VC POLICY TOWARD TREATMENT OF ALLIED POW'S IN VC MILITARY REGION IV

Created: 10/28/1967

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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COUNTflZ SUBJECT

DATE OF IHFO

ATE AND OF ACQUISITION

11.

I SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN)

i VC Policy Toward Treatmentllied PCW'o in VC Military I

Region TV

Vietnara

87

i SAIGON,

28AO/67

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he (POW's) that thoy bombing and

Lasbynctre than" one-half hour. Leal- oarap near the battleground; atrio't'onci higher,he Central Office Forit* of >ho oonflloto fighting ttlo ohange of their being #mp. VC had to treat POW's

In VC Military Region! (MR TV^frohi OtVC dug trenchesattla .for Allied Anticipated capturingThesesed fo were only prepared for'.engagotoantsLexpecte Upon oopture, theererom there, VietnamesePOW's woro taken throughounded prisoners woro wasoad or an Allied poeti^whon there rescued, the wounded vera taken

welljoldier violated this rule, ho was oriticieed by his- supervisor,he continued thee was criticised again andwere criticised and subB3quently sentoar Services unit, ifof tha rules.

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February lStlf 'Am fycnwiehee In their camps near the command post prior to aifeMKi ed for Allied POW'e whom tho VC expected to cup>iite daring the battle. Ths trenches were to protect tha prisoners free: artillery fire 2nd tombings. PCW's sat in group ofear the holes, and when tho aiicUing began thay were told to Jump into them. Thoiorf- vrrn not tied, but one VC was assigned to watch all of Chen. iefor only one to three men to attenuate the of footsio jotiit-iog. Tlie number of trenches dug depended on on estimate from thoaandcr a$ to..how many would be taken; however. ' here wao no dir-iciiva toertain numbor. The commander based hie guess ii tinf the unit to be attacked. Trenches were only dug when the Stvtnsjdae c'.nidod thaf. tha battls would last mora than one-half hour, after ftOOOid&ffldf Uw siie of the opponent, Uw type of unit, the .terrain avl Luther or not enuay reinforcements or airrt arpected. f

Most cept'ired ARVN eoldiore under the rank ofepnt wereoainuto briefing on the policies of the National "rant For Tha Lihnrntlon Of SVWince the cadres realised that theae men haded by tho OVH to light. quad wae assigned to take ell otter rcw'nedical evanmtlnn point0romttte'r.vLd; if C'.cior: for ench battle waained by the battalioner; it na jcntiaily

-locatedall participating vnits forho batt'e, and yet far enough away to avoid artillery fire. Itlocatedo prevent detection by aircraft, tut ifnot practicable, um entire medical a'.nplnx trovod to a

eoon as the wouiiied ver? tvaoubtcd from the battlefield, firing phaeis of evacuation, tha healthyvere not tie* I, but assigned or.e C equal, to pin-iit bothsafeguardingapid movement.

the unitattle inwered re sou.'

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co areaoad or an Allied pest, woundedbindoned. It was felt that4 hrJ'-hour, and thet If tho VC had to evacuate incm wo=SB avr> lu-nto Etvnn kUometeis of deoFa- ferret, *hayiea t' niv wfi'll bu slower!unnooo wearily. However, If tho battleJtaigrttjrosbed aria whor* there was littlef tho* ilL^agthe vo ha'! no nholae but to cr.rry thin to the VC base ciap. AllAlliede and VChe Most soricuj eofios-.xro treated Injured prisonerosccpe, Sv.-VC soldiers ntV, Zjj* after Mb, If* they could not cetoh him,c shot was fired ' this was netoldiers shot sjrl wounded the POW..:

Comm isEioned

nlring enlisted nee were re-educated at provinceo gc cither to OVN or VC controlled arei3, :ank of senior lieutenantsent to MSand re-education;nicing Vietnamese Akeajph to COSVh*. Oneiaison

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Evacuation fr-n meoLcil utation was effected imm3di^tely aftar P'W-iiiah to diofcricfc or province flrnt, depending or.n'jar^i'.ct dir'-rict for one to two day* itii'l-'oato withgent, end then sentthethey were evacuated toraJ forng to highercralhlo throu*ih district, frovinop, andCOV'i,heiru-Vl not bennmesohie* unliinp enlisted wn

s fcr -tiity sac'ci portion of the journey frem district to

i3Cr'pa. -Jpiaily threea one to two vcit at each level while coordinationh commo-'liflipon agents; however an emorgpney means was found'

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to ovaciiate then if there was not adequate food and lodging to accomodate tho prisoners at any given level. . prisonora were given bread, if available, or rico cakto, and tea. Other POW'e had one liter oray and eight piasters worth of food, which included tea, bought by. tho unit at tha loo'al market. It wae believed by the VCtroops vdidhot have much to eat. Therefdre,o Source, COSVN ordered the VC to give more food to anyone who needed it.

" All VO were to treat POW's well. Cadres who violated the rules wore ticieed by their supervisor in front of the entire unit and then not given any work to do. If they continued to disobey VC policy they were sent to 1 Hear.Services and not allowed to participate in combat until thoy changed - their behavior. No cadres were known to commit more than one violation, -V'ii't^V. because of the humiliation thoy realized they would suffer if not permitted

o fight. Cadres were considered by Source to havo tho power- to do hey wanted, whereas.soldiers Just carried out orders* Hoi-aver, aset the example for Overyone and if hoOW; thowas more aarious. oldier violated the regulations, he wasreleased fron combat until he admitted his" mistake, during whish he stayed at the unit. For minorhe soldier was firs". .'in private by his lsaedlate supervisor and thereafter by hian front of tha entire unit, After^repeoted violations, :cCdisrcuMre-educated. The man had to writ* down tha entireead his dissertation in front of the unit and explain it part by part.

Subsequently, fcfie unit merobors had the ooportunlty to comment if thaye violator had not been complete or Oprrect in hio analysis; hornaver,made any additionalhe entire processours. In thin manner, political officerss ofo remind others of the proper priaonsr-bandling procedures. Examplesoffenses included one case which occurred in 1X3 oldier

OW. MajorOW without an order, an'* example of which wan putlioiaod ty noSVN, when,oldier ahotand voundsd throe ARVK soldiors ln CU CHI District, HAU NOHIA1 .It was known that at times solc'Cors took out their anger on Alliedhem after thoy foil into VC hands, but noere known to Source. he immediate supervipsr and tho 'W man involved wotild npolopiza to tho prisoner, bscaaso. If-the POW wire an officer, the lever-ranking offender night hot be able to, effectively with him; if the violator were of higher -ranke prisoner, there would be an argument between theegarding POW trentmoiit were net aa strictly enfopoadl howeverihen the situation'became progressively more difficult for the VC, greater . effort was wp.dn to enforoe tho rules.

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