._
LBJ
.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE .
(supersedes
The Liberation Movements of
Southern- -
Submitted by
7
PROSihCrS AND IMPLICATIONS
THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA
IHE PROBLEM
To estimate the character and prospects of the nvjvcmenis,alled liberationhat seek to end white minority rule in Southern Africa, their relations with other African States and(Communist countries, andmplications for the US.
CONCLUSIONS
lil>cratJon increments which are attempting to deposeregimes of Angola, Mozjinbioue, Southern llhodesia.and South-West Africa stand little chance ofnd probably for some considerable timeMost of ihe liberation groups will probably continue lodisabilities, especially the lack of broad Indigenous support,far have limited their efforts. But even with greater successnone of the liberation groups is likely to espandoperations sufficiently to shake the deteiinination ofregimes lo resist all challenges lo their domination of affairs.
liberation cause has bioad support among Africanmany of those believe that the US and the olhcr greatlake action that would lenninate whito rule in Southerncontinued frustration of the liberation movements, there fore,US relations wfth African stales and also USgamer African support al the UN. Hut US relations withslates aro influencedumber of factors and theUs positions with respect to Southern Africa will vary. Theissue alone will have the greatest impact on US relationsand 'Zambia, states that border on the whitearc engaged in operational support of liberation forces,retaliation by the wliite regimes.
C The USSR. Communist China, and Cuba seek to expand their influence in Africa by providingtatted .yet mwh'^^ZZ tary and financial assistance to the liberationhe capacity of these groups to use aid effectively were to grow, thetates would probably provide increased assistance bu it is highly iN-cly that the USSR or China would engage In direct miblary
un
inteivcntion.
DISCUSSION
I.TN1RODUC1ION
espite ihe remarkable' prcJiferatloo tt ir-hi* indent black African states over ihe past decade, most of Southern Africa still is ru'cd by while minority reguii. Angola and MoramM-jue, Overseas liovincei cf I'otiugual. arc ruled dimtly from lisbon ia all hapoifrt matUis. Angolaopulilioo of over 6vo million, withuropeans; Mozambique, over seven million, with onlyuropeans. Southernelf-governing colooy whichitsf the UKmunityopulation of aboutillion.illion whitci dominate affairs In the Rcpubbc of South Africa, though the population alio loctudetillion bUcVs and over two million Asians and racially mud pcopkv South-Wevt Afikmulcdhy South Africa since its was mandated by the league of Nations Incontains lewhltei and morelacks.
n each of the white controlledolitical activity by noowfutes is severely icsii'ttcJ.emit, organiicd groups of blacks and other nonwhites arc see king tlirough use of force to depose the white regimes aad ^berata* their ind' So far, however, these liberation movements have been relatively inrflcctivc. Liberation groups In Angola and Mur.'inbi',ue have suit lined active inurgcocirs1evpeea'veiy. but thesebeen cootiLncd by Portuguese military fotors largely within unimportant border areas. The would-bo liberators of Rhodesia and SWA have managed oo more than sporadic and ineffective terrorismtheir boir>elands. In recent years Southr'i groups, unsuccessful in occasional attempts to infihralo terrorist bands into iho Republic, have cooducled only tiifliDg clandestine political activities.
hus, we are Corner oed In thH ctliinMc mainly with the implications for the US of the fnistratlon of Southern Africa's librraliOD movements. Despite the limited capabilities of presently activeho liberation cause is an important political issua vrith most of tbe black aod Arab slates of Africa. Indeed, it It tho one issuelilch African stales can generally agree and. therefore, is usually the central theme at meetings of tho Oiganlr^tlon of African Unitylie govermeots aad pobtKal gioups most vocifetuus in their support of the cause arc critical of the reluctance of tho US to commit its Infltience and power lo rid their roWinent of whito rulers. At tha sime time ihe white governments inAfricacritical of the generalired political support the US lends to the libewtioo cause, whose leaders they condemn as criminals andoovnunisl couotries seek to tale advantage of US embarrassment on this lisue and lo expand their influence in Africa ly proviiling limited, yet much-jpprteislcd, military ami financial assistance toeration groups.
II THE WHITE REGIMES A. General
he -hire regime* of Southern Africa are detertnin.o retain theirol affairs anJ to resist, to destroy if possible, tho liberation forces. Intltvld-ually. they bring impressive resources to these-heir superior securityheir ability- through miuiudabon, selective rewards, and rnarupula tioo of tribal rivalries'-to uodeiutine the appeal of tKa liberation movements. Some important differences in interests and policies stand In the way of close relations among the white regimes- The I'oituguese and. lo some extent, there wary of the superior power of the South African* la tbe areaSouth Africans and trie Portuguese are critical of each Other's racial practices and cautious about Identifying themselves ioo ckwely or openly with the'illegal* JuSodrsian regime. Yet, as the threat from the liberation movr-menls has penhtcd and as insurgent group* fioen more than one country havei'wmIj acted in ccnccrt, the white tegimei have stepped up their cooperation inmatters and border patrols. Itcccntly the South African* indicated thai they wc*uVt tend militaryf asked, to help defend their white neighbors against Mack icvv^troearfeO
B. Angola ond Moiombiquo
& Angola and Mozambique have been Portuguese possessloni fee over -I'O yean; Ijsbon eonskleis thriri an integral part of Portugal and i* determined not to lose them Powerful political interest* in the mwropote profit considerably from the Overseas Provinces, butde<ninant iraotivationi of tho Salarar regime ptobaUy are politieaL religious and psychological. Prime Minister SalriMir and lit* staunch supporters In the military establishment, the oligarchy, and the Chun li apparently believe that retention of the African empire Is essential for the preservation of Portuguese nationtvood. WitliOul it. they argue, the iinall and otherwise insignificant Iberian state would lose its sense of national purpose. 'I hey often express this purposeitsdoobligation loinhristian, antiCommuntst, multiracial society.
he bulk of the Portuguese population is inaudible on Salazar'* African policy, as on tnost political inaUcti; yet the morale of tlie soldiers called upon to fight for lie preservation of the African empire is generally good. In the past, there have been stirrings of separatism among the European eojninunirvet of Angola and Mozambique, but these have been largely sidled by the nd .cnt of black rebellion andepeiKJcsxe ou Portugal for militaiy proleelion. "trddes.itoos police control* repress rmunvetropole as well as aati-Salactivitic* among white* and Donwhites alike.
MU South Africa*naelrd la tha7erw theMonVsisfop) of Soodiand rusedritatisfarf* al of whotn weie iswhUyapoired. South Afikain rttvdeiiarUo) trrsorceen tu lelp pano) Out ImkoVt.
Until the oult-rcaV of the rebellion In Angolaortugal had largely neglected the dcvrlnpmi-nt of Angola and Mozambique. Sn.it then it has paid considerably greater attention to the economic interests and general welfare of tlie popublion. both whitelack. Portugueseadmit* no discionination on ibe bash of race; traditionally, Pudugucs* attitudes toward non whites hive been remarkably tolerant by the standards of theute-ruledEd atcd bUtks and miilattoci who support the political system can hold prominentositions and tise high socially. Yet the vast majority ot MmU in Portugucv Africa have little opportunity to obtain education or to j< hicte rcvoomic and socUl advancement.
Ihe Portuguese haw had Utile difficulty *ithleslslince lo their rule in (he urban areas ol Angola and Mi(le In both Provinces ihe gitat l> ilk of the black pupuljikm lives in scattered village;. Here, liberation groups have
' some success in reer tilting from among several Iritcs in border areas, Most ruralowever, remain loyal to their generally pro-Portuguese village and thlal thirls. Many tribes in the immediate insurgency ueai arc loog-hme enemies of th* tribes supoomng the hberaboa groups and for thai reason alooc hate rrstMcd theiberation leaden. Others art defined by respect for the white man's superior "magic" and Grcpower. intimidation and exploitation of tribal rivalries, along with stepped up local improvements and training for self defense, arc ihe essential ingredientsoriiEed village program, which has helped tho Portuguese to contain the lr. MM fores* in Moranihlque and ii now being introduced In seme border area: of Angola.
he manpower and Financial costs to Pc-rtugal of defending the Oteiseu Piovinees are considerable, yet clearly toleiaUe. At present Portugal maintains aimed forces of0 men In Angola0 In Motainbioue. About one third of the troops are local blacls and mulaltoet. whose service record has been good. Portuguese military casualties probably have nurohcied lesshousand per year foe thencludinger year killed. Defense eatwodilures, nviinly forj Moramhi<|ue. run to oscr SO percrol of the Portuguese budget, roughly seven pcrcer if national income. Parity because of Ihe stimulation ofortuguese economy his been eipanding briskly In recent years, though wiih Increasingly evident irs-Bal-i.trains.
C. South Afrko ond SouA-Wcil Afrko
outh Africa's totiely Is based on the unqualified supremacy of its white community in all mutters. The overwhelming concern ol Ihe whiles and the principal charge to their govfintncM Is lo protest this supremacy from any challenge by the nonwlite majority. Tbe policy of the ruling National Tarty foe preservation of the Rcj.oboe's "way of We" is apaitheid oe separateunderreat votuioo of restrictions and conUcIs, the stem and the petty, isposed On the nonwhites. Ihe whites claim thai any sign ilk nut concession to tlie other racial voiituiurutict would inevitably lend to
the 'Irhe domestic peace androsperiiy thatm fit allhus, the great bulk of the while ec-nmumty supports apartheid, though some would apply it more leniently foe humanitarian or pticlkal purpose*.1
Most hoowhites resign themselves to the governments teptcsilve policies, though resentment ol while rule and of paitkulv governmental policiesleast In uiban areas. In any case, there have been very few mature stallotii of organised resistancehite lute within the Republic in recent yt>n.n good ineasute testimony to theespcct for South Afriea't large, well-equipped, and well-trained security forces.0 mm National Police. Including its rlfeitive Security Branch, is the Hist line of defense for internal security, ft is hacked up by an army of0 and various tialncd resents of. Blacks make up arsproximalely one-half of the police force, but carry no firearms in the course of their duties.
SWA. SWA, in elicit. Is ruled as an Integral part of Sojth Africa. The South Africans legaid their control of the turitory at vital to ihe Itepjblici' security and have resisted all efforts of black African slates, through the UN, to force then lo relinquishy-atvl-large the white conununity of SWA is content lo let Pretoria run territorial aflaln. Most of ihe black* apparently also arc politically apathetic or cowed. Most of their chiefs cooperate with (he government, except in the case of Ihe Hcrern. who hive lung been restive under white rule, lba South-West Africa Peoples Organisation (SWAPO)ollowing of several thousand among the Ovambo. the Urges! tribe andabout half the Deflation. It is permit led to eiivtoliticalut iis operations have been severely curtailed. Many of its younger members are critical of both the chiefs and themall minority of SWAFO adherents advocate the use of violence lo achieve independence, small bands of SWAPO guerrillas, after receiving military training Ininfiltrated SWA, received some support fiom the local population, andlsort-Iived guerrilla campaign. Ihe South African Oovcroininl has responded by strengthening its police force* in SWA. ifJieducing tougher security laws, andarge number of suspected dissidents, tomef whom now are being tiled for terrorism.
D. Southern Rhodes^
be regime of Prime Minister Ian Smith derlatcd luSodesiVs Independence in November IOCS to forestall any UK atteuvpt to undermine while domination of afha anitude* of ihe European Cvnvntiruty en while supremacy have been less doctrinaire and the controls eaertWd over tho blacks less harsh than in South Africa. 'Ibis partly reSeets an accommodation to UK pressures during the prerebelBon period;ho small percentage of black* who meet eduea-
we tVuiird ducustion cfolicies la Sooth Africa, seaSouth AfrfcV FCRET.
See MB TOKO. TibAUKesk-saf tie ON Central AsvneUyrnranatt Use So.rh-VYot Afefca Iha Jail*r'CRRT.
an vote, and
tiona) and property qualification* canTote, anduarter oi the seats in Parliament arc inSect allocatedbo blacVi. Ii alio retire tt the anal) sire ol the white pojxil ami theol rigid segregation. Nonetheless.efore tbe rebellion the lOvodcslan regime bad banned black nationalist political parties and detained their leaders. Tin subsequent militancy of the prohibited organizations and the regime's concern about security In urban areas have line* led to tighter restrictive measurei There have been some reeenl novet, moreover, to imitate South African racial laws.
ost of hhodesia's blackesides in nuaj areas, where it shows little interest in national politics and continued respect forauthority of village anil tribal chiefs. 'Ihe chiefs are scrruothcial appointees cf the government and mostly accept its policies. Indeed, the regime has been upgrading their prestige and training, partlyeward for royalty and panh/ to enable them' to withstand the coinprtitioo. from liberation leaders for tic allegiance of the villageSo far theds, whclher from loyalty or fear, have mostly sSded with Ihe whita regime, at.lc.vj to the citent of informing security officials of the movements of guerrilla*.
ith the help ol black Woeuscrs, urban as well as rural, Rhodesia'* security forces have proved highly elective in fertctting out dissidents andguerrilla infiltrators. 'Iheso forcesolice, an army. and trained reserveslacks make up mil of tho polke force and have served with distinction in occasional combat against Iteration groups. So far. neith'r the security forces nor the white civilian pocnihtioo barmany casuaRies at the hivls of insurgents The costeserving white supremacy must of course also include the economic losses brought about by the sanctions instituted against the regime, first by the UK and then by theharp decline ofhas soowwhat depressed the general level of eeonoinic activity. Rot the white community ha* jutTereJ no privation and its political support for the SiMlh regime hasnything, increased.
III. THE HBERATION GROUPS
sccause of the clandestine character of the liberation organisations ll is d'ttcult lo eMiuvite the size of their active membership, much less the estenl of their Indigenous support Yet none appears to have more than several thousand active members or to enjoy broad popular support In its homeland. The Mozambique Liberation FnvM (KRRLIMO) probably Is the largest ilnglo organl/ation, withctive members. Ihe three feuding Angolan groups together probablyaboutsc number. The fthodesian liberation groups probably count their active inetriers only in the hundreds, most nf them outside the countiy. Ihe South African groups probably also count their active members In the hundreds, including both potential tasurgcr'* and scattered long-limehe Rhodesian and South African organiM-bons are outgrowths of fotmrrly legal pot'ieal parties. Ihcy undoubtedly have many supporter* within the respective countriesare ligidly suppressed
by the security apparatot and play Iiltle or no active, re-le. (For brief ile-seriptlons of the roijoe fiber .lion ceg*ni rations of Southern Alrva. see Aiocl)
IT. Mewl liberation groups have eomidrrahle difficulty In rcttuitingtheiranyrcruiU are emked abroad witheducation or employment, only reluctantly taring up the insurgencythru it upon them. Others are picked up horn destitute refugeem tteaiby eountiirt Tightened security measures make itany reviuits in Bhodeih, Souih Africa, and SWA to leave theirlargeitand Angola ave had VUCCeil in recniitiog from
ceifain bellicose liorderow,ever, at odds with the government.of FRF.UMOs fighting force cexnes from the Makomle Irioetrnenon both sides of tho MoaamhirsuoTansania bonier. The Bakongo,the Angola Congo (Kinshasa) border, paalhl up the gical Memembership of the Kinshasa based Angolan IsCvc^futionaiy
IS The limited appeal of the libnaUoo groups Is partlyto the personal limitations of their current leaden. eWpevieoc* In pohtiealhe Dationalist movements aie of relatively recent origin, except for South Africa's African National Coogtrsshich data hack someears. In phedesia and South Africa, theleaders and many middle-ranking cadres are In fail or under detention. Presently active leaden tend to lack pollti-cat Mature among the blxVs back home. Usually well educated and co-jno-Iby local standards. |hey tend to be somewhat otranged from thepaiutlual andhl>ticatcd blacks of Southern Africa.
their political message is usually losl on the homepresent themselves and their organizations as the future guidinga oathm occupying the territory now ruled by the white regime.ihe case of the relatively more sophblicated Souih Africanho native
a
iUUotts think mostly in terms of village and'Ihe concept of fighting dying fee acalled fsAoJeiis or Z'm&oeWr- It forgery foreign to them. Thus, the vsiy neglect of education and rural development, whichajor ludJcuiteiit mule against the white regimes by liberation groups.erious obstacle to iLe lsrlert* efforts lo iitohilire pojiular support for their cause.
h more, the national outlook claimed by liberation leaders Isbytlcr facliouallsin among competing group* Potentialoften lepetttd ty the intractability and PSStintiS of the coeupetiUoo. Itrank In Angola, where rival groups periodically engage each Othercombat. The diBeriWCS between Organizations Svcklng to liberatecountry at tunes ictctt age oU antagooiems betweest tricol groups andcultural antagonisms (urbannrilsut pnsonal iWalrks axe usually central lo the inabilitywould-be liberators lo stick togetherat least cooperate. Each leaderat the ii. i i'.i" of his couutiyefutes to share power or
accept CCjUcctiva discipliofe
tl. Inften widespread negative feelings ol (I* blacks of Southern Africa toward tlx white regimes *ir'V translated into positive allegiance to the liberation cause, much lewarticular lilxfalloo group. Espcilnlly to the bluVs In the bush, the liberation rnovunciiti tie often unknown, distant, ea* even alien, at in cases where Unv are IdentiSed with hostile tiibes. Pot-ulii entagonluns toward the rsbtration group* alio arise fiocn the violence theyheit aicas of operation or the retaliation they evoke fromfceurity forces. Finally, when not iriditrYrenl or hostile togroups, inacyremain Inactive simply because ol their conviction that no liberation group noweal chance lor success against the power of the white*.
IV. fXIERHAt AID A. General
J'i Because ol the imposing strength of the white regimes and the difficulties of the liberation movements in arousing indigenous support, they are vitally dependent upon eiterna) assistance. Tiearid material aid they get from usdeperfdciit African states, from Communist countries, and from various Western sources sustains their political and diplomatic attivitiet. Tha training and staging facilities piovided by the black slate? that bonier oo the while ruled areas and the arms and advanced hainlng provided by tho Communists, andesser esteot by North African states, are Indispensable to their insurgency efforts.
B. The Role ol Airicon Stoles
il. Nearly ail the AfricaA slates, black and Arab, champion the bbetatsoo cause at ihe UN. in such forums as the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Oiganlzation, and in bilateral relations with Ihe US andoihn wot Id powers. Nearly all givo verbal support to thefrican liberation Committee (Al.Cf. which was formed to provide pohtlcal and financial backing lor tlx insurgency efforts of the libcia-lion groups. The annual budget of the ALC has run to aboutOh'on in recent years, assessedAU member slates loughly on the bails of populv tion. Total payments, however, have come to only eoc-lialf of annual assess' menisumber of countries have madeayments. The delinquentclaim preoccupation with dosnestic problems or disgust with tha factionalism and slow progress of the liberation groups. Some of these countries contribute directly to Individual liberation groups, thereby encouraging the divisions they laiaeot
n
en
an?aruiOuMcis Ihe im.pt burden pi Support. President Julius Nycreic is peisonally dedicated to the liberation cause. besides, hi* courV tiy never has had significant economic ties with the white s'atci of Southern Africa. r cs Salaam serves at headquarters of the AI.C. 0 and two competing South African gioups maintain their exile licadquarters thete and nearly all groups haw politicalanzania rrervidei the rnost eitcnsive. tialnJiig facilities for African insurgents, wilh Chinese as well as Tan-aanian instructors. It also is the major entrepot for Communist arms for the liberation groups and the embarkation point for trips to Communist countries Ln quest of subventions or paramilitary training. Though Nyerere keeps an eye on the movement of weapons within Tanzania, he apparently hat tew qualms about acting as host to the Mack rebels and iheir Oiinese tutors. Me is much iiK>rc eonccnied with the threat of Portuguese retaliation agaimt the staging bases of FHF.LIMO In soulheiD Tanrania So far the Portuguese have been remark-ably tolerant of Tanzania's activities in behalf ofitarv forces.
. cause, oui to cornpeonp
Lusaka and the two gioup* ope" 12
ton cause, but ptBng
7*
Ihe past lie In- permitted liittrmitlent border uossings by guerrilla groups,prolaT*ted ruu ami bury training md the use ol Tarabiianctuary fcrit-and-run rafcls. lie did, however, permit (he recent buVbariont into ruVJ.ua by Rhodrsfan and South African guerrillas This mayill-ingncss to take greater risks on behalf of liberation efforts; it already hat evoked threat! of econoiiiic and military retaliation fioirt Rhodesia and South Africa.
8S. Atide from Ihe bocuVr countries, several other African Mates from time to time havediitct support lo the insurgency efforts of the bberation forces. China prior to the downfall of Nkiumah and Algeria before the ovcr-thiow of Ben Bella were important centers for guerrilla training and tuppllet ol weapons. Early7 Algeria showed an Interest inajor role in the liberation cause; but so far there has been little evidence cf an bv crease at activities Egypt- Tunisia, and Moroeco also provide arms andng assistance, thoughinor Kale. Guinea,ow devotes itsto the Insurgency campaign against Portuguese Cuinea. at one lime tuccoted Angolan liberal MM!*
C. Communist
The USSR. China, and Cuba are the major sources of military equipment for ibo liberation movements. All three coun'iies provide paramllitajyIn their borne countries, and tbe latter two also dispatch Instructors, China foe the training facilities in Tan?arm and Cuba for those in Coogohe Kaal European Communist States contribute weapons and sponsor training, mainly as an adjunct of Soviet assistance programs. Communist countries also are an Important somcc of financial assistance to tho bhcratios cause and for miscellaneous help, twh asservices and academic scholarships. Finally, the luunisl countries champion the bberation causeer national forums, though ihe Soviet! in particular have avoided ctvnrnitroents that would involve them in slircct military action.
XI. For the Communist countries, assistance lo tho liberation movementsow-cost, low risk Investment intended to undermine the VVeMernfrica amiolster llrtir Own prtupccts for iuunediate and loog-tenn InRueocc. They are unencumbered by political or economic ties with the while-ruled slates, so they suffer no losses by antagonizingctualn behalf ot (ho hberatiou movements areet, incipensive as they are. the aid programs gain iheegree of acceptance arnong hbcralioo leaden and among African natiooalins generally that lends lo offset African criticism of heavyhandcil Communist political ventures elsewhere on the
oo tie amountsewflwnlst aid an sketchy. MiUtuy wpptm are niwily sv-sJus store* of small anus, ammunition, and Seld euuipmeot Ibeie are- oltro distributedhe eavenaacatt el TwmiA and CoogoFir.ar.ria help frOW iB Ceu.us.nM sources wsiball/ deesear. The isumler of Souther* Alritans lectived by tlie ComiMmM countries lorwirJog pwbaWy rangiSCO
continentit Ghana underome Africans charge Irowevtr, thai Communisl assistance, particularly the coiiiLXtliion for Influ.etween the USSit and China, cncetbates ftition.ihst tendencies among tho liberation groups-
'SSH. The Soviet prist ke. generally has teen lo cultivate tic* with the liberation group they regard as most promising from each white-ruled country, to back it exclusively, and to be fairly gerietont'with offerings of military ccjuip ment. Soviet-backed gioops includeMO.ANC, SWAPO. and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAKU) of Rhodesia. Theon-intentlyio Cornmimlst lute, while the AS'C hat clote ties with the outlawed South African Communis! faityandMO hat Communists among its second-level leadeis. fixcept for thehowever, lhe giinips have nottrong affinity for Communist Ideas. "Ibey desperately needawl financial assistance and tho USSK has proved toeltible source.
e Chinese appear loaiter-gun approach in extending aid. They mostly avoid continuing obligationsingle group, apparently prefeiiing lo tevlew tlie results ol eaeh individual fnfucion on ihe miliary and polifical xctviliei of the recipient At times they have asslvted Soviet-backed groups; at limes, their rivals; al limes, both simultaneously. They apparently hope lhat strenuous indoctrination of trainees in China svill influence various groups loro-Chinese hoe. at once anti-Western and anti Soviet. They apparentlyigh priority lo the funding and manning ol Rainingin Tanzania, which principally benefit FftF.UMO. Here, they seem not to have overemphasisedbut seek lo win Ihe respect of Tantanlans and trainees through their professional competence.
