OXCART OPERATIONS ON 27, 28, 29 OCTOBER (LOCAL TIME)

Created: 10/31/1967

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Operations9 October (local time)

momorandum Is for your information.

Since deployment of tho OXCART aircraft to Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, we have flownhotographic missions ovor North Viet Nam. Ofere flown during the month of October,

3 of which were on successive days over last

with tho third missionand later North Viotnamoso Air Defensehavo tracked tho aircraft and havetheir tracking capability. In theattempts toissile athavo beon mado but the firstoccurred over last wookond. Oneoccurred on Friday night (local time)wcro probably atissilesSunday night's mission. One from theField aroarom the Hanoi. It willdays before wo completo our dotailedthis activity but tho followinghavo been established:

a. During the period whenissiles wero being launched the aircraft

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was flying in excess ofnd at altitudes varying from00 reet.

jammer systems aboard thoto function normally and maya key role inhoot down.

pilot actually observedofppeared to burstfairly close to the aircraft.

landing an inspectionsmall hole in tbe bottom of thepenetrated throo layers ofand the metal object was actuallyone of the fuel tanks. The fragmentroturned to the US for analysis butpresume at this point it is inarhead.

a. COMINT confirms the launches as observed by the pilot and indicates that the launch crews thoughtf the missiles porformod properly.

4. Wo axe obviously concerned about thothe aircraft and will thoroughly review allbefore making finalthe moment, however, wo do not believois sufficient concern to warrant aand would propose that if the weatherwe should continue to operateumbersuch as naintalnlng very highsome adjustment of our flight routes. Vefurthor recommendations concerning anyin the program that may be requiredanalysis is

T.C :

Deputy Director for

Science and Technology

W-SEfiie-trine oxcart

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NOTE FOR: The Director

I justook at some of the COMINT traffic relating to Friday night's mission andew quotes might be usedight conversation on this subject develops.

Apparently most of the communications between the Regimental Controller at Phuc Yen airfield and the Battalion Commander of one of theites was The Battalion Commander had been ordered to fire when the aircraft was. from the site. The two argued about whether that was beyond theof theystem. Re did actually fire when the aircraft2 miles away. The Battalion Commander said that firingistance5 miles and at an altitude4 feet was "unrealistic and too far and highuccessful launch." The Controller complained that "One missile was not enough." The conversation then turnedore congenial mood, and the Controller congratulated the Battalion on their being the "first unit to be able to pick It up and launch." The Battalion Commander replied, "There is tho matter of my having experience already. If it continues and comes in again, I'll intercopt it." The Regimental Controller then left. The Battalion Commander continued, "Perhaps if we launch at It it will leave, but our missiles are too slow."

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Original document.

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