison relations between East and West Europe by building "subversive espionage and sabotage centers and broadcastingnd thatS. presence in Europe encouraged West German "militarism" and threatened peace in Europe.
Brezhnev set forth the rationale for concentrating on Europe in his7 Karlovy Vary speech. After pointing out that the United States had been unsuccessful in its "stubborn efforts" to Involve its NATO allies in the Vietnam war "as occurred during the Koreanrezhnev argued that "tying down the forces of Imperialism in Europe" limits the scope and hampers the success of capitalist ambitions on "all other continents." On the surface, Brezhnev's rationale is inconsistent, inasmuch as it appeals for the removal of. presenco In Europe but goes on to Imply that the military status quo in Europe works not only to the advantage of the North Vietnamese party but also to the advantage of the CPSU. However, the stress onWest German "threat" in Europo providesretext for Moscow's limitedin Vietnamounter to Chinese Communist charges tbat the Soviets are planning to pull back from, rather than opensecond front" in Europe.
The "threat" in Europe also harmonizes with the priority Brezhnev has glvon to strengthening Soviotin East Europe. Secondarily, Brezhnev has used the theme of war danger in Europe to persuade the Wost Europeans of the danger. presence in Europe and of the desirabilityurope detached fromnot
Strengthen The Soviet Bloc, Fragment NATO: Trying to have it both ways, Brezhnev has drummed up fears to keep the Warsaw pact consolidated while extendingto wean the West Europeans away from America. Clear the most important goal for Brezhnev is lhat of assuring national and bloc unity; the less Important, gainingcooperation with the capitalist countries of Europe. In7 election speech he defined theof the Soviet Union's European policy as follows;
First, to consolidate and to strengthen the gains of tho peoples achieved as the result of the most cruel war in the history of mankind and of the radical class social changes in Europe whichit; second, to isolate the forces ofaggression, not to allow the Wost Germanand rcvanchists to unbridle themselves, and abovo all to prevent them from gaining access to nuclear weapons; on that basis to strengthen the socurity of our western borders and the borders of the socialist countries allied with us, and to create the conditions for broad and fruitfulin Europe of countries with difforont social systems.
Brezhnev's formulations on this themeixture of old Stalinist themes and more recont detente themes. Thus on tho one hand, he calls for unrealistic, oxtreme preconditions for Europoan security which subordinatemoves toward meaningful European detente to the consolidation of the Soviet bloc. For example, ho called for the dissolution of NATO by9 renewal date and other one-sided propagandists demands, such as theof military bases and the removal of. Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean, On the other hand, he dangled before the West Europeansroposals, such as tho construction of
natural teas pipeline from the USSR to westernho gas pipeline, argued Brezhnev onpril, would be one measure leading to theof Europe from. "dollar diktat." Notable among Brezhnev's other bids wore genoral proposals for cooperation in the fields of economy, science, technology and culture onilatoral and an all-European basis, and spoclflcfor the establishmentnified color television system for Europe, cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy, and joint activity in river and sea purification and dlsoaso eradication.
Expanding Communist Influence in Wost European Politics: The Karlovy vary conference of tho European parties also marked an intensified effort on Brezhnev's part to increase CPSU influence in European politics through tho agency of local parties. Brezhnev spoke of the growing role of the West European Communist parties in the recent period and implicitly claimed credit for the increasing Influence of those parties during his Thus he stressed that "the past few years have shown quite clearly that in conditions of slackened tension the pointer of the political barometer moves left." This period of leftist progress was impli-citly set off against the record under Khrushchev. to his predecessor's rocket-rattling and associated threats over Germany and Berlin, Brezhnev statod that the atmosphoro of military threats had been counterproductive
With NATO embargo on nd Eastern Europo Soviet leader and thoIks were natural gas
"The "pipeline project had boon
no itfbtt announcement of the end of the wido-dlameter pipe to the Soviet Union the proposal was publicly aired by Supreme Podgornyy with tho Austrians in6 ians In January, at which time Podgornyy said "underway" toipeline to provide to Italy.
for tho West European Communist movement.* He went on to conclude that during the present period (which in this context he portraysuiet period) Communist party influence had increased correspondingly:
Certain changes in relations between communists and social democrats in certainoticeable falling off in anticommunist hysteria, and the increase in the Influence of West European Communist parties is most directly correlated with the reduction in tension which has taken place in Europe.
On tho matter of working with social democratic parties, Brezhnev's remarks contained cautious currentsthis particular case, endorsing in principleparty cooperation with the social democrats and.then undercutting that call with sharp attacks on the two major West European social democratic organizations.hus he went out of his way, as he has done in the past two years, to score the British Labor Party and the West Germanmajor West European parties which, in Brezhnev's lights had shown themselves unwilling to "march with us."
*Accordingly, Brezhnev did not comment on the neederman peace settlementall also deleted in tho7 May Day slogans), though he repeated thesix points of the European security programat the6 Bucharest meeting of the Political Consultative Council of the Warsaw Pact (develop Intra-European relations, liquidate NATO and then the Warsaw Pact, adopt several partial disarmament measures, prevent the possibility of West German nuclear armament, recognize Europe's postwar frontiers,onference on European security). In his Karlovy Vary speech, Brezhnev called only for the "recognition of the existence of two German states" rather than diplomatic recognition of East Germany perGDR leader Ulbricht insists.
Brezhnev's repeated critical comments on the two major socialist parties in Europe have closelyto the early post-WWII Comlnform line on thesocial democratic parties introduced inyStalinist henchman praised by Brezhneveningrad speech on4 as "anpolitician and statesman." Paraphrasing Zhdanov's pejorative comments on the West German social democrats, Brezhnev in Bucharest in the latter part of5 reportedly stated in private that tho Soviet Uniononfidence in the leadership of the SPD because the Socialist International, of which the SPDember, iseadquarters of the struggle against the socialist camp in the capitalist world." In his6 report to the central committee atd CPSU Congress Brezhnev, without elaboration, chargod that difficulties encountored in the Communists' struggle for unity with working class movements are due "above all to the right-wing leaders of the social democratic parties." Brezhnev scored the SPD's role in the Bonn coalition government in7 March election speech byuite routine matter; he told Moscow electors onarch that "although social democrats nowumber of ministerial positions in Bonn, the new government has already found time to announce its Intention to continue the ban of the party of the German working class"the KPD-fcommunist Party of Tho KPD ban was also sentlonod in his next two major speeches which, In citing other spurious examples, served to expand his attacks on the SPD. In East Berlin onpril Brezhnev said that the SPD, the party "that calls itself the party of the working poople
*Thls routine announcement, which has almost always been ignored in comments by Soviet leaders, was alluded to by FRG Chancellor Kiesingerarch Interview with N'eue Revue, and the Chancellor, who reportedly expressed his "fundamental skepticism"an on extremist political parties in general, went out of his way to state that the KPD could again be legalized when the topic of"enters an acute stage."
of Westad "In no way"hange from the FRG's "aims of revenge and war preparations to aims of peaceful cooperationuropean security." And in hispril Karlovy Vary speech, he attacked the SPD for refusing to adopt an independent foreign policy and for following "in the wake of the CDU, the party of the German monopolies." Brezhnev also derided tbe British Labor Party, the "primee said,arty betraying the working class" for its support for NATO.*
Brezhnev topped his call for (limited) unitedwith an appealovel propagandacongress of the peoples of Europe on the broadest possiblediscuss problems of peace and European security. Brezhnev1scongress" call explicitlyxclusion only implied in Brezhnev's6 CPSU Congress callgeneral European conference" on European security.** Kosygin's past remarks
Party< " -
osygin criticized Prime minister wit sun xur uuirig -store American than the Americans" on the Vietnam and NATO nuclear-sharing Issues. But he reportedly went on to stress that "it must, after all, be possible for the Communist and social democratic movements to find certain common views."
naming the participant In6 Congress report Brezhnev expressed the need to "initiate talks on European security; discuss the proposals of socialist and other European countrieselaxation ofeduction of armaments in Europe and theof peaceful, mutually advantageous relations between all European countries; convene an appropriate international conference for this purpose; and continue to look for ways of settling one of the cardinal problems of European security, thateaceful settlement of the German problem by recognizing the now existing borders of the Europeanincluding those of the two German states, in order to completely remove the vestiges of World War II ineleting the "cardinal problem" of Germany, the Karlovy Vary communique merely supported "the idea ofonference of all European states to study problems of security and the development of European cooperation, as well as other initiatives toward the same purpose."
on the Brezhnev-proposed European security conference have, in fact,ore realistic effort aimed at actually negotiating East-West problems inrather than engaging in an anti-American propaganda forum, such as Brezhnev's "peoples' conference." Thusigh degree of seriousness underlying the
ideaecurity conference, Kosygin
made the first specific suggest mitb iof Ltiw1 ti
and means of organizing the conference. He said that the conference should be held8 and that acommission" should commence working "atinally, while his statements on West European policy (discussed presently) display the desire to increase Soviet influence there, they are generally not cast in the hostile form used by Brezhnev in his arguments on the need to. economic influence and to cripple NATO's military capabilities.
B. Defense And Vigilance At Home
As in the case of his foreign policy formulations, Brezhnev has stayed close to the conservative lines set in his early pronouncements on domestic economic policy. And his pronouncements, reflecting his views on external conditions, have consistentlyhe defense and heavy industry sectorhe agricultural sector. Otherin particular the consumer-related sector of the Sovietsubordinated.
Brezhnev's traditionalist formulation on the "prime task" of Soviet resource allocation policy was made in his first public address as CPSU First Secretary (now Generalrezhnev called for strengthening the country's defenses and stated that
in the sphere of domestic policy the party regards it as its prime task to develop the productive forces of our society, to raise steadily on this basis the welfare of the Soviet people, to develop socialist democracy in every way.*
Brezhnev's formulation in thisas an accurate preview of the6 directive on the "main tasks" of the five-year plan which werein large part, by an alleged necessity to react to the increased "aggressive" activity of AmericanThusimilar conclusion, the current five-year planclaiming that the Soviet Union is required to strengthen its defense might in the next five years due to the "aggravation of internationalcaused by American imperialism which unleashed-mill-tary aggression in various regions of thethe development of the productive forces as the "main tasks" and "thanks to this [the development of the productive forces], the achievementubstantial rise in thestandards of the people." imilar formula wasinto7 Theses.)
The second main part of Brezhnev's economicmajor allocations for the agriculturalin his4 Tashkent speech in which he argued for strengthening Soviet defenses, "our national and internationalnd for increasing at the same time Soviet agricultural productivity, "our paramount and nationwide task." The two tasks were not regarded by Brezhnev as being mutually exclusive, in the sense that the funds for Brezhnev's subsequent grandiose agriculture plan announced in5 wore not to be taken out of the military budget. In fact, in his5 central committee speech which introduced his plan to investillion rubles in state and collective farms, Brezhnev completely ignored the subject of military allocations.
Emphasis supplied hero and elsewhere in. this study, unless otherwise noted.
More recently, Brezhnev's bias in favor of the forces" sector was prominent in7 election speech. Here he called for "the strengthening of the economic and defensive might of the socialist motherland, for [note the order) the growth of the people's welfare and culture, and for durable peace the world over." While he stated that "Improving the: life of our people" is the "main aim of the policies of tbe Communistis formulation on the attainment of that main aim includedas success in agriculture andwhich placedany significant increase in the standard of living in the future.* (It should be noted here, however, that the rate of growth of consumer production has increased somewhat during the post-Khrushchev leadershipnd warning against complacency with regard to defense matters, he said in7 speech (his first public address following the Israeli victory) thatis in the forefront of all our work." Thus hisremarks sustain his6 election pledgesoviet defenses "will be maintained at thend will continue to preserve the superiority of our army"hat "the priority development of heavy industry is the unchangeable principle of oureinforcing hie traditionalist economic position, Brezhnev has not recently reiteratedd CPSU Party Congress call for bringing together the rates of growth in the heavy and light industry sectors of the economy. (On the other hand, politburo leaders who echo Kosygin's economic views have recently reiterated the congress' line on proportional growth.)
While in the past two years Brezhnev has discussed the need for material incentives in the pursuit of Soviet national economic policy, he (like Podgornyy) has given noticeable stress to "moral"is, the effort
other politburo members (such as Kirilenko, see page ave recently argued that present economic conditionsignificant increase in the standard of living "now."
to imbue the workers with party-approved attitudes.* For example, in his6 election speech he called for "selfless work" in building Communism and equated that callorld War Two political officer's slogan-"Communists, forward." in7 election speech he said that this year's slogans are "shock labor in the jubileeingle man lagging behind but at your side:" And he summed up his hackneyed sloganeering on incentives, as well as his overall foreign and internal views, in one concise statement:
Great persistent work and daily conquests on the labor front in combination with constant vigilance regarding the intrigues of theis the only keyhining Communist tomorrow toward which our people are moving confidently under the leadership of their Leninist party.
on the other hand, has given particularto the extension of material incentives through capital construction (though he has also mentioned the need for educational and cultural facilities which, presumably, serve to imbue the workers with party-approvednterestingly, those who favor material incentives over moral incentives have come under attack. For example, Stalin's former chief theoretician Chesnokov wrote in Pravda on7 that "the disregard of some leaders for cultural-educational work and the broadening of the material and technical base of culture, as well as attempts to set off economic building against cultural building, can only be explained by political naivete or ignorance. Quite recently voices were heard in some places demanding that the construction of clubs and other cultural and enllghtment institutions be curtailed under theof 'concern' for economic construction. Such aapproach to cultural construction violatesMarxist understanding and the solution of tho problem of balancing material and spiritual culture in theof society."
Preserve The "Leading" Role of the Parly: Unlikeb" campaign performance, Brezhnev in his election speech this year did not discuss the partyproductiv force in the life of the nation. Rather, he fell back on the more traditionalist view that the partyguides" and "organizes" tho nation's productive forces. Last June, in the context of callingew Soviet constitution to "crown the majestic half century of Soviet power"roject to which he has not since publiclyhe discussed the productive economic tasks of rank and file party workers. He said in6 campaign that the party is called upon to "formulate the basis of the country's economic policy, the main principles and methods of management and to put these intorezhnev's revived emphasis on the traditionalist role of the party also occursime when Soviet media have been sharply attacking developments in both the Chinese and Yugoslav parties for departing from "sound principles" and following policies which allegedly debilitate the party's leadership over the society.
KOSYGIN: COOPERATION ABROAD, REFORM AT HOME
The keynote of Kosygln's more optimistic foreign policy outlook was sounded in the introductory passages of7 election speech. In evident rebuttal of Brezhnev, Kosygin explicitly placed troubles with the capitalists in the "contemporary international atmosphere" and looked to the "future [which) will bring arelaxation of international tension" and will create conditions, he said, for the Communist tomorrow. Kosygin
the- spokesman for the politburo's coordinated line on the occasion of the last revolutionelshe cited6 party congress remark that the party "organizes andthethan citing Brezhnev's less6 election comment that the party puts economic policy "into practice."
went on to emphasize that relaxation ofactic or diplomatic game;
Our party and government, in their foreign political activity, have always proceeded and continue to proceedoncern for strengthening peace and creating the conditions for peaceful socialist and Communist construction. We do not regard the search for ways to strengthen the security of the peoples as questions of tactics and diplomatic maneuverings. For us thisine of principle, corresponding to the desires of hundreds of millions of people who hope that the future willonsiderable relaxation oftension.
Thus Kosygin has persisted in the optimistic foreignmirrored in6 Supreme Soviet reportis, that Soviet foreign policy "takes into account the broad perspective of international development." Brezhnev's projections which magnify present troubles, Kosygln's forecasts have, in the main, looked beyondconflicts and have generally been capped with optimistic, pacific conclusions. Kosygin told Supreme Soviet delegates in6 that
to orientate correctly in policy means not to shut oneself up in present-day events, but to see the main trends of long-term significance. If we look at things broadly, we shall see that these tendencies, despite the present tension caused by imperialist aggression, are favorable for the forces coming out for peace and international security.
A. Improving Relations With the United States
The Vietnam war has been the central problem for Kosygln's line on foreign policy in general, and relations with the United States in particular. The implementation of his major foreign and domestic policy goals havereversals which have coincided with theof the Vietnam conflict. ese goals, such as a
reduction in the Soviet military's share of the budget and an expansionoviet trade, which he outlined during his first months as premier have been sidetracked.
Vietnam: Kosygin's Obstacle, Brezhnev's Opportunity
During the months prior to5 and the bombing of North Vietnam, subtle differences between Brezhnev and Kosygin were reflected In their publicon Vietnam. Kosygin's more circumspect statements fitted his detente-oriented outlook, Brezhnev's, his consistently harsh view of the United States. For example, with North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong on theBrezhnev in4 revolution anpiversary speech initiated the new Soviet leadership's condemnation of the "intervention of American imperialism" in South Vietnam. Apparently with the early August and. retaliatory strikes on North Vietnam in mind, he charged that "we resolutely condemn the provocations against the DRV." In his first public remarks on foreign policy after Brezhnev's attacks, Kosygin (innniversary speech in Ashkhabad) did not even mention North Vietnam and the acts of unnamed "imperialists" in South Vietnam were briefly passed over. Kosygin'swas particularly noticeable in light of thehat Moscow-Hanoi relations had greatly improved in the wake of Pham Van Dong's return from the early Novemberhat Soviet conventional air defense materiel
after Pham Van Donti's return from Moscow, an articleRV spokesman who had consistently engaged in anti-Soviet polemics was suddenly deleted from the November Issue of the DRV party's theoretical journal (Hoche title of the contents page was inked over,oose insertonpolemical speechorthpolitburo member was added. And the DRV'slack of criticism of the Soviet party stood in sharp contrast to Hanoi's unfriendly actions prior to the Soviet leadershipon-technical Russian newspapers and periodicals were reportedly withdrawn fromin the DRV and students returning from Moscow were being given political re-education courses.
had arrived in Vietnam in either late December or early January, In short, it is probable that the Sovietto reverse, at least tentatively,ithholding of significant Soviet military support to the DRV was taken in early November, and that thehad not evoked Kosygln's public endorsement as of late
Constrasting comments by Kosygin and Brezhnev in4 tend to strengthen this conclusion. inecember speech based his formulailitary budget cutcertain change for the better" in relations with the United States and pointed in this context. pledge to reduce military outlays. Less than one week earlierecember) Brezhnev wasthe worseningSoviet relations on the basis. military actions in Vietnam. Brezhnev pointedly threatened to render military assistance to the DRV on the basis of what. military aircraft and navalhad already done in early August and mid-September. Kosygln's lino on aiding the DRV, on the other hand, was made conditional on what unspecified "aggressors" might do.
34 Kremlin speech
Recently DRV territory was again subjected to raids and bombardmenttary aircraft and naval vessel's. These acts of aggression causethroughout the world. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we have already declared for all to hear that the Soviet Unionremain indifferent to the fateraternal socialist country, and that it is ready to render the necessary aid tu it.
4 Supreme Soviet Speech
The Soviet Government is attentively watchingin the Caribbean, in southeast Asia, and other parts of the world. After all, the actions ofimperialist circles are exacerbating tho situation. The Soviet Union states that it will not remain indifferent to the destinies of such fraternal socialist countries as the DRV and the Cuban Republic, and is ready to render them necessary aid should the aggressors dare toand against them.
initial line on "rendering necessary aid" to
thesole reference to that country in his lengthyalso diluted by including Cuba in the same
Brezhnev capped his. remarks with a .
warning that the policy of peaceful coexistence does not prevent the Soviet Union fromebuff" to those who interfere In the affairs of bloc nations, and in Asia Africa and Latin America. Kosygin's remarks onaggressiveness, however,assageconsiderable increase" in East-West trade, as well as an optimistic passage on prospects for improvedrelations.
Kosygin did not lend his full endorsement to DRV defense aid until And at that time, he apparently linked Soviet military supportegotiations effort that failed in the followinghen for several months in his numerous speeches he tended (unlike Brezhnev) to confine the scene. to Southeast Asia.
While continuing to stress that Vietnam was the obstacle to improved relations with the United States, Kosygin In5 gradually began to expand his view of the supposed scope. "Imperialism" and to switch
*lt has been plausibly concluded that the Soviets were attempting (successfully) to increase their influence in Hanoi by granting military support while simultaneously urging negotiations on the Vietnam war, apparentlythe DRV had been considering the possibility that. might be willing toonferenceover. withdrawal from South Vietnam. The. bombing in the north shattered Hanoi's and Moscow's illusions regarding the degree. resolve.
to this period, the signs of political pressure on Kosygin were evident in two political slights to which he was subjected. Publication of his5 Gosplan speech (discussed presently) was delayed until April and then carried in the small circulation journal, Planned Economy, rather than In the larger circulation press.roposed April trip to Poland was, according to the Soviet press in March, to be led jointly byand Kosygin; in April the same media announced that Brezhnev led the delegation and gave him the overwhelming attention while slighting Kosygin on several points of protocol.
**For example, only in one speechnd then in passing, did he note that. was in EuropeilitaryMay speech in East Berlin.
temporarily to the Brezhnev rationale for strengthening Soviet defenses.* Hisaway in the summer5 from his own version of detente abroad and concentration on civilian economics at home may well haveentative compromise aimed at preventing aas the defeat of his economic reform plan (adopted in September amid rumors of hisretirement). Nevertheless, Kosygin refrained during this period from emphasizing the threat from. in Europe.** The exception to this general pattern appeared in Kosygin's atypical remarksith New York Times columnist James Reston. It should be pointed out, however, that Reston apparently provoked Kosygin with some rather blunt badgeringellicose position on several issues. (Thus the interview mayess useful source for the purpose of comparingthan are speeches written by Kosygin or hist any rate, during the interview Kosygin argued that the increase in the Soviet military budget (announced the next day) was in reaction. intentions in Europe and nuclear sharing proposals for NATO. In his next comment in the interview, Kosygin forecast that "the next few years will set the pattern for the nextoears. One prospect is for the arms race and the increase in
military budgets. 1 Ho did not comment on any other pros-poct. Thus, Kosygin at that time appeared to havefrom his4 positions.
His retreat was shortlived, for in6 he began again to speak of tho Vietnam war as the sole obstacle In the way of improved relations with the United States. Inugust Supreme Soviet speech last year he based the increaso in the Soviet military budget (which he described ast weighs heavily onolely on one specificVietnam war. And while he. "Interference in the internal affairs of othere did not follow Brezhnev's practice of elaborating upon such charges (such. support for Bonnnd using such specific charges as tho bases for Increased Soviet defense spending. In fact, Kosygin went out of his" way to acknowledge the presence of "sounder tendencies In He said he looked forward to the time when "sounder tendencies" would predominate over theggressive moods."
Kosygin's characteristic position on substantial cooperation after Vietnam was most recently renewed in responseuestion posed during his7 nown conference at the United Nations. He said that
the cause of the improvement of Soviet-American relations could boat be served by one first step and that is an end to the American aggression In Vietnam and to improve those relations it is necessary first and foremost to end that war and thena big group of questions and steps could be charted which could all be designed to improve those relations and these questions could be the Improvement of economic ties, cultural ties, technological exchanges and tho solution of various Important political issues which exist in the world today and which could be resolved through cooperation between the two nations.
Significantly, Kosygin's response was censored in TASS'une version of the UN press conference which rendered his remarks on improving relationsougher, more
strident vein. TASS recorded Kosygin as stating that "it is impossible" to count on improved relations as long as. commits "aggression" against Vietnam. imilar line was taken in an Izvestiya editorial onune.) The TASS version alteredemark on the possibility of mutual cooperation to read "cooperation between the two nations together with other nations."* And TASS deleted Kosygln's reassuring Judgment, which followed his remarks on the possibility of Washington-Moscow cooperation, that "we are equally sure that the people of the United States [like the people of the Soviet Union] do not want
Negotiations on Vietnam: The divergent conceptions held by Kosygin and Brezhnev on the natureUSSR relations beyond Vietnam have recently been set against apparent differences on the possibility of East-Weston the Vietnam war. Brezhnev has harshly. efforts to bring the issue to the table, whilehas sought to use recent opportunities to try todiscussions.
he subject of cooperation with capitalist states of Europe, Brezhnev and Podgornyy in7 election speeches stressed the line that the Soviet Union wasjointly with other nations of the Warsaw Pact.
**Izvestlya onune carried TASS" censored version of Kosygln's press conference and also quoted fromJohnson'sune remarks on the Glassboro talks, but Izvestiya did not cite the President's statements that his talks with Kosygin made theittle less Kosygln's judgment that Americans do not want war was not the conclusion drawn9 August Pravda article by its correspondent Kurdyumov. Kurdyumov, who reported that he had. public opinion about the Vietnam war, concluded that the "majority is probably composed of those who have been deftly sold on the idea of imperialist superiority: America has neverar. How can it throw in the towel to the Viet Cong?"
The contrasts between the two leaders on this issue surfaced in the wake of7 London discussions on the possibility of settling the Vietnam war. Brezhnev, in one particularly polemical passage in his7 election speech, said that "now even the most naive people realize. ruling circles deceived the world and their own people when they stated that they were strivingeaceful settlement of the Vietnam issue." As if defending himself, Kosygin in his election speech explained that in early7 "thereeal possibility of beginning talks on the Vietnamonly one thing was demanded of the leaders of the United States: thatnconditionally halt their aggressive actions against the sovereign DRV. The American Government, however, did not make use of this opportunity."* Brezhnev, who did not discussreal possibility" and unused "opportunity" to begin talks",sharply that the alleged purposefully deceptive efforts of. leaders to try to "mislead naive people have crumbled." Kosygin plaintively concluded that. destroyed genuine "hopes" with what later proved to be "empty words calculated to deceive public
On the general subject of the efficacy ofit is interesting to note that in his7 United Nations address Kosygin Judged the peacefulof "dangerous developments" in the Middle East,Asia, or any other place" as an imperative of state policy. He went on to tell the delegates that
correspondent Yuri Zhukov statedate7 conversation. Senator Hartke that theof bombing the DRV was "costly" to Kosygin "who staked his personal prestige on the effort" to commence negotiations.
Khrushchev was subjected to indirect but unmistakeablo attack in the journal Oktyabr afterncident for having been hoodwinked IntoPresident Eisenhower's "talk about peace."
Kosygin then dramatically underscored the urgency ofconflicts by asserting that the Vietnam war "is fraughterrible danger of escalatingajor military clash between the powers."
His remarks on"the nature of war revealedsignificant differences with Brezhnev's pastto the subject. The major implication of theconcerns not only the relative emphasis onof resolving limited conflict, but alsoof Soviet defense allocations. For example,Vary, Brezhnev stated thatew warEurope it could become fmozhet stat')envelop the wholehile at the Unitedstated that "nobody doubts"ew war[neizbezhno byla by]uclear one." which Khrushchev developed in the earlysignificant policy implications; thehashat due to the mutuallyof the use of nuclear weapons, all means mustto prevent the outbreak of the inevitablewould result,hat due to the fact thatwar would inevitablyuclear one, thereneed to maintain costly across-the-board toonventional conflict. Theelaborated upon by several Sovietin5*hat the
possibilityon-nuclear war should not be excluded under contemporary conditions for political and security reasons (such as the needredible rationale for the conventional role of the non-nuclear allies under the command of Moscow)hat reliance on "massiveretaliation" is not sufficient to preventar and that practical steps to deal withshort of massive nuclear war should be taken. Accordingly, Brezhnev, more than any other politburo has stressed the need to improve the conventional
forces. In5 speech, for example, while speaking of Soviet ICBM and ABM- advances, he went on to emphasize the "great role belonging to conventional types of armament." He told his audience that the Soviet Army "is being constantly supplied with the most up-to-date tank, aviation, artillery and other equipment." Thereby he identified himself with the combined arms school of the late Defense Minister Malinovskiy, who one month earlier in the restricted military journal Military Thought argued, in the present tense, that "we consider it premature to 'bury' the infantry, as some people do."
Favoring the non-nuclear forces is also implicitly reflected in Brezhnev's rather conspicuous failure to spell out the mutually destructive "consequences"uclear war. According to t
broshnev said that
unairraanne uetense Council" he was "familiar with the consequences of modern war. Unfortunately there were certain people who did not understand this." (This particular remark was drawn in the context of an explicit attack on the Chinese Communist leadership.) To the same effect, Brezhnev said inuly speech this year that the measures taken by the Soviet Union to "stay the [Israeli] aggressor's hand" prevented the three-day war froma size dangerous for all mankind." Thus he stopped short of employing the typically Kosyginesque conclusion (which weakens the argument for across-the-boardtoonventional war) that the war wouldhave endeduclear, universal conflagration.
there have been indications of differencesthe Soviet military over the ABM issue,on strategic defense spending have not This is not to suggest that thedecided to commit Soviet resources to anof the existing ABM system. In fact, thetreatment given to key features of theissue (such as the ABM's role in modern war,capabilities, negotiations aimed aty Soviet military leaders andreflect general indecision (or dissension) inon the matter of moving ahead with theprogram. At any rate, in the context ofABM deployment, one Soviet official
in7 that Kosygin, "inas "very desirous" of holding down arms expenditures in order to meet various economic needs.
Expansion of US.-Soviet Trade: The Vietnamnindored tho development of Kosygin's proposals in4 for greatly USSR trade. That Kosygin's plans were ambitious was suggested byroup of. businessmen who reported that Kosygin94 closed session with the businessmen commented favorably on the possibility of settling Moscow's wartime lend-lease debts to the United States.* Kosygin's offerutually agreeableon themain political issueSovietnever made public in the Soviet Union, although Moscow propaganda pegged to thevisit with Kosygintrong interest in expanding East-West, andUSSR trade. Kosygin also urged reduced armamentsSoviet economic relations in remarks tocorrespondents on Heimilar appeal in the context ofecember Supreme Soviet announcement that the USSR and. intended to spend less money on armaments. He said that. and the USSR "have every opportunity" to consolidate and continue joint efforts for better relations "by searching for and seeking solutions to controversial political questions andn the sphere of economic, cultural, and scientific ties." Later he calledtruly extensive' expansion of trade with the West and stressed theof "Increasing considerably the capacity of the Soviet market."
While Brezhnev has not neglected the subject of external trade, his remarks have generally amounted to
the wane of2 Cuban missile crisis, Kosygin commentedend-lease settlement inevolution anniversary speech.
the Soviet armed forces to ten percent of its present size and eventually eliminating that force was regardedhappy prospect" by Kosveln r*
little more than reiterations of earlier ambiguous formulasoviet readiness to develop "foreign business relations." He has made no recent calls foroviet trade. Kosygin, on the other hand, hasto comment on the sensitive subject of trade with. During7 BBC press conference, he repeatedly pointed out that the Soviet Union would like technical and trade cooperation with Western Europe "as well as the Unitedut that 'certain circumstances" precluded the possibility of active cooperation with the United States. He added, however, that "we would help and also certainly welcome the development of suchwith all nations, including the United States."
Western Europe: oanjngful Detente
Kosygin displayed his preference in pursuing Soviet national objectives through Soviet-West Europeanon what he has called in numerous speeches thispan-European basis."*
*The Gaullist-tinfea vision of "pan-Europeanism" hasavoredrequent subject in Kosygln's speeches this year. ebruary at the Guildhall in London for example, he painted the following Utopian economic scenario: The European states would receive great advantages from the expansion of their mutual economic, scientific, and technical ties. If, for example, we take thebelonging to different social systems underof an international detenteafeguarded security, they could boldly go forwardore profound international division of labor in Europe and thereby more effectively use the opportunities of each state to the advantage not only of its own self, but to the advantage of all the participants ineconomic exchanges. And it may be said with confidence thateasonable utilization of all the available natural wealth in Europe, including the resources of the Soviet Union, and the reasonable use of the industrial potential, the accumulated skills, (footnote continued on
Kosygln's theme that political and military security and economic progress can be achieved through European cooperation is devoid ofhree prerequisitesthe status quo. Isolate the West Germans, strengthen frontiers of the socialistamount to restraints on the development of meaningful intra-European cooperation. In his election speech his year, Kosygin pointedly argued that "it would be naive to expect (European cooperation] to occur automatically without any application of effort, without struggle.' In short, he seemed to be denying Brezhnev's proposition that theof the earlier-discussed three objectives would, ipso facto, create the possibilities for fruitful, Soviet-West European cooperation. Kosygin went on to emphasize favorable developments (instead of dwelling on future possibilities) involving current cooperation with specific
TToothote' corit'inued from
experience, and the knowledge of the toiling people, Europe is capable of forging ahead in the vanguard of the world's economic, scientific, and technical progress.
Political and military security were the chief themes of his pan-European remarks inarch Moscow election speech:
In this region urned in the conflagrations of two world wars, new tendencies are clearly displayed. These tendencies consist of the fact that in many West European states the insolvencyolitical course connected with the activities of the NATO military bloc is being recognized. The idea is penetrating deeper and deeper into the awareness of the broadest strata of the population that security in Europe and the solution of its problems could be best insured by strengthening relations between West andof cooperationan-European basis. And tariff reforms were added to the above political and military security pitches in hisarch references to
West European countries. Brezhnev in his election speech briefly acknowledged that the USSR "is working tirelessly" to devolop mutually advantageous contacts and to strengthen cooperation with "those countries seeking such cooperation" (presumably France in particular). Yet unlike Kosygin, he placed the realization of cooperation in Europehole in the indefinite future by asserting that Soviet
tween the states of Europe."
Relations with Bonn: West Germany was not one of the "cooperating" nations singled out by Kosygin, though in the past two-and-one-half years he has voiced atemperate position on doaling with west Germany. (Brezhnev, meanwhile, has concontrated solely on theto FRG-USSR cooporation, such as aof "revanchist claims" and soor example, in5 Leipzig speech, after
expressed interest in expanding Soviet-West German-co=
operation in the chemical fertilizer industry, Kosygin said that "the Soviet Government by no means intends to consider West Germany as an outcast where everything is bad and nothing is good." Inay6 East Berlin VE Day speech he said that
the Soviet Union by no means holds that all West
Germans are imbued with the ideas of revanchism
It is being said that the new generation of Germans who have grown up in tho Fodoral Republic since tho war cannot be held responsible for the crimes committed by nazism. It would indeed be unjust to saddle today's West Gorman youth with this grave responsibility.
And, finally, in7 BBC interview he said that the Soviet Union shall always ontertain respect for the Gorman people, but "what we do hate is any new display of fascism."
Brezhnevs recent comments on "good Germans" have beon directed solely toward the working class which, he said in his Karlovy Vary speech, "have shown in the class
clashesovement against militarism and fascism is growing in West Germany itself." In his7 East Berlin speech Brezhnev indicated that the "eternal mark of Cain" might be erased once West Germany reversed its principal domestic and foreign policies, after having twice asserted that one must regard Communists as "very naive people" to hope that they would not see theinsidious motives behind Bonn's East European recognition campaign. Kosygin balanced repeated appeals for cooperationeadiness to develop Soviet-West European cooperation with attacks against West German "imperialists" in Paris inondonnd Moscow in March. But he cast noon theecognition campaign and made noof the SPD for its failure to legalize theosygin in the past has not infrequently referred to the "party of the German working clasd' (in his view, theut, as in the typical case ofebruary BBC press conference, he did not go on to criticize the West German social democrats and, lit fact, exonerated the German people from past crines against the working class.
eeming aberration in Kosygln's comparativelystatements on Germany appeared in his election speech this year. He voiced the particularly malicious distortion that "quite recently Chancellor Kiesingertatement whfrih made it clear that he did not exclude the.possibility of settingoalition government of the Federal Republic with the participation of the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party. Who can guarantee that the ruling circles of Bonn will not later on call for the establishmenturely fascist government." No "recent statement made by Kiesinger even remotely "makes it clear" that the NDP would be welcomedoalition government. On the contrary, Kiesinger has repeatedly and explicitly excluded the NDP from the current coalition government. For example, inarch Neue Revue interview (the one in which he discussed the possibilities of legalizing thehancellor Kiesinger referred to the NDP as agroup" and stated that the most effective means of "fighting" radical groups is an efficient policy.
B. Balancing The Domestic Economy
Generally, consistent with his assertions sinceouster, Kosygin's recent spoeches have continued to place consumer welfare before defonse in listing the domestic tasks of the party.
Kosygin's position on this sensitive matter ofwas first suggested in remarks given within hours of Brezhnev's first speech as party leader. Like Brezhnev, Kosygin bowed to the military in his4 reception remarks In mentioning the supposedto strengthen defenses, but heifferent tack than Brezhnev in placing no prerequisites before what he (Kosygin) called the most "lofty and vitalfa steady growth of tbe living standards and welfare of the Soviet people."* That Kosygin's support was strong for the consumer sector was further suggested by the fact that his remark on "steadyollowed the sober reminder to the costly defenso and space Industry that "while storming the skies we do not want to forget about the earth, about our groat earthly affairs." imilar tone was struck In his public remarks onccording to Western press sources, Kosygin lamented. and Soviet consumers' sacrifice to tbe high cost of dofense and stated that "the whole of mankind eagerly awaits the day when we [tho United Statos and tho Sovietoth spend less money on armaments and more ontho needs of the individual."
appeal steady growth" of consumer goods may well have reflected his principal argument with Khrushchev, who in4 hadramatic redistribution of the economy in the direction of the consumer. While Kosygin's remark suggested that he did notrastic sudden change in favor of the consumer sector, his statomonts also suggested that he did not favor tho policy of continuing to give the massiveto the heavy industry sector.
initial differences later developedattern with Kosygin generally placing front of heavy industry in his as mentioned earlier, reversed on this economic issue in the first halfonsumer in terests in public remarks. Brezhnev, the order.
identification with consumer interests was reinforced by his public and private supportroposal to cut the Soviet military's share of5 budgetillion rubles. Brezhnev did notublic position on the military budget cut. Thus, he joined the leading marshals, with whom he had closely
their "conspiracy of silence" on
associatedn the planned defense cut
Brezhnev's silence on Kosygin's plan wasconspicuous in light of his (Brezhnev's) practice under Khrushchev of promptly reacting to proposals to reduce the military budget. He was among the first to endorse the Khris hchev-sponsored defense economyof3 andot Khrushchev's eleventh-hour proposal in Septem In4 both Brezhnev and Kosygin had given generally similar pledges to strengthen the might of the Soviet Union in their early post-coup speeches, but in4 Brezhnevtronger appeal for "the highest possible level" for Soviet defenses. 5 Brezhnev took the lead inrogram of stepped up military spending. Kosygin only belatedly
at the 7
remlin reception Brezhnev toasted the armed forces (and Malinovsky by name) and later called upon Malinovskiy, who delivered an attack. policy. Malinovsky went on to claim that the USSR could crush
. ]Kosygin then tried
to smooth tnings over witn. Ambassador after Malinovsky's diatribe, with statements to the effect that the "main preoccupation" of the new Soviet leadership would be to overcome various shortcomings in the USSR,
gave bl8 support to tho reversal of his position. At the time, he accused. policy-makers of perfidy in incroaslng the Pentagon's budget and thus undermining his position on the Soviet military cut.
Though he lost ground5 to those pressing for Increased spending in the heavy-defense industry sector, his early callsteady growth" of thoof the Soviet budget devoted to consumernonetheless was Incorporated intod CPSU Congress resolutions. And unlike Brezhnev, Kosygin in7 election speech commented upon the proportional development theme endorsed by the Congress. He said:
Tho bringing together of the rate of growth of agricultural production and the rate of growth of Industry, and of the rate of growth ofof consumer goods and the rate of growth of production of the means of production, has started. All this is needed in order to raise tho well-being of the Soviet peoplo more rapidly.
Two yoars earlier he had askedeadjustment inproportions In order to "improve the livingof the people more rapidly." Ho combined his request with criticism of "some leaders jwhoj may have doubts or event raise objections when discussing the question of proportions." 5 speech to the officials of Gosplan USSR), "Some of these people cannot but beby the departmental approach, which runs counter to the nationale charged. Reporting to7 electors "with satisfaction" the tidings that the "first Important steps" had been takon in the direction of the improvement of the main ratios In the proportional development of the national economy, Kosygin continuod to complain that the demand for clothing, footwear,furniture and television sets "is far from being met fully today." And he warily concluded that the "major measures" being taken "should" lead to an increase in such consumer goods. Brezhnev acknowledged that the production of such goods is insufficient, but he confidently assured his electors on7 that "we areto those difficulties."
The "Productive" Role of the Ministries: Kosygin has promoted the prerogatives of hisempire. In his recent remarks, he hasecent party-state decision which expands the rights of ministers in the sphere of capital construction. Kosygin explained that union republican building ministries have been formed which would carry out "both industrial and housing, civil communalotherlear mandate to perform tasks that had been, at least in part, the concern shared by certain city Soviets.
And in the context of discussing the expansion of ministerial powers,had paid deference to the party throughout most of hishisapparatus before the party in discussing theof one important sphere of policy. Here heighly sensitive point last employed by one of his, Malenkov. Kosygin said:
A radical improvement of capital construction isask of cardinal national economic On its solution should be concentrated the attention and forces of [note the order] ministries and departments, party organizations, Soviets of workers deputies, and our entire public*
Conspicuously,arch account of Kosygln's speech (which was broaclcasi live) deleted the above remark, though Pravda printed Kosygin's next comment which was that the "party and the government" unswervingly pursue the line of raising the level of the life of Soviet people.
Concurrently, with regard to the subject of party leadership, Kosygin has frequently invoked the self-
ialenkov in3 Supreme Soviet speech stated that "the government and the Central Committee" had decided to make certain changes dealing with the personal income of collective farmers. After his fall Malenkov was accused of placing the state over the party.
protective "collective leadership" and associated themes. In both67 election speeches Kosygintosubject about which Brezhnev in both his last two campaign speeches was notably silent.*
PODGORNYY: FIRMNESS ABROAD, WELL BEING AT HOME
Since DecemberPodgornyy was kickedto the largely honorific Supreme Soviet(replacing Mikoyan) and removed from the secretariat-he has had to operateelatively weakosition. Following the assumption of his Supreme Soviet Job, Podgornyy has shifted his domestic views from ansupporter of pro-consumer interestsoreline, though he has not fully endorsed all of Brezhnev's economic formulations. The switch from his earlier policy position displays the characteristicsolitburo apparachik opportunistically maneuvering to improve his relative power position (in this case, by joining the Brezhnev "bandwagon").
*Brezhnev's last reference to the modes of leadership was reminiscent of Khrushchev's remarks onhonot everything depends onorkollective"). Accepting the Hero of the Soviet Unionrezhnev said: "In face of the great and Intricate tasks which have tom encouraged by the awareness of the fact that in the politburo, in the secretariat, in the entire central committee, and in the government wo are workingmooth, harmonious collective, relying on each other's assistance."
While subtle differences with Brezhnev may be found in certain foreign policy statements recently made by Podgornyy, his comments have reiterated his earlier harsh line, particularly on Soviet policy toward the United States, and, on balance, his foreign policy statements have generallyeflection of those of the general secretary.
A. Hostility Toward America, Cooperation With Europe
Support for Brezhnev's foreign views was clearly displayed in7 election speech in which he went so far as to revive the Stalin-Zhdanovthesis that the world was divided into "camps of war and peace." In this vein, he claimed that the "wild men" in the "war" camp "are ready to go as far as toew worldnd, consistent with his recent statements,
*Potitfornyy hastened to add that such "wild men11 are "in fact being helped by those in China who today call themselves the utmost revolutionary leftwingers; that is those who do notorld military conflict from the possible means of attaining their adventurist aims."
asserted that the strength of the socialist bloc "is the main bulwark in the struggle for peace and against the aggressive aspirations of imperialism," Accordingly, Podgornyy has been careful not to stray from the emphasis given by Brezhnev on joint bloc action with regard to the Soviet Union's policies toward West Europe.
Somewhat inconsistent with his harsh rhetoric and not unlike Kosygin, Podgornyy gave high priority in7 election speech to furthering cooperation with the governments of Western Europe. And while reflecting Brezhnev's lowered emphasis on peaceful coexistence, Podgornyy did not limit the pursuit of peacefulto the capitalist countries of Europe:
Whileesolute and strenuous struggle against the aggressive policy of imperialism, our country is at the same time consistently pursuing the Leninist course of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. We favor normal relations with the capitalist countries and are developing economic, trade, cultural, and other relations with them.
He did not, however, go on to make an explicit call forSovietubject upon which he (like Brezhnev) has been notably reticent in public.
Within three weeks of Khrushchev's political demise, Podgornyy joined the Brezhnev-sponsored move in theto upgrade the national liberation andthemes. He stressed the need to oppose the "export ofnd like Brezhnev at that time, he did not mention its Khrusbchevian corollary, theof Communists "exporting revolution":
The Soviet people actively support the national liberation movement, the struggle of the once oppressed and dependent countries for theirpolitical and economic emancipation. It firmly and consistently rejects any imperialist exportation of counterrevolution; it supports the people's sacred right to fight for their liberation.
including just wars against subjugators. uba Sociallsta artlclo by Podgornyy)
Brezhnev's line giving increased priority to supporting national liberation movements and sacrificing improved relations with the United States continued to be voiced by Podgornyy In one case, in bis 5 Sevastopol speech, Podgornyyarticularly sharp illustration to show the "principles of proletarian internationalism." He boasted that Sovieturface-to-air missiles) to the DRV had. airplanes "into piles of metal scattered in tbejungles." . activity in Panama, tbe Congo, the Dominican Republic and West Germany were also attacked by Podgornyy5 He laced his attacks on the "worldwide" scope. ambitions with repeated refer ences to the dominance of the "hawks" in American foreign policy-making. Unlike Kosygin, he has not pointed to the existence of "sounder tendencies" in Washingtoncircles. Characteristically, in7 election speech Podgornyy spoko only of the "hawks" on the Vietnam issue in American politics. Thus he stressed that. political figures" wanted to end the Vietnamese warradical intensification". military action in order to "speed tho collapse of the [Vietnamese peoples] resistance and force them to their knees."
conversations. officials, how-
ever, Podgornyy, for reasons (apparently) oftalked fl6
gornyy mentioned only the Vietnam problem as an impedi-ment toUSSR cooperation. With regard tohe expressed his pleasure in the fact that in spite of Vietnam limited agreements could be reached. (He citedSoviet air agreement, the negotiations on the now completed outer space agreement, and theof an extension of desatinization agreements.)
B. Personal Prosperity and Production
While-Podgornyy's dual emphasis ih-the past on foreign danger and domestic well-being appeared to be inconsistent, it is noteworthy that his recent remarks on internal affairsarked shift toward more conservative views. Podgornyy's recent formulations, nevertheless, contain significant aspects of Kosygin's domesticas an emphasis on thedevelopment thesis and on the need for greater efforts to improve the standard of living. But, like Brezhnev, Podgornyy has recently placed special emphasis on successes in agriculture and industryrerequisite for meeting consumer demands:
The Indisputable successes have been achieved[in] the Insuring of rawindustry. This is one of the most importantof the Implementation by the party infew years of the course of-bringing the pace growth of heavy industry closer to the pace of "of the light and foodstuffs industry. one can already see the results. Yet, itinsufficient. The demand of thenot met
A mixture of both Brezhnev's and Kosygin's formulations was presented in other remarks on internal policy byinarch election speech this year. stated that "in the future weave toheavy industryighnd "continue to take all measures to constantly maintain the military might of the Soviet state at the level necessary to crush any aggressor." Yet, like Kosygin, Podgornyy stressed consumer needs and placed welfare before defense in his discussion of party tasks as he had done in his election speech last year: "The further development of the economy will allow us to meet the people's requirementsbetter and [secondly] constantly strengthen the might of the Soviet state."
The salient feature, as mentioned earlier, is that Podgornyy's7 formulas mark another step in the evolution of his extreme consumer-oriented policy views. His most extreme views were presented in5 speeches which provided support forbutter-over-guns" policy proposals of Kosygln's predecessor.* With regard toodgornyy was the only presidium member to publicly praise the military budget cut plananuary
in Turkey) announced by Premier Kosygin. toodgornyy in his5 Bakuso far as to employ one of the key arguments usedof proposalsundamental shift in thein favor of the consumer sector voiced byshortly before his fall, in Baku Podgornyy said:
Thereime when the Soviet people deliberately accepted certain material restrictions in theof the priority development of heavy industry and the strengthening of our defense capacity. This was fully justified, because it is preciselywhich is the material basis for the growth of culture and of the welfare of our people,efenseless socialist state would have been crushed by imperialism.
Now with each passing year our social wealth is multiplying and the necessary conditions are being created better to satisfy the ever-growing cultural and domestic ambitions of the working people.
Podgornyy did not repeat such explicit pro-consumer views after his5 "honorable demotion" to the Supreme Soviet chairmanship, in fact, he noted inune
speech that the Soviet Union maintainsrates of development of heavy industry and we are
development of light and consumer industries was an implicit part of Khrushchev's3 and4 renewed appealsoviet troop and military budget cut.
steadily concerned with strengthening the defenseof the country." He went on, however, to stress that "at the sane time" the party's task "is toigher rate of growth of the national income, particu-larly in the sector spent on consumption."
Finally, Podgornyy's formula presented in his. recent election speech (cited earlier) moved even closer' to the economic views of Brezhnev. And in what seemed-toual effort to further the "cult of Brezhnev" and to represent Brezhnev's views as similar to his, Podgornyy added to the reasons that had been given in the official message on the occasion of the award of the Order of Lenin to Brezhnev. Where the official message tressed Brezhnev's military contributions, Podgornyy's remarks highlighted Brezhnev's supposed contributions in economic, social, and political fields as well as in the military.*
Expanding the Role of the Supreme Soviet: Renewing the line emphasized in bis6 election speech and6 Supreme Soviet speech, Podgornyy stressed the allegedly more active role of his Supreme Soviet, implicitly
6 Party-Government message toor outstanding services to the Communist party and the Soviet state in the building of Communism, theof the country's defense potential, for greatin the struggle against the German fascist invaders on the fronts of the Patriotic War, and on the occasion ofh birthday."
6 Podgornyy presentation remarks: for an exceptionally great contribution to the activity of the party and state in the restoration of Leninist principles and standards, in switching the economy to scientifically motivated development, in strengthening the defense potential of the country, and in implementing major social developments for the good of the people."
argued that it wasrubber stamp" parliament, stated that the Soviets control and check "all ihe state organs" (Kosygln'snd praised the expanded activity of the permanent commissions of tbe supreme and republic level Soviets.* Podgornyy in6 speech hadacknowledged that Brezhnev atd CPSU Congress had raised the issue of creating new Supreme Soviet permanent commissions. The new commissions, which were set up in6 and staffed with party apparachiks, weredesigned to strengthen the Supreme Soviet in its dealings with Kosygln's Council of Ministers. In short, lt appears thatin6ember of Podgornyy's Supreme Sovietthat greater party control was needed over the formulation and execution of state legislation. And by instilling some life into the comparatively weak organization headed by Podgornyy, Brezhnev could check Kosygln's power without giving Podgornyy enough organizational authority to eventually rival his (Brezhnev's) position.
Brezhnev has continued his apparent effort to play off Podgornyy against Kosygin. In his7 speech, Brezhnev revealed that the central committeeew days ago" hadesolution which, in effect, backed up7 appeal for enhanced authority of the local Soviets in their dealings with Kosygln's all-union ministries, Podgornyy had stressed that every local soviet "should make fuller use of its rights and obligations" in the fields of economic,and "all matters of local significance."
Interestingly, the apparent squeeze play against Kosygin has not been going smoothly. For example, divergent
commissions are bodies which continue to work between the biannual Supreme Soviet sessions. While the commissions are nominally empowered to check onactivity and to implement resolutions passed by the Supreme Soviet, the commissions in the past have been effectively bypassed by the Council of Ministers. bodies, acting on the approval of the centralhave implemented the vast majority of state
handling by the party's and the government's newspapers of tho substance of the Brezhnev-introduced partyon the local Soviets (discussed above) suggests that that particular Issue was not settled by the resolution. (This surmise Is strengthened by the fact that the text of the resolution was not printed, it was only reported upon.) ravdaarch) on the Brozhnev-intro-duced party resolution suggested that the recommendations of the local Soviets are henceforth to carry greater weight and that Kosygln's local "organizations and In- stltutlons" are now obliged to carry out thoof the local Soviets;*
The CPSU Contral Committee emphasized that the rural and settlement Soviets of workers' deputies are the highest organs of state power on their territory that decisions and instructions of the rural andsovlots taken by them within the sphere of their competence must be carried out by all authorities as well as by all enterprises, organizations and institutions located on the territory of the soviet.
Reflecting Kosygln's preference, Izvestiya'sarch) on the party resolution deleted the passage underlined above, butubsequent passage which stated that the local Soviets "musttheir recommendations with the "enterprises,and institutions" on each particular soviet territory.
ome republic Supreme Soviet leaders, such as Arutyunyan (an Armenian Supreme Soviet official) had complained that tho all-union ministries had been lgnor-ing the recommendations and orders of the local sovlots.
And on the larger Issue of the powers of the Supreme Soviet permanent commissionsis the powers ofCouncil of Ministers, controversy may be reflected in the delay in the adoption of new statutes for the permanentstatute which had been called for in "the near future" by Podgornyy inn the meantime, the government press continues tothe active role of the permanent commissions of the presidium of the Council of Ministers.*
Plenum Preferences: The Brezhnev-Podgornyyis also reflected in the emphasis the two give to the5 CPSUwhich Brezhnev presented his agriculturalthe corresponding de-emphasis given to the5 CPSUwhich Kosygin presented his industrial reform plan. In his election speech, Podgornyy concentrated solely on the salutary effects of the March agricultural plenum. Like Brezhnev, Podgornyy made no specific reference to Kosygin's September industrial reform plenum though he combined, and warmly praised, recent industrial reorganization and agricultural measures.
Kosygin, for his part, praised the decisions of the plenum associated with Brezhnev, but he made it clear that the5 decisions were not the sole reason for the increase in agricultural gross production
prior to the decision regarding capitalthat Kosygin introduced in his election speech, Izvestiya reported onebruary thatew daysonference, held at the Council of Ministersraft, worked out by the commissions of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers USSR,tatute on the USSR ministries. It also discussed drafts of decisions to further expand the rights of the USSR ministers and to refer questions of economic and capital construction to council of ministers of union republics for further determination."
The economic measures worked out by the March plenum of the central committee and the labor upsurge of the workers, collective farm workers and specialists were the decisive condition for speeding up theof agriculture.
And, unlike both Podgornyy and Brezhnev, Kosygin specifically praised the decisions of his5 industrial-plenumassage (in7 election speech) that did not combine industry with agricultural production.
. MAIN FOREIGN DANGER:. DOMESTIC DANGER
Foreign Views: Suslov's positions parallel Brezhnev's on matters of Soviot foreign policy. In his capacity as
the party's chief ideological guardian, Suslov has given particular attention to the formation of an. imperialist front" to meet what he consistently portraysorldwide threat. imperialism. nd encouragement for "West German militarism" has alsorequent theme in Suslov's assessments. But his general theme as it was expressed in6 speech at the Italian Communist party congress, has boon that. is purposefully and persistently undermining the policy of peaceful coexistence byinternational tension.
To remedy this supposedly formidable threat,insistently called for Communist unity under the While Suslov has attacked tho Chinese inwith Communist party mombers, he, unlikeloaders (with the exception of Shelepin) hasconspicuous restraint on the Chinese issue instatements. Since Khrushchev's fall he hasthe Chinese by name. Even his Indirecthave been mild. ime when other
were oponly castigating the Chinese, he only alludedto Chinese obstreperousness. For example, in6 Helsinki speech, instead of attacking Chinese "splitting" activities, he merely indicated their refusal to Join in unity efforts by saying that "the groat majority of the sister parties" are trying to strengthen the world Communist movement. Thus lt was left to the listonor to recall that the Chineso woro not part of that majority. Suslov was an early promotor of the early post-Khrushchev policy of not engaging in polemics with the Chinese. Other sources have reported that Suslov has been optimistic about the possibility of an accommodation with the Chlnose after Mao.
Suslov has even arguedodified version of the old Comintern line of thirty years ago, in the context of callingnited front of "all democratic, anti-imperial ist forces." In this connection, in5 speech Suslov equated the policy of the. administration with pre-war fascism. But at the same tlmo,
Suslov betrayed reluctance about cooperation with West European social democratic leadors. He reasserted Stalin's spurious judgment that the right-wing social democratwere responsible for the rise of fascism and the out-broak of World War IIesult of splitting the European workers' movement ina.
Domestic Views: The consorvatlsm of Suslov's foreign policy pronouncements complements his rigid, doctrinaire domestic pronouncements, particularly those on the role of the CPSU, on the priority devolopment of the heavysector, and on the need to instill discipline and vigilance in the populus.
Suslov in6 election speech set the stage for his comments on the CPSU's lntornal disciplinary tasks by first unearthing the early postwar Soviet dichotomic world view. "We cannot forgetingleuslov argued, "the factitter class struggle between tho two systems, socialism and capitalism, is taking place In the International arena." And on the basis of"psychological war" aimed at subverting socialism, Suslov appealedeturn to Zhdanovism in Sovietaffairs:
It goes without saying that the enemies of socialism cannot stop the progress of tho Soviet society to Communism, but should we bo complacent, they can create difficulties and obataclos in this path. And that is why, in relation to this, it is necessary to maintain vigilance, and our ideological work mustilitant nature in exposing in its true light the bourgeois ideology and the liberal attitude toward It. The Communist Party sees as its main task the preservation of purity and generally multiplying the glorious fighting traditions of the party and theclass and In mobilizing all the efforts and energy of tho Soviet people toward the achievements of big now triumphs in the building of Communism.
Preserving the party's traditional role in tho nation's economic affairs was emphasized in5 speech in Sofia. Ho attacked the Khrushchevian
concept of the economic-oriented party2 "party production principle"). He emphasized (as he had done under Khrushchev) the primacy of the party's political-ideological role. In this connection, Suslov's views of tho correct role for the party and for the state (though differently motivated) resemble Kosygln's. That is, that the state is to be concerned with the day-to-day operation of tho nation's economic life, while tho party is to bo the guardian of tho Marxist-Leninist ideological teachings and tho director (but not tho operator) of the state. This division of responsibilities was set forth in1 Partydocument recently ignored by Brozhnev, but favorably mentioned by Suslov In6 Helsinki address and in7 campaign speech.
But on tho Issue of economic priorities, Suslov (like Brezhnev) has listed the heavy and defense industry before light industry. In the available versions of7 election speech he dwelt only on achievements in the heavy industry sphere (power generation, machine building, chemical and oil roflning industry). With regard to the light industry-consumer sector, Suslov appeared to rost content that the problems were being adequately met. This complacent tone was reflected In bis Helsinki remarks6 in which he emphasized Soviet industrial developments and thon briefly claimed that "light industry and food production are developing todayreater speed than heretofore." In6 election speech he stated that In spite of the "aggravation of the internationaland the underfulfillment of certain parts of the seven-year plan (he mentioned agriculturo in particular) the Soviet Union, nonetheless, "hadot In the struggle to raise material well-being."
Material compensations to induce workers to step up production have not been completely Ignored by Suslov, though he has put his usual oaphasis on moral incentives. For instance, in6 Helsinki speech, Suslov singled out material compensations for farm workers as only one of many party-approved factors that spurred agricultural production.
SHELEPIN: MILITANCY ABROAD, THE HARD LINE AT HOME
Foreign Views; Of all the politburohas drawn the most consistently harshpicture of the world situation, and hasand oven sharpened themes introduced by Shelepin was the first politburo (thento endorse4 threatNorth4 Cairo speech). was the first to expand upon Brezhnev's alteredof peaceful coexistence. In response to aat his4 Cairo pressreportedly replied that "there wore manyin the way of peaceful coexlstonco (with thethe most significant one. imporlaiism'sin thothe peoplos of Vietnam, Cuba,
and the Congo." Shelepin then went on to judgo as false what he callod. view that tho USSR is afraid of' war: "All peoplos realize that we do not fear war, and this is what the United States should understandReflecting sensitivity on the policy implications of that reported boast Soviet accounts of tbe press conference deleted Shelepin'sn5 visits to North Korea and North Vietnam he tailored his remarks for his audiences by avoiding any mention of peaceful coexistence as an element of Soviet foreign policy.* In his most
*In his visit to North Vietnam innpt only referred to "peacefulut he defined it in torms used by Khrushchev. In his 7speech in Hanoi, TASS reported that Kosygin declared: "Invariably following the Leninist policy of peace and peaceful coexistence of states with dlfforent socialthe Soviet Union threatens no country. The Soviet people regard the peoples' struggle for peace as afor creating tho most favorable conditions for the consolidation and development of the socialist community, for promoting the revolutionary workers and national liberation movements." And in the wake of. Air Force bombing of tho Dong Hoi and Vinh Linh areasebruary, tho text of theebruary USSR-DRV joint (footnote continued on
recent remarks on that subject6 Kalinin speech) Shelepin virtually buried coexistence In an appeal for greater vigilance and military strength in order toshattering rebuff to any imperialist aggressor."
Shelepin was the first political spokesmanKosygln's4 proposalilitary budget cut to mention the necessity of "strengthening the defense might of our5 war veteransin Moscow). He was the first to explicitlythat the new five-year plan would concentrate attention on the "further strengthening" of the Soviet5 Severomorsk speech) due to what he portrayed as the worldwide aggressive ambitions of the United States. In his5 speech he not only echoed Drezhnev's line that the world was livingeriod of unrelieved international tension, but Shelepin went out of his way to raise tho alarm of supposed Americanactions directed against the Soviet Union. Cast in the first person singular, his object lesson for vigilance in5 was presented dramatically:
British and American submarines appeared recently near our northern shores. elieve that it is probably not out of love for the beauty of the Far North that in these days the American icebreaker Northwind is plowing its severe waters.
(footnote continued' 'from
statement on the visitosygln-llke reference to the effect that defending peace means (among other things) struggling "for the implementation of tbe policy of peaceful coexistence between countries havingpolitical and social systems, and for the settlement of international disputes through negotoatlons." the above reforonce was not prefacedhrase indicating joint agreement, as in the caso of otherin the joint statemont. In brief, lt appears that Kosygin was not willing to delete peaceful coexistence from the elements of Soviet foreign policy In order to please his audience
Tho speed withar can come to Soviet shores was highlightedemark in6 Leningrad election speech which came close to refuting the Khrushchevian emphasis, dating back to6 CPSU Congress, on the non-inevitability of war. Shelepin stated that the party and the state must "explain tirelessly to the masses the real position of how mysteriously war is born, how lt can descend on us at the most unexpected moment." Comments from other politburo leaders shortly thereafter suggest that they thought Shelepin had gone too far, and they offered counter-balancing arguments. Thus five days later, Suslov in his Leningrad election speech countered with6 party-approved position that while the threatew war does exist, "it does not mean that it will be inevitable" due to the "real forces" in the world which were capable of thwarting the "imperialist's" Intentions. In Karlovy Vary7 (with Shelepin as the number-two man in the SovietBrezhnevomewhat intermediate position by telling tho dolegates that "we do not want tothe danger of war, but neither do we wish toit." The central committee's Theses onh anniversary do not address the Issue of theof war, and the Theses turn around the Khrushchevian emphasis of0 CPSU Congress' line on theof preventing war. 7 document states that "the peoples now have sufficient might to avertow world war by active and coordinated actions. However, as long as imperialism exists the throat of ag-gressivo wars remains."
Kith regard to his emphasis on the continuedof war, Shelepin's comments on tho dosirabilityino-Sovlet rapprochement were particularly in Cairo on4 he reportedly forecast that the dispute will "inevitablyhat Moscow's and Peking's "ultimate aims are one and thend that "liko them, wetaunch attitude against And his provocative attitude toward. rescue effort in the Congo was displayed in his comment
that the presi-
aium aecided to aid the Congo rebels rather than rely on "weak and ineffective protests."
Shelepin's more recent remarks on foreign matters sustain his earlier expressed bias in favor of anforeign line, in his last recorded speech in which he commented on the international situatione held on to the precept that "thein theas seriously deterioratedesult of the strengthening of the aggressive attempts of the imperialist states." Shelepin backed that Brezhnev-like formulation with harsh attacks on the United States and, in particularly sulphurous tones, on West Germany. West Germany, he echoed East German leaderdistortion by saying that "in the German Federal Republic revanchism is raised to the level of stateBrezhnevimilar statement in) Shelepin discussed not only the standard theme of the supposed West German hunger for nuclear weapons, but also the less discussed, highly emotional issue of alleged West German claims to Soviet territory (presumably East Prussia, now Kaliningradskaya Oblast). And he capped his remarks with an alarmist conjuration dealing with the potential of the FRG to developower "which is able to plunge the world intohird world war."
Domestic Conservatism: 7 election remarks on domestic policy matters dovetailed logically with his December foreign policy pronouncements. On the subject of the state of the Soviet economy, Shelepin discussed consumer goods production "briefly" (his word)though consumer goods production was then his chief politburo task.** (He gave considerable attention to
*The excerpted passages of7 Kalinin election speech as rendered by Moscow domestic radio did not include remarks on international affairs. And his speech onay on the occasion of presenting the Order of Lenin to the Bryansk Region was only noted in the press.
**His assignment to consumer affairs in the secretariat and, more recently, his downgrading to trade union chief, seems to have been among the consequences of moves within the ruling group to curb his influence in organizational questions and cadres appointments within the central Shelepin's slide highlights the influence of Kremlin power politics over policy, inasmuch as he was one of the most eager backers of the hard line introduced t- Brezhnev.
consumer goods production in his June election speech last year, but in that speech he was careful to list the task of "considerably increasing" production before the task of increasing the standard of living.) And in his election remarks this year he reiterated his past view that the party and government are "firmly adhering to the priority development of heavy industry."
POLYANSKIY: REFORM AT HOME, CAUTION ABROAD
Internal Policy: The contrasts between the domestic policy formulations of Polyanskiy and the "metal eaters" on the politburo have been striking. 7 election speech attacked "conceited comrades" who were arguing,ut in allocations to the agriculturalsector, in Polyanskly's6 Syktyvkarhich determinesarge extent" the growth of the nation's economyhole and theof the Soviet citizen's standard of living." Thus in launching his barrage against the heavy industrialists, Polyanskiy did not call (as Shelepin did on the next day) for the utilization of the supposed "big reserve existing everywhere." Polyanskiy said:
Above all, to insure fulfillment of the plans envisaged, there must be full allocation and tho best possible utilization of planned capital investments and material-technical means. This has to be said because the good results of the last agricultural year have gone to the heads of some comrades. Some people are beginning to argue that collective and state farms are now able to develop with less substantial aid, that melioration plans can be cut and supplies of technical equipment and mineral fertilizers reduced. Such arguments are extremely dangerous, for they could delayof the planned program and any attempts in that direction must be resolutely nipped in the bud.
(That Polyanskiy has been fighting an uphill battle is suggested by Moscow's official mid-year status report on the Soviet economy which indicates that the growth rates
for agricultural and chemical equipment for the first six months7 are down relative to the rates of growth of the two proceeding periods The status report7 also suggests that expanding militaryhave virtually pre-empted the planned expandedof agricultural machinery.)
In his next majorune in Blagoveshchensk) Polyanskiy reiterated earlier argumentsmore and more proportional development of all branches of the country's production" and presented tho consumer's case in argumentative terms (which of course, may be read as an attack on Chinese Communist fanaticism):
Let some personages Ideyateli] who have lost their mind talk as though the desire to live betterourgeois prejudice.
With regard to the heavy industry sector, Polyanskiy stated that the party "will continue to devote special attention to the continuous growth of heavythan stating Shelepin's different tack that the party "firmly adheres to the priority development" of that sector. In other words, Polyanskiy was arguing that the party should not go overboard with, and be inflexible toward theof the heavy industry sector. (The party should merely devote attention to continue industrial growth, rather than "firmly adhere" to the "priority development" of headus try.)
Polyanskiy has repeatedly argued that discipline alone is not the method to overcome economic shortcomings. (Shelepin, on the other hand, called for tighteningthroughout the economy and cracking down on those who "restho are "conceited" and who "close their eyes tond called upon such sinners to engage inn his election speech inolyanskiy aimed an attack at theby warningolicy of tightening discipline would fail unless it was combined with "comradelytoward honest workers and responsiveness to the urgent needs and demands of everyone. And in line with Kosygin's emphasis on olyanskiy in his6 speech asserted (in the present tense) the
importance of "constantly" observing Leninist norms and style of party and state leadership and he declared that tbe party must eradicate "subjectivist" approach,"rudeness" and an "incorrect attitude" toward fellow workers. To omphasize his argument, he cited Lenin'sreference to Lenin's comments on Stalin'srudeness in contacts with follow workers and subordinates was impermissible.*
Whileactful approach in personnel policy, Polyanskly's comments on liberal Soviet writers have been as dogmatic as Suslov's and Brezhnev's blasts at the "anti-social" and alien trends in Soviet society and literature. For example, Polyanskiy Inaccused American anti-Communists of endeavoring "to use for hostile activities any scum, from Kerensky to crazy story writer Tarsls. And now, enticod by tho American dollars, Alliluyeva [Stalin's daughter], the fanatical servant of Cod and God seeker, has been drawn into this dirty cause."
Foreign Views: Polyanskiy has frequently cited the same "facts" used by bis hard line politburo colleagues to demonstrate. activity is both worldwide and aggressive. In particular in his6 speech in Syktyvkar, Polyanskiy played down the potentialof. activity in Vietnam. action here has ledmore tense" world situation) and fanned the fearsonflagration omerging from the West:
Great anxiety is caused among Soviet people byhotbed of tension in the very center of Kuropo, The Wost Gorman imperialists, supported. ruling circles, arc working to gain access to nucloar woa-pons, Thoy shout openly about revenge andeview of the existing frontiers. This is nothing but tho unleashingew world war.
also cited Lenin's statement that "heads" havo no right to be "rude and nervous" precisely because they are heads. Polyanskly's admonitions against rudeness and nervousness almost surely mirrored bruised feelings over the conduct of somebodyhead" apparently) in the "collective" leadership.
But his expend! sector) defense with re Soviet simulta on defe
statements on the roquired level of Soviet defense tures (like his statements on the heavy industry have cautioned against going overboard. And hisformulas have generally been embellished Terences to past sacrifices, the adoquacy of present might, the neod to avert war, and the need to neously continue "constructive work" while working nsos.
PRODUCTION AND PRAGMATISM
een careful to hew to Brezhnev's line since Khrushchev's fall stressing the primacy of production
till To^tTT inPOliCy" heSnSJe task for the new five-year plan consists of insuring a
rowth of industry, steadyrates in agriculture, and, thanks to this of achieving
a substantial rise in tbe people's living6 Smolensk speech.) But like Kosygin he has stressed the efficacy of science and technology as the means of raising labor productivity and meetingneeds. Thus, he has been an outspoken defender of the technocracy. In6 election speech, for example, he stressed that Kosygln's economic reformrecognition on the part of the party that "economic and engineerlng-tochnlcal workers have accumulated great experience in socialist and Communist construction and can docldo Independently Important complex tasks with an awareness of whit they are doing." Kosygin has alsoimilar--but not soto the important role of the technocrats, but such references to therolo of technicians are not frequent In leaders' speechos.
Paralleling the bulk of his domestic policyhe has sldod with those who stress theof economicthanthe issue of world revolution. Voronov hasvoiced Kosygln's line on establishing bilateral buslness-llkc relations with the states of Western Europe. In tbe wake of his6 visit toe repeatedly spoke of the "unexplolted possibilities" for the development of bilateral economic and cultural contacts between Britain and the Soviet Union.
MAZUROV: IDEOLOGICAL DISCIPLINE AND CONSERVATISM
Mazurov hasasic conservatism onof economic policy. He was closely associated with the ministerial re-centralization after Khrushchev's fall and in his6 election speech polntod out that the post-Khrushchev restructuring of industrial managementlong more traditional lines) was based onimplication being that Khrushchev's reforms lacked this essontlal characteristic. Ho recalled In67 election speeches the charges against
Khrushchev's policy (many leaders have now dispensed withthe underestimation of objective economic laws, voluntarism and subjectivism. In67 election speech he was careful to note that new plan's aim of accelerated growth rates for both heavy andIndustry was occurlng under the umbrella of the maintenance of the preferential development of the means of production.
Mazurov has stressed the role of economics in policy citing Lenin on the point but not the Khrushchevian formula that politics is to economics. In the past he has used tho formula on economicsost important policy which was used under Khrushchev by those who did not accept the more explicit and radical Khrushchev Mazurov has also given stress to Ideological indoctrination. Re said that "Communist morality, strict and conscientious discipline is possible only in uncompromis ing, persistent struggle against bourgoois Ideology and propaganda, against Indifference to politics, survivals
of private ownership attitudesattitude
toward national ideals and triumphs". And in his recent Leningrad speech, heifferent tack on labor policy than that taken by Polyanskiy. Mazurov omphasizod solely the "struggle for strict labor
On forolgn policy issues, Mazurov has closelyto Brezhnev's policy guide lines. Regarding Europe, his recent Leningrad remarks stressed Joint bloc roceptivity to West European interest in economic cooperation. He was sharply critical of the "hostile policies" of the Kieslnger-Brandt coalition which, he said, wore backod by. in order to try to "maintain tension and dis-sldence" in Europe. imilar goal is assigned by Mazurov. activity elsewhere in the globe.
SHELEST: ORGANIZATIONAL DISCIPLINE AND DEFENSE
Mazurov's, Shelest's foreign and domestic policy statements bear tho conservative trademark. He has made consumor well-being conditional on futurein the industrial and agricultural sector. He has ropoatedly emphasized the need for Increasingon one6 Ukrainian plenum report)6 election statement that "people's rule was unthinkable withoutigh level ofe, like Suslov, has also strongly socondod Brezhnev's and. Podgornyy's proposals for strengthening the powers of the Supreme Sovietis Kosygin's Council of Ministers.*
With little variation, Shelest's comments onaffairs have stressed tho need to strengthenenses, raise vigilance and "Intensify the struggle against tho American imperialists and the perfidiousof the West German revanchlsts." Not all his comments, however, have echoed this line: on7 speech) he resurrected, in part, one of Khrushchev's favorites by asserting that "the world socialist system is winning ever new victories in the economic competition with capitalism." (Under Khrushchev, "peaceful economic competition" was regarded as the "main" arena of struggle withas one of many struggles, as Shelest andh anniversary Theses have it.)
he has apparently adopted positions on economic and organizational questions that contrast with those held by Kosygin, on matters of nationalitiesparticular the rarely discussed matter of the status of Jews in the5 remark that Jews made an important contribution to the Ukrainian victory In World War II followod Kosygin's unusual5 assertion that antl-semltlsm was alien to the Communist world outlook. The other politburo members have apparently remained silent on this issue.
KIRILENKO: REFORM AND WELL-BEING "NOW"
Kirilenko has consistentlyro-consumor bias. He was one of tho first Soviot leaders to press for the growth of consumer goodsate similar to the growth of heavy5 Vladivostok speech). And his recent remarks on the need for greater attention to the consumer sector are reminiscent of Khrushchev'seforence to "goulash Communism." Kirilenko cited Lenin's "testament" that under socialism "everyone wants the good things ofnd Kirilenko went on to state that the CPSU "fulfills Lenin's testamont in overy way." In the same speech, Kirilenko paraphrased5 Baku formula (discussed on; Kirilenko argued that in light of the party's solicitude for production, consumer industries are "now able to advance more quickly." Unlike Brozhnev at6 Party Congress, Kirilenko did not base an increase in consumer goods production upon "successes achioved in the development of heavyor did he voice Brezhnev's congress lino that the party would givo "more rapid development" to the heavy Industry sector. And in the same address, Kirilenko strongly endorsed Kosygln's economic reforms and pointedly criticized "certain workers" who adhero to the "old ways."* imilar criticism was recently leveled in an Izvestiyagainst ferrous metallurgy planners who "frequently do not
on matters of domestic politics (not policy),has done much to contribute to the Brezhnevcult." 6 Kirilenko at Novorossiysk bestowed on Brezhnev qualities once reserved for Khrushchev; Kirilenko said that "lt gives me groat pleasure to mention that the general secretary of our party's central. Brezhnev, who at that time was head of the political section ofh Army, was among the ranks of thewho fought for Novorossiysk and among the defenders of the "Little Land" [the locationanding operation in. Under his leadership, many-sided party and political work was conductod among the units and groups of units under complex fighting conditions. Participants in the struggle for Novorossiysk remomber with great warmth the Indefatigable activity of Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, his personal bravery and steadfastness and his profoundconviction, which served as models of partymlndod-ness and military valor."
take into consideration the achievements of science and technology" and "implement decisions based on yesterday's positions."*
On foreign policy subjects,USSR relations, Kirilenko has generally hewed to the Brezhnev line. That is, that an end. "interference" in the internal affairs of foreign countries. not justis the precondition to improving relations with the Soviet Union. Kirilenko in Chile in5 also strongly endorsed CPSU support for anti-American popular fronts.
PELSHE: THE CAUTIOUS NEWCOMER
Pelshe, elevated to the politburo at last year's party congress, has skillfully skirted virtually all the major controversial domestic economic issues. He hasboth Industrial and consumer production but,has not linked the two sectorsormula that would clearly betray his personal preference, in hiswell-coordinated speech at the French CP Congress in early January this year, Pelshe listed the party's task of satisfying the "material and spiritual interests" of the Soviet people after the task of increasing "economic and political strength." On another occasion as thespokesman, Pelshe discussed in somewhat more detail and gave more effusive praise to Soviet accomplishments in the heavy (rather than light) industry sector. 6 revolution anniversary speech) But as mentioned earlier, the fact that these speeches appear to be heavily coordinated renders them less useful for the purpose of defining individual positions on key themes.
Treading very cautiouslyew politburo member, Pelshe has given praise to the decisions reached at Brezhnev's5 agricultural plenum and Kosygin's5 industrial plenum. But in hisarch speech atd Party Congress, Pelshe repeatedly praised Brezhnev by name and endorsed Brezhnev's suggestion toystem of "elective collective farm cooperative bodies." The cooperative
the Izvestiya editorial did not state that the allocations would be increased in the ferroussector Rather, the editorial, afterthat8 state plan for this sector was "recentlyoncluded that the "growth of production of steel and rolled metal is in the main intended to be through an improvement of the work of the operating units."
Ialist the bottomist It tollt
of ?Jfgr1S',than nis PWticuUr iLfingrnaVMlS' Pelshe's positions on key foreign policy issues have not been made clear.
CANDIDATE (NON-VOTING) MEMBERS
Andropov (the new KGB chairman) has sided with Brezhnev on most major foreign policy issuesn hlS7 Novo!'
f> Andropov referred to "peaceful coexistence"assage devoted only to improving relations with West
Si??dastfttateSi rdine SovietgrelationsUnited States, Andropov voiced the line most consistently espoused by Brezhnev; that is, that the suppedmasterplan of the United States precludedSoviet relations. Andropov said:
In the interests of international peace, our country is also ready to improve relations with the United States However,. officialsreat deal about their love of peace, about the need to respect human rights and the dignity of the peoples-but what are their actual deeds? The United SUtes UnTKJ Sri?*circles of West Germany. The United States is the inspirer of all the aggressive blocs in the world. Any people who rise up to fight for their national liberation are confronted with
aggression. imperialism. That is what happened in Korea, Guatemala, Cuba, the Congo, the Dominican Republic, and finally, asknows, that is what is happening in Vietnam.
Regarding domestic economic positions, Andropov seemed to favor the consumers' interests inasmuch as he listed people's well being" before raising "production" (heavy industry) and by reiterating the reformers' formula calling for an approximation of the
rates of growth in the heavy and light sectors of the economy. Andropov's "liberal" image was sharpened
"jafter his KGB promotion which stateasoviet intellectuals welcomed his newthe other hand,reported that
the Moscow intellectual community was alarmed by thecirculated immediately after Andropov's KGBthe Soviet censorship organ, Glavlit, would soon become part of tho KGB.
Demichov: In his speeches Demichev in one way gives the appearance ofeo-Zhdanovite ideologue whotrong line on combatting the influx of "hostile bourgeois ideology" in the USSR and intensifyingand ideological controls within the country. Thus he seems to have been very much allied with the post-Khrushchev re-emphasis on the party's ideological role in Soviet society. On the other hand, he also conveys the impression of sophistication seeking ways of revitalizing
and adapting official doctrine to contemporary Soviet He clearly isigid neo-Stalinlst, and has stressed the need for theorists to come to grips with the new social science disciplines.
Nonetheless, in his speeches, Demichev strikos all the main themes ofd Congress on ideological He has often spoken of the "Ideologicalbeing waged against the USSR by the West and attacks the "notorious tactics of building bridges" which he asserts are designed to soften and corrupt Communism from within. Demichev also stressed the "still existing heterogeneity of our society." This suggestion that all traces of tho class struggle in tho USSR internally have not been removedine dampening to Khrushchev's notionociety which had become homogeneoustate of the whole people. Notably, in this latter connection, Demichev plugged the line (which Polyanskiy tacitly criticized) on tho need for intensification of work discipline and the struggle against "anti-social phenomena." Demichev stressed that this washort-term campaign caused bycircumstances and linked it with tho broad campaign to educate tho new Soviet man. He also repeated tho theme that the enemy sought to implant nihilism in Soviet youth by exploiting the shortcomings and errors "which occurred in our history" (the Stalin period). Demichev read the party's message to7 Soviet Writersordering that the writers1 union work to defeat the enemy from within; the union "must continue to work for rallying creative forces on the fundamental party basis, to shape collective views on fundamental Ideological-creative problems, to promote the ideological tempering of writers, to shape their Marxist-Leninist outlook,particular attention to young writers." At the same time In his comments on economic policy, Demichev has portrayed himselfpokesman for traditional interests.
Kunayev: Kunayev. an unmistakable protege ofhas stuck closely to his principalagriculture. Notably, he strongly boosted the ambitious program for land reclamation presonted by Brezhnev at the6 plenum and in6 election speech made claims for the program not unlike those once asserted for Khrushchev's virgin 1ands project. Kunayev thus notod that tho new policy will help produce Increases inoutputhort time" andhis warning at those lukewarm toward reclamation as aMwe must all understand'* the landproject washort-lived campaign,ong term program of planned expansion of agricultural lands. On broader areas ofas tho hard line toward the United States, and the heavy industryhas echood Brezhnev.
Grishin: Conservative economic formulationsproduction over consumption and appeals for the strengthening of the Supreme Soviet mark Grishin, the newly appointed Moscow city secretary,rezhnovlte. (Though at the2 plenum, Grishin showedtoroponent of economic
Belyayev was made the scapegoat for failures in the virgin lands inunayev who was the second highest official in Kazakhstan next to Belyayev emerged unscathed. The interesting thing is that Khrushchev heaped abuse on Kunayev equal to that he gave Belyayev, but Kunayev subsequently prospered and Belyayev wont into oblivion, Brezhnev who was linked with the virgin lands projectnd who was involved in the purging of Belyayev undoubtedly was Instrumental in saving Kunayev's political neck at the time. It would seem that Kunayev's gratitude has not diminished with time. His election speech inor example, Is replete with references showing that Kunayev regards Brezhnev as his boss and personal leader. s Comrade Brezhnevthe Central Committee and "in his May plenum report Comrade Brezhnevnd so forth.)
reform stressed by Kosygin) Grishin has strongly seconded agrlcu1turaIntroduced by Brezhnev, and like Kunayev, Grishin in his public speeches has often praised Brezhnev by name. Generally steering clear of contentious foreign policy issues, Grishin in5 speech in Belgrado seconded Brezhnev's4 and Suslov's5 call for anunited front and called for joint action of alltrado unions to oppose tho nuclear arming of the Vest German Army. Urishin's comments on the supposed global ambitions of the United States have not variedfrom Suslov's or Brezhnev's,
Mzhavanadze: In line with Suslov, Georgian party leader Mzhavanadze has concentrated on the ideological role of the party and on what he has called the "purity of the party ranks." In his7 Georgian central committee speech he citeds he had done ind Congross report and his report at the5 Georgian central committee plenum) on the matter offaithful party members. And in his election speeches of the last throe years he has stressed the need forand vigilance against the "slightest deviation" fromm . Mzhavanadze has employed Stalin's device of pledging that the Individual and his welfare is the "highest aim" of the party, and then going on to list industrial production before the other tasks of the party, such as increasing living standards. Not only has he listed the party's tasks in the style of Leonid Brezhnev (ande has also given particularly obsequious praise to the current general secretary. In6 Tbilisi speech, for example, Mzhavanadze thankedch" nd, incidenti i atronymic) for giving an award to the Georgian republic and assured "our dear Leonid" that existing shortcomings in the republlc would be ellmlniated. Georgian problems have occupied tho bulk ofime. Accordingly, he has given only sporadic attention to routine theme of. imperialism" in Vietnam.
Rash1doy: erm used by his Chinese no ighbors, Dzbck party leader Rashidov has occupiedwith what he called in7 election speech the
"leap forward" in industry and agriculture in his republic. Whileew of his policy remarks have been made available, the pattern that emergesrezhnev look. On the issue of the relative powers of Kosygln's Council of Ministers and Podgornyy's Supreme Soviet, Rashidov(in hispril speech this-year) on increasing the role of the latterational level, such assoviet control over the ministries, andocal level, such as granting added authority to the village and settlement Soviets. And on the matter of thwarting the alleged global and villainous actions and Intentions of the United States, Rashidovjakarta speech in late5 voiced Brezhnev's and Suslov's call for united action of all "anti-lmperlalist forces," Repeating that call at26 Tri-Continental Congress in Havana, Rashidov unveiled the particularly militant definition that Moscow's peaceful coexistence doctrine did not apply in the underdeveloped world where people are fighting for their "liberation."
We believe that relations between sovereign states with different social structures should be^based on peaceful coexistence. However, it is quite clear that there is no peaceful coexistence, nor can there be peaceful coexistence between the oppressed peoples and theircolonialists and thebetween the imperialist aggressors and their victims.
(In the wake of strong reaction from Latin Americanthe Soviet Foreign Ministry took the unusual action of privately disavowing Rashldov's statements and passed the word through Brazilian and Uruguayan ambassadors that Rashidov had spoken to the conference as an unofficial^ "non-governmental" delegate. The disavowal appearede hypocritical, since Rashidov was most likely given explicit guidance both prior to and during the Havana conference.)
rezhnevite of long-standing, Ukrainian Council of Ministers chairman Shcherbltskly' has consistentlyias in favor of heavy industry interests, and in5 he took exception to CPSU
Secretary Kapitonov's listing of the three main features of6 budget. The budget as presented by Kapitonovember of the Budget Commission of the Supreme Soviet's Council of thealledeneralof the nation'srowth in living and, trengthening of the nation's military might. Shchorbitskiy at the same sessioneversed the order of .the last two features and in his subsequent speeches he proceeded to press even morefor defonse priorities. Inarch election speech this year, for example, he interpretedandidate to the Supreme Sovietignal of "complete approval" of the CPSU's "general policy line and its unremitting struggle to strengthen the Soviet Union's might." He has frequently paid deference tociting the general secretary on such subjects as the importance of moral incentives and "Bolshevik" self-sacrifice. Shcherbitskiy has given attention to the matter of selection of qualifiod party cadres, but unlike his colleague Mzhavanadze, Shcherbitskiy has stressed thefor party cadres to study economics and modern methods of production.
Ustinov: Befitting his party responsibilities as Brezhnev's defense-industry expert, Ustinov has based his froquont appeals for increased defense expenditures on the "belligerent tendencies" of West German "revengers" in Europe and on. policy of "armed attack" on the DRV and "constant pressure" on Cuba and North Korea. Ustinov has consistently given priority to the heavy industry sector. In an apparent effort to expand his heavy-defense industry empire, Ustinov seemed to be promoting the idea of.diversification by pressing for
incidentally, was not re-elected to the budget commission, which was reorganized into thean Planning-Budget Commission at the6 Supreme Soviet session. He retained, however, the importantof the central committee department that controls personnel appointments.
the utilization of certain defense industry plantsautomobile manufacture. He promoted theof Soviet automobiles innd did not comment on the plannedof the Italian Fiatconsumerassociated with Kosygin. (The heavywas not linked to the project to expandwhich Kosygin introduced in hisprilspeech. In fact, in his
wilh the president of Fiat later in THO year, Kosygin reportedly indicated the desire to reduce defenso Industry costs and, with the attendant savings, to shift from the production of conventional armaments and nuclear woapons to more intensive development of the consumer industries.)
Masherov: Like his republic partyolorussian First Secretary Masherov hasthe "preferential development of tho production of the means of production belonging to groupheavy-defense Industry sector. And in his brief7 Minsk election speech he ignored tho consumeraltogether and concentrated solely on industrial growth in Belorussia. In6 election speech he talked about production of refrigerators, television sets and mo forth, but he concluded his reaarka on that subject by counter-balancing material goods and Communist Ideals.
While showing constant care for improving the material well-being and the cultural level of the Soviet people, tho party simultaneously gives groat attention to the
upbringing of everybody In the spirit of Communism. The moulding of the Communist world outlook and of high ethical standards will leadurtherof conscious discipline among workers.
And with regard to strengthening Soviet militaryhas proved tooyal supporter of the He also has employed one of Stalin's
practices of using military terminology in referring to organs of the party. Thus, in Masherov's style, the CPSTf central committee is "the battle headquarters."
In conclusion, the vagaries of Kremlin politics must bo kept tn mind, for the patterns in the leader's policy statomonls described in part two of this paper are not Immune from substantial transformations. The pursuitiven policy in the Soviet environment has not infrequently been subordinated to politicalon the partiven leader and his coterie. (In addition, Kremlin cliques have been notoriously precarious. All aro unstable.) Kosygin's gradual and temporaryaway in the summer5 from his own version of detente abroad and concentration on civilian economics at homell haveentative compromise aimed at preventing aas the defeat of his economic reform plan (adopted amid rumors of his imminentthe face of his losing battle to cut the Soviet military budget. The identifiable policy patterns have, nonetheless,emarkable degree ofduring the post-Khrushchev period. The remarks of tho individual leaders have reflected power and policy struggles and shouldseful backdrop against which future struggles can be better understood.