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LU AT ED INTELLIGENCE
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VIETNAM7
SUMMARY OT VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM CORING7
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THWJGKJUT SOUTH VIETNAM THE VIET CONG (VC) CONTINUE TO FACE SERIOUS PROBLEMS. EVERYWHERE, EXCEPT SOME PARTS OF IV CORPS, FOCO AW) MANPOWER ARE IN SERIOUSLY SHORT SUPPLY. TAX COLLECTION IS AN INCREASING PROBLEM IN ALL AREAS.
-AH SUPPORT CONTINUES TO DECLINE. THIS IS ACCELERATED L C'S INCREASED USE OF TERROR AND REPRESS 1ON TO FORCE
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LOSS OT POPULATION FOCM VC CONTROL CONTINUES TO REDUCE THE MANPOWER AVAILABLE FOR TROOPS, LABOR SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARY, AND TILLERS OF THE FIELDS. DESPITE SUCH EROSION, HOWEVER, THE VC STRUCTUREONG ANDWITH FAIR TO GCCO MORALE 'H THE UPPER LEVELS. THEY LAUNCHED VERY FEWARY ACT IONS IN JULY, HOWEVER, FOCUSING THEIR RESOURCES & ATTACKS ON SMALL COTPOSTS AND ON HARASSMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY 'EVElOPNENT PROGRAMS, CHIEU HOI {OPENO REFUGEEINES CF COMMUNICATION. THERE APPEARED TON EltSPEPA7.CN IN THE IRCASING KtSORT TO INDISCR MlvATE TERRORISM. THE CHIEF NEW DEVELOPMENT IN JULY WAS TH" GREATLY INCREASED ATTENTIONTO THE APPROACHING NATIONAL ELECTIONS. THIS CONSISTEO ALMOST ENTIRELY C" PLANNING, -BvPACANDlZINC, AND SPREADING THREATS OF DEATH TO THOSEcP^ORT THE ELECTIONS. SOME MINOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES WERE NOTED DURING THE MONTH. END SUMMARY.
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VC PROBLEMS:
I. FOOD SHORTAGESY SERIOUS IN JULY IN ALL BUT IV CORPS, AND EVEN THERET CONG (VC) WERE HARD PRESSED
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METO nd II CORPS A
b AMOUNT OF MIL t' AiY MAfli-BEEN DIVERTED
. -QRICIJLTURALND COLLLCTIF FOOD FROM THE; FOR EXAMPLE, ONt TALI ON h 1iorth VIETNAMESE (NVA) REGIMENT IN PHU YEN PROVIfcCE HAD ERCENT OF ITS rttH DETAILED TO AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. THE FOOD SHORTAGE
has coj;tributed to poor morale and TO DESERTIONS and DEFECTIONS.
thl FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM IS an ABSOLUTE SHORTAGE OF GRAIN .AUStD BY DECREASED PRCDUCi I AND INCREASED DEMAND, BUT THISBEEN COMPOUKDED BY SERIOUS DISLOCATION OF THE VC SUPPLY SYSTEM. ALLIED SWEEPS HAVEUP VC SUPPLY ORGANIZATIONS, e',. ALLIED UNITS ARE OCCUPYING KEY LOCATIONS on SOME OF THE ESTABLISHED COMMO-LIAISOB RUUTES. II.riJAN A NUMBER OF CADRES tf&RE REPLACED BECAUSE OF FAILUREECURE SUPPLY ROUiLS FROM THE MAIN LOGISTIC SUPPORT AREAecret OPERATIONAL UHlS. MEDICAL SUPPLIES, ESPECIALLY ANTIBIOTICS, ARE SHORT It. ALL AREAS.
HE VC ARE SUFFERINGhortage OF TAX IN-COKc ALL OVER COUNiRY. RAISING TAX LtVLLS HAS served TO HAKE COLLECTION ALL TnE MORE DIFFICUL:, AND LOCAL UNITS
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INCREASINGLY RESORTING TO TERRORISM TO ENFORCE PAYMENT. IN SEVERAL DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE COUNTRY INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN "EXECUTED" FOR NON-PAYMENT OF TAXES.
3. POPULATION CONTROL AW) LOSStF POPULAR SUPPORT ARE GROWING PROBLEMS. ALLIED SUCCESS HAS MADE PEOPLE IN MANY AREAS RELUCTANT TO COOPERATE WITH THE VC. TO ENFORCETHE VC HAVE FREQUENTLY RESORTED TO TERROR ANDWHICH HAVEIR UNPOPULAR ITY. THE KHANH HOA PROVINCE COMMITTEE FOUND ITSELF IN AN UNHAPPY DILEMMA:
IT DECIDED IT DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT TROOPS TO COUNTER ALLIED OPERATIONS AND MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER THE POPULATION AND FOOD PRODUCTION, BUT IT COULD NOT SUPPORT ANY ADDITIONAL TROOPS BECAUSE OF THE UNAVAILABILITY CF FOOD. IN IV CORPS, VC HAVE COMPLAINED OF LACK OF POPULAR SUPPORT BOTH INAREAS AND VC AREAS.
h. MORALE IN THE LOWER ECHELONS IS POOR NEARLY HIGHER-LEVEL CADRES AND MAIN-FORCE TROOPS ARE GENERALLY
IN BETTER SHAPENSTANCES OF HIGH MORALE ARE FOOD AND MEDICAL SI OS7AGES AND, ESPECIALLY, THE AWESOME POSER OF ALLIEDf'Y "ORCES CONTINUE TO DEPRESS
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PERHAPS THE MOSTRITICAL4 IS Tttt 'MORTAGE OF MANPOWER, WHICH ISARGE IXTINT AN OLfoROV'TH OF THE PROBLEMS ALREADY DISCUSSED. ECLINING POPuuAh SUPPORT MEANS FEWER VOLUNTECiiS, THE PHYSICAL EXODUS OF PEOPLE FROM VC-HELD TERRITORY MOHS AN ABSOLJT1REASE Ih AVAILABLE MANPOWER FOR ALLAGRICULTURAL, LABOR, AND MILITARY SUPPORT ACTIVITIES. IN ONE DRAMATIC EXAMPLE, IN ('PORTION GBLO-BCING SVCD)PHONG DISTRICT OF QUANG TRI
EING SVCD)FAMILICS REMOVED THEMSELVESELATIVELY SAFER RURAL DEVELOPMENT AREA.
IAS RECENTLY BECOME APPArtLNT THAT WHILE ARE LEAVING THE VC, THE VC ARC BEING FORCED TO LEAVE /
E. ESPECIALLYND II CORPS, SUSTAINED ALLIED PRESioRE HASARGE PART OF THE VC FORCES FROM THE POPULOUS COASTAL PLAINS TO THE SAFER BUT SPARSELY INHABITED .MOUNTAIN JUNGLES. THIS IN TURN COMPLICATES THEIR RECRUITMENT AND FOOD-SUPPLY PROBLEMS.
VC ARE TRYING TO MEET THEIR MANPOWER PROBLEMS
BY CALLING ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN. YOUTHS DOWN TOYEARS -
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OF AGE ARE BEING TAKEN IKIO THE ARCED FORCES. EVEN NORTH IETNAM <NVN> HAS RESORiLJ TO LOWERED AGE STANDARDS FOR THE REPLACEMENTS IT SENDS SOUTH. SEVERAL RECENTLYYEAR-OLDS HAVEIURED. RECENTLY SEIZED DOCUMENTS REVEAL THAT IN ONE ARtfl VC HAVE ORDERED THAT ERCENT OF THE GUERRILLAS MUST IE WU>!EH. IN AHOTHER AREA THE MINIMUM VAS SET ATERCENT. SOKE PROVINCES REPORT FURTHER CUTS VI ADMINISTRATIVE STAFFSRELEASE MORE MEN FOR MILITARY SERVICE.
8. THEPLACt-.iENT PROBLEM WAS REPORTED AS BEING SERIOUS EVERYWHERE Ih I'HE THREE NORIHERN CORPS AREAS EXCEPT IN Q'JANG TRI PROVINCE. IH QUAlvG TRI THEYGEI INFILTRATORS FROM THEH WITH RELATIVE EASE, BUT REPORTS SAY THAT EVEN THERE THE DUALITY OF rHE REPLACEMENTS IS DECLINING. IN POPULOUS IV CORPS, FIVE PROVINCES HAVE REPORTED SERIOUS MANPOWEF PROBLEMS. KILN HOA REPORTS NO
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XPORT MANPOWER AS IT HASHE PAST.
7. HOWEVER, DESPITE THESE CONTAINS AND, INEF.WING PROBLEMS, iTHE V. ORSfiNIZPTMS IS EFFECTIVE'iANO/VCRETAIN ATORMIDaBLE CAPABILITY TO'IHFLTCTrirrsT^
z"DESTHUCTIOACTIVITIES
la JULYELATIVELY ROUTINE MONTH FOR VC ACTIVITY.ADVERSARY OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS,ULY, WAS HERALDED 3YVC PROPAGANDISTREAT OCCASION TO BE HARKEDAJOR MILITARY AND TERRORIST ACTIVITY, BUT IS THE EVENT
'XT -AS SOT DIFFERENT FROM ANY OTHER DAY. IN 8INH THUAN PROVINCE, FORMPLE, THE VC PROPAGANDIZED THAT THERE WOULD-ND VC FLAGS EVERYWHERE ONH AND THAT THE DAY WOULD -
BE CE-ibRATED WITH "GLORIOUS ACHIEVEMENTS" AGAINST GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM <GVN> INSTATLATIONS. IN FACT, ONE BULLDOZER WAS DESTROYED AND ONE SMALL, UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK LAUNCHED, BOTHH. ON THENOTHING HAPPENED. IS GENERAL, PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED TRENDS CONTINUED THROUGH THE MONTH, THE ONLY MAJOR CHANGE' BEING THE INCREASING ATTENTION GIVEN
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ASEPTEMBER
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DAfE DREW.
PROVINCE .. 0 tfOJREAT DEAL
OF ANTI-ELECTION ACi * USTLY IN THE FORM OF PROPAGANDA DISPARAGING THE ELECTiCSSTRESSING THE FUTILITY OF SUGGESTING--SOME!IWES BY EXPLICITTHATE ELECiXON INVOLVED SERIOUS RISK OF BEING KILLED. BIEN h" PROVIfiCL Hi PORT ED THERE WERE SOME IHSTAnCES OF VC SEIZURE OF FAWILY RECORD BOOKS ANDCARDS TO PREVEN1 VOTING. IN VlflH LONG PROVINCE IT WAS NOTED THAT NEARLY ALL VC PLANS AND DIRECTIVES WERE PREFACED THE PHASE "FROM NOW UNTIL THE ELECT IONS," INDICATING THE IMPORTANCE ASSIGNED TO THE ELECTIONS BY THE VC LEADERSHIP.
ACTIONHE VC/WVA FORCES WASTO SMALL I'J QUANG NAM PROVINCE, MANAGED TO SCORE fVO "SPECTACULARS" OF THE KINDII* BOOSTING THEIR OWW MORALE AND PRESENTING THEA PICTURE OFULNERABILITY. ON ULY THECOVERORTAt-T^CK, SEIZED THE HOI AN JAILTHE PRISONERS. ABC*J1 OLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
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PRISONERS MADE GOOD THEH ESCAPE, PROVIDING THEUCH fcEEDED SUPPLY OF TRAINED MANPOWER. ON THE SAME NIGHT, Ar: KVA ARTILLERY UNIT HIT DANANG AIR BASE WITH 48MM ROCKETS, KILLING EIGHT, WOUNDING. AND CAUSING DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT AND FACILITIES ESTIMATED AS HIGH ASILLION DOLLARS. IN BINH LONG PROVINCE ON ULY THE ENEMY LAUNCHED A3 ILL-CONSIDERED REGIMENTAL-SIZED OFFENSIVE AGAINSTF THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VfETNAM (ARVN) 5TH DIVISION AND TOOK HEAVY LOSSES. THROUGfiOUI THE REST OF THE COUNTRY, THE VC/HVA GUERRILLAS AVOIDED LARGE-UNIT CONTACTS AND LIMITED THEIR INITIATIVES TO HIT-AND-RUN MORTAR 4K0 ROCKET ATTACKS, ASSAULTS ON SMALL OUTPOSTS, AND SMALL ATTACKS ON LINES OF COKMUNICAI ION.
