COMMENTS ON DRAFT CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE OF NORTH KOREA

Created: 2/19/1968

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

MEMORANDUM FOR: William C. Truehcart INR/ODC

Department of State

Comnents on Draft Contingency Plan

for Airborne Reconnaissance of North Korea

Ke have examined the Draft Contingency Plan attached to your memorandum of The following comments ropreaent the coordinated views of the responsible components of this Directorate.

Wc believe the initial assumptionthat increased airborne reconnaissance over Worth Korea will put pressure on Pyongyang to release the Pueblo and its crewis at least dubious.

A veiled threat of "US preparations for further military actions of an indeterminate nature" a3 represented by photo reconnaissance aircraft is unlikely to be viewed seriously by the tforth Koreans. At the least, it would have to be backed up by tangible evidence in the fore of highly visible air and naval preparations that would suggest the seriousness of the US purpose. This has already been attempted in some degree and was not productive. Since then, the US has reduced this more tangible threat by falling back from some of its more northern positions in the Sea of Japan.

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Theust be aware that the present US cojccStHcnt in the Tar "ast has placed strains on the us military structure and has reduced available military reserves. .The North Koreans probably calculate that the US would be extremely reluctant to engage in any (Military action that would rick the ectabliohncnt of another area of conflict. .

Moreover, even assuming that airborne roconnaiseance wouldressure or throat, however nininar, thore would bo at least an even chance that the North Koreans would react by beconing even acre obtiurate on tho Pueblo issue. What wc know of tho Mirth Korean mentalityronounced tendency toward incrsascd obstinacy and belligerency in the face of pressures, even in their dealings with their Coraaunist neighbors, the Soviet Union and China.

It seeiss unlikely that the South Koreans, if thoy were to be informed and possibly toin the planning, would take much reassurance fro= the project, ine South Koreans appear rtorc interested in guarantees frcis the US and in tnking sowe fore of active retalictior. against the North. Cutting thea: in on the project would accomplish

Tho other optionstactical recce,and peripheral reconnaissancere even loss ucsirablc tactics than airborne reconnaissance. Ml would be ineffectual. Tho first ttfO run tha riok

significant conflict, am- the third is probably

not vorth doing. The net intelligence take woulii

IMMMh b0 low ln cocapuriaon with tbat routinely collected

poripheral flights

10. would of course welcome any int-illt^-oncarth Korean uilitary forces, capabilities, and reactions that photo reconnaissance coulo provide. We do not believe, however, that its value at this Juncture would outweigh the considerations above.

E. J. Gatt&

R. J. SMITH Deputy Director for Intcllioenco

Distribution:

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Original document.

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