Cnrar. Tlie Castro regime al present gives major akl to only onegioup in Southern Africa; ll* Soviet-bttcked MPLA. Perhaps In an attempt to prove that Cubaorkhvide leaderrfk imperii list revolution t, Castro's aid has Iccn paitkularly boH. Cubans peouably hive participated in guerrilla forays and Castro onceuban svtuntccis to any Africangroup There were no lakers.
D. Role of Ihe Welt
ith the exception of tbe Mf'LA, the bberation groups seek material and political assistance from Western sources, in partvoid ICO close an IdentaLVAtion with Communist patrons. Most African slates urge tho Western governncirts lo support tlie hberalioei movements To the disappcxntinotit of the Africans, material assistance from the West Ins been much less significant thankl Public: and private sources in the US. thei UK. and othrt Western, countries have peovkled funds,nd medical and welfare aid for political exiles and icfugcet from white-ruled countries. Dut Western sources have ettended almost no military assistance.
I i groups and their African champions are also disgruntled overinefecfiveness of Western political and diplomatic action on behalf of
their caw.ckcu* US arsdother Wnlcm condcsrwutioni ol minority rule and racial dhaiiiiination In Southern Africa, but they almostbelieve ilut tliei* arriorii 'ill far short ofhe Writ coo Id do. UKigaimt the Smith regime in I'hodcifaconsidered Inadequate andand the US and the UK arc rebuked a* apostle* of restraint at the UN In such matters at UEngtng South Africa to heel OB control of SWA- Both are also denounced, often bitterly, for permitting indirect support of the South African regime through private Investments and trade, Finally, tha US in puticular and NAIO nations in general are indicted fory aid to Portugal, which, the Africans claim, helps the Portuguese to sustain their control of Angola and Mozambique.
V. PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS
e believe that the liberation movementsittle chance of significant progress toward deposing any of the white regimes of Southern Africand probably for some considerable time thereafter. The key to the snaltee, in our view, is the will and ability of tht white regimes to pay the military and economic cost* necessary to icslsl the imtugcoey effort* of thaost of the bbmirofl movenxroU will probablyto uiHer for *xne time the disabilities that so far have limited theirarticularly tha inability to attract broad Indigenous support. But even with greater success Inand the higher levelternal support which would probably follow from (hat, no liberation group ts likely to esp.ind its operation* Pifnclcntrv to raise the costi of white resistance to an intolerable level.
A/riM. for at least the neat several years, nothing shortcivil war or *oelal revolution In Portugal would be bkely lo undermineof Sala/ar (age Id) c* any likely successor lo retainAngola and Mozambique. The success so far in containing theimproving eeonemiic prospect* of the two Provinces, and the direof such indepcntlenl black slate* as Congo (Kinshasa) andlo be reinforcing Portuguese eonvictlorii that their cowse In Africabest one foe whites andable.
We see oo early prospect of liberation groups being ableimurgincy opcriik*os within Rhodesia. Even il they were to, weBhodesiari security forces would contain the guerrillas in sparselyareas, much tho way Ihe Portuguese have done withI MO.future political settlement with the UK, the Rhodes ian whi'e* mightgradual Increase in the political role ol blacks, Such an arrangementnot satisfy bberatfon leaders. In die absencet-ttlemmtUK, however, the whites will probably cornpMocak bya Republic *omc lime during theear or Mo. Such aprobably be accompanied by snore stringent restrictions against thenod might poduco outbreak* of disorder in urbanheforce* would pohably be unable to exploit these and securityahivost witainly maintain control.
.TO South AJHOI ond SWA
3
Ihetimeime
but bberation groups would probably notMillion to prolong themecurity forces wuuld probably restore order swiftly. The South African regime has announced plans to create Bantuilani otin SWA for the Ovambos and othet tiiLs. with some degree ol internalis is partly intended to bolster the prestige of the consctva-tive"'. and diminish the politic-al appeal of SWAPO. Opposition to while role, how*ver. will probably coutuiuc, and the South Africans If necessary will employ stiffer security measures.
tO. We cipeet slut closer cooperation in security matters among the white regimes over the neat several yew The South African Covernrnerj, in the wake of its reaction to the ANC incursions into Rhodesia, will probably beat least for some tune, to Khodesisn oe Portuguese requests foruiity assistance, whether or not South African rebels rre immediately involved. Moreover, regulariiation, one way or another, of the vtatus of the Rhodetian regime would probably produce closer pobtkal and economic ties between Salisbury and Pietoria. while planned South African participation in elcvetop-mcul projects iu Angola and Morambioue will draw the Portuguese and South Atiic-ans somewhat closer. .
he bberationespite these dismal prospects, will almost ccr-(ainly persist in ihcu efforts, and some of them, will probebly achieve significant increases in membership over time. Nest touestion of recruitment, the actual level of Insurgency opeiailorvs will probably depend most heavily on the estent of support by the border slates. We see very little piospect ofOjMjitxxal assistance Iron Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Malawi. Evenadical regime were to replace one of the present cautious ones and were lo initiate such help, prtsssucs from tho white states would force it toourse or would soon undermine ill tenure. Tanzania and Congo (Brazzaville) will almost certainly remain steadfast in their operational backing of FREUMOai-JMI'lA. The course of Congo (Kinchao) is likely to fluctuate with the strength and inclination of the icgim* in power and the degitc of pressure exerted by the Portuguese. Whatever pressures ihe Portuguese may eieit. IkCAvever, Klmliasa will probably be unable to exercise consistent control over Angolan rebels operating from its territory.
inhii is liVely to temper activism with picidetice Kaundais associates, frustrated at Rhodesia's continued survival and at theirmi!-nerability to pressure from the white regimes, are likely intennittenUy to give freer rein lo Zambia-bated insurgents. But becausecute economic dependence oo Rhodesia and Portuguese Africa will continue for some years, tbe Kauoda government will probably retrench its support to the insurgents svhencver economic retaliation appears iuiuu'ncril.
he hbtratioo cause will continue lo be in Issue with broad appealTho OAU lumniil meeting in Kinshasa Iniho ANCZAPU irxursi-.ni into Wwdeila, pledged lo contrihutetho ALC (ot Millyear. Many states, a* In the put, willless enthusiastic about supporting guerrilla opmiioni by Ihe lime Diplomitic support-of the causein contrast, reman
steadfast. IikIccsI. the continued failure o( tho insuigeficy elloili ol the libeia-lioo group* andlmost certain unwillingness and inability of independent African (later to eommil their own military forces to Ihe struggle will probably producaEed efforts lo induce the greato eiert effective pecsiure onwhite regimes- In all lifceliliood, the Africans will not be satisfied by the response.
he ecititinued frustration of the liberation movements will complicate US bilateral relations with African statei and embarrass our efforts to garner African support at the UN. But US relations with the Africanumber.of factors aod the impact of its positions with respect lo Southern Africa will vary. With some countries, particularly the border states of Tanzania and Zambia, the liberation question already is centra) in their foreign policy and will probably grow In importance. Some other countries (eg. Ethiopia. Ghana) put such value on their close relations with the US lhal tbey usually will tolerate our stand on Ihe liberation question whenever it varies with their own- Meanwhile, so many formkUble problems stand in the way of hannontous US relations with such radical governments as Coo go (Brai-za-vvik) and the UAll that penttiom taken by the US regarding Southern Africa are not likely lo make much difference
ough viilually all African governments repeatedly proclaim theirfor iho liberationood number, including most of tho former French colonies, become actively involved la the issue only when under pecs' sure from their more committed African colleagues. Iheso governments atewirh enormous problems of national development and face no lugenl dorrirstic demand for action on liberation. Many of them look to the USotential if not actual source of economic aid and clevelopmcot capital and as an important trading partner. They would wish to continue beneficial lies even when they dies greed with particular US policies oo Southern Africa If, however. Afrkan* generally weie lo come lo believe that the US wasto Ihe lilxrabon cause, (he liberation issue would become much more Important; It could becoeno of primary Importance In US-African relations if the African* camo to believe thai Ihe US was actually seeking lo perpetuate white minority rule.
he Communist stales will continue to exploit their evpportnrutlcs In the liberation issue. The USSll awl Cubab>bly grant Increased assistance lo any of thehey support whichapacity lo absorb mora aid. We think it highly unlikely, how-evir, that the Soviet* wouldall for direct military interventionhite regime, either unilaterally
miitMi
ANNEX
LIBERATION GROUPS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA
ANGOIA
1 CRAE. 'Ihe Angolan Rewh-hnnary Cover nineM in Edlc, the largest of ihe Angs-lanb anof political gioupt formed in the mid-IVJft andtcsponsilitc for ihr start of Ihe insurgencyT. CBAK ii domtnated by lloldcn Roberto ami drawsgreat bulk of lit active members' from Isis fellow DaVongo tribesmen. Most of its external support Is fromAfrican slates- Coo go (Kinshasa) serves as political headquarters and as the training and staging base for CRAE Insurgents. Guerrilla groups have been -persistently active in northwest Angolaver ihe past year CRAKo engaged in sporadic guerrilla Incurs along Ihe central and eastern sectors of iho Conge-Angola border.
