Secrer
CIA.
im
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCV Directorate of Intelligence Office of Strategic Research
TO
MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS of
: THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM
ExpencUtute ImplicationsSoviet Space
SRebruary8
Copy No bs
Note
This contribution has been prepared in response to the Terms of Reference for the Memorandum to Holders of: The Soviet Space Program.
For costing purposes, the schedules and target dates for projected space programs had to bo made more explicit than those contained either in the National Estimate or in the contribution to this Memorandum to Holders prepared by the Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAICJ oi tho USI3. For thia roa3on data on futuro coots of the Soviet space effort, in particular, should be considered tentative and subject to revision as new information becomes available on the progress of individual Soviet programs.
Tlie judgments contained in this contribution represent the current views of the Office of Strategic Research and have not been coordinated with other Offices of CIA.
Content*
Page
Summary
X. Civil Space Program
II. Military space Program Costs
III. Support Costs
Appendix
Statistical Appendix . .
Illustrations
Figure 1. Expenditure Implications of Estimated Soviet Space . . .Pacing paga 1
Figure 2. Composition of Soviet Military and Civil Spacend . . .Facing page 3
Tables
Table 1 Expenditure Implications ofSpace Programs 10
Table 2 Estimated Total Program CostsSoviet MannedPrograms 11
Table 3 Expenditure Implications of Soviet
Military Space Programs by 12
EXPENDITURE IMPLICATIONS OF ESTIMATED SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS
A/llfON US S
sKCrnrT"
Expenditure Implications of Estimated Soviet Space Programs,
Summary
f
Estimated costs of tho Soviet space program* for the period9 do not differ significantly from the expenditure judgments in. Out calculations still show that the Soviet space effortit had been purchased in thuhave amounted to aboutillion3 and would hava grown to about SS billion The period of very rapid growth in outlays for space ended7 when the heavy investment in support facilities for major new Soviet launch systems reached its peak. (See
89 the Soviets will probably be able to achieve the space objoctives implied by currently estimated programs and still hold overall spending to about6quivalent of S5 billion5ear. After that, the total resources required for space could again increase if the USSR pursues programs designed toanned lunar landingarge apace station ineriod, while continuing the other individually less costly programs identified in the Estimate.
Costs of military spaceto include ortion of the manned space effort--will probably grow appreciably faster9 than civil program costs possibly reaching as much as
1 Direct information on actual Soviet expenditures for space is not available. The estimates reflect
the costs of known and estimated Soviet programs as
though they had been incurred in the United Slates.
The cost estimates are intended to convey anof the approximate site and composition of the Soviet space effort measured in financial terms.
i
COMPOSITION OF SOVIET MILITARY AND CIVIL SPACE EXPENDITURES'
OTAL SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM EXPENDITURES
SOVIET CIVIL SPACE PROGRAM EXPENDITURES
MILITARY SPACE PROGRAM EXPENDITURES
-
one-third of the total effort. (See The dominant share of costs attributed to military objectives is made up of manned space programs and applied satellites in the reconnaissance, navigation, and communications fields.
ubstantial effort for potential weapons development would be required if the USSR seeks to keep future options open for co-orbital antisatellite systems, penetration aids, and multiple orbit weapons systems. Costs specified in thisfor such purposes include only outlays for research and prototype design and development and do not imply deployment. If the Soviets do not view these as promising military systems and forgowork on them, the growth would be less than that shown in Figurelthough outlays for military space would still probably double in size from about SI billion8 to aboutillion
CrtE'l
I. Civil Space Program Costs"
The pattern of expenditures for civil programs shown insee the appendix) reflects the GMAIC judgment that the Soviets are "more likely" toanned lunar landinghan earlier. The cost implications for other civil programs are based on the judgments of.
