SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK (NIE 11-8-67)

Created: 10/26/1967

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack

DISTRIBUTION

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE CtAEVIEW PROGR^IVI

THE DIRECTOR Of ClNIRAL INTtLUGENCf WASHINGTON.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of

Extreme Sensitivity of,

- "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack'

Dissemination ofust be carefully limited because of the extreme sensitivity of the information therein.

In thisish to stress that there be absolutely no reproduction of this Estimate, and that no revelation of its existence be made to unauthorized persons.

Richard Helms Director

CONTENTS

Page

THE PROBLEM

CONCLUSIONS

L TRENDS IN POLICY AND DOCTRINE

IL INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES

Deployment

Levels and Composition to

Capabilities ol die Force

Rcbability and Reaction

Reentry Vehicles

Refire .

Research and

Solid Propellants

Status of Mobile

Future ICBM Development

Reentry Vehicle

Levels and

APPLICATIONS IN SPACE13

AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILESS

Levels and Composition IS

Research and Development W

C- Force Levels and Composition

V. MISSILE SUBMARINE17

Missile17

Missile18

and Composition of thc Porce8

Capabilities of Ihe Force

Leveb and Corn portion

VI.NCE AVIATION

Developments in Long Range Aviation

levels and Composition to

Capabilities of tho Force

Aircraft Development

Air-to-Surface Missile Devekrpment

Force Levels

VII. COMMAND AND CONTROL

ANNEX

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE NA HISTOillCAL-RmEW KOGIUM

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK

THE PROBLEM

To cslimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet stiatcgic attack forces throughnd to estimate general trends in those forces over thc nextears,

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programs for strategic attack forces have been aimedlhc lead that tlie US has held in this field. Inmiliiary considerations, the Soviets undoubtedly sec politicaladvantages in improving their position relative tothe US. Soviet strategic policy has recognized that its first aimtoredible deterrent, not only against US nuclearthe USSR but also against US actions that would endangerinterests. They have been building strategic attack forcesthat, however nuclear war began, the US would facea scale unacceptable to its leadership. Beyond this, they arethrough both offensive and defensive strategic programs,the damage they would sustain should general war occur,

Soviet leaders almost certainly believe that theirstrategic position has improved markedly in recent years,as the result of extensive intercontinental ballisticdeployment. We estimate that the ICBM force hastripled in theears, that it now hasand that by the end8 will havehe same number as thc US. We believe that moslercent) will be in dispersed, hardened single silos,the survivability and readiness of the force. The USSR

-KSP-StrGHtrf-

will remain inferior, however, in numbers of bombers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Moreover, the Sovieis almost certainly realize lhat even this relative improvement in their position does not promise to be permanent. Consequently, they almost certainlythat to improve their strategic positionis the US requires continued effort.

the longer term, Soviet leaders face decisions ofand uncertainty. One reason is the inescapablebetween US and Soviet strategic capabilities in thewith no increase in the number of US launchers, plannedin the US strategic attack forces during the next decadethe Soviets with much greater numbers of moreMoscow must also be concerned that the plannedantiballistic missile (ABM) defense might be expanded todamage-limiting capabilities against Soviet forces.

complicating factor is that their strong) effort has given theroader rangethan in the past, and thoir programs will almost certainlypriorities from those which have hitherto beenprobably will place greater emphasis on qualitativesurvivability, capacity to avoid early warningto penetrate enemy defenses, accuracy, and reliability.situation emerging inill make theseimportant than sheer numbers of launchers.

the Soviets believed that they couldeaningfulover the US in strategic forces, they would, of course,do so, and they may forge ahead in one or another particulardeciding whether to undertake any new weapon program,would have to weigh the prospective gain against theand the capabilities of the US Io detect and counter it. Into improve their overall strategic posture, they will beimproving their counterforcc and da magecapability inthis would not only deter the US from nuclear war butreduce US opposition to aggressive Soviet actions in supportobjectives elsewhere in thc world. As indicated by ourof Soviet forces for the nextears, however, wethey will not consider it feasible to achieve strategic capabilities

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which would permit thcin toirst strike against thc USreceiving unacceptable damage in return.

F. ICBMs. We estimate that the Soviet ICBM force will number something more. but is not likely toaunchers byyeorce numbering more. but notorce near thc low side,, wouldeliberate Soviet decision for political reasons to hold thc number of launchersevel about equal to that of the US. Regardless of their decisions as to number of launchers, thewill probably begin deployment of at least one new ICBM system within tho next few years. We believe that the Soviets arc flightmall solid-propeltant ICBM and may beew large llquid-propellant system. They are probablyobile ICBM system and may deploy one. Qualitative improvements may include more sophisticated reentry vehiclesenetration' aids, multiple reentry vehiclesultiple independently-targeted RVsardened warheads, and better accuracy.

C. Space Weapons. Forears, the Soviets have been conducting flight tests which we believe relate to developmentractional orbit bombardment systeme believe that the chances are better than even that the Soviets will within the next few yearsOBS in order to negate or delay US warning and otherwise complicate the US defense problem; any deployment would be in relatively small numbers. We consider it unlikely that they willultiple-orbit bombardment system (MOBS) in view of the probable adverse political consequences and of its cost and effectiveness as compared to other systems.

H. MBBM/lRBMs. The Soviets will continue to maintain massive strategic forces against Eurasia. We estimate that new MRBM and IRBMs will supersede present systems within the nextears, and

Maf. On. Jaeh E. Thomas, the Annum Chief of SuS, Intelligence. USAF. would delete the first lenience and rubititut* Ihc"We estimate that tba So-rMI ICBM (ore* in IkeJl number moreo* lito0 Uuochm if lhe USSR by then haieployed masJes withtype of rmduple reentry vehicles. Otherwise, end parthvUriy in vtew of lhe numbers nfn the US sndJ US ABM capability, the Soviet Union probably wiU hive censidersblr morerogram which eddedunchers per year beyond thoee already dUm.fWd wouldy"

thai (he introduction of unproved missiles may result in some decrease in numbers. We believe that one or more newhiscould become operational as earlyome of the new missiles may be deployed in mobile launchers.

I. Submarine-Launched Missiles. The Soviets are clearly placing increased emphasis on ballistic missile submarines. Tbcy area new nuclear-powered class of ballistic missile submarine withaunch tubes which we believe willissileange of. We estimate that, by the mid-lOTU's. the Soviets will have twice as many ballistic missile submarines as at present, and six to seven times as many kunchers.

J. Long Range Aviationttrition and retirement of older models will gradually reduce thc heavy bomber force. We still believe that tho Soviets are unlikely toollow-on heavy bomber. The medium bomber force will probably decline as Badgers arc phased out; by thet will probably be composed largely of the supersonic-dash Blinder.*

' Maj. Cen. Jade E. Thomas, lhe Assiitant Chief of Stall. Intelligence. USAF, believes the Soviet Union will continue to consider manned strategic aircraft an important element ol Iheir intercontinental itrike forces. He eitimalei tlie USSR Is likely to Introduceoi low-on heavy bomberew medium bomber into LRA within the period of this eiti-mate. He espoeti that In the mid-lSTo'i LHA sull will includeeavy bombers (approximately tl* same number as atndedium bombers of both new and old types.

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DISCUSSION

I. TRENDS IN POUCY AND DOCTRINE

L Our estimate of overall Soviet military policy and doctrine appears in'Main Trends in Soviet Militaryated SOwe emphasised there, the most important issues ol Soviet militaryupon the strategic relationship witb the US, and strategic weaponsreceive primary emphasis in Soviet planning, deployment, researchoviet strategic policy has recognized that its Erst aimtoredible deterrent; the Soviets are building forces whichare giving them greatly increased confidence in their ability, even into assure lhe destructionignificant portion of thc USindustrial resources. Beyond this, they are also seeking, through bothand defensive strategic programs, to improve their ability to limit Ihcwould sustain should general war

The Soviet leaders almost certainly believe that their relative strategichas already improved markedly. They are aware that US deployment of strategic missile launchers has leveled off, their own intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) deployment programs, which have been underway for the past few years, will giveough parity with the US in numbers of ICBM launchers within the next year or so. After many years ol strategic inferiority, they undoubtedly see political and psychological advantages in the attainment of such parity even though it does not alter the basse situation of mutualand still leaves them inferior in heavy bombers and submarine-launched missiles.

Moreover, tho Soviets almost certainly realize that cvon this relativein their position does not promise to be permanent. For the longer term, they are aware of announced US programs for various qualitativein strategic missile forces which would erode relative Soviet strength. They must also calculate the effects of the US decision to begin antiuaUisb'c missile (ABM) deployment, allowing not only for thc system ai announced but also for thc possibility of its expansion

To maintain an assured destruction capability in the strategic situation that is emerging, qualitative improvements, particularly those related toand capacity to penetrate enemy defenses, become more important than sheer numbers of launcheri. There will undoubtedly be pressures for aenlargement of the ICBM force, and it may continue to grow. But having attained rough numerical parity in ICBMs with the US, thc Soviet planners will probably give increased attention to other options. Further measures to enhance survivability and effectiveness of the strategic attack forces could include

0CCRCT-

-TQR-SECRGT

a greater emphasis on ballistic missile submarines, developmentobile ICBM, ABM detente of ICBM hunching sites,ariety of systems designed to elude or penetrate US ABM defenses.

hus, tho SovieUumber of uncertainties in deciding what force composition and force levels tbey should attempt to acquire for. The interaction between US and Soviet strategic programs introduces extraordinary complications and variables. But given thc technical complexities and long lead rimes required for modern weapons, the Soviet leaders must already have made some decisions for future strategic systems, and will have to make others before long. Whatever iheir specific decisions, we believe that they are deterinlncd to maintain an assured destruction capability, and that they wil! seek to improve tbeir strategic positionir the US.

The internal situation appears favorable to continuationtrong military effort. The present leadership is evidently more responsive than was Khrushchev to tbe news of the military hierarchy. We estimate that military and space expenditures7 represent an increase ofercentS, a, decided change from tho more stable spending level. It is not yet clear how the recentercent increase in the publicly stated Soviet defense budget may relate lo actual expenditures. Some of it probably reflects programs for miliiary aid to Vietnam and the Middle East, as well as changes in the Soviet price structure and accounting practice. In any case, however, we think it clear that real Soviet military expenditures are continuing to rise.

The continuing development and large-scale deployment of strategichas been largely responsible for the increase in these expenditures of the past few yean. The Soviets have given roughly equal weight to forces for strategic attack and for strategic defense. We cannot estimate at this time how the increase8 defense expenditures will be allocated among the various force components, but thc high priority of strategic programs is almost certain to continue.

c behove that the Soviets' effort to improve tbeir strategic position relative to theevident in tbeir ICBMbe extended to some other components of their strategic attack forces, and that they, may see an opportunity to forge ahead in some particular field, We believe that they will also continue to maintain massive strategic forces against Eurasia. And they will abnost certainly pursuen strategic attack systems, both in order to prevent lhe US fromechnological advantage and to gain any advantage they can for themselves. In deciding whether to develop and deploy any new weapon system, however, they would have to weigh the prospective gain against the economic cost and tho capabilities of the US to detect and counter it.

n considering the goals of ihcir strategic weapons programs, tbc Soviet leaders will, of course, examine the possibility ofirst-strike counter-

force capabilityconjunction with their strategicbe sufficient to limit to acceptable proportions the damageS retaliatory strike could inflict on the USSH. Considering the number, hardness, and reactJoa times of US targets which would have to be struck in such an attack, and the likelihood that many would escape destruction,oviet effort would require notery large, highly sophisticated strategic attack force, but alioand effective air and misiJo defenses as well as an effective antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability. Tlie tcchnologicftrand economic magnitude of thc task would be formidable, however, and the Soviets would have to consider thcthat the US would detect and match or overmatch the Soviet effort. Into improve their overall strategic posture they will be alert to improving their counterforcc and darnige limiting capability in the belief this would not only deter the US from nuclear war but would also reduce USto aggressive Soviet actions in support of political objectives elsewhere in the world. All things considered, however, we continue to believe that tbe Soviet leaders wiU not expect to acquire strategic capabilities which they would deem sufficient to permit them toirst strike against the US without receiving unacceptable damage in return.

II. INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILBS A. Current Deployment

We believe lhat within the past year, hard, single-silo launchers hove come to comprise the bulk of tho Soviet ICBM force. We estimate the present strength of thc force to beperational launchers, deployed inarge complexes across thc central USSR. We estimate that moref these launchers are single silos for thcndCBM systems; older systems, which are deployed in soft sites or in triple-silo hard sites, account for the remainder.

Status of First and Second Generation ICBM Sites. We estimate thai virtually all of (he first and second generation ICBM launchers remainmost of them employing theCBM. We believe that two of the fouraunchers have beenrimary space role; tbe other two will probably also be allocated to the space program or phased out ah og ether in the near future. We believe thai theoftaunchers wiU have been phased out bye believe thai the nine hardaunchers remain

In previous estimates wc considered the possibilityroup ofriple-silo launch sites had been equipped with theCBM. Wc now believe, however, that these sites are equipped withnd thatre deployed only in thc single-silo configuration. We have no evidence suggesting phase-out of anyaunchers, and believe that they will remain operational for some lime to come.

B. Force level* ond Composition to

e believe that the Soviets arc developing new ICBMs and that at least one of them could be ready for operational deploymentut we doubt that it will reach IOC in hard sites byur estimate of thc Soviet ICBM force for thcears includes only types now operational, but we do not rule out the possibility that it willew missilesew type

ESTIMATED OPERATIONAL ICBM LAUNCHERS

7

a

128

14

(triple-silo)

69

e'

'

"m"

(single'silo)

(SS-3)

114

MO-MO

..

*

In addition to tho ICBM launchers cited above, we believe that the Soviets have aboutaunchers at the Tyuialam range which are associated withAboutf these launchers are considered to be complete, and we believe that most of them could be readied to fire at the US. We see unable to make any valid estimate of the time required to ready them, reaction limes. Or the availability of missiles for them.

C. Operational Capabilities of the Force Survivability

he vulnerability of the force is decreasing. We estimate that aboutercent of tbe curtcnt operational force is deployed In hard sites. We think it likely that byO percent of the force will be in single silos. We believe Out single-silo sites are so widely dispersed as to present separate aiming points. We believe that all hardened ICBM launchers deployed In the field are designed to remain completely operable when exposed to overpressures on the ordersi.

