Tht followingorganixcrfiorijin hSa preparation ot this etfifnerffe
Central Irttalllgenc* Agamy and the IriteUiganca organlxaitom of the Deport-manti of Slam and Defame, and tha NSA.
Vic* Ada.aylor, Dapvty Diractor. Caotrol Imelliganc* Mr. George C. Danny,(or tha Director ot Intelligence ond KaMorch, Department o( Ml
Vice- Adm. Vomonowronce. for the Director. Defame Intelligence Agency It. Gar. Marahallarter, ihootional Security Agency
Dr. Chart. Rekhardt, for tha AaWtont General Manager, Atomic Energyand Mr, William C. Sullivan, the Auhtarrt Director, Federal Boreou of Invottlgatlon. lha tob|ecl being outjJda of thalr luritolclion.
III. CAPABILITIES AND
ANNEX: North Korean Military Capabilities With Respect To South Korea
north korean intentions and capabilities with respect to south korea
believe that the recent, more vigorous activities ofagainsl the South have several motivations; to createon the Pak government; to tie down large ROK forces;the Communist clandestine apparatus in the South;osition to exploit any new and major disruption in thetiming of these tactics has been strongly influenced by theWar, for example by such factors as the absence oftroops in South Vietnam.
North Koreans will almost certainly continue theirof military liarassment in the DMZ, at current or evenWe believe that North Korea undertook its program ofits own volition, not under pressure from either Moscow orthat this program does notresent Communistinvade South Korea. Pyongyang is conscious of the riskssuch an action and would be reluctant to accept them.is probably no intention of escalating the DMZ attacks toat which open warfare might result. The North mighthowever, and raise the ante along the DMZ until theto strike back ineries of actions andensue which could lead to open hostilities.
Korea will also continue attempts to infiltrateteams into rear areas of South Korea. Communist chancesviable bases for guerrilla operations are probablysome teams will be able to carry out short-term terroristmissions.
here hasarked increase in Northagainst ROK and US forces in Korea's Demilitarizedarger teams of more heavily-armed North Korean agentslanded in rear areas of South Korea with orders to test theAnd sir.ee early September, there have been two instancesagainst South Korean trains. These developments raise importantWhy has North Korea, after moreecade of relativerogram of violent action against the South? what doesto achieve? And what arc its chances?
i. recent north korean activities
Captured agents have testified that North Korean plans to subvert South Korea underwent significant changes during the winter. Thereubstantial enlargement of agent training facilities by the ruling Korean Labor Party's Liaison Bureau, Pyongyang's primary agency for intelligence and subversive operations in South Korea, and instruction in guerrilla tactics was added to the curriculum. At the same time, the North Korean Army'sBureau set up several new training "bases- and, perhaps more significant, seems to have been assigned at least partial responsibility for coven operations in rear areas of South Korea.'
The DMZ Area. From mid-October to earlyhere weremall-scale but deliberate North Korean attempts to kill or capture US and ROK personnel in or near the DMZ,mbushes inotalSOK soldiers werection along the lSO-mtle-long DMZ subsided as usual over the winter. Inowever, it flared to extraordinary levels. So far this year,ncidents of all types have been reported* In comparison:MZ incidents were reported5nd
1 The. ReconnaJssarx* BureauWeonnaissaiw* Brigade, with an estimatedOf,an Airborne Reconnaissance Battalion; (hex; dements or* trained (or rxhlnd-tbe-lin* opcrstMns In tlie even! of war. In addition, thereoot Rewm-nabsarx* Department, with an estimated strength. which has hitherto been concerned only with the acqnaafioa of laclical military Information by short-icrmrimarily in tbe DMZ am.
ol these attack* otay have been retaliatory. For example, tbe one Ui which the US troops wr( killed occurred one week after ROK forces raided the North Korean sector and kilted or wounded aboutorth Koreans.
' With respect toMZ. the word "incident" Is usedroad sense to mean anythingire fisht between opposing forces rnorth Korean mine or live dischargeS or ROK weaponresumed intruder.7 incident total includesire fight* In whichS and ROK soldiers have been killed and ISO wounded: known North Korean casualties liave beenilledaptuieil.
The increase in DMZ incidents reported this year is comprised of many elements. The increased alertness of US and ROK forces following the attacks inmproved reporting of DMZ activity by front line units toand Ihc availability of new detection equipment probably meanreater proportion of infiltrations are bring spotted. Nevertheless, infiltration appears to be much higher tlian in the past.ercent of the incidents appear to Ite aggressive lwrassments of the type initiated lastattacks on outposts and ambushes of patrols. Other incidents are attributable toand shallow reconnaissance actions by North Korean paramilitary personnel; there is evidence that this has recently become part of their training. As in earlier years, however, many DMZ incidents Involve the detection of agents, alone or in small teams, moving in or out of South Korea on intelligence or subversiveifference is Hurt they are evidently better firmed and more aggressive tlian before. 'Hie two train sabotage missions of September Occurred near tbe DMZ and may have been the work of agents recently infiltrated from the North.
Rear Areas.he North Koreans may have stepped up seaof agents into rear areas of South Korea. Sincehere hasurther increase in landings and, more important, the scope of activity has changed. The North Koreans have begun landing largttr teams, more heavily armed andumber of army ofBccrs; at leastuch teams,en, have landed. Their primary mission has been to see if certain remote highlands could serve as base areas for guerrilla war. They had no orders to initiate violence, other than to engage in small DMZ liarassments while cxfiltrat-ing. They were to return North before winter.
So farhe teams appear to have had little success in accomplishing their stated mission. ROK securityandreportedndROK losses have been staled asilled andouth Korean civilians have cooperated by promptly reporting suspicious activities. The Communist agents have proved to be poorlyAlmost all were native northerners with speech identifiable as such; many apparently lacked adequate local knowledge; and some teams were so short of supplies that they degenerated into food-gathering expeditions.
A relative handful ol these men, including someemain at large, and there may be teams which have not been discovered. Any evaluation of the effectiveness of this new North Korean lactic, Iherefore, must necessarily be tentative. There will be some gains lo the Communists in intelligence and operational experience, which can be applied to future training. But it may be that their chief gain from rear-area activity this year will he psychological. The infiltration, coupled with DMZnd bellicose propaganda from Pyongyang, has worried the Pak government and exposed it to domestic criticism. In addition, as many0 KOK police and military may have become involved to some degree in the detection and pursuit of the infiltration teams.
IL north KOREAN MOTIVES
yongyang's recent tactic* appear to representiirw style of approach to what we iiill believe is its long-term objective; the reunification of Korea under Communist rule. The adoption of these tactic* seems toeaction to twohe war in Vietnam and the growing political and economic strength of South Koreais the North. In the course, of time, Korean developments alone might have led the Inruled and hard-linesong regime to move as it has against tbe South. But the war in Vietnam probably caused North Korea to act when it did.4
A. North versus South
Economic Situation. Tho past few years have not been good onesKorea, particularly in the economic sphere.4heexcellent progress toward its goals of rapid industrialization andigh degree of sell-sufficiency. This progress arousedsome South Koreans, particularly students and intellectuals, whoby their own relatively modest economic advances under Phrctbe prospttt of prolonged dependence on lhe US. Itajor lheCommunist unification propaganda.
ncouraged by its success anil with the promise of substantia) Soviet assistance. North Korea launched an ambitious Seven-Year Plan. It was billedrogram to raise living standards while continuing the rapidof heavy industry. Within two or three years, however, it became apparent that the plan had failed, particularly the effort to raise living standard' In pan. thisesulteduction in Soviet aid when North Korea, inligned Itself with Peking in the Sino-Soviethe failure was admitted publicly at the Korean Labor Party Conference in earlyulfillment of the plan was postponed7he major reason adduced for this 'readjustment of tempo in the development of the national economy" was the threat of US aggression and the consequent need for strengthening defense
By contrast, the economy of South Korea began to grow more rapidly in* and, though its per capita gross national product (CNP) Is still lower than that of North Korea,5 the South was surpassing Northern rates of growth in most Industrial sectors and probably In agricultural product urn asustained rise in living standards was abo perceptible. In these circumstances, whatever propaganda appeal North Korean economic achievements once had for the South has been largely dissipated.
'Brig. Gen.ranklin, dm Acting Anbtant ChW ol SUIT for liitrlllp'Orf,of (he Anny. believes that this leniencehein Vietnamfor North Kara'i recentHi betavei (Julthe war In VirtnuinOTiilrom! and encoorajnl North Kcra'idopt new tktVi.
aid row inJlri PYongyang revrrtpilcolttnn of neutrality ort leut In pari for economic rcamm.
The Political Scene. Political developments in the South have been equally frustrating for Pyongyang- The years05ime of domestic political turmoil in South Korea. Kim Il-song and his associates must have been encouraged as they viewed, in rapid succession: (he "student revolution" which toppledear of confused and tolerant parliamentary democracy; the coup by disaffected nationalistic officers; their unpopular repressive measures; and,itter military-civilian political struggle for control of theYet today, after two national elections, the firmly anti-CommunistPak isosition of unchallenged authority in Seoul and appears to have the support, or at least the acquiescence,ajority of the population.
Certainly, all South Korean political problems have not been solved. The rigging of recent legislative elections has led to considerable dissatisfaction with the regime. And there are other, longer range, problems even more difficult to cope with, including the developmentiable political opposition.the outlook for political stability in Southood, so long as economic improvement continues and the governmenteasonable degree of sensitivity in handling popular grievances.
The apparent inability of North Korea to exploit unrest in the Southhrough its usualand politicalprobablyactor in its decision to adopt viulent tactics. Propagandafor unification on Communist terms had some impact in the emotional and permissive atmosphere that accompanied the fall of Rhce, but such proposals were categorically rejected and their advocates suppressed after the military coupn any case, pressures for unification seem to have diminished among South Koreans in recent years. Nor has the North Korean campaign of political subversion demonstrated much effectiveness. There are perhapshundred clandestine Communist agents in the country (and almost certainly many more Communists and Communistut they seem to have made no significant progress in subverting the population or in penetrating the higher levels of tbe government and the military.
International Relations. South Korea has also made gains on thescene in recent years. Most important was the establishment ofrelations with japan, which opened the way for massive injections of Japanese economic aid. But to the North Korean leadership, the implications of the ROK-Japanese agreement far exceeded the likely economic gains to South Korea.inimum, iteduced Japanese interest in mollifying North Korea or assisting itsore important, in the North Korean view, it would lead inevitably to increased Japanese political influence in South Korea
apan gave notice of iU decision OOt to9 agreement with North Korea mxWr which wnic SB.noO Korean resident) at Japan had been helped to migrate to North Korea.6orth Korean economic delegations (mind it increasingly difficult to enter Japan,ciult, at least one important deal, for tlie tale of an acrylic fiber plant to North Korea, fell through.
and, possibly,OK-Japanese military alignment TV North has been less fortunate in its International dealings. While it began to achieve somerecognition by non-Communist status3ecent gains of this sort have been few.
B. The Vietnamese War
The war in Vietnam is proltabfy the proximate cause of the North Korean shift to tactics of violence against Southnith theof regular US bombing of North Vietnam and the dispatchROK troops to South Vietnam, the conflict there eamc toentral place in Pyongyang's thinking. In July, about the lime that US ground combat troops began to arrive in South Vietnam in force and Seoul announced that it wouldull combat division. Kim II-song adopted the line that Vietnam had become "the focal point" in tltc world struggle. Al the partyofim went further and tailed upon Communists every-where to get tough with the US in order to "disperse" its forcrs. He urged the necessity of destroying, in Vietnam, "illusions" about American strength andHe stated that if this were accomplished, it wouldlear setback for the Pak governmentowerful boost for Communist prospects in the South. (Conversely, in Pyongyang's: view, if Hanoi did ttot succeed in unifying Vietnam on Communis! terms, prospects for eventual unification of Korea on South Korean terms might be enhanced.)
Pyongyang has abo been apprehensive that the conflict in Southeast Asia might spread to China and thence ultimately to Korea.he North enjoyed the relatively unstinted support of both Moscow and Peking.hough it still li.is security pacts with both, Pyongyang has become less certain what their response would be in the eventider war involving Korea. It would count on help from the USSR and China if North Korea were invaded. But it Sees Moscow, as in Cuba and Vietnam, unwilling to confront the US directly or, indeed, to sacrifice what Pyongyangolicy of Soviet detente with the West.orjcexned over the failure of Communist China and the USSR to close ranks is support of Hanoi. And it must regard China, in the throes of the Cultural Resolution, ai something shortholly reliable ally. These considerations may underlie North Korea's adoption6 of policies emphasizing self-reliance,ilitary strategy of "protracted" guerrilla warfare which requires among otheruildup in local militia forces.
' Concern on thB count is heightened by such politfcn) developments at Japan's decisionH to foin the South Korean-sponsored, ann-Comnniniit Asian and Pacific Councilnd by the talks in Seoul between high-level rer-resenianie* of the US, Japan, the CBC, and the ROK on the occasion of President Pak's Inauguration in
'Brig. Ceo. Wesley C. Franklin, the Acting Assistant Chief of StaH for Intelligence, Depart* ment of the Army, believes that this sentence ovciempliasiirs the war in Vietnamause for increased North Korean violence against the South. He also believes that the sentence it misleading in that itorth Koreano tactic* of violence when in fact thev have used violent tactic* along the DMZ
The Xoith Korean regime is also disturbed al the thought that tens ol thousands of ROK troops are gaining combat experience in South Vietnam. It is aware of the increased military aid which the ROK is receiving from the USonsequence of its service in Vietnam. And it is conscious of the prestige accruing to the Pak government at home and abroadesult of the good performance of tbe South Korean expeditionary force. The tone and content of Kim's speech in, coupled with other official and private North Korean statementsake it apparent that the leadership of the regime is embarrassed by its failure to forestall the dispatch of ROK troops to South Vietnam and its inability to provide substantial material assistance to Hanoi.'
We believe that North Korea undertook its program of violence of ill own volition, not under pressure from either Moscow or Peking. Whether or not Peking would like to become involved in Korean aflairs at this moment, its influence with lhe Pyongyang regime is severely limited. Moscow is probably content to accept Pyongyang's initiatives, with the understanding that North Korea will move cautiously, avoiding acts likely to trigger major retaliatory attacks. The Soviets probably have no desire toajor conflict on their Far Eastern borders.
iii. capabilities and prospects a. capabilities
For Conventional Operations. We do not believe that North Koreas new tacticsresent intention lo invade the South. The North Korean armed forces could notustained attack against the Southarge volume of material help from outside, including substantial troop reinforcements (presumably fromnder present circumstances, neither Peking nor Moscow is likely to provide the sort of Support which would be required.so long as Pyongyang believes that the US will defend South Korea,retaliatory air attacks on the North, it would be extremely reluctant to attack.10
For Infiltration. For the short term, the number of trained North Korean personnel immediately available for infiltration into the South depends principally on two factors: the length of the training cycle at the new bases and camps, and of more immediate significance, the extent to which regular military units, particularly the Reconnaissance Brigade, could be tapped for experienced per-
" Material asintante from North Korea, to Hanoibeen modest. There have been scone ililiunentk of toiall amis, transport and construction equipment, and probably some ntcdlcul supplies, dmhing. and rice. Some machinery and tool* may alio have been provided alongumber of technicians. Without publicity, it has provided aboutorth Korean jet Tighter pilot* for dcfcrwtvc patrols (and on-the-job training) in the Hanoi area. There are probably aim soine North Kurean military advisers nnd instructor* In North Vietnam, and therebe some in South Vietnam.
rief evaluation of North Korean military capabilities with mprct to South Korea.
rd'css of the numbei of trained personnel available, the primary problem in the conduct of North Korean guerrilla operations in the Smith would be provision for their sustenance and survival within South Korea.
The physical environment in South Korea provides some advantages for guerrillas. One of them isile-long coastline with its thousands of small blands. many uninhabited. This mates infiltration and supply by sea relatively easy. Another potential guerrilla asset is the predominance of rugged terrain. On the other hand, vegetation in these highlands is generally sparse and cones jlim-nt difficult in winter when fleering weather makes evenroblem During the warmer sewsoni. vegetation is dense only in the most inaccessible mountains; elsewhere, ground movement is comparatively easy to observe from the air. Such physical factors contributed to the failure ofguerrilla movements in South Korea9.
In its operations against infiltration teams, the South Korean Government has other advantages. The Communists can count on assistance from established agents (including radioommunist sympathizers, and in some cases, relatives- But the overwhelming majority of South Koreans are unlikely to assist (lie Communists in any way. There is widespread dislike of communism and Communists, based on bitter rrsemories of the Korean War. In addition. ;heie are broad anti-Communist laws, rigidly enforced; even suspicions must be reported. Another major ROK asset is the long and apparently successfulof its intelligence and security forces In countering Communist subversion.
Government security forces were alerted atear ago to Iheof the planned changes in Communist tactics. Inombined Command Center (CCC) was established In Seoul under the leadership of the ROK Central Intelligence Agency to improve coordination between military and police forces in operations against Communist agents in rear area*.subceaters were established The CCC also becameclearinghouse for intelligence on all forms of infiltration
oo. the Korean National Police (KNP) force was increased in size lond counlcrguerrilla training was instituted in certain areas. Special nine-man police "sweep teams" were created, trained, and equipped to cover potential guerrilla ureas in their home districts. ROK Army Special Forces units were designated to back up the police effort. Additional boats were assigned to the KNFs coastal patrol force,ew new coastal radarsprovided. Several new patrol craft were added to the ROK Navy. The ability of trtilifary aircraft to detect infiltration by sea was enhanced Along the DMZ thereigher state of alert, and detection was unproved by various new warning and surveillance devices, and by the constnxltonomplex barrier system in some sectors.
Despite these and otherhere are still important deficiencies in ROKet guerrilla capabilities. In recent operations, the police required heavy support from the army for manpower, weapons, and transport andfacilities. This has caused serious government concern, not only
about the consequences ofubstantial portion of its conventional military strength to internal security operations, but with the problem ofthese forces. Thereistory of police-army rivalry to overcome, and it is by no means clear that the newly established CCC mechanism is doing the job. Infiltration by Sea continues, In part because available patrol craft arc generally not as fast nor as well armed as the boats North Korea has assigned to its sea infiltration units- There are also deficiencies, particularly among the police, in several types of communications equipment, ground and air transport, ami automatic weapons.
North Korea will almost certainly continue its campaign of military harassment in the DMZ area at current or even increased levels. The costs of these operations, both in lives and materiel, are small. Whether the actions are successful or not, they engender fear and apprehension among the South Korean people, and thus put certain pressures on the ROK Covenimeiit, particularly in connection with its participation in the Vietnamese war.
Communist losses along the DMZ will probably increase as US and ROK training is improved and new detection and other protective devices areNonetheless, it will probably not be posssible to prevent substantial casualties on the US/ROK side if the Communists remain willing to accent their losses, however high.
This is not to say that the Communist commitment to DMZ harassment tactics is open-ended. Just as we consider it unlikely that North Korea intends lo start another Korean War, we believe It unlikely that it plans at present to escalate its DMZ attacksoint at which open warfare might result. The North might miscalculate, however, and raise the ante along the DMZ until the ROK resolves to strike back incries of actions and reactions might ensue which could lead to open hostilities.
Rear area infiltration of guerrilla-type teams couldore serious problemlmost regardless of the outcome of this year's reconnaissance effort. The most vigilant naval patrol and the most efficient radar network would probably not be able toetermined effort to infiltrate teams by sea.
Even so. Communist prospects lorase of operations for guerrilla activity are probably poor. Under present circumstances, prospects for leeruitment inside South Korea are also poor. At best, the teams may survive by carrying adequate food and other supplies, and moving quickly from one temporary haven to another through remote and sparsely settled districts. While doing so. some teams will be able to carry out acts of tenor and sabotage. Soon afterward, however, they could expect to become the object of intensive security operations. We do not believe, therefore, that78 North Korean teams will be able to organize guerrilla operationscale sufficient to undermine existing local authority.
oreover, even if the North Korean effort were to cause some localthe current alternative at the national level is an opposition party whose leaden are even more vocally anti-Communist than the present government. Hence, successful political raarupuktion by (be North of any unrest which might be generated by their activities in the South seems unlikely at this time.
t may be that Pyongyang itself has little expectation of achieving much success in this rear area effort. The North Koreans are aware of the odds against them in the South, the heavy investment in manpower and materieltopeoples'nd the ilsk to their own territory shouldguerrillas show evidence nf success- It seems likely, therefore, that Pyongyang envisages rear area operations as yet another method of upsettingolitn.il i'i|inlibrium in the South, with the added virtue of tying down large ROK forces. The North Koreans probably hope that, in time, rear area operations will yield additional dividends in the form of increased support and recruits for their existing clandestine apparatus. By thus increasing subversive capabilities, they would hope to beetter position to exploit any new and major upset in South Korean political life.
NORTH KOREAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH KOREA
The North Korean Army,trength of, is much smaller than thai of South Korea. The North Korean Navy isoastal patrol and inshore defense force. Its main offensive strength includes atW" classKOMAR" class guided missile boats, andther motor torpedo boats. There are also atruise missile coastalKOMABs" were probably provided by the USSR6 under the terms of an arms pact negotiated in
The North Korean Air Force is superior to that of South Korea. It haset
rescos,odern aircraft inventory whicharmers andishbeds. About half of thendave probably been delivered during the past year. Sincehe number of surface-to-air missileites has increasedf which about half arc occupied.
North Korea will probably continue to receive limited amounts of modern air and sea defense equipment from the USSR so long as Pyongyang remains reasonably neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict. We do not know to what ex-lent the Soviets are replacing or augmenting North Korean lieavy groundartillery and armored vehicles. It is unlikely, however, that Soviet military shipments will be large enough over the next few years toignificant shift in the current balance of military forces in the Korean peninsula.
ROK ground forces in Korea now number; in addition, therermyarine brigade, and supportingtotalouth Vietnam. Despite the numerical advantage of the ROK ground forces, we do not believe that they or the North Koreans would enjoy superiority in live unlikely contingencyar fought without externa) support for either side. The ROK Army is well trained, but much of itsis old and its purely indigenous logistic back-up is probably less wellthan lhat in the North. US logistic support would he essential to sustain ROK combat capabilities in any situation in which North Korean forces were receiving supplies from external sources.
he effectiveness of the ROK Air Force is limited; thereredominance6 fighters, and aircraft control and warning systems are inadequate and obvolescent. upersonic fighters are being introduced, but in the event of
hostilities, ROK ait defense would probably require augmentation by US Air Force units. The ROK Navy Isoastal patrol force of abouthips,estroyerast attack transports,inesweepers,atrol ships, andmphibious ships. There isarine force ofThe capabilities and confidence of ROK forces are bolstered by the presence of0 US military personnel,S infantry divisions.
"iA NTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE
his document woi disaeminated by the Centre! Intelligence Agency. Thisforse ofrod plant ond ol parsons under hk [urbdlction on o
dditional essential dlsi-emlnation may bo autr-artzed by tha Wfcwlng orrltlok within thair respecrtve daportmartn,
o. DVector of fere%ence ond Reseoreh, tor tha Depovtrnortf of StaM
b. Director.rstasttgaesc* Agency, tor the Office of the Secretory of
Detent* ond th* rsrrjrjmnSSon ol the Mr* Osiers ofaaetoM Chief of Stan" for Iraesltginta. Deport-ner* of rh* Army, for the
Deportmentthe Array d. AiseBonl Chlaf of NovoJnfallor the Cepctr-.er; of the
One* of StotT, IntelDgence,or the Deportment of th* Air
ol Intelligence, AEC. for the Alomk Energy Commission
Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau ofDirector of NSA. for the National Security Agency
I. Director of Central Reference, OA, for any other Deportment or Agency
Tha document may be retained, or destroyed by burning In accordanceotspUcobl* security regulations, or returned la the Central Welliger.ee Agency bywwi th* Omce of Central Reference. OA.
Whenerswru reofrlersti mayeriodaoau of on* year. At th* end of th* period, th* documerrl should either be destroyed, returned to th* forwarding agency, or per-mission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain rt rn
Nile of thU document when used separately from the text should bafHslf.il IISF HN1Y
National Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Alomk Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of InvestigationOriginal document.