IBRARY 8ECBffiT
Seo/itive Oocnmento Fojfeign Dissem
B
A Psychological and Political .Analysis of Cornmander richer'3nts
Psychological Analysis
1. All of Commander Ducher's Naval service records
have been reviewed. These include his fitness re-ports, background invostigative report* and medical records. We have also had the opportunity ofa Naval officer in the Washington area who was Subject's commanding officer, immediately prior to Subject's assignment to the Pueblo. We have also listened to the tapes of his purported confession.
We believe we haveeasonable under-standing of Subjecterson. Some judgements about his reactions can be stated with conviction. Others which are based on inferences must bemore speculative.
Nothing in the data reviewed raises anyabout the Subject's loyalty. The statement alleged to have been written by Subject in North Korea after his capture is inconsistent withhe might have composed voluntarily. Nothing suggests that he wouldrepared statement
TO* RELEASE HATE: 2
f :
O
3
or under slight duress. Nothingthat Subject could have been brought to the point of utter capitulationrief period of time even under intense psychological coercion by his captors.
question then is whether in aperiod of time he could have been broughtpoint ofconfession" writtenlike the terms published by theGovernment. Me understand thatof the taped "confession" indicatesprobably is Subject's voice but that thebeen spliced repeatedly. Although we have
no information about his treatment after capture, in order to answer this question, and understanding of his personality make-up is needed. On the basis of the following analysis of his background and personality, we bolieve it is possible that he could have been brought to the point of signing some kind of document, which later could bewithout his realizing its significance.
isears old, married, and thetwo boys. When he was three his mother died in
No Foreign^issem Sensyrive
SECRET
an accident. Although his father and grandmother were both alive, for reasons unclear he entered Boy's Town when he washere he was twice elected president of his class and was captain of the football team. However, his scholastic record was not Upon graduation from high school he enlisted in the Navy and served three years. In order to qualify for OCS he enrolled in the University of Nebraska andegree in education. Although he reported to one officer that heaster's degree in paleontology, his Navy officer's records do not support this.
6. His early performance in the Navy was only average. He was about two or three years older than most of his rank. During his early years in the Navy he was consistently described as an active, highly motivated young man who was eager to perform well but who needed somewhat morethan officers of his rank. It is alsothat hetrong inclination to become too involved with his men. He was given his weakest ratings on factors relating to military bearing.
-3-
SECRET
Sensitive Ko Fo/eign Dissem
cooperativeness and personal conduct of his affairs. In general his overall ratings placed him in the lower half of officers of his age and rank. 7. His primary duty was with the submarine service and he obviously desired toubmarine skippe There are indications that he felt he would not be selected forost. He was quite disappointed when he was notubmarine command and wasto the Pueblo instead.
6. It was when he was given his first command that some signs of strain became evident. He worked very hard in getting the Pueblo ready for sea. Indeed he pushed so hard that he was criticized for being too demanding with the civilians outfitting the ship. During this period he became involvodecurity investigation after being arrested for gambling. One informant indicated his belief that Subject had been drinking on duty. No administrative action resulted from this investigation.
rom this material we are able to draw certain inferences, but we wish to underscore that they are only inferences.
-4-
j
j
Political Analysis
Pyongyang's propaganda exploitation of the sei2ure of the Pueblo has consisted primarily of two alleged statements made by Commander Bucher. Bucher's first statementconfession"onanuary. His second statement,two days later, was described as an interview by the North Korean press. Thisxceptew additions, closely follows the first statement. The statements attributed to Commander Bucher are for the most part straight recitals of Communist propaganda and were obviously dictated by Pyongyang. As such, however, they do indicate some aspects of the position Pyongyang now appears to be taking in regard to the Pueblo's capture.
The most obvious intent of the statements has been to establish the credibility of the North Korean version of the Pueblo's capture. Bucher's statement that the Pueblo had deliberately "deeply intruded into the coastal waters" of North Korea
at the time of its capture is highlighted.
making this point, Bucher'sgive detailed and somewhat lurid accounts of
-7-
No Foreign STissera Sensitive
the Pueblo'a recent "provocative" activities. Bucher was alleged to have confessed that the Pueblo had also violated the waters of "Peoples China and other socialistnd in fact had entered North Korean waters after performing "espionage assignments along the Soviet Union's maritime province." (The North Koreans perhaps hoped thatharge would make it difficult for China and the Soviet Union to withhold full public support for their position. The Pueblo had in fact gone directly from Japan to itsalong the North Korean coast.)
14. In his statements, Bucher labeled the
Pueblo's missionplain act of aggression" and stated that the ship operated under the guise of an oceanographic research vessel. He allegedly stated that the Pueblo's mission was laid on by the CIA and that he and his men were tempted to undertake their mission by CIA "dollars andhe two civilians on board the ship ware described as "special espionage agents who are conducting military espionage missions" as wall as "otherspecial assignments."
No Forei
SECRET
Sensitive No Fo-feign Dissem
statements can be viewed largelypredictable propaganda attempt to publicizeUS intelligence-gatheringalso plainly indicate Pyongyang's concernthe case it rightly or wrongly feelsfor the retention of the Pueblo and itsstatements clearly indicate thatfeels itselfosition to bargainUS concerning the Pueblo. In line with this,
aanuary editorial in the authoritative North Korean newspaper Nodong Slnmun depicts the Puoblo incident asew flagrant trampling on the Korean armistice agreement." This strongly im-
*
plies that Pyongyang sees the final disposition of the Pueblo and its crewubject ofdoubtPanmunjom.
second Bucher statement, unlikeone,onnection between thethe Pueblo and the war in Vietnam. allegedly stated that the Pueblo'sNorth Korea was in preparation forwar of aggression in Asia" and added that"regards Korea and Vietnam as two fronts"war.
-9-
No Foreiuar-TJtssem
Sr^RET isitive No Fq/eign Dissem
ie interesting to note thatstatement, issued after Pyongyang hadtime to reflect upon the publicit wished to adopt,onnection Whatever the degree of premeditationin the capture of the Pueblo, Pyongyangsees its seizure of our shipay
to support Hanoi by placing diversionary pressure on the US. North Korean propaganda in recent months has been increasingly concerned with linking "US imperialism" in Vietnam and South Korea. it would appear, new sees its possession of the. Pueblo and its crewolden opportunity to intensify this propagandafactor militating against an early release of the crew.
indication that Pyongyangto retain the Pueblo and its crew foras feasible is Commander Bucher'she and his crew "should be punished inwith the criminal law" of North Korea. ANodong Sinmun likewise stated thatthe crew were "criminals" who must "beby law" and receive "due punishment." quite possible, however, that the crew will
No
not be brought to trial. The first Bucherconcludeslea for leniency. In the second statement he is allowed tolea for the crew's release. Pyongyang has left open the option ofthe crew at any time.
the last incident involving thecapture of US military personnel, twopilots downed in North Korea ineleased untilear of negotiation During this time Pyongyang ignoredof nonmilitary pressures and attemptedcharges of espionage and "criminal intent"fliers. They were, in fact, successful inan apology from the US.
e
Bucher's statements indicateNorth Koreans would prefer to handleimilar manner. It seems clear thathave no intention of simply releasing
the Pueblo and its crew upon demand. esire to drag out the incident and inflict the maximum amount of pressure andupon the US, they seem intent ontrong propaganda case against the crew, aspunishable by North Korean law. Although
o Foreiajr D
'Sensitive
SECRET
Sensitive
Pyongyang has carefully and obviously provided for an eventual release of the crew, its propaganda statements indicate that North Korea will press for at least an implicit US admission of guilt before taking such action.
No Foreignf Dissem SensjrtiveT
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: