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CIA/DIA/STATE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Reactions to Certain US Actions
1. In this memorandum we consider some recent developments
in North Korean, Soviet and Chinese policy in connection with the Korean crisis and the possible reactions of these countries to several US courses of action.
IN COMMUNIST POLICY
The attack on the Blue House in Seoul and the seizure of the Pueblo are the most flagrant and conspicuousof an aggressive policy of armed subversion against the ROK developed by Kim Il-Sung since the fall This policy aims at the eventual reunification of Korea by revolutionary violence, and is designed to exploit the current US and ROK involvement in Vietnam to this end.
independently and probably intend to keep the affair in their own hands insofar as they can. The influence of China in the
present circumstances is marginal, and the influence of the Soviets in Pyongyang, though greater than Peking's,ia not decliive. The Soviets have considerable potential leverage, but they would be unlikely to apply severe pressures on North Korea unless thay thought hostilitiesontinuing and extended scale were becoming likely. They would be roluctant to risk the recovery of their influence with tho Asian Communistoal they have been seeking for several years, unless they believedajor danger to their own security was developing.
k. In the last week, the North Koreans haveonsistently hard and unyielding public position. However, there is, io private statements through the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, seme suggestionillingness to bargain for the release of the Pueblo's crew. We judge that the North Koreans wish to avoid military retaliationossible resumption of host!litlea in Korea. Their primary concern is to manipulate the crisis ao aa to discredit the US and complicate US-ROK relations.
5. The USSR and China probably approve these immediate North Korean aims, though they may have concern over Pyongyang's tactical handling of the crisis. They nay even be concerned
rolonged crisis or possible hostilities in Korea would adversely effect Communist prospects in Vietnam byeneral hardening of US policy in Asia. Both the Soviets and Chinese have thus far refrained from involving themselves directly. The Chinese, after remaining virtually silent for several days, have offered only pro forma support, mainly because of their severely strained relations with Kim Il-Suag, and perhaps because of their own confused internal situation. In public the Soviets haveeneral support for Pyongyang, but without adding to the tensions. They didS message to Pyongyang and through calculated leaks they have endeavored to hint at the possibility that the Pueblo incident could be settled peacefully if the US made some concessions.
II. POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION
6. The possible US courses of action discussed below are grouped into two broad categories: first, those that are purely demonstrative in intent; second, these which areor involve the use of force in some way. Under the first category, we also discuss the question of possible warnings to the North Koreans or through the USSR.
DUMOKSTRATIVE ACTI0H5
7. The demonstrative actions, discussed below, taken singly or even together, vould not be likely to effect the release of the Pueblo or its crew. Probably tbey would not even convince the Worth Koreans that the US in fact intends to use military force if the crisis is not settled satisfactorily. The North Koreans might still feel their possession of the crew was strong insurance against US retaliation. They might also believe that the US was constrained from moving very far in the direction of military action by the requirements of Vietnam. But taken togetherurther significant buildup of US military capabilities in the area these demonstrative actions would probably reenforce North Korean concern over US retaliation and raise apprehension in Moscow and in Peking over US intentions. While we cannot be sure, we believe thereair chance that some combination of demonstrative actions, diplomacy,orce buildup would lead to the release of all or most of the crew, and possibly the ship.
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i ip/ODIBT'l'IVl!
A. The US would deploy the USS Banneruitable escort and air cover to the goneral location of the Fueblo seizure, following the route of the Punhlo; the following day the Banner would retrace tkis route and tbe procedure would be repeated as long as desirable.
8. No direct military reaction to this move is likely. All of the Communists would recognize itemonstration, and as long as North Koreas territorial waters were not violated, there would be no response. There would be further military alerts in North Koreaoviot vessel would probably shadow the US force. There would be the danger of incidents, particularly between the Banner's sir cover and patrolling North Korean fighters. And such incidents would draw considerablecriticism of the US for deliberately seeking such encounters. This course of action probably and any incidents certainly would undercut US diplomatic efforts aimed at asolution of the Pueblo episode.*
C. The US could move ionic ahipn to the site of the Pueblo seizure end begin salvage operations. (Assuming that the North Koreans were not already on the scene for thii purpose.)
U. The Communists would see in thisarginal show of defiance and also an attempt to recover gear to support the US claim regarding the precise location of the Pueblo. The North Koreans would probably do nothing in response, except perhaps complain publicly that the US was trying to provoke another incident. If the US claimed to have recovered Pueblo gear, the North Koreans would deny US veracity and continue to insist that the incident had occurred in their territorial waters.
D. The US would conveyarning to tho
North Koreans that military reprisals were intended at an early date unless theroatisfactory termination of the Pueblo affair.
The question here is one of credibility. The Worth Koreans would have some reason to believe that the US might be bluffing. At least they could not be sure. Presumably they would consult with the Soviots and ready their own defenses. If the US were simultaneously making significant military moves indicating an increased readiness for major hostilities in Korea, howover, then the North Koreans would probably make seme gesture toUS actions. They might cake an acceptable offer to bargain; they might even release part of the crew. Any Soviet advice in those circumstances would probably run along this line.
If the IS Involved the Soviot Unionhannel toarning to North Korea, the Soviets would almost certainly refuse toarty to conveying officially on American ultimatum. Nevertheless, tho Soviets would probably pass the warning to Pyongyang. It should bo emphasized, however, that there is no guarantee that the Soviets could persuade the North Koreans to moke concessions, even if they decided to try to do so. Thereood chance, however, that the Soviets
eight open up clandestine channels to the US, hoping to gain time while they explored further both US and North Korean positions and tho possibilityettlement.
RETALIATORY ACTIONS
Ik. As indicated above, thoreair chanceombination of demonstrative actions, diplomatic moves, and military reinforcement in Korea vould persuade the Kim Il-Sung regime to end the current crials by releasing the crvw and perhaps the ship. Once the US took retaliatory actions involving the use of military force against North Korea, however, the chances of obtaining early release of the crew and ship would be virtually eliminated. Moreover, retaliation would probably bring the Chinese and Soviets more directly into the situation. They would probably still try to contain tha crisis, but would feel compelled to take aome ateps to show thoy were prepared to aid North Korea's defense. Thus, the risks of an enlargement of the crisis and actual hostilities would be increased.
US would mine Wonsan harbor, preferablyby an air drop.
North Korea would, of course, defend against this action; it might also attempt some retaliation of its own, for example against US ships or forces. The USSR would assist In any efforts to remove the mines, if requested, and they would also begin to build up North Korean air defense capabilities around Wonsan and other major ports. Mining of Wonsan would be of special concern to the USSR, not only because Soviet ships use the harbor, but also because the action might be seenrecedent to similar action against Haiphong.
US would quarantine or blockade one or morelimit tbe action to North Korean navalwouldlose in blockade with some USNorth Korean waters.
16. There wouldigh risk that the North Koreans would challenge tbe blockade with their forces. The Soviets might ostentatiously move ships through the blockade line, possibly including some military vessels. Some move would probably be mode by the Soviets at the UN; they would have good prospects for getting wide support. At this point the North Koreans end Soviets would conclude that further US military action might
follow; ihey vould move ahead rapidly vith defensivehe Chinese too vould probably begin some show of military activity in Rorth China and Manchuria.
US would attempt toorth Koreanhold it in return for the Pueblo and ite crew.
time and circunstancos permitted, the Northdefend againsteizure, regardless of whetheror territorial waters. Presumably, theyenough not toajor ship to suchthe reaches of their air cover. In any case, thewould not be likely to bargain for an exchange. Andpropaganda would becloud tho original US case No military retaliation would be likely, however.
US or the ROK wouldaid insize across the EMZ.
North Koreans are probably alert to thisany case the action could build upajor battleroenforcements on both sides. It would certainly notthe return of the Pueblo's crew. Indeed it is possible
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that action on this scale would be tantamount to reopening the
war. The Soviets would probably accelerate arms aid to North Korea, and the Chinese might make some gestures to Indicate more support for Pyongyang.
E. The US and/or the ROK would conduct an air strike against one or more selected targets: S air strike against Wonsan airfield and Mumpyong Ni naval base; the ROK AF would strike against guerrilla training centers in North Korea.
19- The North Koreans would of course defend themselves against the attack. They would weigh carefully the desirabilityetaliatory air strike of their own against South Korea. They would recognize that such action wouldontinuing exchangeirtual air war. On balance, we believe they would probably not retaliate in this way unless they judged that tbe US intended to continue itst the same time, they would probably not be willing to accept the US and ROK actions. Probably they would immediately sentence the crew; perhaps they would hint at an execution.
* The DIA representative believes that the North Koreans would makeetaliatory air strike.
20. The attitude of the Soviets and Chinese in this situation would be of increasing importance to the North Koreans.
Chinese-Korean relation* are currently so strained und thein China so confused that the Berth Koreans would probably not count on Chinese support, while the Chinese wouldard propaganda line, they would almost certainly refrain from any action against the US.
North Koreans cannot afford to procood very farconfrontation with the US without some assuranco ofsupport. We doubt that any firm Soviet assurancegiven at this stage, despite Soviet obligations underMutual Assistance Treaty. We think that the SovietsrespondS air strike by tough public support
of Pyongyang, but probably they would also make private efforts to persuade North Korea and the US to end th* crisis and for Pyongyang to restrain its own reactions.
the Communists would be greatlythe US might embarkourse of sustained airwould step up preparations to meet thisnew measures to strengthen North Korean airboth the USSR and China regard North Korea as an areasecurity interests to them.
23- International Reactions: If the US did resort to sanctions or punitive measures against North Korea, it would gain considerably among certain of its allies in Asia, but it would certainly draw criticism in those quarters already opposed to US policy in the Far East. Indeed, most Free World countries think that an early resort to military action would be unjustified. If,etaliatory action* there were no serious consequences, international concern and alarm would die down. The US position in the UN would deteriorate; charges would be made that the US was misusing forces operating under UN auspices.
2u. Should the US try to marshal supportreak in trade between North Korea and the Free World, lt would probably meet considerable resistance. Japan, the largest of North Korea's trading partners in the Free World, would be reluctant, because of domestic considerations, to join the US. Indeed, the Japanese
left would exploit tho Korean crisis to bring heavy pressure on the government, and among other things to harass and inhibit the
use of US bases in the country. The Sato Government would be placedery uncomfortable position.
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Original document.
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