Th* following irrftlfigence organfafi fhi'j erfimafe
"fc&cipafeo' fnintVeparorion of. The CentralAgency and
r. R. J. Smith, for Ihe Deputy DWeclO'7'Centtal
he Director "of lnteHiger.ee ond ReMorch, Depctrtrnenl
lowtante, (or iheefense InlelUgonee Agency Carter, the Director. Notional Security Agency
>cr!ei rt.(or the Assistant General Marwjger/AtoaVk'Energyond Mr. William O.or ihe Assistant ^Director, Federal Bureau o( Invenigatior. the subject being' outside of Iheir jurisdiction- - -
This material conloins information oftt within ihe meaning of the etpiont mission or revelation of which ieijaW rr-
THE PROBLEM 1
I. BACKGROUND 3
II. THE BURNHAM GOVERNMENT
III- PREELECTION MANEUVERS
IV. SECURITY FORCES
V. POSTELECTION PROSPECTS
To consider the prospects for Guyana, with particular attention to problems and consequences of the coming parliamentary election.
In the coming election, which according to themust take place by the end ofill again bealong racial lines. Cheddi Jagan. the East Indianan enthusiastic Marxist-Leninist,asic advantage: Theare nowlight majority of the population.almost all of whom support Forbes Burnham. theMinister, constitute aboutercent.
whose coalition with the small, conservative(UF) has always been fragile, is working on variousenlarge the Negro vote. He will try toubstantialabsentee votes from Negro Guyanese residing abroad. Beyondis exploring means to merge Guyana with one or another(most likely St. Vincent) so as to increase the proportionvoters.
Burnham became convinced that such arrangementssuffice to keep him in power and Jagan out, be wouldthe election. In any case, he would have to rely on thepolioe and Guyana Defense Forceoth of whichNegro, to maintain order. They probably couldexcept in the unlikely eventajor East Indian uprising.
econd Bumham Administration wouldmajor part on how heerger with St. Vincent, foralmost certainly raise fears, among East Indians and UFof discrimination and possibly even of persecutionov-
eminent completely controlled by Negroes. Such fears could produce unrest and some violence. If Burnham returned to power as headoalition in an election that appeared reasonably fair, prospects would be good for continuing stability and further gradual economic progress. Tbe need for outside economic aid would nonetheless continue.
Jagan's party won, he would probably not be permittedpower. Burnham could use force to keep him out, orConstitution and rule by fiat, or even pressrandhe liimself would seelc to head. Alternatively he couldto taketo subvert his governmentater date.
the unlikely event that Jagan did take and hold power,orientation of his government, more than its actualwould makeew disturbing factor in hemisphericin the Caribbean area. Communist countries wouldpropaganda capital of the fact thatovernmentto power by free elections. The USSR and some othergovernments would move quickly to establish diplomaticmissions in Georgetown. Both the Soviets and Castroprovide Jagan with small amounts of economic aid.
Jagan administration would, however, be beset byopposition and would not have the resources for anprogram abroad. Thus, Jagan would not try to launch anCommunist revolutionary effort on the continent or inthough he probably would cooperate in the overt andactivities sponsored by the USSR or Cuba. Such actionsVenezuela to press its territorial claims against Guyanaeven to undertake military action.
1 The Kait Indians are mainly Hindu or Moslem and, wiih the exceptiont of business and profeasioDal men in Georgetown and other towns, they live la the country, working on their small rice fields or oo large Britiih-owoea1 sugar plantations. With the abolition of slavery, tha Negro population left the sugar estates to move to the towns, where they work in fact&ries and hold most of the positions in the civil service and police. Negroes and mlied strains are aboutercent of tbe population, at against the East Indians who are slightly above SO percent Tbe remainder consist of American Indians,nd Chinese. The statistics we use here, though the best available, are by no means fully reliable, they are projections from the data of the census conducted under British auspices
In the racially turbulent years3ew would have predicted that within three years British Cuiana as Guyana would be capable ofelatively smooth transition from colony to independent state. Even fewer would have been optimistic over the country's chances of survivingation. Nonetheless, the coalition government of Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham which led the country into independence, and has ruled on its own sinceastable government and presidedodest recovery of the economy from its decline during the period of violence. Now the country is movingew election which will test whether this condition of relative tranquility and progress can continue.
Almost like an island in its geographical isolation from its neighbors. Guyana was for much of itsather sleepy outpost of the Britishilitant, multiracial independence movement which sprang up in thender Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham, as the Peoples' Progressive Partyncreasingly preoccupied the British as did the later ascent of Jagan to the premiership, Tbe path to independence, however, was impeded, on the one hand, by the reluctance of the US and UK to rum the country over to Jagan and his American wife, both avowedinlsts, and, on the other hand, by Bumham's defection from the PPP to form what later became tbe People's National Congress (PNC).