Expenditures for almost all manned space flight programs in the Soviet space effort have experienced steady growth in the past few years. The estimated manned lunar landing program is, however, the single program most responsible for the high level and rapid growth of expenditures for civil space. Other civil programs include the now completed Vostok-Voskhod program, the Soyu2 developmentircumlunar project,mall spaceounds and three or so men). Aboutercent of total outlays for these programs7 were absorbed directly by the manned lunar landing undertaking.
Several cost alternatives for the manned lunar landing program are shown in Table 2. Total program costs for the manned lunar landing could varyillionillion depending upon theof alternatives, operational techniques employed, and the actual degree of adherence maintained with respect to the intended schedule and objectives. While the minimum cost program alternatives have the obvious advantage of economy, the hardwareassociated with the more expensive costwould greatly increase future Soviet manned space options beyond the lunar landing and for this reason might look attractive to the Soviets. The detailed cost estimates used in this contribution reflect the use of program alternative II as defined in Table 2.
* We have been requested by the Office of national Estimates to distinguish between costs of civil and military programs. The distinction used is the US institutional pattern of program funding. While this permits gross comparisons between US and Soviet data ao construotedy it probably is not the way the Soviets view their space costs.
The expenditure implications of future manned civil space programs contained in this contribution include those forunar basearge space0 poundsrew of. Neither of these programs is expected to be advanced enoughowever, to require sizable outlays. Program timing reflects the judgment of the Estimateunar base will follow the manned lunar landing by several years and that it is unlikely the Soviets will attempt toarge space station at the same time they are conducting their initial lunar landing mission.
If the program schedules for the large space station were to be accelerated, total expenditures ineriod could rise appreciably. Costs
for both the small and large space stations considered in this contribution have been divided equally between the civil and military accounts.
Space science and applications have accounted for aboutercent of total Soviet civil space program expenditures to date, but their relative share has been declining in recent years and this trend is expected to continue. Future emphasis probably will be focused on applied satellites in response to directives ofarty Congress
the Molniya communications and the Meteor meterological satellite systems are nearlyubstantial amount of additional funds could be spent for an advanced satellite broadcasting system, particularly if the Soviets wore to use this technique to further their international propaganda effort. Heavy Soviet participation in international-regional communication systems beyond that currently anticipated could also require large amounts of money in addition to the outlays covered by this contribution.
II. Military Space Program Costs
Little is actually known of the institutional framework within which the Soviet space program is operated, but the effort appears to be handledthe institutional distinction between civil and military programs that exists in tho United States. The cost series most affected by tho distinction
between civil and military programs is in the program for manned space stations. Because of the uncertainty concerning Soviet intentions for the use of such stations, their costs are now arbitrarily divided equally between the civil and military accounts.
About three-quarters of military space program expenditures7 have been invested in the satellite reconnaissance program in accordance with the high priority ascribed to this effort by the USSR. (See Expenditures for reconnaissance will probably continue at the current annual level ofalf billion dollars Moderately higher expenditures would result if the Soviets develop an advanced multisensor reconnaissance system in addition to the maneuverable system now included in the cost implications of the Estimate.
The rapid pace of US military technology may stimulate the USSR to pursue the development of weapons systems options in the space field. If development work is begun on offensive and defensive space weapons systems during the next five years, the more likely systems to be considered wouldultiple orbit bombardment systemn unmanned co-orbital antisatellite interceptor, and an orbiting penetration aid system. Development and design costs might reach as muchalf billionearf all these programs are pursued concurrently with the aim of providing deployment options durinc theeriod.
III. Support Costs
Support costs are those expenditures associated with the Soviet space effort which cannot be assigned uniquely to specific programs. While all clearly identified civil and military space projects are carried as expenditures under the appropriate budgetignificant amount of Soviet space activity does not fall neatly into this accounting structure.
Activities whichommon service-tracking and data acquisition, launch and other test facilities, basic supporting research, and administration, for example--are considered support program costs. Advanced research and launch vehicle development with either an undefined or potentially common purpose are also carried in the support account.
