iibrary -mfcndnionjr review
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INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUBJECT: MBKBUDWders OF NIKORTH KOREAN INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH KOREA, dated
Events since last September tend to confine theof NIEhat North Korean activities villampaign of military harassment In the dm2 area,attempts to infiltrate guerrilla teams, and the dispatch of terrorist and sabotage missions. Tbe raid on the Blue House represents the most dramatic and flagrant manifestation of the campaign begun In6 to disrupt political order in South Korea, to tie dovn large ROK forces, and to encourage insurgency In the South. North Korean handling of the Pueblo crisis reflects an intention to heighten tensions end exploit US preoccupations vith Vietnam. Kla Xl-sung's recent speeches Indicate he la still determined toellicose posture.
These developments have hordenod Seoul's attitude and Increased the likelihoodajor ROK reaction to North orean harasocents. The North Koreans probably believe that the
US will lapose restraints or. tho ROC aod will be reluctant to escalate Its own responses lo Korea. The North Koreans now probably see great and continuing opportunities to exacerbate relations between Seoul and Washington,
e continue to believe that Pyongyang realizes that an Intensification of Incidents and attscXs could escalate to the point of open warfare. We still estimate, however, that North Korea does not plan to Invade South Korea and will notprovoke hostilitiescale which would anounteeuoption cf the war,
U. Nevertheless, the general situation In Korea la more dangerous than it was last fall, since the possibilities ofare greater. The North Korean attitude is more openly truculent than at any tlao The raid against the Presidential residence Indicates that the North Koreans ere willing to run fairly high risks; they cust have been aware that os3QGsl:;aticc cf President Pok could haveajor sck retaliation. They cay be counting heavily on US preoccupation with Vietnam, arA cr. the deterrent value of their own mutual defense treaties with China and the Soviet Italon.
5. We believe that North Korea la pursuing an Independent policy. Pyongyang probably does not consult with Moscow and Peking on the tactical development of its policy against the HOK and tbe US. North Korea's relations with Chios ere cool, and thus Peking'a influence is quite limited. In any event, we believe Peking dees not wont to be involvedew Korean War at this Juncture. As for the USSR, recent events have probably forced it to pay somewhat tore attention to developments in Korea. We believe that the USSR dooa notajor war in the area. Though not necessarily decisive, the USSR's Influence in any major crisis would probably be exerted in tbe direction ofon Pyongyang.
(, Additional evidence since our last estimate suggests that North Korea will continue its efforts to establish guerrilla bases in the South. But we believe that their prospects for success in this endeavor remain poor.
7. We now believe that the North Korean Navy haa at leastlass submarines, at least seven "KCMAR" class guided missile boats andassoolatedStyx missiles, and two "SHERSHEN" class fast patrol boats. Otherwise, the general level of equipment and strength of tbe North Korean forces Is as described inf NTS
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