That split5 marked the end of tbe multiracial movement. The East Indians bave since followed Jagan, and the Negroes have backedheir organizations are more racial pressure groups than parties. Racial ill-feeling and strife were intensified during Jagan's last term as Prime, largely by bis ill-considered attempts to push East Indian interests in the labor unions and by the Negroes* violent retaliations. With tbe country in turmoil, Jagan found himself forced to call for British troops to maintainear later, be signed an agreement with Burnham and with Peter S. D'Aguiar. tbe leader of the small conservative United Forcehat they would accept whatever political solution tbe British Colonial Secretary might devise to pave the way for tbe granting of independence.
Jagan's dismay, the Colonial Secretary implanted an electoralproportional representationountrywide basis to replace theof plurality elections in each constituency. Tbe election infollowed the new system, and the PPPercent ofeats in the Assembly, the5 percent andeats, and the UFand seven seats. In coalition, the PNC and UF were able tomajority government, to agree to terms for mdeper>deoee, and to providecountry's peaceful transformation.
II. THE BURNHAM GOVERNMENT
he country has been run by this uncomfortable alliance,principallyutual fear of Jagan's regaining office. Theup as it is of European businessmen, native Indians, and othergreatly distrusts Burnham and feels that he is attempting toitarty. Burnham's relationship with the UF leader, D'Aguiar,far from harmonious. There are basic difierences in viewpoint andandesser extent undercurrents of racialroad, ambitious program of spending on public works,as Finance Minister was strongly inclined to the balanceda series of quarrels over fiscal policy and personnel, D'Aguiar finallyInbe coalition, however, remained intact as theUF members stayed in tbe Cabinethird was added.
Despite these frictions. Burnbam's coalition government has presidedeneral economic improvement Increased foreign aid and investment have contributed to an average growth rate In real gross national product (GNP) of three to fourearnvestment by the Reynolds Metals Company and the Aluminum Company of Canada,n the bauxite industry has increased considerably, as have the receipts from the export of bauxite and alumina. Covcmment spending on public works has buoyed up overall demand, and business confidence has largely been restored. It is noteworthy that even after his resignation from the Cabinet, D'Aguiar sought to dispel the fears of his followers in the business community by announcing his intention to expand his business interests in Cuyana.
All the same, Irving conditions have not noticeably improved for most members of tbeis now in the neighborhood. We estimate per capita GNP in Cuyana at0 annually, as compared to an average of5 for Latin America. The country suffersigh rate of unemployment (aboutercent) and of rural underemployment, and the labor rorce is growing rapidly, ftoductioo of the three major exportrice, bauxite, and sugar, does not provide enough jobs to alleviate the problem of unemployment. Tbe sugar industry is plagued with high fixed costs and is undergoing wage problems with tbe unions. Tbe riceraditionally East Indian hailiwick, is highly inefficient and has long required heavy subsidies. Tbe Burnham government has been trying to make It more
competitive by improving tbe quality of rice grown and by gradually cutting down on subsidies. The govern rncnt-eon trolled Rice Marketing Board and the Rice Development Company, whichombined loss of4 million during6 crop year,mall profithe growth in bauxite mining helps with foreign exchange problems but provides little additional employment for tho growing labor force.
government's economic performance has not bad any appreciablebaste political loyalties. The East Indians may vary in their enthusiasmPPP and for Cbeddi Jagan. They may even credit the governmentpolitical stabUity and making some economic progress.is without rival among East Indian leaders and, for mostandidate of another race rather than for Cbeddi would beEven in those villages where tbe government's public projectshving conditions. East Indian pou'tical attitudes seem tbe same.Bumham's road now, but ours after theasypicalthe other hand, tho Negro part of tbe population shows no greater signsaway from the PNC and Forbes Burnham. Jagan'* appealsultiracial workers party have met with little reactionNegroes, and most of that adverse.
III. PREELECTION MANEUVERS
and personalities of tbe leaders thus continue to dominate tbeWithin their racial composition, each of tbe two big partiesgroupings. The PPP includes conservative shopkeepers andHindus and Moslems, students and back-country rice workers.is much more an urban party; it has some workers in village sugarits members, but its main strength is among tbe civil servants andclass io Georgetown- The UF, though very much smaller, is alsoaclmixture: its leaders are business people but many of itsnative Indians. Some strains are visible within each of the parties.attempts to increase the discipline and theunistthe PPP havemall number of party moderates. Burnhamwith discontent on the part of certain labor leaders who want moneyprojects which will benefit them and not East Indians in the backhas alwaysodicum of friction among members of the UF,has not come to much since tbey have no other place to go.
a professed common purpose, thenderlyingBurnham have grown rather than receded. Apart from inevitablespending, the UF suspects, with some justification, that Burnham isto absorb it or sizable portions of it, particularly the native Indians,PNC Many members of tbe UF are uneasy about bow committedis to democratic processes and suspect that, if given tbe opportunity,ruleictator. Some are concerned that he may be aiming toNegro rule In Guyana. Anxious as the UF is to keep Jagan out of office.