13. TERRORISM INCREASED IN MOST AREAS, POSSIBLYAN INABILITY TO CONDUCT LARGER OPERATIONS. THESE ATTACKS TENDED TO CONTINUE THl INDISCRIMINATE CHARACTER NOTED THE PREVIOUS MONTH: PEOPLE WLRE KILLED SEEMINGLY AT RANDOM BY HIRES, BOOBY TRAPS,AND MORTAR FIRE. THEREEW GROUP "EXECUTIONS" OF PEOPLE WHO WERE ACCUSED OF SOME SORT OF ARj'-VC CONNECTIONS. IN NAM HOA DISVRICl OF TKUA THIEN
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ELECTED PEOPLE, EAR-OLD CHILD, WERE ASSASSINATED. IN ORE SUCH CASE II GIA DISH PROVINCE, SIX PEOPLE WHO WERE KILLED 'OR IhVOLVEMENT WITH GVH INFORMER ACTIVITIES WERE LATER FOUHDO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED.
REPORTS FROM SEVERAL WIDELY SCATTERED PLACES INDICATED THE VC AREO INCREASE THEIR CAPABILITIES AND ACTIVITY Iii TKc CMES, BUI THERE WERE FEW SIGNS OF ACHIEVEMENT IN THIS REF6P3 DURING JULY. FOR THE FIRST TIME INEAR,PLA'TED GRENADES WERE FOUND IN DANANG CITY, BUT BOTH WERE DISARMED BEFORE EXPLODING. KIEN HOA PROVINCE REPORTED ThE ORGANIZATIONDEATH" CLASS FOR GIVING IIDOCiRIMTIOfl AND IRAImInG FOR ACKS ON 6VN TARGEIS.
THROUGHOUT THE COUhiRT i'HE VC COUED TO 3IVE HIGH PRIORITY TO COUNTERING GVN PACIFICATION PROGRAMS. AS PREVIOUSLY, THEY LAUNCHED NUMEROUS PHYSICAL ATTACKS ON REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOP"fc*!T (RO) TEAMS, OFTEN SELECTING THOSE CEAMS WhOSELflE TAXING THE GREATEST PROGRESS. BORE PROVINCES, EXPECIALLY IV CORPS, HAVE NOTED IN-CRiAStDt AnTI-REDUMBER
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TECHNIQUES, INCLUDING SCfJG AND PCiTRY-WRITING CONTESTS, AREIN AN EFFORT TO TURN THE HAMUT-OWELlERS AGAINST THE TEAMS AND TO DEMORALIZE OR SUBVERT THE TEAM MEMBERS.
16. AGENT REPORTS,DEFECTORS, AnD DOCUMENTS TELL OF VC DISTRESS OVER THE GROWING EFFORT OF THE CHIEU HOI (OPEN ARMS) PROGRAM. IN AOOITlON TO CONDUCTING EXTENSIVE
ATTACKS ON
PROPAGANDA, THE VCHIEU HOI AND REFUGEE CAMPS, KILLING ANDUMBER OF 1NHA81TANTS, AND THEY HAVEUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL HOIHXHANHRGANIZATIONAL CHANGES.
17. THERE ARE REPORTS FROM ALL FOUR CORPS AREAS OF VC MILITARY UNITS BEING BROKEN UP INTO SMALLER GROUPS AND RECEIVING TRAINING IN SAPPER ACTIVITY AND SMALL-UNIT TACTICS, IN PG CORPS, VC UNITS HAVE BROKEN INTO SMALLERN OROEft TO EVADE FRIENDLY FORCES, AND OBSERVERS SAYEEM TO BEUPPORT ROLE FOR NVA FORCES. THIS WAS DONE
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orps, where it reportedly caused vc resentmentthe hva.
n giang provincedong khol" (move cot all forces) campaign designed to unite all vc forcesa military comand section and make all cadres work harder for the success of the fall-winter campaign. the oetails of this reported policy are obscure, but it appears to involve an increased reliance on military discipline in place of political motivation. binh thuan province reports thatvn political cadres, who came down in may, have beeh assigned to help direct activities of district and village committees. manv of the binh thuan vc are likely to lookthem as carpetbaggers. this province has alsothree cf its districts in an effort to recover from the disruption caused by allied military operations.
iy. he central ofmce for south
would be sent down to lower levels to
subsequent -PORTING indicated
vietnam (cosvn)irective that cadres from various (gilCSI
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compliance with the directiveJMBCft Cf provinces, in-
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CONTUM, NINH THUAN, PHONG AN Gl AN'i KiC* GIANG,ANDOA, REPORTING RECEIVEDNDICATES THAT DARLAC IS THE MOST RECENT PROVINCE TO HAVE THEIRECTIVE.
FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV OIR/JUSPAOR TMIAM ONLV) CtNCPAC ARPAK PACAF PACFLT.
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