Created: 10/28/1967

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i VC Policy Toward Treatmentllied POW's in VC Military

Region IV








In VC MlUtary Region (MR) IV from5 throughha VC dug trenoheaattle for Allied prisonora of war (PCWa) that thoy antioipatod capturing. These were used for protection against bombing and

wero only prepared for engagements oxpected'to loot more than'one-half hour. Upon oapture, the PON's wero evacuatededicalar theron there, Vietnamese prisoners were sent to district and higher. PCW'a wero taken througri district, and Province to The Central Office For SVNounded prisoners were left at the site of the conflict when the fighting wasoad or an Allied post; when there was little change of their being rescued, the wounded were taken to the VC base cpmp. VC had to treat POW's well;oldier violated this rule, he was criticised by his supervisor, end if he continued the mistreatment, he was criticised againeducated. Cadres were oriticlsed and subsequently sentoar Services unit if thoy continued violation of the rales.




dec 7

Postal Hoalotry So.




Appr Date


In THU DUO District of BIEN HOA Province5 throughhe VCtrenches in their camps near the command post priorattle abeoe irwncoesor Allied POW's whom the VC expected to capture during the battle. The trenches were to protect the prisoners from artillery fire and bombings. POW's sat in group of three near the holes, and when the shelling began they were told to Jump into them. The prisoners wero not tied, but one VC was assigned to watch all of them. rench was designed forne to three men to attenuate the effects of the jenbing. The number of trenches dug depended on an estimate from the battaliui commander as to how many would be taken; however, there was no directive toertain number. Tha coramandor based his gues3 on tho size of the unit to bo attacked. Trenches vera only dug when the commander dicided that the battle would last more than one-half hour, after noncideriiig the site of the opponent, the type of unit, the terrain nnd whether or not enemy reinforcements or airpected.

Host captured ARVN eoldiors under the rank ofweiaoinute briefing on the policies of the Notioc.ilrent For The Liberation Of SVNince the cadres realised that there men had boon foi'sed by the OVN to fight. quad was assigned to tekv cJl ether PCW'* t? medical evacuation point0 motirebattlefield;etlob for each battle waa determined by th* battalion ccviar.der; it icnfc.-aJly located among ell participating units for earyand cl;ervation of the battle, and yet far enough away to avoid artillery firo. It was usually located ln the fo.*oat to prevent detection by aircraft, bat if this wao not practicable, thi entire medical ccmpJesr movedafor area aa soon aa the wounded woro evacuated from the battlefield. Duringphases of evacuation, the healthy POW's vere not tied, but assigned or.e C squad, to permit both adequate safeguarding and rapid movement.

If the unitattle in en areaoad or an Alliednded PC's vere onlynd then abandonei.. It was felt that the Allies would rescue them within one-half hour, and that if the VC had tc evacuate them through moreive to seimn kilometers of denesoy would die en route nnd the unit would bed-vn unnocestarily- However, if the battle vers foughtorested ar:sthere vas little chance of the prisonors being reaov.ed, the VC had no ohoioo but to carry than to the VC base enmp. All wounded Allied prisoners and VC werelike; the most serious cases wero treated first. Injured pisonor triiu to escape, VC soldiers would run aftor him. If they could not catch hie, ore warning shot vas fired. If thle WJ rot heeded, soldiers shot wounded the POW.

Evacuationhe medical station was effected immodlntely iftar the battle. POW'e vere sent, to district or province ftrt>t, depending on whioh waa nearer. Thoy were kept at district for one to two day= it this location was safe, to coordinate with comno-liaiscn agent, and then sent to pro-.inco. If the area mo net secure they were evacuated to province immediately; these papers vere processed for those going to higher schalons. . POW's were sent as qtilckly aathrough district, province, and headquarters to COSVN, since their saCtty could net be guaranted,Vietnamese Non-Ccmmlaoloned Officers (NCO'b) nnd high ranking enlisted man were re-educated at province level and then reloecsd to go cither to OVN or VC controlled areas. Viet.naaene officers throvgh tbe rank of senior lieutenant wvre sent to HRfor interrogation and re-education; higher ranking Vietnamese Officers were taken through HR headquarters to COPVN. One comno-llaioon guide. POV'a for only aach portion of the Journey from district to COSVN. Usually threene to two wait at each level while coordination was effected with comoio-liaison agents; however an omorgency means vaa found

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day and eight piasters worth of food, which included tea, bought by the unit at the local market. It was believed by the VC that OVN troops did not have much to eat. Therefdre, according to Source, COSVN ordered the VC to give more food to anyone who needed it.

5. All VC wore to treat PCW's well. Cadres who violated the rules wereby their supervisor in front of the entire unit and then not given any work to do. If. they continued to disobey VC policy they were sent to Rear Services and ndt allowed to participate in combat until they changed their behavior. No cadres were known to commit raore than one violation, because of the humiliation they realized they would suffer if not permitted to fight. Cadres were considered by Source to havB the power to do what they wanted, whereas soldiers just carried out orders. adre had to set the example for everyone and if heOW; the incident was more serious. oldier violated the regulations, he was criticised and released from combat until he admitted his mistake, during which time he stayed at the unit. For minor offenses the soldier was first cri-'icl sed in private by his immediate supervisor and thereaftor by hi3 unit co'Tiar.dsr in front of the entire unit. After repeated violati'uis,lso be re-eduoated. The man had to write down the entire sequence cf eventG, then read his dissertation in front of the unit and explain it part by part. Subsequently, the unit members had the ODportunity to oomraent if thsy felt the violator had not been complete or correct in his analysis; hovever. they rarely made any additional statements. The entire process took approximately two hours. In this manner, political officers used cajes of mieirc*tment to remind others of the proper prisoner-handling procedures. Examples of minor offenses included one case which occurred3 oldierOW. Major offenses includedOW without an order, an example of which was publicized by COSVN, when,oldier shot and wounded three ARVN soldiers in CU CHI District, HAU NGHIA Province. It was known that at tines aoldigr3 took out their anger on Allied prisoners by shooting at them after they fell into VC hands, but no specific instances were known to Source. iolation, tho immediate supervisor and the man involved would apologise to the prisoner, because if the PCW were an officer, the lever-ranking offender might not be able to ccimruni^at': effectively with him; if the violator were of higher rank than the prisoner, there would be an argument between the two. 13 regulations regarding POW treatment were not as strictly enforced; hovever,, when the situation became progressively more difficult for tho TC, greater effort was made to enforce the rules.

Original document.

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