SOVIET STRATEGIC AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES (NIE 11-3-67)

Created: 11/9/1967

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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97

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses

br

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Cortcuirtd in br Iht UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

97

mnccd mi HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGR RELEASE AS SANITIZED

Authenticated-.

secretary//sib

QLXRCT-

The following infeifigonce oigonizolioni parlictpaied in lhe preparation of tnn ci'imofvt

Ihi Central Intelligence Aoency and iho .nlelligeme orgonizal.on* ol th* Depart-monti ol Stole ond Detents, Tha AEC, and in* NSA.

Cone un ing:

Vko AoW rturvt Taylor, Depvly Director. Central tetetlgi^o

Mr. Thomathe Director a|ee and ?eveor,h. Deportment Ol State

U. Gen. Jote-ph F. Carroll, Director, Dolenio Intelligence Agency

en. Mm .hall S. Corier,ector, NalionalAgency

Mr. Howard C. Brown, Jr.. tha Aiiluonl General Manager, Atomic Energy Com minion

Abstaining!

MrO Cregor. for theOy.l ' he wbtect being oJHiom of hh |tmideirron.

This material contain! intormotion affect" within Ihe nooning of theiuion or re-eiotion of* which in any

Notional Defame ol Ihe UnitedJo, USC. Seev 7S3. tho tuneulhorlied pertan ii prohtbrtod.

1iJH ROW

CONTENTS

THE PROBLEM

CONCLUSIONS

DISCUSSION

I. SOVIET STRATECIC DEFENSE FORCES

IL AIR DEFENSE

Through

Air Surveillance

Surfaoc-to-Air

Through

Against the Medium- and High-Altitude Threat

Against the Low-Altitude Threat

Against the Standoff Threat

Against an Electronic Coiintermeasurc Environment

Through

Through

DEFENSEM

and Capabilities Throughha Moscow

and Capabilities Through

System Development

ABM

SURVEILLANCE AND ANTISATELLITE DEFENSE22

V. CIVIL DEFENSE 23

ANNEX: TABLES

APPROVED FOR RELEASE-CMEW

SOVIET STRATEGIC AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet strategic air and missile defense forces throughnd general trends in these forces

estimate that the Soviet strategic defense effort isin absolute terms andhare of the total military budget,of the US. Resources allocated to strategic defense in theabout equal to those devoted to strategic attack. Thiseffort can be attributed primarily to the size and diversitystrategic attack forces.

Soviets haveormidable system of airin depth, which would be very effective under allagainst subsonic and low-supersonic aircraftpenetrate at medium and high altitudes. The system is lesshigher performance aircraft and standoff weapons, andno capability against low-altitude penetrationshe Soviets .recognize these shortcomings and arenew interceptors, surface-to-air missilesndan effort to improve their air defense capabilities.

received during thc past year hasprevious estimate that the mission of the Tallinn missiledefense against the airborne threat, particularly against highaircraft ond standoff weapons. It has beenhe firstnits probably became operational

Adm. E. It. Hurler, ll*f nf

Ur bl*

2

and deployment was stepped up. We can now identify more ihanomplexes, which are being depleted in baniei defenses across likely avenues of attack and in point defense of key targets. Theystem probably has capabilities against strategic ballisticoidy in thc limited self-defense rule inherentigh pciformar.ee SAM system.'

planners undoubtedly recognize that US bombersmissiles (ASMs) will continue toajorthend have piogramed forces against them.lhat by thehe Soviets wUl haveomplexes. They have begun toewinterceptor with better capabilities against the standoffhaveew airborne surveillance system, whichused for warning and control. They are also developingimproved capabilities at low altitudes and may introduce asystem for this type of defense. The primary limitation ondefense, however, is surveillance arid control. WcSoviet development of ground-based radars anddesigned to handle low-altitude penetration fnbut we expect little advance in ground-based continuouscapability at low altitudes for the USSRhole duringof this estimate.

of antiballistic missile (ABM) defenseshas continued during the past year, and we believe thatbecome partially operational sometimeullfor theaunchers apparently planned for thewill probably not lw reachedur analysisthis AUM system willimited defense of thebut that it has some apparent weaknesses. It does not coverthe multidirectional US missile threat to Moscow; it is subjectnnd exhaustion, and. in our judgment, none of theAre hardened against nuclear hursts.

'I.I. Orn.he Dlrafiw,. y.vi rh.-it lhe abrnriwa much hlghsT ilce/ir nfinguti-nli Irciulrrrrl Ihan ,irrtry liteli.il thi-u- lUIrmxiU iinmlcniuU-lc

jilittn. Uilp>IMnfTJKi.it lyrtnu. Sw hlaF.|; tlic

hr. On. WtaV?

sSiBf AostiX Orinf aaT Maflfl,p'-v. Ih^um-t'.j-

j*i lUrM|AoW K. R.

rtasresrv. As* .WaaastMfItetsrsssp ili-J. IhiMnWM .a* thrit--asal .ofhr

Milc

3

F. Wc have no evidence of ABM deployment outside thc Moscownd it seems unlikely that the Soviets have yet decidedomprehensive system for nntional missile defense. We have no evidence of any wholly new ADM system in development, and think it more likely that the Soviets will develop an improved version of lhc Moscow system, which could probably begin U> enter operational service as early. We believe that when an improved system is available, the Soviets will fill out the Moscow defenses to cope more adequately with the US threat, and that they will extend their ABM defenses to other areas of thche extent to which Ihey undertake to do so will be affected by their consideration of economic and technological constraints.

C. During the past year several large Soviet radars which have very good capabilities for finding and tracking objects in space have begun partial operation: they will probably all be fully operational. within theears. Although we have no evidenceoviet -antisatellite weapons program, it would be technically possible for the Soviets now toimited capability against satellites in near earth orbit based on existing radars and missiles, employing nuclear warheads. Nonnuclear kill wouldround-guided missile system of high precisionoming missile capable of exoatmospheric maneuver, either of which could be developed inearsecision to do so; such development could be well underwayour knowledge. Soviet ability to cope with satellites in higher orbits (aboveppears verye believe that the Soviets would seek to destroy or neutralize US satellites only if they believed-general war were imminent. They might, however, use antisatellite systems in peacetime if they believed they were retaliating against US interference with their own satellites.

' Ll. CeitK. Camill. the Diictliw,int tlr nbctvu ii.ik*mrtilnirii hi^lier dVjjnv el confiilcitee inmlpiimlt Ix'fuj; remlcmtIi iiI'-il by the aiaitibtvami lhat thi* lUlenK'iit iVki mil iiltijiotifyI DM pastIbtlUlr* of tlie Tallinn ijiton. Sod lib;

C VnuJMmn, lhe Acting Aunli'l Chlrf of Slall U*aaim't ol*m Ja.t, fc- Ttaaaaa*.Sn*.fSAK. m

f thrl_-

anfaaa on al

'Vnf near AA* F_ B. Hwin. tin AHUriaval Opmllnna

1Ikrandf lhc TalWi ultra).

lataUawaaa]fcaaf

. II..Vav.lDtpHfUMrnl of Oar Xa-y. fr hi' fiarfmrtr In liteciar

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ScCRET-

DISCUSSION

I. SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE FORCES*

ct tNe Soviet itr-iu^ti defense effort it larger. Ixjtlindhare o( tlic total military-budget, than that of the US. The Soviet! allocate nbout equal resources to tlteir strategic attack and tlieir strategic defense forces. This considerable effort can be attributed primarily to the sLu and diversity of US strategic attack forces.