SfiCEET
Support expenditures declined7 in relation to total Soviet space costs and will continue to do so. This decline results from the decreasingfor launch vehicle development, the largest single item in the support category.
Most of the funds involved in developing anclass of large vehicles for space work probably had been spent by the end Although few vehicles have been flown, launch support facilities to accommodate Soviet space programsumber of years to come are believed to be nearing completion-No additional activity is foreseen in these support categories that is large enough toarked effect on future expenditure levels.
The three cost elements in the civil support category that are expected to increase in the future are advanced research, administration, and international projects. Research and administration are estimated to increase in direct proportion to total space costs. Funds allocated-by the Soviets for international projects also are expected to increase in the next few years. Although only limited expenditures have been made to date for this type of activity, current Soviet-French space negotiations mayrelude to much more activity in this area.
Military support expenditures remained relatively constant7 and are not expected to grow much more The only activity which might add much to spending here would be thedevelopmentew space booster family designed exclusively for military space applications.ooster program has not been included in the cost implications in this contribution.
statistical Appendix
The costing methodology that underlies the statistical data presented in this contribution is based on intelligence estimates and projections of Soviet space programs and employs appropriate US cost analogs and techniques to reflect the costs of the Soviet space program in dollars as if they had been incurred in the United States. The original construction costs of facilities and development costs of hardware used initially or primarily for military weapons purposes are not included in our expenditure estimates. The costs of constructing facilities for an exclusive space purpose and the costs of modifying, adapting, or utilizing other facilities and hardware -oftenost-sharing basis--are included, however.
Expenditure estimates for future space programs necessarilyroader range of uncertainty than expenditure estimates for past or current programs and should be viewed generally as reference levels impliedarticular set of programs having specified characteristics. Also, the reliability of the expenditure estimates declines as the data become more detailed. For example, an estimated level of expenditures for any single year must be viewed with less confidence than the cumulative expenditurespan of years.
At the extremes, actual Soviet outlays for space could be considerably higher or lower than the single-valued series presented in this On the upper side, annual resourcefor space could reach the equivalent5 billion to S8 billion2 if the USSR concurrently pursues the full family of programs estimated in National Estimates to be within its technological grasp. If, on the other hand, the USSRuch more economy-minded and less-competitive program, the costs might be reduced to the equivalent of5 billion. This lower level would still permit pursuit of most civil programs at their present scheduling rates, although the large space station and lunar base programs probably would be delayed by
two to throo years. Developmentapability in advanced military systems, however, such as Sigint satellites, an independent military communications satellite system, MOBS, and penetration aid satellites might be delayed much longer.
The format of this year's contribution differs from that of last year in that the civil and military categories of expenditures are broken down into the subcategories of expenditures for programs and for support. The new breakdown allocates support to the civil and military accounts separately, includingon launch vehicle development, advanced research, tracking and data acquisition, construction, and administration. Previously, support expenditures were charged entirely to the civil spaco program.
Details on annual cost schedules for both program and support activities are shown inndtlternativo cost profiles for the manned lunar landing program aro presented in Tabic 2.
Table 1
Expenditure Implications of Soviet Civil Space Programs by Calendar Year, a/
4 5 6 8 9 0 1 2
Civi1 programs Of which: Manned Science and applications
Civil support Of which: Launchle
de/ Advanced research Tracking and
data acquisition Construction International
projects Adminis tration
Total
Civilercent of total space expenditures
US S
30
30
30
20
30
40
70
80
40
Data are rounded to the nearestillion and totals are independ b- Includes all launcher development costs for manned space stations-
Table 3
Expenditure Implications of Soviet Military Space Programs by Calendar Year, a/
Militarv programs Of which; Manned Applications Of which: Reconnaissance Weapons
i Military support
H Of which:
vehicle
Advanced research Tracking and
data acquisition Construction Administration
Total
Militaryercent of total space expenditures
3eforo
0 5
916
US
II fl
20
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: