V
Subversive Activities in Latin
H H
Report
LY REVIEW
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3 SCSA
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ID.
CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN LATINI96S
The essence of the Castro regime's policy on armod rebellion in the hemisphere was established in the early months of thexistence and has not materially changed sine* then. Tha record shows that "export of theasomnant ambition of Castro's next to maintaining his cwn firm grip on power at home. Indeed, the Cuban loadercompulsivean who sees hir.self as another Sison Bolivar, destined toew *freedon and unity" to Latin America.
Castro has been consistent in this dream, although he has pursued it with varying degrees of intensity Moreover, he has shown himself capable of modulating his overt and covert support for revolution in Latin America,on his assessment of the factors governing the situation. The evidence is overwhelming that Cuba made special adventuristic efforts7 to establish "other Cubes and Vietnam" in Latin Africa.
Castro has been singularly unsuccessful, in achieving any real breakthroughs in the hemisphere. Despito nine years of effort, no guerrilla group in Latin Americaerious threat to any government today. The demise of the Guevara-led venture in Bolivia proves that even when Cuba puis its "first team" into a it will be doomed to failure in the absence of real popular support for the guerrilla cause. On the other hand, while these harassment* are minor and containable, they pose expensiveto tho Latin American governments involved, and force them to tie up resources that are badly needed elsewhere.
Years
Cascro waged his revolution
73r.Cuban -novement. Ones he assumed power, however, it
became evident that he had set for himself the goal of Latin America from US
domination." The earliest
public manifestations of this revolutiondry mission were the
armed expeditions that set forth from Cuba to such Caribbeanas Panama, Maiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic during the first eight or nine months
In private statements during this period, Castro made it known that he looked upon his success in Cuba as merely the first stageontinent-wide effort. Venezue ian president Romulo Botancourt said that Castro came to Caracas incarcely three weeks afterpower--to enlistand financial backing for "the master plan against the gringos ."
Cas trc sounded the keynote for Cuban subversion onhen he said, "We promise to continue making Cuba thethat can convert theof the Andes into the Sierra ttaestra of the Americanhe following September, hehis ringing "firstofhichshewed that he looked upon the Cuban revolution aseneral Latin American political upheaval.
The Cuban subversive effort graduallyore carefully organized endeavor far differentthe first hastily organized and ill-conceived raids9 and , Cuban support began taking many fcrms, ranging from inspiration and training to such tangibles As financing and communications support as well as some military
assistance. Mechanisms for conducting subversive operations were established at home and abroad. Radio Havana's service wai inaugurated on Maynd has beamed an increasing stream ofto tho Anericas ever since.
During this period, the Cuban agency for foreignand subversion, the General Directorate of Intelligenceas established within the Ministry of Interior. The DGI benefitod from the advice of at least five Soviet intelligence experts from the very beginning. This organization sent over SI million in US currency to the Venezuelan insurgents alone
1nd0 to Marco Antonio Yon Sosa in Guatemala
From1 the Cuban regime stepped up the tempo of its foreign The most spectacularuring this period was the discoveryache of three tons of weaponsenezuelan beac;h in The weapons included light automatic rifles and submachine guns definitely identified as among those shipped to Cuba from Belgium9 There were also mortars, bazookas, re-coiliess rifles, and air-munition of 'JS manufacture. The motormall boat found near the cache site was oneseveral Cuba had earlier acquiredCanada.
Coitmunist documents seized by the Venezuelan authorities shortly after the discovery of the cache indicated that the equipment was intended for the paramilitary arm of the Venezuelan Communist Party for Plan Caracasaimed at disrupting theelections in December of that year*
During this period, Cuban-trained guerrillas also tried to initiate operations in southern Peru and in Argentina, Cuban agents in La Paz tried toBolivian groups to take up armed action against the Paz Estenssoro government. Finally, Cuban financial assistance was sent to Brazilian subversive elements seeking to establish guerrilla training camps inte of Goias, as well as to peasant leader Francisco Juliao and then-governor Leonel Brizola. After Cuban Foreign Minister Roa's son, Raul Roa Kouri, was appointed ambassador to Brazil ine servedhannel for Cuban funds and guidance to Brazilian subversives . At One point Roa described Brizola as
the Brazilian with the greatest revolutionary potential. Two Cuban couriers were on their way to Brazil with clandestine funds earmarked for Brizola and his Associates when President Goulart was overthrown in
In short, during this peak period of Cuban subversive efforts, Castro encouraged in an almost haphazardide variety of extremist groups in manyto begin the armed struggle.
Atatin Americans received either guer-rilla warfare training orindoctrination in
Disagreement with the USSR,4
astro'ssubversive efforts had brought him intowith Soviet leaders and into conflict with leaders of most of the principal orthodox Com-munist parties in Latin America. ecretin Havana inhe Soviets helped to workecret compromise agreement which called for support to insurgency efforts ew Latin American countries, but specified that in all cases the local Communist Party should determine whether violent ormeans were to be pursued.
esult of thisand setbacks in Venezuela, Panama, and Brazil3astro muted his revolutionary exhortations forear and narrowed his focus to threeuatemala, and Colombia--where bona fidebands were in the field and actively engagingsecurity forces.
The Cubans began chipping away at the edges of thewith the Soviets At the Tri-Continent Conference inastroore general
call for insurgency in latin cuban propaganda returned to the mere strident pitch noted the operationalhowever, in comparison with the earlier years, changed to the selected list of target guatemala, colombia, and bolivia, elsewhere, the cubans sought more general opportunities that would lend themselves to foreign.
current support mechanisms
even in those countries where there is no significant insurgency under way, the cubans have beenupport mechanism while they waituitable opportunity andassets. moreover, there is evidence that castro hasaman intelligence and commandoarm of thepromote and support armed clandestine penetrations inlatin american countries. cuba's fishing vessels areat the disposal of this unit, which was first identified following its involvementanding last may in venezuela.
the dgi, which manages all of cuba's espionage and subversive activities, was formed1eneralof cuba's internal security and foreign intelligence its director general is manuelas "redho has been closely
general directorate of intelligenct
ernes of the omcicn
n* aocumuk
r
*
i
lis.
associated with Raui Castro7 and has been working with Cuban foreign intelligence : >his leadership and the tutelage of several Soviet advisors, the DGi has been moldedighlyintelligence organization along classic Soviet lines.
The DGI is divided into three operational units. Theseepartment of "legaln "illegal-epartment of "national liberation," Theof legal centersoperations by handling its agents throughatin Acer-ica these exist only in Mexico and Jamaica. The illegalhandles agentspermanently in countries with which Cuba docs not have diplomatic relations. This is done directly from Havanaomplicated system of The national liberation department isthe largest in the DGI and is responsible forand directingactivity in Latinand other areas of the world. These three units are backed by various support elements.
The QGl'c methods of selecting, training, and foreign agentsigh degree of There are two basicof these agents: oneeep-cover
subsequently "run" by thewith collecting information as well as penetrating local governments. The second group is recruited and directed by the department ofliberation to guide and support revolutionary activities.
Guerrilla warfare training for the latter group is conducted in national units ranging in size from three Courses usually last three to six months, although in special cases they may last as longear. Training covers all aspect* of guerrilla warfare, including weaponsabotage. demolition, military tactics, corbatand means of countering anti-insurgent activities. AtCO Latin Americans are known to have gone to Cuba for such training
This number by no meansaximum figure for the guerrilla potential. Kany of these trainees, for instance, have in turn trained others when they returned to their hor.e Some, however, probably became die illusioned wi th the difficulties of initiating armed revolution, and left the field to -ore enthusiastic Castroites. Theternationa1 coopera-tion among these trai.nees appears to involve those whose countries are neighbors,
In the last year or so, Havana has demonstrated ancapability to correspond clandestinely with its agents abroad. This ability has not yet been translated into a
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REPORT
Feb 66
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more successfuleffort, at least partly because the Latin Americanhave become increasingly aware of the danger. Presumably for the same reason, there has been less evidence of Latintraveling to Cuba forand there have been fever and fewer reports of Cubanto fund Latin Americangroups.
Other support andmechanisms include Radio Havana, which today is beamingeek in Portuguese, Spanish, and even Creole, Qucchua. and Guarani to Latin America. it alsoopen code messages to Cuban intelligence agents . Cubaiterature distributionprovides the glossy magazine Cuba f the theoretical monthly Critical Though t, speeches by Cuban 'leaders in pamphlet form, and the economic review Panorama
inoamericana. Havana' spress service Prertsa Intina has stringers andthroughout the world, its employees function as an intelligence gathering andmechani sm. At the present tine, Cuba is also supporting several local Comrvunistandmost recent example being theradical left daiiy
In addition to theof this support tfochanism and the growth and improvement of its clandestine
service and propaganda machi ne, Cuba has been able to bring about limited international cooperation of national movements and parties in some areas. This has helped to create or strengthen infrastru teres upon which futureactivities may be built, by making it easier to channel funds, move agents and leaders, transmit communications, and obtain false documents.
Two groups providing such support to the Venezuelan oove-ments were uncovered in Colombiand one of the Colombian movements has chosen theborder region as its area of guerrilla operations. Thus it can support Venezuelans moving either way across the border, and its members are in position ta cross into Venezuela themselves, The Salvadoran Communist Party has provided Salvadoranto Guatemalans for travel to bloc countries, and alsosanctuary for Guatemalans and Hor.durans.
The Current Situation
As is evident, Castro'sin advocating andrevolution has not always been logical and realistic. He usually has been canny enough, however, to keep his risks low. The form and extent of his forts, vocal and material, have varied with changing circumstances but his essential theme continues. He insists that revolutionaryis necessary to bring about any meaningful change in Latin
America. Moreover, he claims that guerrilla units, when boldly led, can take to the field, sustain themselves there, and precipitate the conditions that will assure their eventual success.
*Che" Guevara's ill-fated efforts in Bolivia and Cuban in the insurgentin Venozuuia last year are excellent examples of Castro's theories in action. 7 and hisrecent asB"fulfill hts duty ofith throughout the world, clearly demonstrate histo spread his revolution.
Despite his declaration of4 that he would not support would-be insurgent groups which were not under the control of tho orthodox pro-MoscowCastro has continued to give moral, material, and support and training togroups. Furthermore, he it clear in speeches7 that he does not feel bound by the4 agreement and repeated his persistent thesis that violent revolution is necessary to bring about any meaningful political or social change.
Furthermore, on twohe flung accusations of cowardice -nd betrayal at the orthodox Coamunist parties inand Colombia, which do not give full support to dissident guerrillas. Ke appeared irked oviethad been trying to improve
relations and expand trade in Colombia and Venezuela. Hethat members of thethe Soviet Union--who deal with oligarchies in countries where insurgents are active are betraying the
His statements7 reflected his intense disillusion-nent with the urban based pro-Moscow Conmunist parties in Tnis same thenc wasby his theoreticalJules Regis Debray, who is now languishingolivian jail for his role in the insurgency there. hesis, which merely reflects Castro's andown thinking, is that Latin Americaynamic, rural-based guerrilla action in which the basic guerrilla group takes precedence over the urban-based party and, in fact, becomes the "authentic" party.
In his speech inastro keynoted these ideas by stating: "If, in any nation, those who call themselvesdo not know how to fulfill their duty, we will support those who--even though they do not call tnenselves Comiau.nllike real Communists in thegain, on astro referred to the Latin American parties by implication when he spoke of some parties being in the "rearguard" of thestruggle.
The Siqnificonee of LASO
The first Latin American Solidarity Organization conference
(LASO) closed on7ajor ideologicalon Cuban foreign policylueprint for solidarity with Latin American guerrillas by Castro. Although he made anto pay hc-age to pro-Soviet Communists by stating that "in some countries violentmay not be an immediate,utureo loft no doubt that Cuba views "armed struggle" as the only valid course to achievs "national e also indicated that Cuba wai prepared to advance this doctrine.
The conference and Castro's returnilirant foreignwidened still further the policy differences between Cuba and the pro-Soviet Coiraruniflt par-ties, and caused discontent among the Soviets themselves. This challenge to Soviec influence in the Latin American Conucunistand Castro's calculated af-front! to Moscow, however, have not prompted the Soviets toby econooic aid cutbacks. On the other hand, the Soviets will probably continue to give private encouragement to their friends in the Coraunlst world to persuade Castro to change his radical policies. They can also he expected to continue efforts to build diplomatic, commercial, and other contacts with Latin Ar<erica, despite Castro's
Current Targets
For the past year, therefore, Havana's effort has been to lay
a solid foundation for future revolutionary action, to attempt to unite feuding factions of the extreme left under one leadership to extol revolutionaries who are willing to take up the fight, of whether they are bona fide Communists, and in Venezuela and Bolivia actually to send in trained Cuban Army officers and central committee members toand lead insurgents.
In Bolivia, the Cubanseal effort to translate their revolutionary theories intoguerrilla action bynesto "Che" Guevara and other high Cuban officials to do.-tir.atc the guerrilla movement and toa continent-wide anrcdto start "other Vietnams."
The all but complete annihilation of the insurgents by the Bolivian Army, and the death of "Che" however, have severelythe myth of Cuban guerrilla invincibility and will probably dim the enthusiasm for the time being ofatin American revo lutionaries who have beenguerrilla activities.
In Venezuela, Cuban funds, training, propaganda support, and some advisers are going to two separate dissident groups. The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and Douglas Bravo's group. Last May, Venezuelan guer rillas, escorted by Cuban militar personnel, landed near the coasta village of Machurucuto. Fourinvolved in the landing were later captured by Venezuelan There are Indications
that other landings took place dur arid at least one impant landing occurred in6
Venezuelan guerrillas are now being hard pressed byforces. In August, their urban terrorist organization was paralyzed by the arrestunber of its leaders. There is also informationthat friction hasbetween tho Cuban andcmbers of thegroups, Tho Cubans are not satisfied with the revolutionary enthusiasm of their Venezuelan compatriots, and the Venezuelans resent the he Cubans are giving them--the same type o( friction that developed in Ho-
m
In Guatemala, where Cuba has been giving assistance and guidance to guerrilla andgroups for more than three years, recent army Operations against tho insurgents and the
ii of r:t have played havoc with
ctivities . Thoowever, are regrouping and are still capable of harassing the Terrorist attacks On Guatemalan officialslearly demonstrate the rebels' tormenting capabilities. Two us officials were also killed during these attacks.
Havana radio quicklythe shooting incident and indicated that "Che" Guevara's death was instrumental in uniting the Guatemalan guerrillas. In view oi" the often reoeatcd Cuban
from
offer to help active guerrilla groups, the Guatemalan rebels can probably count on more training and financial assistance Havana.
In Colombia, there wasand intensified guerrilla activity during The Cubans are giving assistance andto several groups, some of which are remnants of bandit gangs that have operated in the country for years.
The group which has received by far the most Cuban aid is the Army of National Liberation (six)-Some of its members were recently arrested while trying to slip back into the country carrying small arms, ammunition, and radio- They reportedly told Colombian intelligence officers that theyumber of other Colombians had justuerrilla warfare course in Cuba and that the weapons had been given to them there. The ILN stepped up its activity with at least two raids in January, the ambush slaying of three members of an army patrol. Follow-up action by the military resulted in the killing of five ELM guerrillas.
The pro-Soviet Communist Party fPCC) is reportedly trying to convert its guerrilla arm* the Revolutionary Armed Forces nto inactive "self-defense" groups Thisequest from the Soviet Union to avoid anythat might complicate its newlv established diplomatic
-SECRET
sgmiti .
with the Colombian It is probable that many FARC guerrillas, rather than lay down their arms, will join forces with the ELN or the newly forxed Popular Army of Liberation IEPL).
This new group hasitself in northwestern has carried out several isolated attacks and reportedly is making preparations for full-scale guerrilla warfare if the government carrier out its threat to xove into the area. This group is the guerrilla arm of the pro-Chinese Communist Party of Colombia, but may seekfrom the Cubans if no other source of aid develops* (See naps following text forof insurgent groups in Bolivia, Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia *)
Prosoects
Cuba has given ample notice that it intends to continue its propaganda, training, andsupport to selectedthose in Colombia, Guatemala, and Given Castro's goal of developing and exploitingfor further armedplus the vulnerabilities that exist in many Latin American countries* new outbreaks of Castro-sponsored rural-oriented violence in Latin America can be expected. Such ventures will have little chance of success, however, unless they exploit genuinely popular antigovernioent causes androad peasant baseharisua tic indigenous leader. Guevara's defeat in Bolivia shows that despite Cuba's mechanism for sponsoring guerrilla groups and Castro's willingness to infi1trate key Cuban Army officers intocountries, these efforts will at best produce only minor harassments of the centralfor the foreseeable The danger increases, in those countries where political and economichas been marginal, andhreatplit in the usual guarantors of, the military orrowing possibility. Should this occur, what had been ainor in the countryside could suddenly mushroom into aforce out of proportion to its numbers.
GUATEMALA: Area of Guerrilla Activity
av. JOYoi> