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MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable Walt Rostov
Assessment of the "Danang Document"
CIA has prepared tha following assessment of the "Danang Document" in response to your request to Mr* Helms last night. You will have received, via tho White house Situationull translation of the document.
examination of the document (inthat i* isommunicationCong MilitiiryRagicnt is an assossmsnt ofof the_Tot. offensive intended for subordinatea tacticnl ccrr.indcontains io-
^steuefcions for fu'-ure operation?. The original document, ^hcrfeverr.ftPstillnd US official* in Saigon state that they are unable at this time to make an accurateof its authenticity. Moreover, sons questionsunanswered as to date of document and circumstances of its capture.
document-appears generally to agree with^"gleaned from interrogations of prisoners takenTet offensive and on what is known of the enemy'sthat the Comnynis_taj,achieved less-than they had .an-*
his" evidence has suggested that the enomy believed ^hey wo'uTd test greater success ingeneralalthough the extent to which they expected genuine popular support is still not clear. Prisoners of officer rank have stated that they believed most of the population would support them, but their own statements and documents from the pre-Tet period indicate rather strongly that the uprising was to be "motivated and organized"rather than spontaneous.
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the exact sequence in tints of theand the "generalhas not been fullyare strong suggestions in statements by otherin captured documents that the two were to bethe "uprising" at luaat being initiated during tho Certain troops or cadres apparently wereto organize support, to begin in the form of we know that such demonstrations wereattacks on several cities in the central coastalTarn Ky--but that they were dispersed by police.
Some prisoners havo linked the public's lack of cooparatlon to the failure of the attacks themselves.
has been no evidence as to whethor theactually intended attacks throughout tho country toor to take place on successive days. document .provides tho first ^ood indication -thatto be nationwide.and that the full impactdissipatod through poor:t alsothat US-bombing attacks -successfully threwin-the Khe Sanh/DMZad the communists
'genuinely expected to score complete successes in some areas, they almost certainly would have had to act everywhere at once.
5* The document, however, does .notasargoe North vletnaraoso units wore to participate in'the initialr were.to be coE-aittod in follow-up* effortsror4?ingi Neither does it make clear whether "all' North Vietnamese units or only some eloinents were to have bean commi-ted.
6. Although the document clearly suggests, failure andi the^eed^fc^^jclsicn'oii'a"future cojirse _oftL doos. not seep'to,rule out the" possibility- thatI maximum and"jninimuw. .goals, at least pbroke"ll of -the future bourses'cited "in the document point to continuing th*-strugc;le in Kili.tary Region. Five, particularly in tha urba^areaaj. as might be expected, thee and-jresourceielatively strong" assots are deemed still in place.
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7. We vould concur vlth COXUSMCV's .cautionary, advice concerning" both snap interpretation? of Coaounlat; verbiage, especially in trjppliicianand-ttm possible relevance or* significance.of.this document to the thinking and overall strategic planningliigh-lavsl Communist* authoritiesCOSVN "or'.Hanoi*
0. US officials in Saigon are endeavoring to clarify the circumstances surrounding' the capture of the document and to establish as precisely as possible its authenticity.
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Original document.
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