CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYanuary8
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Confrontation in Korea
The Pueblo incident and the violentby the North Koreans at Seoul haveonfrontation which now engages the interests of several parties, not only those of the US and North Korea. The attitudes and actions of the USSR, China, and the ROK, not to mention pressures and advice from others not so immediately involved, will complicate the further course of events.
We do not believe that we are dealingeries of coordinated actions among the Communist powers which were intended, well ahead of time, to produceonfrontation at this moment- It is true that all the Communist parties have an interest, because of Vietnam, in bringing diversionaryon the US. It is also true that the Communists may believe that the present military-politicalin Vietnam makes the US especially susceptible to such pressures.
we believe, however, that the present strained relations between the North Koreans and the Chinese rule out any serious collaboration between them. Nor do we believe that the Soviets had ;direct part ineither of the North Korean actions. 'Theevidence on this point (Thompson's conversation with Kuznetsov) does not indicate any more than that the Soviet leaders expected Thompson's visit and prepared for it shortly beforehand. Moreover, the Soviets would wish, because of the magnitude of the risks potentially to have exclusive control of the course of events; almost certainly they would not expect to
have this degree of control over the North Koreans.
North Koreans, of course, clearlya pattern of aggressive actionsROK inspired, at least in part,esire cn
No ForedTgn Dissem
issem
exploit Seoul's involvement in Vietnam and to support Hanoi with diversionary pressures on the US. Probably the incursion at Seoul was conceived deliberatelyove of this kind, and as oneew and higher level of overt violence and risk which was thought to be justified by tho present situation in Vietnam. This would not mean, however, that the Pueblo incident was part of any prepared scenario.
may be the whole truth of the the present confrontation, however, from this point
ail the Communist parties will wish to handle the affair inanner as to inflict the maximum feasible damage on the US position, particularly with reference to Vietnam. This would mean to compel some diversion of effort, but more especially to increase pressures on the US Government, at home and abroad; the effect they would hope, would be to make it mors difficult for the us to sustain its present course in Vietnam. In attempting to maximize such pressures, however, account will be taken of risks; none of the Communist parties, we believe, would want the new focus of tension in Korea to develop into actual hostilities.
Moscow will now be making its advice heard in Pyongyang. We believe that this advice will be to milk the situation for all the embarrassment andit is possible to inflict on the US, but to av^id further provocative action which might lead to US retaliatory measures. Probably Moscow will' advise the Koreans to talk but to stonewall as long as feasible at the MAC table. The Soviets will' also probablythe Koreans to be prepared for the eventualof the Pueblo crew. At this stage,ourse would probably suit the Northook. Should they be disposed tooree re lit course, however, we cannot be sure that the Soviets would be able to control all their moves.
what we know of the present relationsChina and North Korea suggests that Peking has for less influence in Pyongyang than Moscow doef. Indeed, the Chinese may not be consulted by the North
No ForeioX BTsserr
Koreans. To the extent tlie Chinese do offer advice it will probably be ambiguous; they will be concerned primarily not to be less venturesome than the Soviets. We do not believe, however, that the Chinese would urge Pyongyang to any course of undue risk. Thisderives from what we believe to be China'stoward the Vietnam war as well as from its internal situation.
estimating the risks inherent in thethe Communist side will be conscious thatwith- or without US concurrence, has thetake actions, which could balloon the crisis out This consideration will probably argue formeasure of caution in further handling of
the
sum, we believe that at the presentCommunist side will be in essential accordfurther moves should aim at forcing the USacceptance of the North Korean affront The Communist parties will probablythat they should prolong the standoff forat least until they become convinced that the US
will resort to major retaliatoryir strikes against North Korean naval targets. If in their view the danger of an uncontrollable clash becomes too great, they will probably take some partial step toward settling the Pueblo incident. The North Koreans may reach this view fairly quickly. Obviously the calculations on the Communist side will be close ones and easily subject to error.
I
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: