REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US ACTIONS

Created: 1/28/1968

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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CIA/DIA/STATESUBJECT: Reactions to Certain US Actions

this oeEorar.duta ve consider scoe recentNorth Korean, Soviet and Chinese policy in connection vithcrisis and the possible reactions of these countriesUS courses of actloa.

I. DEVELOPMD'TS IN CCKMUNIST FOLICY

attack: on the Blue House in Seoul and thethe Pueblo axe tbe most flagrant and conspicuousof an aggressive policy of armed subversion againstdeveloped by Kim Il-Sung since the fall Thia policy

at the eventual reunification of Korea by revolutionary violence, and is designed to exploit the current US and RCK Involvement in Vietnam to this end.

the current crisis they have appareritlyaad probably Intend tothe affair inhands insofar as they can. The Influence of China in the

APPROVED FOR

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present circumstances Is cargical, and the influence of the

Soviets in Pyongyang, though greater than Peking's, is not decisive. The Soviets have considerable potential leverage, but they vould be unlikely to apply severe pressures on North Korea unless they thought hostilitiesontinuing and extended scale were

beccclng likely. They would be relucts tohe reccv.ry

of their influence vith the Asian Ccesunistoal they have been seeking for several years, unless they believedajor dauigor to their own security was developing.

k. In the last week, the North Koreans haveonsistently hard and unyielding public position. However, there ia, io private statements through the Neutral Nation* Supervisory Cccaission, some suggestionillingness to bargain for the release of the Pueblo's crew. We judge that the North Koreans wish to avoid cilitary retaliationossible resumption of hostilities in Korea. Their primary concern is to manipulate the crisis so as to discredit the US and ccoplicate US-ROK rslatlons.

5. The USSR and China probably approve these icnediate North Korean ains, though they may have concern over Pyongyang's tactical handling of tha crisis. They may even be concerned

rolonged crisis or possible hostilities in Korea would adversely effect Ccoiunist prospects in Vietnara byeneral hardening of US policy in Asia. Both the Soviets and Chinese have thus far refrained from involving themselves directly. The Chinese, after remaining virtually silent for several days, have offered only pro forma support, mainly because of their severely strained relations vith Kim Il-Sung, and perhaps because of their own confused internal situation. In public the Soviets haveeneral support for Pyongyang, but without adding to the tensions. They did pass s. US message to Pyongyang and through calculated leaks they have endeavored to hint at the possibility that the Pueblo Incident could be settled peacefully if the US made some concessions.

HROUGHENIED IN THEIR ENTIRETY UNDER EXECUTIVE,

(DocumentIA/DIA/STATE MEMORANDUM DTDANUBJECT: REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US ACTIONS

Original document.

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