I. Thc development ol Soviet strategic defense forces since World War II has gone through several stages of reaction to the changing US threat. Through thehe Soviets attempted to counter the large US stralegic bomber force in being with large numbers of air wrveillancc radars and interceptor aircraft, reinforced at Moscow with large numbers of surface-to-air missiless tlte US force obuincd higher performance intercontinental bombers, the Soviets In theeveloped and deployednterceptors and extended SAM defenses throughout the country. When tlie US, in the face of thisdefense, began practicing low-altitude penetration tactics, the Sovietsin theeploying the Firebar interceptor and theoth possessing better capabilities for low-altitude intercept than earlier systems. 'The US developmenttandoff capability with iu to surface missiles (ASMs).followed by Soviet development and the current deployment of the Fiddler interceptor and the Tallinn defensive system, which have greater ranges thin earlier systems.

n their efforts toefense In being against an Immediate threat, the Soviets have generallyystem quite early, using available technology, rather than wait for the development of more advanced but unproven techniques. These systems have then generally been modified and improved during the period of deployment. In some cases, however, deployment has been canceled early In thc progntm. either because the sysletn proved relatively ineiTcctivc ora better one war in the offing When an improved system has beenolder ones are not rapidly retired or replaced. The Soviets (end to have extensile defenses deployed In depth, usually with considerable redundancy. This reddiditiicy often gives the defensesrouter capability thanof each weapons system alone would indicate. On the other hand, some eltitseiitf of the defenses are alnays somewhat out of date, and do not ivpriicttt tlic most effective Soviet counter to new US systems or concepts of operation.

Soviii military planner* pro'wlily see tlic US strategic threat in the mld-lVTO't a* citiwitlmg of thru' major fom i: lioanhvr* and ASMs, intercontinental

Sivtin* mint riU'iitiihial Soviet pnlicy, NIKi-'ii, 'f.iids inLit.iluly IWff, SHCltET.

mnwtmnd submarine-launched ballistic mimic*rc nw.ue lh.il (lier-.it will become vastly more suphitlicalcd and for* miilnblc with tlie incorporation ofultiple wde pendent ly-target eel reentry vehicle*nd new aircraft andrtcy ptoliably believe that the massive air defense force* they have built ,md arc building will provide an effective counter lo the medium ;ind high altitude homher tlire.it. although they realize lhe problem of low-altitudeit not vet satisfactorily solved. Thc most critical rc*iiiiremcnt of Soviet strategic deferrse. and the one moil difficult lo meet despite moreecode of effort, is defense ugaitttt US bnlliitic missiles. The Soviets arc deploying anlllhillulie missile (ABM) defense* around Moscow. We continue to have no evidence of ABM deployment elsewhere in theurther ABM deploy, maul, Hi nature and extent, is almost certainly one of Ihe major questions of Soviet military policy.

5 Soviet decisions ni to how best to meet the strategic threat of the* will ho affected not only by tho Soviet view of the threat and the pace of tctlmologit-al dctvlopinetit. but also by the constraints ofhe Soviet leadership haseneral deposition to accommodate militaryand miliiary expenditure* are clearly rising. Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders will continue to face difficult choice* in allocating resourcesariety of competing claimants, both civilian and military. Their decisions as to whether, .ind to what extent, to extend ABMthe moil costly single military program on thehe made in the con-teat nf these competing claimants.

oviet strategic defense Is the responsibility of the PVO Strany (Antialr Defense of thehose commander In chiefeputy Minister of Defense ranking with the heads of the naval, air. and strategic missile forces. Tim Soviets have stated th.it the destruction of aerodynamic, ballistic, and space targets in flight will be ixTformcd by the PVO Strany. We have no knowledge of the way in which the antimissile and antisatellite functions are organiied in PVO.

II. AIR DEFENSE

lie PVO air defense is composed of three major fnrccerforming tlie function* of air surveillance, interceptor, and SAM operation*. These forces

. Jtiwi* F. Oimll. Ihe Director, Defease liKellieciite Af(*y, hrllrvc* that lhe

-Ihu- I" I I mm ll t' feglC* III In tllf rlllg imiWlll

lionlupfHitiAl hilahit cvuIokj ami Dialhesystem. See hi. alalr-mt i- thr mluW-

a>ulf the Tallinnfoflnwlnj: if* IrHual. nf (lae tettinii oa MUitlr'nr the tlrws nfm. IWiliy C. Krunlliif. llwf Sl.ll fmfff%MLV. IXtMlimiil nl lha Atoiv. aud Maj. (iafAF. mn lheamif llr TallM tyArm.in-ti-iiPi fnllrwi-ip il- teiiuat juviliii ol llic "ullmi ui Mrfuli IXdiiu .SI.

nru deptuycd throughout (he USSflierarchy o( geographical divisions and subdivisions linked by multiple cornmunkalioni channels. The major divisions ait-ir defense districtshich arc. in lurn. divided into someir delcuse zonesost of the latter are further divided into wctora Tor air surveillance purposes. Integrated control over all three functional elements of thc air defense forces is exercised primarily at the ADZ level.

H. In addition to the forces directly assigned to it. the TVO Strany can call on the services of tbc air defense elements of the Soviet general purpose forces. Moreover, each of the Eastern European countries of the Warsaw Pacteparate national system equipped almost exclusively with Soviet materiel nnd organized In much the same manner as an ADD. For all practical purposes these systems constitute an extension of thc Soviet system.lieve (hat during the past several years thc USSR has assisted the People's Republic of Mongolia in netting up an air defense system, and that it is closely coordinated with the PVO, Although (he Soviet and Chinese Communist air surveillance authorities still maintain contact, cooperation between them is minimal.

orces Throughlt Svrverf fence

oviet air defenses arc based onperaUonal radar sites,along thc boundaries of the country, along barriers within thc country, ami around major defended areas. These arc supplemented byites in the Eastern European countries of tha Warsaw Pact. Each of these sitesultiplicity of radars. All have several air surveillance radars; practically all also have radars which can provide Information to ground-controlled Intercept (CCI) controllers. We believe that the density of coverage.increases theof detection, ond frequency diversification among the sets provides some defense against electronic countermeasurcse expect the numbers of radar sites to remain relatively stable in tlic near term.

situation information from tho radar sites is reported lo filtercontrol centersommunications network whichighof redundancy, flexibility, and reliability. We estimate that theuse older high frequency (UF) radio and upon wireImt they probably are superimposing newt? high capacity cablesystems, which9 may accountajor part ofWe hclicvc tliat they are alsornpojeatter system Inpart of the USSR which will probably Ik* used by PVO andn addition. PVO will probably usein the near future. If they are nut doing so already.

thc last decade the Soviels have been gradually introducingdata transmission system iuln their air surveillance net work,Ix-Hevr. will increase thc speed and vulume iff data Imudlitig,this system is now used extensively in alxiul uue-third uf (he ADZs in lhc

iOP siicn&r-

7

USSH. by Soviet (heater Imwt in ISiixi Eiuope, and by lhc national ulrof( Eurnp-cnii iritinlters of (lie Wjiww Pact. .pi,mi measure mi all with

tin inlioduetionli (lata reporting.n thc ADZ

iiiiptovcd, leading Indelay and more efficient Of>ei.itions, Tlie continuing improvement of PVO tonnmitneulmiifi is directed primarily toward improving timeliness and leducingossibilityvaliiratluit of lhc airlia useyitcm

Infer cepf or t

Wc cslimalc that, as of. (hero werenterceptors in Fighter Aviation of Airess than List year. In addition,ighters of Soviet Tactical Aviation arc available as an auxiliary force for strategic air defense if required, as arc an crju.il number of fighters in tlse air forces of thc European Coimniniiit countries of thc Warsaw Pact Nearly all ofighten in Tactical Aviation and thc EastWarsaw Pact air forces were designed as interceptors;f tliem iii' in regiments whichrimary rule of air defciilo.

About two-thirds of thc Soviet interceptor force in lAPVO is still made up of subsonic or low supersonic models introduced7 or earlier, which have little capability0ost of these models are day tighten and arc armed with guns or rockets limiting them to attack rangesalf-mile or less. Most of the other third of Iho force is composed ofdl-wcntlter intercepton introduced. which are armed with air-to-air missiles (AAMs) liaving ranges. New deployment of the models characterized above lias ceased. Some of thcodels have been retrofitcJ witharmament.

A new generation of aircraft started to enter ojscnilional unitsnd is currently being deployed. Tlie deployment4 of the low-altitude interceptor Firebar, using AAMsange. started this scries of improvedighters. Firebar was followed in6 by Hieof tlse long-range iiilerwjitor KiiUlleroml.'at radius of up tn. We estimate that Fiddler is tlse tint Smietthrf in ti-neptof attacking from any direeliirii and thai it will haveht mixxilex with mi effective range uf up toi.in. We helietv lhat Fiddleri.ni-automatic- data link eriutrnl. allowing it t" lie directed from tlie grnuiKl iiulil it is within firing range nf Ik- target. "IK- Litest Smirt Wrrveptiir. ik- Flagon A. was firrt da-plowl in lale 1'JtJT; its sptiilM rangend coiniiat ceilingiidieuU- that il mil jimhalilyltn' 1'talipot air tin* priinaiy Soviet hii*li-4iltitiule jmiiit hilrrti-ptof. We lieHwe

t

TOP &lC-fifc*-

-sop stcnet

ill he equippedully automatic system, allowing thc air* cm ft to be tout rolled Irom the ground.

IS. Wc estimate that models currently being deployed will coniinuenter the IAPVO forces over the not few years, and that older models will lie phased out. aslow. These older mocicU may bo retained as reserve aircraft.

ESTIMATED INTERCtilTOR FORCE LEVELS

So Longer Being Fioduced

(Yak-BSJ

f.SU-9)

Currently Being Produced

(TU-?)

40

A (SU-r)

10

Missiles

IQ. Tlic area defense capabilities of the IAPVO are supplemented in the USSR by Ihc widespread deployf theAM which makes up thc great bulk of Soviet SAMeployment of thcas essentially complete by the ende estimate dtat there areites of six Launchers each in thc USSK occupied by operationalattalions, and that there are alsoites which are not permanently occupied and are probably Intended to provide alternate or. supplementary positions during periods of emergency. In addition, there areites in the Eastern European countries of the Warsaw Fact, nnd anSObattalions in'the ground forces. Since its initial deployment, theas undergone scverul model changes, which have progressively Increased its maximum effective range fromo aboutmproved Its maximum and minimum intercept altitude cipabilitics, and given it better tracking and electronic counter-counter-measure (ECCM) capabilities,'"

ite Itiw-iiltitudeystem is now deployed inites around Moscow, Leningrad, and on some ltotdcr approaches. Wc estimateboutercent of the sites tire permanently occupied. Fitrtlicr deployment

iiMi* II atur tli:iracieri*tio anil cnitjliilitiii of Soviet SAMs.iiulel ii iimiI alnnnt cidtiMnHy In the USSII; tin- curlier nnalc)ustilli V'l-.in. I'M nlimrst entirety retired front service in the USSR.

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ceased" Theystem, deployed moicecade ago inring around Moscow, is si HI operational, although Onlyaunchers arc maintainedlate ofc believehave made iinprovrmcnts in this system which giveapabilityperformance aircraft approaching that of (liee expect nochange in (lie force levels in the USSK of thcr SA-3

IS. Tcrfffmin the basis of information obtained during (he past year we can now estimate with high confidence that the Tallinn defensive missile system has significant capabilities against high-speed aerodynamic vehicles Bying at medium and high altitude, and that iu mission is defense against the airborne, threat. WC have designated (he sys(cm thec believe (hat theent radar at each site probablyevelopment from earlier Soviet SAM guid. ante radars, and that thc missile was designed to operate within thc atmoiphcre.

believe that deployment of theas stepped up in the pastlhat there are now more thanomplexes, tsvicc thc numborear ago,is apparently still being deployedarrier defense around theand for point defense of selected targets. We believe severalnow operational. Construction to date suggests that someomplexesin operation by

B. Capabilities Through

Againsi rhe Medium- and High-AllHudo Threat

air defensesormidable capability against subsonic(less thanircraft attempting to penetrate athigh altitudes to principal target nreas under all weather conditions.conditions, thc range at which the Soviet early warning (EW)detect and track Is limited only by thc radar horizon, and extends. from Soviet borders. Detection and tracking at medium oris virtually assured at. The detection range of theis progressively reduced against aircraft penetrating a( lowerIsccausc of linc-of-sight range limitations.

of positW*tried foras rcenllvle-

however, wc have net Gnnly Identifiedjurjimcnt outside the

wil.lcnf the Tatli.ii. system lor HM mir is itbtuSCod In paragraph SO.

-a).We.Lv C. PraisUhl.i,lfi ArsWsnlf Stall fornriiiu-iii of tlx- Army, ami Maf.efc K. Thnmsn. lhc Aui-tanl Chief ofriKV. USAF. uii ll* inlttinn snd capability of lhc Tallin..sre tlrelr

WUmirij; the Icvlii-Iof thr

Thc Soviet interceptor force hat good capabilities against subsonic and low-supersonic aircraft at altitudes0 feet, lis capabilities are degraded at mght or in adverse weather conditions, by attacks at lower altitudes, by st.indolF attacks, and by attacks using decoys and ECM. Against maneuvering supersonic targets flying at speeds of over Mach IS and at allitudes0 feet, the Soviet manned intercept capability ir probably marginal. Tlie recently initiated deployment uf the Flagon A. with rapid climb capa hi lilies,roh-able automated control system will greatly improve high-altitude capabilities. Thc probable shoot-up capability of thc AAM on the Fiddler will abo contribute to improving thc high altitude, high-speed capability of Soviet air defenses.

Soviet SAM systems provide good medium- and high-altitude defense against aircraft under all weather conditions. However, thendshort-range systems and arc considerably less effective against small, high-speed ASMs. We believe that thcav alreadyuclear capability, and that theay soon have one, if it docs not already. Selective additionuclear capability to theould greatly increasell probabdity.

lieTallinn) systemonsiderable improvement'ovcr these older systems in terms of range, velocity, and firepower, which combine touch higher probability of kill. Wc estimate that it is capable ofaircraft and ASMs traveling at speeds of up to aboutnd atof op loeet. Its maximum range is probably aboutut would vary witb target speed and altitude. Considering its range, we believe the system wouldonventional warhead with homing guidance,uclear warhead with or without homing guidance.

Agoiml the tow-Altitude Threat"

hc capabilities of Soviet air defenses to intercept aircraft or ASMs flying iit low altitudes decline with thc altitude, largely because of ground clutter and the litic-of-sight limitations of thc radars. The approaches to thc ma/or military-industrial centers have dense radar coverage. In these areas of dense coverage the air surveillance network probably is capable ofontinuous track on aircraft Eying as loweet; in practice, however, the capability depends largely on the (raining and alertness ol individual radar operators, and on weather, terrain, and other factors. In areas of less dense coverage, Soviet radars are unlikely to hc able to accomplish continuous trackingeet. Tlie Soviets have virtually no continuous tracking capabilityQQ

"tn. K. D. ttuekey. the Asabtflnt Chief ofDnurt-

of rhe Navy. Iielicvc. thatonveys theie- Hut low-altituncofai- cuacc could be oewm.plUlKitmmily. Hr- Mh-vc.notc.he total weffihl nftWracaiuM

alions Jnui.-atol in themioo.ichcs.

11

feet, except where mstallations. utilizing new rattan m,rackine capability downort.

The Fircliar interceptor, wliich can operate- otr in adverse weatherrobably has capability dmvn lot over land and somewhatwr water, "ihcltitudes would depend on the pmheicney and experience ofrnund urn trailer and (he pilot. Wc believe the Soviets have during the past year made some marginnl improvements in the radar empluyed hy tin: Fisl.pot "C" and Firelrar. giving them some capability to distinguish moving targets against ground clutter, but no significant improvenniit in Iow-attit.idc cnpability. In clear daylight (he older model Interceptors. Mill operational in large numbers, could also be used for low-altitude area intercept under visual conditions.

Thcystem was deployed at some (rations on tho periphery of the USSH and around Moscow and Leningrad to furnish an all-weather intercept capability down lo aneet within il* limited circle of fire. An improvedwice the range of thend deplov'ed more widely probablyapability down toeet. Evidcnc-jo date does not-allow us confidently to assess the Imv-altitude capability of theut we be- -lieve if is not belter than thai of earlier SAMts torrent deployment

is not indicativeow-nltitudc SAM syslem.

artillery (AAA) is widely employed for low-altiludeSoviet tlieater field forces, but is no longer deployed in PVO for defensestrategic targets.

Agoms! fAe Slandoff Threat

2S. Wc believe that the capability of older Soviet interceptor and SAMfs degraded by the standoff lhre.it. Tliend tlie Fiddlerprobably designed to cope with thiss noted ulmve. then considerable improvement over older systems in range, altitude,probability but not. we believe, in low-altitudc capability. It probablymuch improved capability against small, high-speed ASMs and aircraftMach &

lie Fiddlerombat radius, armament, and attack: range npproxi-mately double those of previmwnterceptors, making possible repented attacks on aircraft before Ihey cm launch their ASMs.ffective in this role, however, tlse Fiddler willurveillance and control system that will extend further to sea from the Soviet Ix.rder than present systems. Although the USSIt has some radar picket ships, these are limited in numlier and capability. We believe, however, that tlie Soviets haveewue siirvcil-

-KWkfalJ

Ullal,f

he aU. awtof .heMV ,Mr Mr.

xtioih. 3L

TQP-SECfi&t-

radar system, prulialily usingOval' adopted Cur airlfnmc warning andiM iiiipenw tin- Sovicl EWpahility.againvl kiw-sevcln*cr *ca approaches, and onild provide lhc flirt mine cotiliolong-range intercepts.

AgainU on Eledionic Countermeaiuio Environmtitl

use of ECM am.irccial.lv degrades lite performance of airthe Sovietsreat deal in an ECM environment In orderthc operation of air defense systems. Furthermore, the newbeing deployed arc equipped wild infrared missiles and data links for CCI.

. which improve their capability in an ECM environment. All Soviet SAMare designed to operateoise fumntng environment, and theodel deployed widely in tbe USSIl can probably counter angle deceptionand select moving targets In an ECM environment; this model is being introduced in Eastern Europe, but not in Vietnam. Considering Sovietupon overcoming ECM. we would espect thco be given features enhancing ils ability to operate In tlic presence of ECM.

C. Copobilities Through

believe that the Soviet air defense system will itlll haveor adequate defenseseet, and lliat major effort)exerted in an attempt lo meet thii requirement. One limitation on anlow-altitude capability is the Soviet reliance on close CCI control,require many closely spaced ground radars, even when elevated.appear to lie trying out such an approach with the development ofsmall radar having an elevated antenna. Another approach to thebe the use of andetection (OHD) radar system, butno evidenceoviet OHD system for detection of aircraft, and wetell when or even if tlie Soviets couldufficiently reliablewarrant deployment. Although we anticipate further Sovietradars and techniques spccificnlly designed to handle low-altjtudespecific areas, wo expect little advance In ground-baicd continuousat low altitude for the USSRhole during ihc period of

Interceptorsow-altitude capability require some technique ofrejection on their air Intercept (AI) radars, suchoving target Indicatoruring tlic past few years new interceptorsimited MTI enpa-bility have appeared, and we lielicve (hat Improved firo control radars giving better low altitude capability will be Installed on interceptors in the. Tlic first inch interceptor may be (heew Mitoyan design, which could be operational in IAPVO. It would probably alio have AAMwith clutter rejection, enabling them to shoot down toward the ground, as well ns automatic data link control.

Hie .Soviets probablytin* requirement fo* long-range interceptors as extending into live 1'JVOV ay ilev clop an advanced .JI weather Mach 3

TSJQDSl-

TOP

cruise interceptor with lhc range of rhe Fiddlciook-down, shoot-down capability, ll could be available.

mprovement* to the low-altitude capa hii it ni ofndaveapproached (he limit* of these systems; (herobably hai no better capability in Ihis respect at present. To further improve low-altilude SAM capa-hililies. the Soviets would Live toew system specifically tailored to this purpose, and deploy it widely. We have no evidence of thc developmentew system optimired for low-altitude defense, and would not eipectystem to he operational beforeurely low-allitude system would probably be deployed only in di-fcr.se of relatively limited areas; its short range would make deployment for continuous orfective defense extremelyInstead ofurely low-altitude SAM system, therefore, thc-Sueiets may elect toollow-on SAM system for thendncorporating some of the more advanced concepts such ns phased array radars coupled with infrared and coherent radar homing systems.ystem mightow-medium altitude intercept capability against high performance aerodynamic vehicles at longer rangesystem designed purely for low-altitude intercept. It would lie used to replace thendyitcmso complement thcytk-in; il could lie ready for deployment in thc.

Thc continued introduction of higher performance interceptors and SAMs. together with the rapid data transmission rerjuircments of low-altilude intercept,impose increasing Injrdens on Soviet air defense communications andWe believe lhal (he Soviets will meet their challenge by extending (lieir xcmiaulomatic data system to all ADZs, and making it available to SAMas svell as CCI continlten. Tiny will probably also improve the capacity of communications systems through multichannel cable and microwave systems using multiplexingnd through greater use of troposcatter and satellite communications systems. We believe tlial lhc trend tosvard more rapid data assimilation and transmission will continue to lie paralleled by corKcntration of conlrol at lhe ADZ level. The greater ranges of new intercept systems may lead lo the combining of some rones.

As thc newer fighters continue to enter thc Interceptor force, we liclieveontrol system sufficiently sophisticated loegree of "hands otT"ontrol swill he deployed on thend later interceptors and will lie the basisecond generation fighter control environment in ihe USSH.ystem would permit these interceptors lo operate in aenvironment, allowing close coordination of interceptor and SAM operations,

D. Forces Through

lhe capability of new airradars will increase, tliehiss-.altitude coverage will continue to ret pi ire. much overlapping, anil the

number of radar sites will probably decline only slightly. Ai new radars with greater reliability and frequency diversification arc introduced, however, the need for redundancy at each site wdl decline. Older cadan will probably be phased out latter than newer ones introduced, and the number! of radars will gradually decrease over thc next decade.

argely to offset the lack of high performance inlerceritori. tlie Soviets in the past have kept largo numbers of the older models in service longer than we expected. However, now that new interceptors are being deployed in increasing numbers, lhe need for extremely largo numbers of aircraft for strategic defense will diminish The overall capabdity of the interceptor force will probablysignificantly during the next decade even though thereecline in the number of aircraft. We estimate that the numbers of interceptors in IAPVO will decline to about three-fourths of tbc present levelnd to nbout two-thirds thc present levelhe trend In the force level will depend largely on the rate at which the Soviets phase out the aircnift overean old.

c believe ihat thc Soviets will continue to deploy theo as toforward defenses on the likely approaches to the industrial heartland of tho European USSR,ocal defense of key largcts and selected major cities throughout the USSR. Based on this deployment concept, the distance seing existing adjacent complexes, and the rate of starts over the past year, we now estimateomplexes will be operational byeployment may be extended to another SO or so complexestarting in, (he Sovieis will probably phase out lhes additionalomplexes arc built around Moscow. Wc would eipect that deployment levels ofould be reduced somewhat in those areas covered by theystem.'* We do not believe that the system will be phased out during the period of this estimate. If the Soviets shouldew system with improved low-altitude capabilities, numbers ofould probably decline further, and theould be phased ouL

III. MISSILE DEFENSE"

t'or the past decade the Soviets have carried on an extensive, varied, and costly HosD program to create defenses against ballistic_misiilcs. They have developed radars to detect and track ballistic missiles)

have tried various ABM tecbul<|ues, interceptor missiles, and concepts of system integiation. Early sue-

nranllln.taff. IV-pulmfii at thakm not believeiKjim hava barn lalrrl at least one Tallinn caoiptca.

" I'or (Ih* vVwi. (Vi> Joat^ih K. Cumuli, lhe Dinvliir,Inlitllcjnnraf. Con.'Vii.illin. the Acting Auialant Chief al Stall( tin* Aiiny;luwiaa, lhe MrBaal. is j. (Ikfcwf al Kaval tlpniH-

ol the Navy, ontnr alah-iomt) fullnw.

i;ihi.illl lliu MitiiiiMtullr IMncar,Jn31.

cc.scs in wiving iOmc of the technical problems of ABM defense apparently led the Soviets todeploymentrototype system at Moscowefore Ihe system had been tested. We have detected no ABM deployment elsewhere in the USSR in thehe apparent demion not tohither probably reflects Soviet concern for the economic and leclmolog.problems in countering the developing US ballistic missile threat.

A. forces ond Capabilities Throughho Moscow System

warning, identification, and initial tracking for the Moscowprobably to be provided by large phased-array dual Hen Home radarson Ihe Kola Peninsula and at SLmnda in_

"Jlhey will probably soon become fully operational. The capabilities, location, and orientation of these radars indicate that their primary concerns arc ICBMs launched from the US toward targets In Western USSR; some limited Polaris missile coverage Is also obtained. We have located no radars which could provide coverage against JCDMs launched toward central and eastern USSR and against the full Polaris threat.

Hen Mouse radars incorporate features which ptovfde them withcapability for detecting and tracking reentry vehicles

o believe that long-range acquisition, early target tracking, and target sorting are to be provided by another large phascd-array radar (which we call Dogocated Aboutm. southwest ofhc large sue and physical configuration or thc Dog House lend us to believe thatillracking capabilityarget handling capacity somewhat greater than thc Hen House. The northwestern face of lhe Dog House now appears to lie complete.

Wlln. Ihenl Staff fee lni.lliKe.Kv.

TiKUr. lheCWf af NavalV

U.U. ,IWlU-wJV

V Uene

Thc other major components of Ihc Moscow system include Ihu terminal target tracking and missile guidance radar installations calledndlaunch petitions for thc Calosh interceptorwo Triads and associated launch positions arc located at severalites on the outer ring about. from tbc center of Moscow. Construction of these components has continuedoderate pace during tho past year. Although we have nut detectedof tbe Dog House brriad radar, we Iwlievc that tbe system will becomeoperational sometimec believe that the deployment now planned, with several Triads andaunchers, uill probably not become fully operational

We believe that (he Moscow ABM defenses arc intended lo intercept inrominpmiisiles at slant ranges out to. from thc launchL

The small number of interceptors apparently to be employed by the system aod its estimated Intercept altitude suggest (ha( each warhead is expected toarge lethal radius in order to be useful against dispersed target threats outside the ntmosphcrc. On the other hand the high accuracy of live Hen House, lhal will probably be duplicated by thc Dog House, and the apparent great precision of tbc Triad radarsapability for precise target tracking and interceptor guidance, more compatibleystem lhal does not relyarge volume kill mechanism.

We believe tho chances are about even that the Galosh missilepecially constructed nuclear warheadill capability on thc orderepending on thc specific RV Involved. On the other hand, if thc Calosh did not havepecially constmcted nuclearould probably be able to destroy the incoming HV only at distances on the order.

4S. This analysis of the Moscow ABM system indicates that, as presently deployed, it willimited defense of the Moscow area, but thai It has some apparent weaknesses. Apparent limitations on tho Triad tracking and guidance radars and on tlie numbers of launchers indicate that lhe system Is subject to saturation and exhaustion. The launchers probablyeload

i. Wndey C. Fni.iHlnIl.r- Art Ins*Chief of Suiteat ol the Aniw. In-tlvvi* lliat]

C

ij sssli.ii

3

nability; wc estimateeload would rcrpriie on (he order ofmiles, lit capability lo deal wiih ji.iH'i-'iloii aid* and prcouior bursts is probablyhigh. TIw Triads pmliahly hive some ability to function autonomously if the KM House and Dog House are lost, butobably would not be able loery large threat. Thc prcsviit deploymenten House and Dog House docs not (Over all of the multidirectional Polaris threat to Moscow, in particular, the northern Hen Houses are hlitid lo Polaris attack from the rear. Finally, none of the system cnmpuimits appear to be hardened to withstand thc effects of nuclear bursts- the Hen Houses arc paiticularly vulnerable.

B. Forces and Copabililies Throughyi'e/it Development

cannot Identify any wholly new ABM system in development, butof the estimated limited capabilities of the Moscosv ABM defenses, svethc Soviets will devote substantial efforts to upgrading tlieir presentand exploring ncsv system concepts. Continued development ofand new large radars at Sary Shagan could leadn improvedlhe Moscow system.sstcin could probably be operational startingearly. We ihink that the Soviets are more likely to improvesystem than toholly new long-range system.

Wo believe (bat the Tallinn system svas designed and deployedAM system, although il probably has the limited self-defense capability againstballistic missiles that is inherentigh performance SAM system. We think it unlikely that it will be developedtrategic ABM system.evelopment would require aojuiillion inputs from otherew fire control system and radar,ew missile.*1

We have no evidence that tlie Sovieis are developing an ABM system that utilizes atmospheric discrimination. Wc believe, however, that US programs for pcnclialion aids and advanced warheads will cause litem to reassess their ABM program, and thatonsequence they mayhort-range, high-acceleration missile. The estimated acceleration of tlie Calosh precludes Its use inole. The time needed to develop and deployystem indicates that IOC probably could not lie. Wc svould probably learn of and identify such development and deployment atears before IOC.

We expect the Sovicls to continue their efforts to develop improvedand tracking systems. There is no direct evidence that tlie Soviets liave tested ABM componenls against penetration aids. II tough the Hen House

" I

Mai

- IS COip-tOft

mayreater capability (linncstiiu.ilcdyear,ed additionaleyond that undertaken by tlic present Henn an nltt-mpt lo counter US programed capabilities.

J*lic Soviets have been investigating OlID techniques, possibly far missile

believe that Hiclr level ofology is such thai they may be able to detect ballistic missile launches ant. Wc have no evidence now of an operational OHD system for detection of missile launches, and wo cannot (ell when or even if the Soviets couldufficiently reliable system to wnrrant deployment. The Sovietsow nlso be developing space-bomc systems (such as infrared launchsensors) which could be used in support of their strategic defense forces.

ASM Deployment

We believe that ABM deployment is thc subject of continuing debate xvHhin the Soviet military and polilical leadership. There arc undoubtedly (hose who advocate primary reliance on strategic attack forces for damage-limiting and opposexpansion of missile defenses, tln.se who-wish to waitore effective system is developed, and those who wish toextend deployment of systems presently available. TW may also be those who have concluded (hat un clfective defense against tlic US missile threat is precluded on technological and economic grounds and that the USSR should seriously consider strategic arms conirol. Our evidence does not indicate what decisions have or have not been made, but on balance wc believe that when problems of systems effectiveness are solved to their satisfaction, tlte Soviets wilt extend their ABM defenses to other areas of thec base this belief largely on thc traditionally great Soviet concern with strategic- clrfcmo and on (lie general disposilion of the present leadership to accommodate military programs.

We Itclicvc tlie most likely first step in further AHM deployment would be the filling out of the existing Moscow defenses with additional launch portion* and forward radars so that they can cope more adequately with the entire US missile threat. In considering the goals of an ADM programscow,

.I. Iliielry, the Ax-bluntfOix-mliu,*of tho Navy. Ix-tlem tl.aluhlieatoty

Msuml destruction iMmrfvw treanoiu astni, Mmw, at tlic Iiul. of all il|WtsMuierli.lc and ll* center of lonnuml andst avoid .Inlmctiriin,.IRl.ik' for thxwlwi.amaeeheli tlw out.lilc- SiMatld tlte tISfirsl.

tn ourWt ISil tlx- Soviets'slrlte Hnt

rhey may .mt.iUr thisoverll. AHM system to

raw lifftMlrn-l fclJ allai.iciliRlit tbvitlcIndw,,fliSitlil.-.

9

will, of COunv, corwdcreasibility of cslcnsive oVptoymenlystems for (lie general dcfcnie of (lie Sovie( Union. The client lo which they undertake to deploy will be affected by their consideration ofand technological restraints.

uch considerations in.iy cause Ihe Soviets lo settleessdeployment that would provide protection,S threat, for major population centers and some significant portion of their strategiche Soviets may also consider that an ABM defense which would limit tlie damage that could be donehird country, ami be sufficient to deter the US through defense of Soviet strategic retaliatory ICBMs. would be an acceptable andlevel of defense. This extension of area defenses could begin toa Supplementation of this forcehort-range terminal defense system to defend thc forward radars, the complexes of ICBM silos, and specific urban areas protected by live long range ABM defenses would bestartingeployment, even if started then, would probably continue

DIA Poution on the Tallinn System

Ll Cen Jowph r* Agency, hihcvea lhat linili on the Tainan syihanvli highr) af unif-V la ihc

- ilgi..ii Wing remltrnt lhan ire iujmmmIxI liyavaitililend lhalc italc-ii.'nil do milMflyADMol the Tallinn syslem. lie believe*n the baiii o( inloimallon obtained am Ihc put year. th. Tnllinn lyilcin, throughout Hi deployment, will comlil of; ihc Tnllinnill) J5aunchersath ill*.tngagvnnni radar fwaamefWisi air ttefenic radars tat eerly warning, *mJsrxl supporting eemnund ami contnaL

In ihb to-digu ration tva. with highlint lhe ijilrm has thr anba o- laiiii the aerodynamic threat ami lhal it can engagel altitudes up loeet and al nx-eds atl oaMhim and high attitudes (he flyout range would be0 nan. Al low altitudes thr thai! range woulJ beut. He agrcei thai lhe Tallinn ayilcni At ploy im-iit ii rail Indicativeow allltude SAM and lhal its lowire probably uohan rhosr of the SA-1.

Itowrver, rccogniiinguncertainties, he loniMcts lhal ihu system, if ergulpricd with appropriate ABM nuclear waihraiti androa^lm andra, tccuhla local an) nlf defense 'apatrility againsi ICDMs. (Local and sel.-ilrfeaac i< dcKrted, is defend afalnitUSithiln largeird other againat the TjBmn sites oi la pointsdnii up to. Iiom the nle.)

he Tallinn lyilon described above woe -iddiliontillytala f'Oni long rapge ace-uitltlcai and laigct KaiHn- nulnn Midi as HEX HOUSE and DOCentralized command and inntrol lyslcni mid neti'tMiy links lo iIh lumpleics, thm tin syilcm wouldimited ABM area defense capalnlily. but only al aboutf lhe presently observed eonplcMt: and al ihu tune only against atUvkilhe north and northwest. Dated on anf the llyoul Huracteahucs of the niaela. asunderstood,i>Wit| wonld be limitedminnjm ofanges of aboutn front thr sites, ami lo aboutan. at langci of about ISO nm. Thc lysine rlTrrtive-neis would be dependent on several factors unh ns warhead (haraetaiitics, radarand missile performance.

If auch an ABM eapabllllysl ami tlie lung range radara were destroyed or denied, (he enpabiliry of the Tallinnlc>c* would hei.to lhalAM againat aerodynamie vehicles, ami at meat lo local and lelf-drfenw aganni ICQMa.

He notca tltr drpaayinent of long ingcadari at Ofrnegank, SI lunili and at Moscow, andn<nuiml and conlrelo tor tbr data from these ladars is essential to the CaLOMI/Kojo.>Hr nlm ootri thai noong range radar? have been di-tcvtcd in ilcjilo) nicul ami that the TaHinn niusllf. aiilv aliened, does not seem lo bu optiniiuit for an ABM role.

believes that, despite llw dinYreiil ami aildlt-oiul infonnatlnn that haa lain nlitaimd Over lhe put year on the Tallinn ivUtm, limenidantfrrtilly

eoncenMng (he devdofHOnil oliyr^tivee and Ofk-ialioaul teutrpt for lhe lyittw and perfonnsaec

capabdilirsn^ioatant imponenta. lie liH-i" that ihr state of ataSablc nidnwv decs

not per mil oituduig lhef an ABM rale lor the Tallinn pjina llownie. iam-

itin.rig Ihe various ailditlen.ilial mull have lo ra- am* ami lhe hick of any liingilile nhhinv of iheir eililnnv, lugrthit will, tin- fatt thai thi- mlwlh-iMcWiitly nutwesl dealarnn In niHIndail tar an ABMnhWn II

, lhat thepnwntly Iiein-jnnblllty.

INIhrre an- en-eynng aVvetefaaartatlBMar

let Uninn.al Sniyan ptanalr an lnn,nw<il *BM ii^ul-bi cilheflhe Tallinn lyilrm O* fo* mmaMti. Wlnh' n* havedetav lhal lUcK develonnnnils arr ijimtVatly tar the Tallinn niin .V- tmf ceailhming1 of this lyitcm ihouM lie ontualed wrili |lH-aen muni.

Army Position on lhe Tallinn System

M.ij. Co.rank Hit. the Actiiij; Aisi.larU Chief of Staff forievcs Mint theelysi. whichf theawl limited evidence ji ilill iniulTiuenltiiiulc will.cnve tlic fullminion of the Talliiu.m-hidiiu;nlgur acrees that thedoc*onclusion thai lhc Tallinn .in.cnr>abilttyaeiodyi.amic

However, be alto believes that (lie system, when augmented hy the HEN HOUSE radar,spiblllty against ballistic missilesulntsntial portion of thc present deployment area. He altoowever,senot now covered by suchne, radars proboWy have oo area ABM capability although all currently deployed complexes doir snd local defense capability. Further, he believes lhat ihe Tallinn system has conridersblc growth potential. He therefore would evaluate ilt continuing .Uvelopment and deployment with these capabilities and potentialities in mind.

Navy Poiilion on lhe Tallinn System

Bear Adm. E. B. Flue-key. the Assistant Chief of Naval Operationsepart, ineni of (lie Navy, bclle.es that the Tallinn system has ncgligiWe capabilities against ballittie

Air Force Poiilion on the Tallinn System

Maj. Cen. Jack E. Thomas, thc Airiitnnt Chief of Staff. IntL-thgenee. USAF. associates hinuetf with the footnote of Lt Cat Carroll. Director.lelligenee Agency, esc.pt that he believes tl.it the Tallinn system probably wai designed fornow possesses an area antl-ball.stie missile (ABM) capability even without inputs from the HEM ilOUSE/DOC HOUSF. tadsrs.

He agrees that the Tallinn system, at any ABM syucm. se^utrest lintcly and cOntlnuui* threat information to function properlyhat rote. Inhe equipment available in the Soviet Union to peoside this Infoematlon besides live IIKN HOUSEVDOC HOUSE radan.the- present ckxbonic environiucnt In tlw Soviet Unionatiety1 of niiljis wlvoso pn-cise capability and mission have not yet Irecn esUbllshrd. And be nntesf tliese. as well ai oldei, radarsa dfsrtv that is notivitli his view of the aerodynamic threat.

He consklcrt that the conRcmatioo of (he Tallinnf in fact Uib element of theystem is correctly ass,-ssed;apabillw for cxwlinosphcric Intercepts. ranRc at. Altitude. range. altitude.

lieational command and coutint system ai.rlinks tollim. eomplcsa would lie cxiential to tlicun.ilo.iiii- of Ihc coutplcie* In an AtlM role but notes that turret evidci.ee neither prove, or disisrsnc* die rxlstcsiee of suchlyitem.

y. against Pjbiisarine-.IaumsredeOTII radars willdeveloped which will provide launch detection Informal Ion for tlM Tallinn iM-ork.

Onieves that no new evidence lui become Mailable whhh would dispel his earlier conviction that (lie Soviets are probably sUi>loyiiljC tire Tallinn system against bolh dieiie and ballistic missilemi thaic-eiesaw significant capabilities inerniimil defense nnd area AtlM rote.

-top- sec

IV. SPACE SURVEILLANCE ANO ANT (SATELLITE DEFENSE

ince2 tha Soviet* how been building Urn llnuvi-s, probably nflightly different type than tin* northern llni IIihiwv described above. These are located at Sary Shagan in Ci-ntr.il.mi', .itnumt-Ifcn Homse* al each location prutiahry survey "far space, amiartial operational capability. Other Hen House* at each location may lie directed iinward and would thus more likelyunction of surveying further out in space these.li prohabiy not be operational for several years.

ssC

^ Iii addition to these radars,and OtcncgorsL dual Hen House* and tlte Dog House also have aspace surveillance. Thc space surveillance radars uouk) enable livedetect and track saielhtes during most passes over thcpacesystem utilizing these radar*

Hfld pruvide

iufurntation required by an antisatellite weapon system.

ave no evidenceoviet an tisal elleapons program, nor of Soviet dc-velopmcnts of hardware useful primarily forurpose. It would:ossible, however, for the Soviets to haveimited antisatellite capability, based on existing radars and missiles anduelear weapon toill, Nonnuclear kill wouldround-guided missile system of high precisiontoming missile capable of ctoatmosnltcrie maneuver, either of which could be developed inearsecision to do so; such develop!iiim could be well underway without Our knowledge. If such ahas been successfully undertaken, tbc ARM installations nt Sary Shagan or Moscow could be used for nonnuclear kill of luw-orbiling satellites. of thc firinge doubt. however, their capability to do this on the first orlrit.

GO. Soviet ability to cope with satellite* in higher orbits (aboveppears very limited. We believe it unlikely that tbe Soviets can develop systems cupahle of efTcctlvcly attacking satellites at synchronousuring the period of this estimate.1*

xIcy C. Knintlin, the Aetii.i;fSulT IW IrrMlitniar IV-

y. MkrmV-ir kill fa,-cniUv. m.

wi.ve llu- fyslwim.ut lili-lv Ik- uliii/vd if kill wai runiiwl/

" K. II.lic-lI.itrlliV.'tKv) IX.^rt.

4 iht- .Navy.t liWy that Hu- .Wi.0 vl.n- nal.

of tins

SCCRCT

TOP

r]| Soechnical capabilities aie such tlvat they could develop and deploy during ihc neitean any of several types of antisatellite systems if tbcy i'Iiovc to do so. Tliey could perfect andround-based missile system umilar lo Ihe cuitent Moscow system, in fad. any further deploymentong-range ABM system could be adaplcd for use in an antiiatcllitc role. They might ciplore techniques (such as electronic interference) for tlic nondestructive neutralisation of satellites. These techniques might utilize mechanisms on the-ground, in missiles, or in space anned coorbiting satellite inspector coulddeveloped as an outgrowthurge near-earth manned space station in the early or. Although the costs ofystem would be high, the operationalnspection, electronic intrusion, capture, disman-lling, etc, might outweigh the cost considerations.

o Isclievc. however, tliat the Soviets would rcatire that any use of anti-satellite systems in peacetime would risk opening their own military supportto retaliation. We think it likely, therefore, that thc Soviets would use autisatcllite systems only if they believed that war with thc US were Imminent and that neutralization of Our military support systems were consequently an overriding consideration. There might, however, be some olher specialIn which they would use antiiatelllte systems in peacetime, such as an occasion in which they believed they were retaliating against US interference with their osvn satellites.

V. CIVIL DEFENSE

lil The Soviets view their cisil defense program as an integral part of their strategic defense effort. This program is controlled by the Council of Ministers through the Chief of Civiloviet marshal, whoorpsivil defense staff officers for the day-to-day operation andof the program. Staff officers arc assigned to all levels of the SovietOperational civil defense units are manned largely by civilians. The civil defense effort it mainly one of training civil defense personnel and the population in evacuation, disaster control, ami shelter construction techniques: this Is done In close coordination with internal defense organIxalions nnd various cis-illan agencies. This training Itcc-omci more widespread and more highlyach year. Itlanned urban evacuation in advnnco of the outbreak of hostilities, unit thin appears to assume several days warning. The civil defense staff also plays an active role in disseminating warning.

IH. Tlie Soviel Union has taken new steps over the past year In an effort to improve thci ess nf its civil defense organ bat ion. ltf-tpansihility for civilian training has been transferred largely lo local managend government officials, and Iraining for tlicse echelons has increased. Altltough thc civil defense program tines notigh priority call on cither budgetary or rco-iwtmie rr-soortvs. tlte pro-ream is stnuigly supported by tin- government, and din-illy missives all segments of tlte populatIon.

TOP GCCnET

top sccrct

it unlikely that the USSR willollow-on heavy bomber into LIlA during the period of this estimate."

Soviets have experienced difficulties in bringing lhe Blinder lostatus. Unless these problems have been resolved, the Sovietsollow-on medium bomber. One possibility is aperhaps with variable geometry wings, having better speed,radius than the Blinder; it could be introduced inalternate possibility, which could be introduced somewhat later thanmodel, wouldupersonic-cruise medium bomber based on thetransport development; it would probablyadius aboutas the Blinder.

Air-to-Surfoce Missils Development

The Soviets are continuing developmental work on ASMs for attack against both land and seaven though theow carried by two models of the'Bear, has been operationale believe that thc Soviets are-still trying to improve the weapon. The most likely component to be Improved would be the guidance system. It is also possible that the Soviets willew ASM for use with the Bear.

Wc believe that the Soviets are working on an ASMange of.ruise speed of Machc think it unlikely, however, that it has achieved IOC. but the program is probably continuing.

Force Levels

7fl. The LRA heavy bomber aircraft are on the averageears old and attrition is beginning to take effect. Thc strength or* the Bear force has not changed appreciably during thcears, but the number of Bisons has declined. We estimate that over theears or so the number of Bear ASM carriers will remain relatively constant but that overall heavy bomber strength will decline, due to attrition of tbe older Bear and Bison free-fall bombers. We estimate that byhe heavy bomber force willear ASM carriers andisons. Wc estimate that byhis force will consist of no moreearsisons."

