Created: 10/31/1967

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible



MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

OXCART Operations9

October (local time)

memorandum is for your information.

deployment of the OXCARTKadena Air Base, Okinawa, wo havo flownmissions over North Viet Nam. ore flown during the month of October,

3 of which wero on successive days over last


North Vietnamese Air Defense Radar noTworKS nave tracked the aircraft and have steadily improved their tracking capability. In the past several attempts toissile at the aircraft have been made but the first actual launches occurred over last weekend. One such attempt occurred on Friday night (local time) and there were probably atissiles launched against Sunday night's mission. One from the Kep Air Field arearom the Hanoi. It will be several days beforo we complete our detailed analysis of this activity but the following preliminary facts have been established:

a. During the period whenissiles were being launched the aircraft


of 7



was Hying in excess ofnd at altitudes varying from00 feet.

jammer systems aboard theto function normally and maya key role inhoot down.

pilot actually observedofppeared to burstfairly close to the aircraft,

landing an inspectionsr..ill hole in tho bottom of thepenetrated three layers ofand the metal object was actuallyone of the fuel tanks. The fragmentreturned to the US for analysis butpresume at this point it is inarhead.

confirms the launchesby the pilot and indicates thatcrews thoughtf theproperly.

CARL E. DUCKETT Deputy Director for

Science and Technology

4. We are obviously concerned about the safety of the aircraft and will thoroughly review all the information before making final recommondatlons. For the moment, however, we do not believe that thero is sufficient concorn totand-down and would propose that if the weather clears that we should continue to operateumber of precautions such as maintaining very high altitude and some adjustment of our flight routes. We will make further recommendations concerning any other adjustments in tho program that-may be required when our analysis is complete.


n top SECULT tm f



NOTE FOR: The Director

I justook at some of the COHINT traffic relating to Friday night's Mission andew quotes might bo usedight conversation on this subject develops.

Apparently most of tho communications between the Regimental Controller at Phuc Yen airfield and the Battalion Commander of one of thoites was The Battalion Commander had been ordered to fire when the aircraft was. from the site. Tlio two argued about whether that was beyond theof theystem. He did actually fire when the aircraft2 miles away. The Batalion Commander said that firingistance5 miles and at an altitudo4 feet was "unrealistic and too far and highuccessful launch." The Controller complained that "One missile was not enough." The conversation then turnedore congenial mood, and the Controller congratulated the Battalion on their being the "first unit to be able to pick it up and launch." The Battalion Commandor replied, "There is tho matter of my having experience already. If it continues and comes in again, I'll intercept it." The Regimental Controller then left. Tho Battalion Commander continuod, "Perhaps if we launch at it it will leave, but our missiles are too slow."

Carl B. Duckett


Original document.

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