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APPROVED FOR OBGWU'D
DATE: AUG OXCART-
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology
of Surfaco to Air Missile
Engagements for OXCART Missionsnd BXG734
memorandum Is for information only.
BLACK SHIELD Missionsndere flown onnd7 in rosponseontinuing United States Intelligence Boardto maintain photographic surveillance of North Vietnam in order to dotoct the possible introduction of surface to surface missile systems. These missions were the sixteenth and eighteenth BLACK SHIELD missions flown since the commencement of operations from Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, on7 and aro the only missions on which SAM firings havo been encountered.
The data contained in this memorandum results from an analysis of all source information which
Warfare Systems Operation
This memorandum represents the coordinated views of the Office of Special Activities, Offico of Scientific Intelligence and tbe Office of Elint.
4. Mission Resume:
The mission aircraft departed Kadena Air Basen7oute which included two photographic passes over North Vietnam. opicts the actual route flown as reconstructed from tho INS tape, (For identification purposes the first pass is, the Tho first actual surface to air missile launchedIACK SHIELD aircraft took place on. Ono missile was fired. This missile firing is analyzed
in detail in 5. Tho planned route was
flown as scheduled.
The mission aircraft departed Kadena Air Rasen Planned routes includod two photographic passes over North Vietnam. II dopicts the actual routo flown as reconstructed from mission photography. (For identification purposes, the first pass is, the secondn this mission at least sovon and possibly as many as ten surface to air missiles were launched against the mission aircraft. ingle missile was launched during, the remainder on. (It cannot be roadily determined whether or not tho missile launched onas fired at the mission aircraft; however, analysis ofs included so as to yield asicture as possible of tho Air Defense Network.) This mission was flown as schoduled, landing at Kadena Air Base. Post flight inspection of the aircraftragment (presumably debrisAM but not part of the warhead) had penetrated the right aft fillet of the mission aircraft and had lodged in the support structure surrounding tho number five fuel tank. Detailed analysis of the missile firings is contained in
5. Detailed Analysis of
From Elint ixty nautical miles to the west of Hanoi (See Attachment III) the on-board System VI Elint Collectoringle FAN SONG illuminating the mission aircraft. Sequentially, System VI indicated theactivity:
SONG up low PRF
SONG dow low PRF
ONG up low PRF
MOTH Jammer On
. Z =' aud guidance signal up indicating missile launch
- BLUE DOG Jammer on indicating missile launch
- FAN SONG up High PRF
= FAN SONG High PRFand guidance- down
Z - MAD MOTH down
- FAN. SONG to Low PRF
= FAN SONG down
Fromntercepted SAM communications revealed that the Phuc Yen Regimental Controller had alerted SAM Siteo ready his missiles and engage the mission aircraft.he site was ordered to fire when the aircraft was aboutautical miles from tho site.id not fire until the mission aircraft5
nautical miles slant range from site. Post launch communications between the regimental controller and the site revealed that the slto was able to fire only one missile in the engagement.
From Photography - Mission photographyissilo takon' abouteconds after launch revealed tho missile to bo heading to the left, down, and away from the aircraft flight path. In addition, mission photography of tho launch site revealed that only one missile launchor was elevated.
From Pilot's Comments - Other than cockpit light displays from the Electronicystems activations, tho pilot observed no hostile reactions (contrails, missiles, etc.),
Conclusions resulting from analysis of Missionata are:
missile was launched at the
launch occurredangethat range requireduccessfulthe mission aircraft.
on-board Electronic Warfareresponded to the throat.
d. Due to tho late launch lino oX tho nlssilc, tho mission aircraft was beyond tho threat envelope for this engagementesult of speed and altitude,
7. Significant Findings:
PRF launch capability was demonstratedfirst time on this mission.
Angloomint derivedchatter during tho missile firing indicatedazimuth which leads targetegrees. While this amountis believed excessive for successfulit mayesire to modifyfor the BLACK SHIELD target parameters.
It Is also quite likely that the indicated launch azimuthogreos is in error; occurring cither during the post launch analysis conducted by the site, or during tho post launch report transmitted to tho regimental controller. The error indicated in tho SAM track position plot of the mission vehiclo shown in Attachment III tends to support this postulate.
Tho two significant findingsoault ofill be discussod along with their implications later in this memorandum alortg with the results of the analysis of
S. Detailed analysis of
From Elint - As tho mission aircraft penetrated denied territory, the System VIingle FAN SONG signal. Sequentially the System VI indicatod the following activi ty:
VIA BYEMAN/COM INT CONTROL SYSTEM
- FAN SONG up low PliF
- and guidance up indicating missile launch
' - FAN SONG to High PRF
- BLUE DOG Jammer up indicating missile guidance
- MAD MOTH Jammer up forilliseconds
- FAN SONG moves out-of-sector still in High PRF
Z - and guidanco and BLUE DOG down
- FAN SONG down
From Comint - Two SAMere notod active from intercepted communications during. Comint relative to those two sites did not yield any evldenceissilo launch, and it is considered highly doubtful that eithor of these sites wouldaunch against sthe mission aircraft sinco the closest point of approach to either of these sites was in excess ofautical miles.'
From Photography - Mission photography onid notissile launch (no observation of vapor trails, radar or launcher orientation, etc.).
9. issionass A
Conclusions resulting from tho analysis of4ata are:
tho ovidonco available doosdemonstrateurface towas launched at tho mission aircraft,
the on-bourd Electronic Warfare Systems operation and Ryu torn VI recordings showed signals of the proper timing and scquoncoissile launch.
SONG signal intercepts on Systema lower than normal signal level. Asit is most probable that theof the PIN PEG and MAD MOTHnot oxceeded. Tho BLUE DOGore sensitive system, respondederiod of approximatelyeconds.
DOD strike aircraft were induring the missile launch it isthat the miss.Ho was directedaircraft.
10. Significant Findings
a. The firing sequenco of the Low PRF launch node ofs similar to the firing sequence noted in.
JOB SSCB n'T
b. Band guidance .signal was up loreconds indicatingemoval of the guidance computer recycle clock or an extension of tho recycle clock time. The guidance computer rocycle time was approximatelyeconds.
11. Detailed Analysis of)
From Elint - Approximately sixty nautical miles wost oi Hanoi the System VI indicated the presence of FAN SONG low PRF signals. Subsequently System VI indicated the following activity:
= FAN SONG up Low PRK
FAX SONG down Low PRF
SONG up Low PRF
MOTH Jammer up
guidance "A" up
- MAD MOTH responded to aof high and low
PRF FAN SONG signals emanating from at least six SAM siteshen the aircraft was approximately fifteen nautical miles to tho east of Hanoi.
DOG "A" up (associatedand guidance
BLUE DOG "B" up (associatedand guidance
E MAN/COMINT CONTROL SYSTEM
- FAN SONG Activity ceased
'int "During the, Comint rollocLions oi"ndicated that SAM Battalions of two Regiments (Phuc Yen and Hanoi) wore actively tracking and attempting launches on the BLACK SHIELD vehicle. Comint indicated that the SAM Battalions located atnd at least two unlocated sites were active during this time.
From Photography - BLACK SHIELD photography of pass-that'itos wore occupied. sixapor trails which appearedZ indicatedewly identified siteof Hanoiotal of five missiles inof the BIACK SHIELD vehicle. Noho obtained from the sixth vapor trail thatits launch site. (See Attachmentphotography ofeveral launchers ndand their FAN SONG radars weretho direction of the BLACK SHIELD vehicle. all data indicates thatthe now site were active and most
probably launched six to nine missiles at the aircraft.
From Pilot's Comments - When the Electronic Warfaro System activity appeared in tho cockpit the pilot extended his roar view periscope in an attempt lo make visual contact. The pilot's report is quoted:
"The missiles wereteep climb through the aircraft altitude of0 feet, thon thoyharp push overoderate dive angle, Leveled out at my altitude and guided toward tho stern of the aircraft to detonation. Tho missiles varied slightly in azimuth compared to my line of flight in their climb, but all corrected in azimuth
to an accurate dead stern position during push over and dive phase. (Missile altitude)0 foot is probably quite close, but couldew thousand feet either way. It was not possible to view the entire contrail until downew miles duo to narrow angle view in rear periscope," (In this encounter the pilot was referring to three missiles.)
Additionally, pilot reportedissileards to the right of tho aircraft abeam the cockpit. It was0 toegree climb angle in the direction of aircraft flight. The missile was reported to have been rotating fairly fast about its vertical axis and appeared to the pilot to be the last detonation bo observed as quoted in paragraph above. In summary the pilot felt that he saw at least six missile contrails and Ohree detonations all to the rear of the aircraft.
12. Summary of Mission)
Conclusions resulting from analysis ofata
-least six and possibly as many asto air missiles were launched at the
VI analysis indicates theSystems performed as designed in jammingsignal environment. (See Attachment XIfor typical response).
13. Significant Findings
not readily apparent itthe Low PRF launch mode was employed on atfirst two firings of. Tho signalthese launches precludes anyLow PRF launch of the other firings.
guidance computer rocyclo time ofhas apparently been extended or thefrom the system as evidenced byand guidanceA,econds).
and/or saturate Etf system -ofand signal ofand the nature of the guidancesmall for an intercept ofindicate there may have been anspoof the BLUE DOG jammer. Also, NPICthat within the limits ofhereeavier than usualoccupied SAM sites in the Hanoi area. SHIELD photography did not reveal anyin the Haiphong area. It may be thatwere moved into the Hanoi area from
other areas- specifically in an attempt to concentrate fireepotitlve area of BLACK SHIELD routes. This also enhanced, as far as the Soviets/Vietnamese may have concluded, their ability to saturate HAD MOTH.
finding resulting from The pilotissilefast about its vertical axisyards to the right of the aircraftthe cockpit. Theissile rotating
about its longitudinal axis,issile out of control and will no longer answer to any guidance commands. It seems extremely unlikely that an out of control missile couldpushive and correct in azimuthead morn position. It appears to bo moro probable that the pilot observed two different missiles; one climbing abeam of tho aircraft, and another detonating some fow seconds later to tho rear of the aircraft. Although the rotation of tho missile about its longitudinal axis nay havo been caused by the on-board Jammers; it is not possible at this time to positively state that this was tho actual cause of the rotation.
current OXCART vulnerability aro: The increased launch range capability of the DRVystem launch in low PRF will definitely increase kill probability under conditions of OXCART jammer malfunction. The capabilityhe vohicle with fully operational ECM systoms is still considered to be essentially zero.
Acting Director of Special Activities
2 As Stated
Office of Scientific intelligence
II HII VII VIII
enetration Route Blow Up
equence of Events
enetration Koute Blow Up
equence of Events
apor Trail Analysis
i -XCART Vulnerability vsAO MOTHB)LUE DOG Response B)
-TOP- TTrP"1Original document.