" MnJ. On. Thomasew heavy strategic aircraft system is likely tti be introduced tu support the present force level into Use. This foltow.on system could be anew ASMupersonic aircraft based onnd development relating, in part at least, to supersonic transports.

"en. Thomas notes lhat both Dear and Bnoti strength has remained unchanged in the past year, and he believes lhat the USSR will continue ro maintaineaw bombers in operational units throughout tho period of this climate,ollow-on tvslrm IO support the lorce level in.

TOP SCCKCr

TOP SCCRCT

ver lhcears lhe strength o( the mcdiutn bombers inbeen declining; lhe Badger force has been decreasing at an averageaboutlresalt per year and Blinders have not beeninto offset this decUne. Since we do noi believe that all lhein the force will be equipped lo carry the ASM, we expect ain Badger strength We estimate that byhe mediumwill compriseadgers andlinders. ByBadger force will probably have declined toircraft butof Blinders will probably have remained relatively constant. Ifew medium bomber ins. we believe that itsome of thc older current types rather lhan being additional lo

VII. COMMAND AND CONTROL

SO. Supreme authority over the Soviet Armed Forces is probably vested in the Politburohole, or at leastommittee of the Politburo. In peacetime the poUtical authentic* ex erase control through lhe Ministry of .Defense. In the event of war the channel would probably runupremo Highwhich would include political as well as military leaders and would have wide powers in the direction of the war effort.

uring theears, some elements within thc miliiary havetbe critical importance of fast reaction and surpriseodem nuclear environment and have stressed the needermanent polibcal-rrulitarysimilar to the wartime Supreme Highoperate in peacetime as well as In wartime. We do not know whether such aa organ bas in fact been created. We believe that arrangements exist for the quick assumption of command by the political leadership in tbe event ofbut we doubt that any one of die present collective leaders has been given the authority that Khrushchev exercised as "Supremee believe that the collective nature of Ihe present leadership works to inhibitentralization of command authority at this time.

e believe that within the military itself, however, the Soviets are movingighly integrated command structure for their strategic attack forces. There are various indications that during the past year there has been arefinement and Improvement of operational controls within those forces.

27

TA3LE II

K FACE-TO-Al II MISSILK SYSTEMS ESTIMATED CHARACTEftlMICS ANO ItlU'OHMANCK

per Compter .

Launchers per..

ilium Stent Range (nm)

Ma.imum Altitude (ft)

Minimum Attitude (I'l)'

aS-OO*

OO'

boulp0 Aboul

e

Aboul

a

Handling Capability per. Si'midtancuus Rate of Fife (per Site) ..

1 a 1 . tit %

200

a Aa* 1

3

0

1

-tper Target Aboul 50

Weight (lbs)

flablc

Train.

' FI.ed

earlier vervlon of theo longer deployed Hi thi-. iiiltaal Europe. North Vietnam, and eluwhe.e.

' For llio pari several vein no more thanbsiltt have been Ken on launcher per die.

Original tyilrm had fl maiimum alant rang*.iMiii-uro Interccpl ntlilude of0 feet- Then are imltcatkint lhal lhcange and altitudeprobably have been improved. The capabilities of thii intern could approach those of Ihe SA-2.

' Thi* rangeliian.reei for rites equipped with lheg li firc-ciml/a) radar whhft ii itandard In the USSR; for liter equipped with Fanilar, the maiimuin range.

' Tliea* some elTecliveness above thb alliliide.

' Varlatlu.il In such factors as large! speed and sire, radar locala-in, ami terrainid ilgnifieemile Influence low-ollilude capabillHw.

We have mi evidence ar Io the mlniuuni effective nlllluitc eapnUliHci of thii system.

'Tl.ilwas probably not ilesipied to counter the US luw allHude

hetem may have some capability againit targvtt ateel itrpcinlingilliter nf factors which are not known at the picaent lime.

'Tin- SiiVH'l* alin-ust certainly wiU provide some nf dm' iniMilm wiih mitsVar wailirails. andii.it* liiue licgun to do so.

TAIILE ill

SOVIET ANT1TIC MISSILE SYSTEM-ESTIMATED CIIAftACrElllSTlCSRFOIIMAKCE

IOC

Maximum Intercept Start flange

Minimum Intercept Altiluilc

Maximum Inicnepl Altitude

nadat__-

Mhrilei cm Launcher

Additional hfUillea or. Silo per Uuneher

Launcher Reload Time

Ma.tmum Velocity

Maximum Warhead Weigh!

Missile Weight

Launchers/Site

cow System (ABM-1)

bs

boul 8

. About ISO nmm

to

U. Cen. Joseph F. Carroll, lhe Direclor. De/cuo InteUigence Agency, is In lull ngieemcnl with the above estimatedand performance for ihomtem. As tv-IW.ted in hb footnote onowever, he belle.es dial (lie possibility'of tl* Tnltinrtan ADM ca.ttbilily cannot be excluded. Although hc believes ft unlikely, in ilie event lhal Use Tallinn system is being deployed toDM rale. It il cxiimalcd Ihai it would have Use following character lilies and performances:

IOC

Sites per Complex;

Launchers per Site

lant Pange (nm)

Ma.imum AliiturJe (nm)

Minimum Altitude (It)

Target Handling Capability per Slle

Rate ol Fire (per Site)

Warhead Weight

Fixed

' Maj. Cen.ranklin, lhe Acting Assistant Chief of Stafi for Intelligence. Depart, meat of the Anny. and Mai. Cen. Jacfc E. Thomas, the Assistant Chief of SUIT for Inlelligerice, USAP. associate thomsdve. with dint part of LL Cen. Carroll, footnotetalns to the characteristic* ami ixvfooiumie of live Tallinn system hi an AflM role. For iheirn the mission of Ihc Tallinn system, see ihcir footnotes at the end of the section em Misiilo Defense,

' Foil system capabilityV launched from the US. Tha isnUlnrl.nl/Caloih combinalJmi.

rtmc.il of the

1

- Maj. Cen.ranklin, the Acting Assistant aid of St-dT. Dcju, Army, believe* tiuiiimum intcncpl slanl range lo be possibly In eiceuiMhii capability and lest ranges mayptimum ranges and not neecasarTTy niaitim.ru _JA ilant range of oiveo.m. wouldround range of upjn.

r

CSNTRAL .NTEUiCENCb AOtNCY

DISSEMINATION NOTlCc

decorae-il wai dineminated by the Central InTclligence Agency. Ihllfor tho information ond uie ol -he recipient ond ol persons under hi*bas.ii. Addlional eiieniial diiie-ninaiion moy be oulhoriied byofficio li withinepartment:.:

o. Director ot Intelligence ond Research, for lhe Deportmenl ol State

Def-tnl* Inleliigenco Agency, lor lhe Office o! the Secretory ol

Defense ond the organisation ol ihe Joint Chiels of Slaff

Chief of Stofl for IMelhgence. Deporimcril ol lhe Army, for Iho

Department of Ihe Army

Chiel of Nawjl Operoiionior the Deportmenl of Iho

Novy

l Sloff, Inielligence. USAF. lor the Oeportment of the Air

of Intelligence, AK, 'or lhe Atomic Energy Commission

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of MSA. lor tha Motional Seevrity Agency

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This document moy be rete-ned, or deilroyed by burning In accordance wiih applicable security regulations, or returned to Ihe Central Intelligence Agency by orrongomenl with lhe Office ol Central Reference, CIA.

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title of this document when used separately Irom the text should be

DISTWBUTION-

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