It Is also anxious to surviverake on Burnham rather thanolitically irrelevant coterie. Mutual suspicions between the UF and Burnham might nonetheless become so strong that tbe coalition would not survive until the election. This would not, however,enewal ol the same coalition after the election.
Burnham seems aware that, in spite of the existence of fissures within the big parties, voting will again be predominantly along racial lines in thewhich tbe Constitiibon requires to be held before the end ofurnham has for some time been reassessing bis prospects in view of the fact that the number of East Indians of voting age is now probably approachingercent of tbe total electorate. Burnham's preferred corrective to thisis to find some way to enlarge the number of Negro voters.
Burnham's Brit efforts to improve his election chances took the form of encouragement to Negroes from neighboring states to emigrate to Cuyana Few, however, have come to swell tbe rolls of the PNC and the unemployed. His adrninistration hasill which would make new registrationfor all Guyanesemeasure likely to favor the Negroes because of their concentration in the urban areas where registration would be easiest to accomplish. He has also been anemptmg to arrangeubstantial absentee vote among overseas Guyanese, who are preponderantly Negro. How large that vote would be is bard to estimate, but Burnham himselfwith somethere may0 overseas Guyanese, and that participation by half of that number would 'not be unbelievable."
Burnham Is ambitious toeading role in Caribbean poUtjcs, and hasovetous eye on tbe overwhelmingly Negro population of the former British colonies in the Lesser Antilles. In particular, he Is anxious to graft onto Guyana an island or two of the West Indies Associatedhese islands are associated not with each other but individually with tho UK, on whom they depend for their economic livelihood.otal population of, Antigua, Dominica. SL Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla. Grenada, and St. Lucia have five separate governments andixth entity, St Vincent, has yet to receive its independence and has been negotiating with Burnham as to merger with Guyana.*
The government on St Vincent and the UK both seem agreeable to that merger, but doubts remain whether Burnham can pull it off In time for the election. It Is not clear what changes might be required in the CuyaneseSt. Vincent isrown colony and has not yet attained associated statehood with thelegal prerequisiteerger. The Britishhas expressed its intention to continue its subsidy to St. Vincent whether or
'St Vincent baspproximately half of0 persoci are eligible to vote. Tbe island's economy has long been dependentubsidy trom tbe UK which is currentlyillion pounds per annum. Tbe Colonial Office Is scheduled toounds for devesopnwo! aid for tbe next two yean.
erger takes place. Ii the merger does take place, Burnham will probably eventually expect the US to furnish more aid than it has been providing to Guyana alone.
Although Burnham professes great respect for the tradition of open and honest elections, he nevertheless fceb that the fate of the country hinges on his reelection. His search for ways to enlarge tbe number of Negro votersetermination to win by respectable means. But if he became convinced that tbe various arrangements be has been exploring would not suffice to keep him in power and Jagan out, he would probably rig the election results. Tnerehance that be might postpone or even cancel tie election, either of which would be unconstitutional- Whatever device be might employ, he would have to rely oo the civilian police and the Guyana Defense Forceoth predominantly Negro, to prevent any resulting turmoil from growing to tbe dimensions of the violence.
Cbeddi Jagan and the PPP are quite convinced that Burnham Intends to do anything he decides is necessary to keep them fromovernmentto prepare forontingency. Jagan has attempted to shape tbe PPPore tighdy disciplined party. While be has eased certain religious leaders and moderates out of key party positions, he seems to have no current plans for any form of insurgent action.ecisive leader. Jagan wiDwait to see what Bumham's course of action will be before determining his own. He knows that Burnham needs scant excuse to jail him. or to outlaw his party, and that the Negroes are generally more adept than his own East Indian followers in the tactics of violence.
IV. SECURITY FORCES
government has emphasized improvement of tbe dvilian policeoeation of tbe CDF to increase its internal security capabilities Thehas been expanded. Its training intensified, and its equipmentnumbering close. the police are expected to reach theirstrengthefore the end of.
IS. The government has made good progress in establishing the CDF to replace the British troops that left Ints present active forceen in two infantry battalions.first class" reservists arefor deployment in the eventall-up; the hundred or so "second class" reservists are over-age personnel or dropouts from the CDF who still have some reserve comraitmcnts. Fifteen British officers, including its commanding officer, are training tbe CDF and fill billets in it.
oth CDF aad police are overwbelrningly Negro. The ratio of Negroes to East Indians is about three to one in each and tbe officers are mainly Negro. Nevertheless, in bnc with tbe recoirunendation of tbe International Commission of Jurists, the government is attempting to rectify the racial imbalance of the forces and has increased the enrollment of East Indian recruits.
questions remain as to the ability of tbe security forces to keepThey would probably be efftxtive in coping with sporadic violencebut their performanceituation comparable to the riotswould be hard to predict. There is doubt whether, in the eventviolencearge scale, tbe men would perform effectively asor would revert to racial loyalties. Another problem exists as toGuyanese leadership of the CDF. Tbe present Britishunder contracts which will expire before the election, though they mayas
V. POSTELECTION PROSPECTS
Burnham wins, the postelection prospects will depend In majorhow he manages to do so If be were returned to office as head ofesultore or less normal and reasonably fair contest, thebis government would be good. He would require continuing economictbe US, and if he got it, Cuyana would almost certainly makeeconomic progress, He would more than likely again havethe coalition, and opposition on the part of Jagan and the Eastbecome increasingly bitter. But there probably would not beviolence of such magnitude that tbe Guyanese security forces couldthem.
f, however, he blatantly hgi the election, or if be wins by meanserger with St. Vincent or another Caribbean island, the political situation is likely to be more unstable. Should Cuyana join with St Vincent, for example, the additional number of Negro voters in the new nation would produce fears among East Indians and UF members alike that the Burnham government would becomeegro-run institution and that they would be excluded from power indefinitely. Jagan would be the first to claim that the merger wasby the US and would use it in his anti-US propaganda in Cuyana and abroad. At least initially, some unrest and violence would be likely. The Guyanese security forces would probably remain loyal to Burnham and be capable of preventing violence from getting out of hand.
If, in spite of Burnham's preelection activities, Cheddi Jagan's PPPajority of scats In the Assembly, Cheddi probably still wmdd not be permitted toovernment Burnham might call upon the security forces to keep Jagan out, or suspend tbe Constitution and rule by fiat, or even try persuading Jagan to joinrand coalition which be, Burnham, would head. Any of these actions, with the possible exception of the last, would raise racial tensions and produce danger of violence both probably more inflammatory than the merger possibility discussed above.
It is possible that for appearances' sake Burnham would let Jagan taketo subvert bis governmentater date. It is isnlikely thatwould go into loyal opposition, but if he did, Jagan would stillighly
troubled tenure. The Negroes lo opposition would probably be more militant than the East Indians have been, and Jagan could not count on tbe security forces.
However determined Jagan was to take measures to favor the East Indians or to carry out Marxist economic policies, be would be severely inhibited by circumstances. Sooner or later, be would have to make numerous concessions to tbe Negroes or risk being deposed. He has talked of nationalizing tneforeign enterprises, but he is probably aware that expropriation of Use foreign aluminum companies or of the big British-owned sugar properties would be disastrous economically. He would, in any case, encounter certain economic difficulty. There wouldoss of confidence on the part of private investors, and most of the economic assistance from which tbe Burnham government has benefited would probably cot be forthcoming tois friends among the Communist countries would probably provide some help, but less. Cuba would most likely giveavorable pnee for Guyana's rice crop and the USSR would probably give limited credits.
In tbe unlikely event tbat Jagan did take and bold power, the Communist orientation of his government, more than its actual capabilities, would makeew disturbing factor in hemispheric affairs, especially in tic Caribbean area. Tbe USSR and other Communist countries would make considerable propaganda capital of tie fact thatovernment had come to power by free elections, and tie Jagan government would support tbe Communist nations in international forums on basic issues. The Soviets and some Other Communist governments would move quickly to establish diplomatic or trade missions In Georgetown.agan administration would be beset by powerful internal opposition, and its internal weakness would require it to move cautiously in order to retain power while trying to strengthen its pob'tica! base. It would not have the resources to carry out an adventuresome program abroad. Thus, Jagan would not by to launch ac independent Communist revolutionary effort oo the continent or in the Caribbean. He probably would cooperate in the overt and clandestine activities sponsored by tbe USSR or Cuba All actions of tils kind wouldVenezuela, certain to be suspicious of Jagan regardless of his policies, to press its territorial claims against Guyana and perhaps even to undertake military action.
, the US committed SIS million in aid to Cuynna ofillion has been drawn down.
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