'See paragraphelow re gliding theringsolid propellintmight achieve IOC beforeence our estimate of ICBMi for the nest 2have lo be modified. It is alio possiblerubles lo both ICBM

and IRBM

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RcliabHily and Reaction

he continuing introduction of single afto* hit brought improvements In both reliability and reaction time. We believe that ICBMs deployed in single silos can be hunchedinutes or less after the execution order is received. Overall reliability of thendystems is probably somewhat higher than lhat of older systems.

Ift An extensive program of test firings of currently deployed systems hasImproved reliability, in terms of both equipment and training. During the past year,CBMs have been launched primarily for purposes of production sampling and crew training This i. the highest yearly total ever observed. Firings IncludedS-fis,S9s, andS-llx

Reentry Vehicles

oviet ICBM tests observed during the past year continue to show(HVs) with low ballistic coefficients and large radar crossis no evidence to show thai the Soviets are Dying to develop RVsballistic coefficients. Which are more accurate and less vulnerableandn the other hand, the current Soviet RVsto simpler design and packaging of nuclear weapons and mayadaptable to

e have virtually no evidence to indicate whether current Soviet RVs arc designed to withstand nuclear radiation, bul we believe that hardening of their RVs for this purpose is within ifce Soviet state of the art Ii they have not already begun to harden, deploymentS ABM defense would be an added incentive for Ihem to do so.

Accuracy

Soviet ICBMs use radio-inertial or inertia! guidance system^"

Thesingis thc most accurate ICBM in thc inventory. We estimate that itCEP on the order ofautical milesith thisits large payload, thes suitable (or attacking hard targets. Thea relatively small payload and an estimatedApparently

accuracy wUritical requirement for thee believe that tbe Soviet objective was to deployarge number of survivable weaooas for ose against relatively soft targets.

Soviets may seek very high accuracies for some future ICBMhave considered iheir capabilities to achieve accuracieshc techniques required and probable development times for newwe believe that the Soviets could achieve an operational systemm.0. To achieve CEPs in this

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range iho Soviets would have to improve their guidance systems, probablymidcourse corrections, and design new RVs for cither faster reenby or limited terminal guidance maneuver.

Refire

believe lhat Soviet soft launcherse/ire capability and thataverage two missiles arc available for each such launcher. Thisheoretical refire capability of upCBMsthe initial launch from soft sites. As soft sites are phased out, thiswill decline. The hardened launchers are not considered capable of retire.

O. ICBM Research and Development Solid Propellants

believe tliat thore are an adequate number of soHd-propellant factoring and test facilities within the USSR toather ambitious solid-

propellant strategic missile program. We believe that the Sovietsolid-propellant ICBM under development. They have been testing solid-propellant missiles to ranges. from Kapustin Yar and. from Plesetsk forears. We bejieve that these two programs are related |

"jHeoen'ly (onhe Soviets fired amissile from Plesetskange of_ Wethis latest test is

Status of Mobile ICBMs

Soviets have displayed what they claim to be two mobilemissile launchers and have claimed that one of the missilesan intercontinental range. We have no information onissile,is no evidence that it has been flight tested to ICBM range. Wethese missiles are prototypesobile ICBM. The USSR,obile missile to improve thc survivability of its ICBM force.could beadapledobile system, but we consider this iinlikely.

lend itself to mobile deployment but we have no evidence

suggesting thatThis is the Soviet intent.

Futureevelopment

noted above, evidence of test firings from Plesetsk indicatesmall, solid-propctlant ICBM in on advanced stage ofWe estimate that this system will have about tlie same payloadas thct would be adaptable to mobUc oeployment butthat it will be deployed, at least initially, in hard sites. Wc doubtsystem could become operational until aboutt couldobile mode somewhat later.

TOP srCfMrf

e have detected no lot firingsew ICBM horn Tyuratam for over two and one-half yean but we estimate (hat at least one is in RAD. Until flight test begins, we cannot estimate its precise characteristics but we believe that the most likely possibility wouldarge, liquid-propellant ICBM about tbe size of thcut having better performance, including some form of improved reentry system. This weapon could beodification of ther an entirety new missile, and would probably be deployed in hard single silos. We estimate that it could reach IOC ineriod.

he Soviets will also probably seek to improve tho quality of their existing force by modification of thend they may replace itew, small liquid-propelled ICBM system. Early Improvements to thcould be aimed at better accuracy or the incorporation of penetration aids or multiple reentry vehiclesf they elect to replace theew system, it would probably become operational in thcCfs.

Reentry Vehicle Development

he Soviets will almost certainly take steps to reduce the vulnerability of their RVs, especially in light of the US decision to initiate ABMoviet decision to develop any particular penetration system will, of course, be affected by their knowledge of the nature of the ABM system the US plans to deploy. They have extensive experience in chaff ond electronic counter-measures (ECM) in conjunction with aircraft defense. We believe that they could have eroatincnphericeet) penetrationears afterevelopment program. The low ballistic coefficients and high observability of present Soviet RVs decrease the effectiveness of endoatmosphericeet) penetrationerminaluitable RV would probably require atears. We believe that the Soviets would test penetration aids to ICBM ranges and wc would probably delect suchear or two before IOC

Tbe Soviets arc probably well aware of the potential use of radiation kill mechanisms, and the development of ItVs with increased hardening losome nuclear effects is probably well within iheir capabilities.rogram of underground nuclear testing thc Soviets could investigate the response of various materialsays at various energy levelsimulated exoahnospheric environment and conduct development tests of new hardened warheads.

There Is no evidence thai the Soviets have initiated an advanced RVHowever, ihey might, regardless of US programs, develop MRVs and multiple independently-targeted RVsor purposes othero increase the numbers of deliverableelatively simple MRV delivery capability probably could be achieved withinonths after the start of flight testing. Development of cither very accurate MIRVi or maneuver-

able RVs (MaHVs) would Involve significantly greater complications, particularly in guidance and control; opoiational capabilities could probably be achievedears after flight testing began. We would expect to detect any of these developments during the flight test phase.

the Soviets undertake early implementationIRV program,thoould be the most likely carrier because of its largeAoIRV system, capable of attacking soft targets,ts development would requireear of flightwe would expect lo detect- We consider it unlikely that thisbe undertaken in light of tbe substantial capability for attackingrepresented by theCBM deployment. To give tbeagainst hard targets would require tbe development of someaccurately delivering several independent RVsounds. Accuracy would be the pacing Item and wouldrequiro improvements in boost-phase guidance and lhe addition of acorrection system. Even ifIRV program were.to belhc very near future, we doubt that IOC could be achievedexpect to detect testing ofears prior to DevelopmentaltV would take at least as long.

E. Forco Levels and

Soviet decisions as to (he best mix of weapons and the proper force levels have become incieasUigly' difficult, not only because of the growing complexity of the threat they face, but also because of the broadening range of options open to Soviet planners. The size and composition of Soviet strategic forces inffs are most likely toompromise which will embody several of the options now open lo Soviet planners. The most likely effect ofompromise on ICBM programs wouldhift in emphasis from numbers to qualitativebough this would not necessarily preclude additional deploy-meat. Thus, although the Soviets could deploy several thousand ICBM launchers by tbe, we do not believe that they willubstantial numerical superiority.

In estimating Ihe sire of the ICBM force fore mustairly wide range ratherrecisesince,eriod so far ahead, much will depend on the interplay between US and Soviettaken In the interim. Tlie low end of thc range represents the minimum figure that can be postulated on the basis of our present evidence. We think that ICBM forces falling anywhere within the ranges estimated below wouldroad Soviet criterion for an assured destruction capability and.redible dctonenL

e EST-

e estimate thai tlie Soviet ICHM foicc will number something more. but if not likely tounchcii byy7 weorce numbering mote. but notorce near the low side,, wouldeliberate Soviet decision, for political reasons, to hold the number of launchersevel about equal to that of thet would imply some phaieout of older missiles. It would alsooviel decision lo emphasize qualitative improvements ratherimplo increase in numbers of launchers. If they opt for lhe low side, the single-silo launchers for thendould continue lo make up the bulk of theew solid-propellant ICBM would probably be brought into service in the nest fewew large, bquid-pfopellant ICBM may also bo deployed in liard single silos sometime later in the period. The Soviets will piobably undertake qualitative improvements lo increase weapon effectiveness and to counter US ABM defenses; such improvements could include bettermore sophisticated RVs. penetration aids. MRVs. or MI RVs.

orce loward the high side ol our estimate would hove many of thc features of the smaller force, including the qualitative improvement of existing systems. It would, by the latter part of the period, includeew launchers,eployment program roughly comparable in size to the currentndrograms combined. It would probably also involve retention of theard launchers for several years and the inUoductlon of one or more new ICBM systems. Deployment on this scale would consistof small ICBMs deployed in single siloi; some of the deployment may be in mobile launchers.

MILITARY APPLICATIONS IN SPACE

hroughout the period of the estimate the Soviets will experiment with

a variety of space systems which could be used for military purposes. New military space applications will be introduced as Soviet technology advances and as requirements for such systems are developed. The high priority evident in the reconnaissance satellite program will probably be extended to othermilitary support systems which the Soviet lenders decide are essential; these will probably include systems for improved communications, weatherand navigation.

3fi

Evidence of Soviet interest in orbital bombardment systems dates from Khrushchev's remarks in2 ami subsequent references to "global rockets" and "orbitalhese caninterpreted to refer to either or both of two concepts which have come to be called "fractional orbit bombardment system"

litm. Cen Jack E. Thomas, th-hief of Staff.see Ins footnote to Conclusion

+OP

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(FOBS) and "multiple oibil bombardment syiiem"ctual flight testing ol what we believe to be hardwareOBS began in5 and is continuing* These testsevelopmental vehicle which we designate thet uses the first two stages of theCBM as the launch vehicle.

ll of these orbital tests have been fired in an easterly direction, giving them the advantage of the earth's rotation to achieve orbital velocities. In order to attack targets in the US on the initial orbit,OBS would have to be launchedortherly or southerly azimuth, depriving It of thisHence, any system so employed must be capable of achieving orbital velocity on these azimuths. There are some uncertainties aboul this system, particularly as regards theaunch vehicle, but in the configuration tested so far it does not achieve tbe necessary velocity. To do so, It would require additional thrust. Hence, if it is to be usedOBS, it would probably have to be modified, eithereducoon in thc weight placed in orbit, or through an increase in the capability of thc launch vehicle. If the Soviets choose to reduce the weight, the modification wou'd probably be relallvoly simple and the system could probably be ready for operational deployment by early tof, on tlie other hand, they elect to improve theaunch vehicle, the system would probably not be ready for deployment until8 orhird alternative would be for them lo go for an enQiely new launch system; if they do this, we would expect toeries of tests ester-.dingear or two, and the system would probably not be ready for deployment

n the present state of thcOBS would be more complex and less accurate than an ICBM. Moreover, It wouldmaller payload than an ICBM employing thc same booster. Nevertheless, thc degree of effort going

* FOBS tt lived lojsfem drptayd en ihr grovnd. largt'rd prior rend Uvnehad mih latent lo erred. Its operational im6 rebel mjuuemenU would be bite those lot an ICBM ttitpt lor the reejuurmcst tottenicM to placewarheademporary orbit and deorbit it en target. In practice,ehicle would probably be targeted lo attack on the first orbit but II could be allowed to Us.el social orbils without altering the basic concept. NOBS It uied toyitrm deployed In orbit,ith no immediate commitment lo titlark, targeted afUr Uuach. end retargeted or rifceiiory. Jt would require command and control links between ground control centers and orbitinfence It would be much mote romple* than either an ICBMOBS. MOuS vehicles could have useful orbital IJetUiten olfew days to one or rnore years.OBSOBS could be developed without violating the spate teiiy The deplsynirntOBS wouldiolationhe truly.

geometry of the early tests swggntrd devetonncMVprntcd trajectoryubsequent evidence kadi us le bchne that they wereeorientation aid deorbit componentsOBS can peiforni essentially lheICBMeduce the amount of winning that the US BMEWS canal would have greater fleilbility since il could .iltirk Ihe US Irom the toulh is well as from Ihe north.

15

into this program and the record of successful launches in recent months indicate that thc Soviets see certain advantages inOBS wouldbe intended to delay or negate US early warning (EW) and to attack soft, time urgent targets (such as SAC alerthe Soviets may also consider that it would complicate US ABM defenses. In no previous case has thc USSRong-range missile system as much as it has thend thenit without operational deployment; hence we believe that the chances arc better than even that thc Soviets willOBS within the next few years. If they do, it will probably be in relatively small numbers. Considering that theses tbeCBM booster and it therefore may be adaptable forinilos, wc might not be able to detect and identify FOBS deployment as such.

is no identified program which indicates that the Soviets area MOBS. Much of the space technology and hardware currentlyby the Soviets could be usedasis for development of such ait would also require the development of several new components,long-life power source and an attitude reference system. For thewe thinkOBS would not compare favorably with ICBMsof effectiveness, reliability, vulnerability, average life, andloss of control from accident or countermeasures. Having agreed toon peaceful uses of space, the Soviet leadership probably wouldthe deploymentuclear-armed orbital bombardment system wouldpolitical consequences. They would also be concerned that ita strong new stimulus to US military programs. In view of thesethe much greater cost of such orbital weapons, we believe that theunlikely toOBS in space during thc period of this estimate.

IV. MEDIUM AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES

A. Force Levels ond Composition

The Soviet MRBM/IRBM force of moreaunchersassive threat to targets in Eurasia, especially Europe. Aboutercent of the force is deployedide belt extending from the Baltic to the .Black Sea. The balance of the force is deployed in the Far East,cattering of sites in thc Caucasus and an isolated facility on the Chukotsk Peninsula apparently targeted against Alaska.

Wc estimate that the MRBM/IRBM force is comprised ofaunchers for.ndaunchers for.he force is predominantly soft; we estimate thataunchers are in hard sites. We continue to estimate that they have thc samei as hard ICBM sites (see. Wc believe that thc soft launchersetire capability but that the hard launchers do not.

top sccrcur

16

uiiwugn mio-iyuy. Byny new missiles in this catceorv ar*>

ably be accompamcdhaseout of some of the older missiles.

B. MRBM/IRBM Research and Development

light testingew RcccDtthat this missile

Avai|abIe ^ac"

Jstorable liqmd propellants and an inertial guidance system. Wesystem could reach IOC ,

SS-4. This new system could beolid or hquid-propeS mSie ^devl^

tht.Soviet effortWnant1^^

wiUohd-propcllan. IRBM within the period of Uus estimate If it U

an outgrowth^

n several occasions the Soviets have displayed two tvnw. porter-erector-launch vehic.es with the Scampi Scrco^ not ope.at.onal systems, but they reflect continuinr. Soviet intersZl-r^

e

OCCRCT-

1/

C. To-cc Level* and Composition

We estimate that new MRBM and IRBM systems will supersede present systems within the nextean. We cannot determine whether these new systems will he basedabove. Apart from these, wc have observed no flight tutsossible follow-on MRBM orew system could probably enter serviceears after flight testing began. In any case, we doubtew system could achieve IOCnitial deployment would probably be in hard single silos, solid-propellant missiles may also be deployedobile rnode.

We do not believe that old systems will be replaced by new systemsne for one basis. As the survivability and overall capability of the force are increased by the introduction of the new systems, there will probably be some reduction in the total size of force. The reduction in numbers is not likely to be great, however, since the Soviets will probably see new requirements as tbe result of thc threatostile China, with its emerging strategic capabilities. For these reasons wc estimate that lite strength of lhe Soviet MRBM/IRBM force will fall somewhereangeaunchers throughout the period of this estimate.

V. MISSILE SUBMARINE FORCES

The Soviet ballistic missile submarine force is composedotal ofaunchers. Tills represents an increase In the size of the force of one or two units (of thelass) over our previousho new figure reflects teanalysis of the Il-class conversion program rather than new production. The USSR alsoruise-missile submarines equipped withaunchers.

We continue to believe the ballistic missile submarine force is intended for use against land targets, and that cruise missile submarinesrimaryof countering naval forces, particularly aircraft carrier task forces. Cruise-missile submarines could be employed against land targets, but with the growth of the ICBM force and the introductionew class of ballistic missilewe believe that thc Soviet requirement for such employment becomes increasingly marginal.

A. Ballistic Missile Submarines

Soviets are clearly placing increasing emphasis on their ballisticforce. Tliey areew class of submarines which wcnuclear powered and will carryallistic missiles. We estimate thatunit of this new class will reach IOC byondthis class probably is in the early singes of fitting Out.

' Memorandum to Holders olated

occffir

16

have estimated 'hat the Soviets willew ballistica range. for this submarine class. Wc havehe evidencebeingequirement. Our evidence is inconclusive as to its range,. and may be as much. Wc believe that

road>'tfnow submarine and that

the entire system-submarine andreach IOC by about

addition to new submarine construction, we believe that the Sovietsto retrofit G-lass submarines with the. missiles, These submarines were initially equipped withn.m. Waco-launchedallistic missile. Someof thesehave probably been modified or are undergoing rrwdification attime. Wc expect these modification programs to continue until allH-class and most oflass have undergone retrofit.

al sometime after the

'he nuclear-powered

nd the Tclass of cruise-missile submarines is continuing, althoughofI class has probably been considerably reduced. Wc expectof both to end within the next few years, since it appears that thc force is approaching what we believe to be its planned level. We do not believe thc Soviets will develop any new cruise-missile submarines, but tbey mayew cruise missile with increased range and speed to replace their present type. All Soviet cruise-missile submarines arc equipped with thee believe this missile could be firedaximum rangeut that its likely operational range would be on the order.

C. Strength and Composition of tho Force9

ur estimate of the strength and composition of thc Soviet missile sub-marine force throughs shown below.

B. Cruise-Missile

cruise-missile submarinesballistic missile units. Wc believe that -

Class Nuclear Powered

H-I

H-II

Newiesel Powered

C-I

C-II

Z-Con version

TOTAL Ballistic

MISSILE SUBMARINES Numbeh or

Launch ens

OcTonrn

Unit

S

a

e

6

5CCHLT

rv

BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES (Co-mW) CI1UISE MISSILE SUBMAHINES

Nuclear Powered

Diesel Powered'8

TOTAL

D. Operalionol Capabilities of lhe Force

was estabhshed northeast of the Azores. SinceS naJsln

nearE near Crccrdand are probably targeted against naval installations in the UK such as the Polaris base at Holy Loch and the British ballistic rZIsuDrnax^

5 'n rCC,and- ncatprobX

Sfese-*

n the Pacific, individual patrols continue to be conducted northeast of Hawai, normally by diesel submarines,lass. This isTooaot a

yubmarines have been maintainedatrol area west of the Azores is now continuously 3least one nuclcar-powcrcd submarine probably an FAl; the7ocatTongreat-drele routes between the US and Europe nmL thatis to intercept US carrier forces a.

c eshmatc that this patrol activity will increase, and that with the advent of thc new ballistic missile submarine, additional patrol areas will be esTahlUnS Because of the lack of forward bases and the operationalowever, the Soviets probably could keep no more than about /percentallistic missile submarines continuously on station in Po-

a Im. T,iets"Memaintainher percentage of submarines on station in areas closer to ,h"

CO. CiitTcnl Soviet nutlcar-powerci missile submarines have aliout thc same operating depth limitation as US ballistic missile subinailnes. but arc somewhat slower and considerably noisier. When seeking to counter US submarinesystems, the Soviets apparently use the technique ol operating at slow speed (belowrnots) to reduce noise levels- We believe that the new ballistic missile submarine Incorporates features which will somewhat reduce the level of noise it generates.

Soviets have substantially improved the logistic andfor their submarine forces during the past several years.hey experimented in the central Atlantic withnique open ocean submarine support and replenishmentariety of auxiliary and support vessels. Classes of submarinescompany with ono or more of the ships included thcI,attack N, und the torpedo attack F. At least one ol tho missileoprinling with this support group evidently remained at sen formonths. Should thc concept prove feasible and he put into practice,greatly increase thc patrol areas which submarines could cover andto some extent at least,ubstitute for distant land-basedfacilities. It might also permit more of the force to be'patrol.

E. Force levels and Composition

Wc believe that the Soviets arc buildingallistic missileforce that will confront the continental UShreat roughlyto that which the Polaris force presents to the USSR. The Soviets might define such comparability in terms of numbers of Polaris-type submarines, in terms of numbers of submarine missile launchers, or in terms of launchers that could be maintained continuously on station. Depending on how they define comparability, wc believe that thc Soviets wouldorce of betweenof tlie new submarines, together with their ll-class units, .is meeting these(Tliclass submarines, because of their limited on-station time al long range, are probably intended primarily for use against Eurasian targets.)

We cslimate lite number of Soviet ballistic missile submarines intfill be of the new type.7 we expect the ballistic missile fleet to be composed ofubmarines, includingf thc new class. Allon version models will probably be phased out1

We estimate that the cruise-missile submauine force will number betweenndnits2 and betweenndyhe estimated reduction in the force is based on our belief that phaseout oflasswill be completed

21

VI. LONG RANGE AVIATION'

tha ballistic missile has clearly replaced the maimed bomberprincipal means ul strategic attack, the bomber lorces of Long Rangestillubstantial capability for strategic strike andWe believe that Soviet planning calls for tho use of LRA inan initial missile strike, or to supplement the retaliatory blow ifis attacked first. LRA noworce ofeavyaircraft andedium bomber/tankers. We believe thatbombers have thc primary mission of intercontinental attack, and thatare intended mainly for operations against Eurasia. LRA activitypast year continued lo reflect training for these primary missions; theof naval reconnaissance received less emphasis, particularly in thebomber force.*

A. Recent Developments in long Range Aviation

Thc most Important recent development in LRA has been'thc equipping of the Badger medium bomber forceew air-to .surface missile (ASM) which will probably extend the useful life of thc Badger. We believeignificant portion of thc Badger force has already been equipped with the new missile and we estimate that as manyadgers may carry the missile by the time the reequipping and training program has been completed. Tbe missile, which we designates estimated to fl/ at high subsonic speedaximum range.

Another impoitanl new development is that theppears finally to have reached operational status. During the Soviet airshow in9 Blinders equipped with thearticipated in thc flyby. (Blinder aircraft configured to carry there designatede estimateircraft have been delivered to LRA.

*Maj. Cen. Jack E. Thomas, thc Atshiant Chief of Stair, Intelligence, USAF. considers lhat thU icctton does not adequately addrfit (intent and future capabilities of Soviet Long Range Aviation ami seriously underestimates the manned nlicraft threat to the US. He believer this threat involves morere raft ^includingedium bombers onhreat ol thlt uugnllude will continue well into the future-Ills specific dtMgreemeiUthis section of the estimate are erptsined In footnotes to the ifproprisle paragraphs besW.

s believes that thc USSR -ould coracsit the neejoeity of Usbornbers, ai well ai the entire heavy bomber force, against the US. rather than use the mediums mainly against Eurasia. It is his vie- lhat the greater lumber of essential andn tbe US. at complied with Uie number in Emails,equirement lhat thc medium boinben be focused against Noith Amenta. Eton without Uie medium banbeis. the USSItassive capability agalnit Eurasian targets wllh MKllM/IllHMs, shoiter rsngelight lumbers and lactlcnl lighten, ni well as bombers ol Naval Aviation and lhe oulie-mlsiile lubmaruiei

TO

TOP 3FCRer-

ircofr Production

Beat and the Blinder are lhe only strategic bomber aircraft nowPlantt Kuybyihev is producing about ono Bear perwe estimate that4 most, if not all, of the Bear aircraftgone to Naval Aviation. We believe that within the neat year theof Naval Aviation for Bears will be met. We think production willif some kind of program in connection with the Bear does" continueplant, its purpose would probably be to effect qualitative improvementsadapting the Bearew ASM or. conceivably, to replace someWe believe that Plantt Kazan is continuing to produce aboutper month; we are uncertain as to how long this production willwe doubt that it will extend longer thanears,'*

levels and Composition to

17

strength of LRA has remained relatively stable over the pastbelieve the Soviets will retain their heavy bomber force at close'tolevel for thc nut few years. The medium bomber force -willsomewhat. Our estimate of the strength and composition of LRAis as follows:

Heavy Bombeii/Tankers

Bison

Bear

Mednim BotbrcVTanktrs "

Badger

Blinder

Capabilities of lhe Force

eview of LRA training activity over the past scvcial years strongly indicates that an aircraft attack against the US (except Alaska) would be carried out almost exclusively by heavy bombers and that the Soviets would use virtually their entire force of heavy bombers and tankers for that mission.

On. Thomas due. not tonii<lcr then* la .ifte.|uato rnulsudgim-ntir snd Blinder produition will end'it. unless it is accepted that the Soviet Unionreparing to produce follow-on models He believes that Soviet efforts to nsodenure the lone; range,apability, as evidenced by limited, butproduction of Bear and Blinder, prohabiy wiU coniinue until llie USSR hai ilrtitled upon specific foDowon models.

" Maj Cen. Thomns eipccti that any reduction in the niediuin-bomberr the nrvl two years will be very ml nee, and not nearly as much as5 aircraft reduction Indicatedthe table. He notes that in the past year Iota) reduction in the enedtum bombci force

only five aircraft

-TOP

Wc continue lo believe tlml medium bombers do not figure prominently in Soviet plans (or an initial attack on the US. To carry out two-way minions againil US targets, they would require Arctic staging and aerial refueling.we believe that the Arctic staging bases, which must be supplied almost entirely hy sea during the short annual shipping seasons, could not simultaneously support heavy bomber and medium bomber strikes of majorewof Badgers might be employed on two-way missions against targets in Alaska, Canada. Iceland, and Greenland.'1

The Soviets could, if they elected to do so. increase tho weight ol an attack against thc US hyortion of tho medium bomber force on range (one-way) missions, since the ulrcraft do have the capability. Considering training patterns, as well as the growth of tbc ICBM and submarine missile forces, we believe such use of the medium bomber is unlikely."

We believe that LRA does not continuouslyortion of its force on an Airborne or ground alerteaction time of IS minutes or less).

. We estimate that with current manning. LRA could establish and maintain one-third of the force on ground alert,light augmentation in personnel this could be raised to SO percent We believe that, if LRA were toround alert statusoutine basis, this would be delected.,,

E. New Aircraft Development

evidence indicates lhat Soviet work tn large aircraft is directedtoward the development of new transports. This work advancesof the art andechnological and production base whichapplied to bomber development. The US announcement to deploymay lead the Soviels toew manned bomber as asuch defenses. Il the Soviets did elect toew heavy bomber,would obtain indications of the development and productionears prior lo its introduction into operationalthe growing of Soviet ballistic missile capabilities, however,other options open to them to counter ABM defenses, we continue to believe

en. Thomash that because ofnge *nd weapon during ransbiliUes. and In view of the lug" number ol US Utgcts as sgjinil tho number of Soviet delivery vehicles, medium bombers continue toajor mission ol attack againsi the USajor nuclear esiault is launched. Inituation, he estimate! moreedium bombers would be used oo range roeuesl

"en. Thomas does not consider available Information is sumcicnt to provide basis for judgment thatA does notortion of tbe force on ground alert. In view nl Soviet doctrinal emphasis on aleit readiness, he corisiders ft likely that ionic portion of the bombers is on constant alert.

TOP SCCRril

TOP SECRET

il unlikely licit (lie USSR willollow-on heavy bomber Into LRA during Ihc period o( this estimate.1'

Soviets have experienced difficulties in bringing the Blinder toslatus. Unless these problems have been resolved, the Sovietsollow-on medium bomber. One possibility is aperhaps with variable geometry wings, having better speed,radius than the Blinder; it could be introduced inalternate possibility, which could be introduced somewhat later lhanmodel, wouldupersonic-cruise medium bomber based on thetransport development; it would probablyadius aboutas thc Blinder.

Air-la-Surface Missile Development

The Soviets arc continuing developmental work on ASMs for attack against both land and sea taigets. Even though lheow carried by two models of the Dear, has been operationale believe lhat the Soviets arc still trying to improve the weapon- Thc most likely component to be improved would be thc guidance system. It is also possible that the Soviets willew ASM for use with the Bear.

We believe lhat tbe Soviets are working On an ASMange of.ruise speed of Mache think it unlikely, however, that it has achieved IOC, but the program is probably continuing.

Force Levels

LRA heavy bomber aircraft are on the average about 6and attrition is beginning to take efted. The strength of tbe Bear forcechanged appreciably during lheears, but thc numberhas declined. We estimate that over theears or so theBear ASM carriers will remain relatively constant but that overallstrength will decline, due to attrition of the older Bear and BisonWc estimate lhal byhe heavy bomber force willear ASM carriers andisons. Wehis force will consist of no moreearsisons.11

" Maj. Cen. TIkk.ukew heavy strategic aircraft system is likely In besupport the present force level into the mid-lUTOs. Thisau

improved IW.irew ASM or aaircruft bawd on rcseanh mid development (dating, in pari .it Icnst. to supersonic tranipoiU.

en. Thomas notes that both Dear and Boon strength has remained unchanged In the past year, snd he believes lhat the USSR will continue In maintaineavv bombers in operatMnal units throughout lhe period of this estimate,ollow-on ivsieili to support the force level in.

ver theears the strength of the medium bombers in LRA has been declining; the Badger force has been decreasing at an average rate of aboutircraft per year and Blinders have not been deployed in surBdeot numbers to offset this decline. Since wc do not believe that all the Badgers now in the force will be equipped to carry the ASM, weontinued reduction in Badger strength- We estimate that byhe medium bomber force will compriseadgers andlinders.7 the Badger-force will probably have declined toircraft but the number of Blinders will probably have remained relatively constant Ifew medium bomber in, we believe that it would replace some of the older current types rather than being additional to tbe above strengths."

VII. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Supreme authority over the Soviet Armed Forces is probably vested in the Politburohole, or at leastommittee of the Politburo. In peacetime the political authorities exercise control through the Ministry of Defense. In Ihc event of war the channel would probably runupreme Highwhich would include political as well as military leaders and would have wide powers in the direction of the war effort

During theears, some elements within thc military havethe critical Importance of fast reaction and surpriseodern nuclear environment and have stressed the needermanent poliiical-milltarysimilar to the wartime Supreme Highoperate in peacetime as well as In wartime. We do not know whether such an organ has in fact been created. We believe that arrangements exist for the quick assumption of command by the political leadership in thc event ofbut we doubt that any one of the present collective leaders has been given the authority that Khrushchev exercised as "Supremee believe that the collective nature of thc present leadership works to inhibitentralization of command authority at this time.

We believe that within thc military itself, however, thc Soviets are movineighly integrated command structure for their strategic attack forces There are various indications that during the past year there has been arefinement and improvement of operational controls within those forces.

en. Thomasore gradual decline inomewhat

larger Bhnder force than this paragraph Indicates. edium-

ha" OO-fDO (rather

ANNEX A

GLOSSARY OF MISSILE TERMS

TABLES OF SOVIET WEAPON SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE

TABLE

SYSTEMS

FRACTIONAL ORBIT BOMBARDMENT SYSTEM MRBM/IRBM SYSTEMS BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES CRUISE MISSILE SUBMARINES SUBMARINE LAUNCHED MISSILE SYSTEMS BOMBER AND TANKER AIRCRAFT AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS

TOP 3ECRET

occgcr

GLOSSARY OF MISSILE TERMS

Initial Operational Capabililythe Erst operational unit is trained and equippedew missiles and launchers.

MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL RANGE

Air-to-Surfacerange between launching aircraft and target at thc time of missile launch.

Surf ace-to-Surfacerange under operational conditions with warhead weight indicated. In the case ol ballistic missiles thc maximum range figures disregard thc effect of thc earths rotation.

-'

Circular Error Probabilityradiusircle centered on the extended target, within whichercent of thc arriving missile warheads are expected to fall.

FOBS ANDfootnote definition on

REENTRY VEHICLES AND WARHEADS

Reentry Vehiclepartissile designed to reenter thc earths atmosphere in the terminal portion of its trajectory.

Multiple RVspayload package consisting of two or more RVs. The individual RVs are dispersed (but not independently-targeted orduring the free flight or terminal portion of the trajectory in order to confuse enemy radars, aid penetration, and/or to increase kill area.

Multiple Independently-targeted RVpayload consisting of two or more RVs each ol which is independently targeted.

Maneuverable RVRV which has the capability to maneuver during free flight or reentry.

Warheadweight of the eiplosive device and its associated furlng and firing mechanism.

RVweight includes that of the warhead, necessary shielding and structure, any internal penetration aids that may be present, and any other necess3ry or desired components.

Payloadweight of that part of thc 'missile above the last booster stage.

SECftcr

i op secnpT-

BANGE CLASSES

Short Range Ballistic MMh (SRBM) Up to.

Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)-

Intcrmcdlate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)

. Inteicontincntal Ballistic Missile (ICBM)

.

REUABIUHES

Weaponpercentage of lite alerl missiles that will successfully detonate withinF.Ps of their targets. This is the product of launch, inflight, and warhead reliabilities.

Aleitpercentage of the operational missile force that is maintained jt normal readiness condition.

percentage of the operational missile force that will successfully detonate in the target area. This is the product of Alert Rate and Weapon System reliability.

Reactionrequired to proceedeadiness condition to launch.

Retirerequired toecond missile from the same pad or

launcher.

sccftcr

srcRcr

TABLE II

SOVIET Pit ACTIONAL OltlllT HOMUAKDM liNT SYSTEMEstimated Charactcristica and Performance

Reentry Vehicle Weight <lbs) Warhead Weight.

Warhead Yield (MT)

CEP (nm)

Deployment

Force Reliability.

Improvement

Reaction Time

Normal Readiness

Peak ftendiness

Hold Time

Thismi estimateOBS based on ihcystem which ihc Sovieu have been testing loruan. Evidence indicates that thcs It has beenoould probably have, to tn) modified to attack Uie USolar imjcctoiy. It tlie niodifien-lion wereeduction of welsht In orbit. IOC could be nchlevod by earlyS and the lower RV and warhead weight) would apply. II the modification were to be so drastic ris tbc developmentew launch vehicle, IOC could not be achieved0 but the higher RV and warhead weights could be delivered. If the modification were lo be in improvement in the thrust of lhe present launch vehicle, ihc higher RV mid warhead weights would apply bm IOC could not be achieved unul late IMS or early ior/l

* If thc FOHS were to be launchedorth Pule Iraory,estimate that ils CEP would be. If il wcie to be launchedoulh Pole trajectory, we estimate that IU CEP would be.

SOVIET MIIBM/IBBM SYSTEMS talimalcdtl:Ci and PrrfOimarc

M*

[MM

Oucrmionnl)

-i

_

ajm

Vehktc Wright (IW>

Warhtad Weight (IW)

Warliend Yield

CEP Inm)

ndlabiliiySyitcinItoundcd)

1

J

J

1.0

0

i.flnti About in

Force on AU*ft.

Reliiibllily

eu

n

yra

Time io Fire From Xonnnl lleodlacta Condition . to Fire From Parak llcadinero

raia-lS mln

ln

poaaibly mobilelnln

poMlbly mobilelnln

ln

Time atincM

Retire Tit '

raree

hraMayi IH MkIm

n a

Imi url

r. .'.

-.

Ufliay

L-mid

UmU

or Storeble LneU

stimateReeeat e*n th* biltuuc mlW.le l*obc ceploytdaaan MRBM __ nu^nded forai an MltBM.Woetfce Se-vteu ami ikt'.op a

MB DM to repUt' Or*t would probably reach lot later lathe period and it could bertype. It reuld be deploji'l in eiihee hattt or mobCe eonljurencn.

We eaiWuMe thainew IRBM win be breugat u> cperaUonal lUlu* during the period of this otlmnie. Ifeveloped aa an- probably could reach IOC If, on the other hand, iiew eyatcfti which hat not yet been Sight trued. IOC

could pntVibly not be reneheS.

behat higher tn hard riles.

TABLE IV

SOVIlfT BALLISTIC MISSILE SUftM AMINES Estimated CtiaructciisUcs nnd Perform mice

Clam

Ncic Ckt*>

of Propulsion

r

of Missile

(KTS)

Surface. .

Snorkel

Submerged/Endurance (KTS/

Submerged/Endurance (KTS/

3

2

on StaUoii/DiaUuicc (nm)

noo

SOU

S00

SOO

The first siibiiiiihne ofhws uas equipped to carryoissiles. Laterovcvci. are equipped to enrry three.

b Patrol duration is defined as lhe norni.il length of limeubmarine can remainnder combat conditions nithoutl. Ii j*ie basis o( personnel endurance,abitability, rood consumption, spare parts, and olher consumables including fuel.

TABLE V

SOVIET CRUISE MISSILE SUBMARINES EsUmntcd Characteristics and Performance

Long Bin

of Propulsion . .

Type of .Miiaas*

Speed (KTS)

Maximum SurfaC

Maximum Snorkel.

Masiinuni Sobnu-rnnl/Endurance..

Economic Submerged/Endurance (KTS/nrn)

Armament

M

Patrol Duration (il.iys)' .

lAUOii/DisluiiCu (tun)

See

m

e

O0

Nuclear

OO

Diesel

IG

00

Diesel

15

. VI2-.

X1

Diesel

18

5.5

14

2

40

35

i

SOVIETUNUKEO MISSILE SYSTEMS

ctcriaurand Performance

IOC

Minimum

Warhead Welghl

Warhead Yield

CEPLand Tarsals) (nm)

Type and I'roiinhiow

(Mich)

< Altitude (ft)

I... Mode

Weapon System (Rounded).

Alcit Rate

ForceHeuadcrf)

Salvo Time by Submarine ClavilNft Conversion (I,is-nlcn)

J I (4

lassissiles)

E-II Clawissiles)

Z-CI.imissiles)

a misrule.)

C-II2issiles) *

Umniasllea)

II-CI Class

Follow.onlseiics)

llearUon Tlnse (min)

(Ineiunei Minutes on Surface Before Launch)

l-a

Cium* Turbo M

urf-red 75

70

rlul

2-8

t

(5)

IWO

1-2

D.lli.iic StoiAble

o

Surfaced

n

V. JO

iii

1-2

Ballislie Stoiable "Ballistic Sloisblc

Submerged

Unknown

Unknownwo res

4-S

Inertial

Son.)

Non.)

Wc brlwr lhat theckaasitcd feesuval surface read, butt cm beattackWfU TW cba/ac tern lie- and ucrformance rial* fata, oa IhM table are lo* tie -at

U thie latter rear. Sonar of the perfeema-ee datawould beHurt if theoaval fewm. figure reprcnenU the maalmuu. range of this mlwilc but wethat use likely eperaUoaal rnnge would be on the order

only toon uaUoL

Lire three .arUnl. oflaa. converaion In the Soviel fleet.

' The first submarine ofll elan* waa equipped loenrryV. Liter modcli, however, are equipped to carry Hire* rissnsPea.

- Time reipuriiloin un-.dlneas condition to filing.akennclude the time fron. Ilir moim-nt of llu- Older In Urn lo hunch of Uie first inv-ilrI) the submarine I. on nh-rtifJ)the.ytlum liiilmles ronlimiou* compulation of fide* iluta,Iiit mh-lli.

liuw bem checked ami are ready fo* countdown. ForSI.DM* submarine Umc on surface Is included In

ction lime, fur iwrlcrnter brtUtdwdibmiirmc Umc lo alL.inUwieh atliludc is included.

TABLE VII

SOVIET LONG RANGE AVIATION UOMnER AND TANKER AIRCRAFT Estimatedi1

A *

0

Combst Radiupi/Rnnpa (unt)ree (all bomber)

lb

one refuel1

1b bombload

one itf ii'I

b bombload .

one

b. bombload

one relunl

. With ASM

Bear)

one refuel

ubsonic)

one refuel

AS-3

one refuel

0 Ib. bomblonil {Supersonic-dash)..

one

b borwbWI

one irt ifi

b bomblod (Sn

00

one refuel

one AS-4

one refuel.

0

li.V'iboiitntt

Target Speed/Altitude (KTS/fl.)

4'J.iiiXi

Snporeonic

i

I

System Rclinbility f% uircr.-ift it-achinr;in North,

omber, sions arc batedneli

.

nc-inwrtawiuUn assVeraV, IMUdcrniat ofarea .arUua ii. only en-

range Tlwirneof an oprintkoiuil rr4uHfer ifcm -nn-li

* This rangebi>nl on the IoIIomIiik itonrunibiil attritionI) VIIol tlM' nlrirafllo homo hise (AOB) would be In coin mix* ionV-IO tiny irtiunldonii (trior lo iulli.dami would Iwcouttr airborne ill launchM prrcmitof aircraft idrbonw would rrnch llltLdinelly fromorfrumt pereent of Ihr aircraft Liuiwhrrl fruwi bnur baau -ouhl br Liuireheit frewibw.vlUb-lilT

to JHnnfr uhIrrfnrliuxtlwirm. i peierHI

reliability *hoiiM beu aircraftton4tua;

TABLE VIII

SOVIET LONG ItANCE AVIATION ASM SYSTEMS

Estimalcd Chsiactcrisucs 'nd Performance

IOC

'. 1

AS 1

I tinge

Warhead Weight (lbs)

Yield

Accuracy (CEP) nm

0 ft

+ 2yrsnknown

8adger/3

reprogrninmedwiih command override.

Aircraft/Number of Mluitei

reprogrammedmrlth cominnnd

We believe thai the Soviets currently have ine* ASM with .in estimated range ol.peed of Macht haa almost certainly noi achieved IOC. We do not know which aircraft may be Intended lo carry It or when ll may become operational.

Does noi include Ihe reliability of lhe currier aircraft.

There are no limitations on lhe speed al which this missile can be launched.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGirNCY

IN'AllON NO'ICE

dccuirwii wot diivtinlnotod by Ihc Central Irrelligciiednlor Ihc inurmo'ion ond use ol ihe recipient and ol persons undei tviod'lo-know bcs'<s. Aaditional essential disseir.inohon moy be ou'ho'lied byoFkioU within then* leipeciive dcporimenii;

of fntilligcnic ond Re-eorch, tor thel*

OVd-kmlor :lio OSicn of the Sccrctat) ol

De'emo ond iho organiialion ot Ihe Join: Chiefi oi Stofl

Chief ofor Inielligence, Department oi the Army, fot the

Department ol lhe Atmy

Chief ol Na>cl OpCC'iOMc the DnpartmeM of th*

Navy

Chiel of 5lcB. Intelligence. USAF. Isr Ihe Deportment ol tho AU

Force

ol Intelligence, AEC, lor lhecgy Commission

Oitcc'or, FBI, lor tho Federal Bureau of Investigation

. for the National Securily Agency

ol Scienlific Intelligence, CIA, fcr any olnur Deportment or Agency

This document moy bo retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicoble security> returned lo Ihe Central Inferenceby arrangemeni wllh the Office of Screnl'Rc Inielligence, CIA.

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The lilta of this document when tried leporately from the ten ihould be <loi-sificdi StCftCf

Whiio Home Notional Secur Department ot Department of Atomic Energy Federal fturean

ity Council SloiO Defense Commission of invei

-TerSECREt""

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