Intelligence Memorandum
North Vietnam Defense Minister Giap's Analysis of the
APPROVED FOB RELEASE DATE:1
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence7
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
North Vietnam Defense Minister Giap'a Analysis of the War--Ilia
The concluding segment of North Vietnamese Defense Minister Giap's latest analysis of the war emphasizes his view on several points debated by the Hanoi leadership over the past two years. most important is Giap's reaffirmation thatthe Vietnamese Communists cannot hope to match tho number of troops the US and its allies put into South Vietnam, they can nonetheless wago the war successfully. Giap argues that the Communists can overcome the numerical superiority of the allies by improving the quality of the Communist forces and by using superior tactics.
Tho defense minister says he expects the US soon to increase its troop strength in South Vietnamnd eventually by as many as. Even so, according to Giap, the Communists canstalemate" situation. To do so, however, Giap indicates that the irregulars mustreater role and that irregular strength must be raised. The relative importance of theversus the regulars has longoint of dispute within the Hanoi leadership. Giap has argued that the guerrillas, in conjunction with regular forces, could tie down and disperse US forces, thus prolonging tho war until the us became tired. His opponents have argued that Communist main force units could successfully defeat the US and its allies in conventional warfare and that the rolo of theshould be subordinated to that of the regulars.
*This is an analysis of the concluding portion of Giap's article which was received out of sequence. The remainder will be reviewed during the next several days.
m: This memorandum wag produomd oolely by CIA. It was prepared by the office of Current Intelligence.
tatement sets forth his concept of the over-all strategy for the war. The tactics and types of Communist forces employed at any given moment in South Vietnam and in any given battle are dictated by the actual situation. Thus, in the area just south of the Demilitarized Zone, Northregulars appear to be carrying the weight of the fighting. Giap appears to be arguing, however, that sufficient guerrillas of high quality could moretie down US forces and thus limit theof US troops available for search-and-destroy operations against North Vietnamese regulars. Giap dismisses the conceptbarrier" across the northern portion of South Vietnamew sentences, stating that it would be ineffective*
Giap also addresses himself to the problem of the defense of North Vietnam, both against air strikes and against invasion, which he mentionsossibility. He recites the usual exaggerated claims of the number of US aircraft shot down over North Vietnam but admits that some North Vietnamese air defense units have performed poorly. He calls for "disciplinary measures" against those whosehas caused avoidable damage and losses.
To improve the quality of the Northforces Giap says the Communists must "develop the superiority of our existingnvent "highly effectivend improve the military He comes down hard on the need for more and better military training* The North Vietnamese Army rapidly expanded56 to meet theposed by the introduction of US combat troops into South Vietnam and,esult, the quality of the army dropped. umber of North Vietnamesecaptured in South Vietnam have indicated they received insufficient training before being sent south* Also Hanoi's need toarge airsystem almost overnight resulted in its putting many poorly trained personnel on the firing line. The defense minister clearly hopes to improve the quality of his troops during the coming year.
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6. Giap concludes his analysisote of He warns that the US can be expected to launch "fiercer and more bloody" attacks, but asserts that the Communists will be able to overcome their enemies no matter how difficult the task.
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Original document.
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