MP LA. The smaller Popular Movement for the Liberation ol Angola was organi/ed in the midlftXfs by urban bracks and inulalrocs and hat taken part in tho insurgency1 is led by Agostinho Neto and based in Congohere it gits training from Cubantro-Comrnurilst line and draws mosl of its financial and military assistance from ihe L'SSR- lis guerrilla activities in northwest Angola and the Cabinda enclave are ivsubstantial.8 it beganperate from Zambia against eastern Angola with somewhat greater effect.
VNITA. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola wa* formed6 by Joes*efector from CRAE IImall core of trained guenillas ami ha* gained (he support, through lrrb.il affinity and intimidation,umb" of villages in eastern Angola. Zambia recently forced Savimbt to move hit ncfrlquartctt from Lusaka to Tanzania. This togetherersistent shortage of weapons will probably limit UNITA'* effettov-nes* for some limp. UNI I'A ha* received minor Chinese military and financial aid.
MOZAMBIQUE
1 PREL1MO. Thebuatioo Front spring* from. dlesfdent ooup* organized in ihe earlyand began itslimorgcocyed by Kduardo Mondl-ne Most ofctive member* arc from lie MaWe tribe ol northern Mozambique, the area ol its guerrilla operations.
n Tanzania, the staging
O has headquarters In Tanzania, the staging base for its gum Ola It receives tncot of its est en ial fuvanelil aid from African
Iht USSR and China bolli provide military assistance FRF. LI MO guerrilla operations have grown increasingly proficient, but tt* Portuguese havecontained them nsostly vvilhtn lordt* areas near Tanzania.
OUBMO, The Mozambique Revolutionary Cummittee split oil from FRKI.IMOambia based. It rporadicaUy ventures Into westernolitical activity and occasionally for guerrilla rahls. Led by Paulo Germane, it has at theembers andporadic Bow uf small-scale atvlitancc from China.
RHODESIA
L ZAPU. The Zimbabwe Afiicao Peoples Union, successor to earlier nation-alnt parties, svas formed1 and bannedts best known leaders including Joshua Nkomo, and many members are under detention. Il probablyr so activesdy in esile and led by James Chikerrma. Political headquarteri are in Zambia, which permits border crossings by gueirtllas. but not the use of its territoryanctuary or staging base. Most military training lakes place In Tanzania. Most of its financial support comes from African slates; the bulk of its military equipment, from the USSR. Nearly all Ihe insurgents who pass into Rhodrva are killed, captured, or desert the cause. The 'MTV organization within Rhodesia Im teen crippleel by infiltrations and arrests by security forces.
2 ZASU. The Zimbabwe African National Union was formed inwith the defectionroup of utbnn intellectuals from ZAPU. ZANU was banned1 and its leaders, including Ndabaninge Slthole, arrested. It now is led by Heibcil Chitepo and probably is smaller than ZAPU. wilh which it competes bstteriy. It loo is based in Zambia and leteives ihe bulk cf its military training in Tan/jnla. China has supplied smalt amounts of military and financial akl. Similar to ZAPU. ZANU'a eflosls at terrorism and political activity within RhoJ-sla have been ineffective.
SOUTH AFRICA
C. The African National Congressorganized2 and bannedany capo kneed leaders arid members are uodet detention OHvrr Tambo now is its President. The ANC is closely assexia-ed with the banned South African Crxnrminisl Party. Most of its financial aid is fiom thePatly of ihe UK and from tlie USSR; the latter probably provides the bulk of its rrtiliUry equipment. The ANC has headquarters in Tan/ant*, In
3*5
Mitical exiles sc-atl
addition lo several hundred political exiles scattered throughout the world, it pruboblyundred or so trained guerrillas. Occasional attempts toSouth Africa have keen unsuccessful. Its political organization within the Republic It weak and Infiltrated fcy government agents.
1 PAC. The Fan-African Congress split oil from tho ANC
of dssatisfaclion with the iatter's multiracial character and the extent ofinfluence. It was bannedO. with many leaders and members placed under detention. The PAC is wracked by factionalism and probably hat no morer so active members, nearly all in exile. Political head-quarters arc In Tanzania. China has provided limited financial end military aid.
SOUIHAVESI AfftlCA
SWAPO. The South-West Africa Peoples Organization, formedperatesegal parly, with perhaps several thousand active members, mostly from the Ovambo, the largestinority of SWAPO members,r so, advocate use ofel by Sam Nujoma, thesen Tanzania and receive financial helpariety of African sources. Ihe USSR piovidci both monetary and military aid.WAPO guerrilla bands Infiltrated SWA, received some local support, andhott-livcd guerrilla campaign. This ledtein crackdown by the South African CcA>ernrncnt, and no new me'dents have been reported over the past icveial otoliths.
SWANU. The South-West Africa National Union Is one of several in. substantial hbaabon groups formed by dissident llerero tribesmen. It has headquarters in Tanzania butinuscule membership.
Original document.
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