JUSTIFICATION FOR RETENTION F THE IDEALIST U-2 PROGRAM

Created: 1/1/1968

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Special Activities

for Retention of the IDEALIST

rogram

REFERENCE:

Recently several formal documents and informalhave indicatedery real possibility exists that the IDEALIST Program mill be discussed at tho November KxCom meeting. These discussions, sparked by either tbe BOB, tbe DOD, or both,most likely examine tbe need for continuation of this Program. In fact, tbe BOB announced at both78 Budget Hearings that at the8 EjcCod meeting they wouldoint of discussing the IDEALIST Program in depth, with tbe aim of determiningtbe Program merits continuation. With indications of this type, it well behooves the Agency to be prepared to not only discuss rogram, but to bave undeniable proofsery valid requirement still exists for continuation of this Program.

It can be assumed, tbat Id these forthcoming dismissions, the arguments advocating discontinuation of the IDEALIST Program will be oucb the same as those used In the past. Indeed, some

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of these points vers used successfully and effectively by BOB/DOD during the debates surrounding the life of the OXCART Prograa. Tbe following depicts salient examples from these now familiar arguments:

cost of the program exceeds the value ofderived from it.

USAF could perform these reconnaissanceveil and at less expense to the Government.

In noeed to differentiateand military pilots for reconnaissance missions.

units (CIA-SAC)uplication of coats

a. The IDEALIST Prograa has, on an average,ar less operational flying time and missions than the USAF, therefore tbe USAF is doing moro productive work and should be given allesoorcea.

3. Undoubtedly, thore are numerous other views in the same vain that could be brought to bear on this subject. It la not however, the intent of this paper to match argument for argument, nor to rehash the reasons for and against the military assumption of the IDEALIST Program. If, however, through lact of diligence

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and effort on our part, these roles and assets were to be lost by tbe Agency, tbe lapact on tbe Intelligence Coaaunity would be immeasurable. Therefore, this paper will atter.pt to record only the advantages and adaptability of tbe IDEALIST Progran to. Intelligence Coaaunity, and, thereby, positively show tbe prograa's ability to stand above any of the DOB/DOD contentions for Its demise. There has to bo sound assurances that aof this Prograa will serve tbe best interests of the USA.

Is no escaping the fact that. Government,

in the years to come, willontinuing requirement forof denied territory which should be attributed to non-allltary resources. The alsslons and roles of theave in the past, and indeed, will in the future, be entirely separate and different from any. reconnaissance alrcrart, (including the's). Tbe's are, simply stated, required to be capable of overflying denied territory In peacetime. ore foraal definition would be the ability to successfully overfly denied territory with impunity in annon-allltary aircraft flownona fide civilian.

overflights of dsnfleddterrltory dictate completely

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sets of requirements for the aircraft systemsuratlon, the pilot used, the command end control of the mission, and the political approval mechanisms for tho mounting for the mission. It is foregone knowledge that peacetime ovorflgghhs of any "other country" require prior approvals for the mission by highest political elements of. Government. In order to merit the political risk Involved, the "fool-proof" success of any mission must be virtually guaranteed to these upper levels of. Government. Therefore, prior to soliciting these approvals, considerable efforts must be expended to adjude tho overall risk and to estimate the success factor for eachlight. 6. Perfection requirements for these missions explain in part the additional cost and reduced number of IDEALIST Operational misslons/flying hours. It is the conviction of these experiencedperations that development efforts over the past few years have in fact made then exceptionally low risk, highly responsive and flexible reconnaissance vehicle. It further bears noting thatecognized unique capability for constantly and promptly developing and adapting equipment, tactics, and operational procedures that insure lowest level of vulnerability for this overflight aircraft. IDBALISt has served in the development of many unique techniques for appllsatlon ofeconnaissance systemorld-wide basis. This program possesses the capability

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Original document.

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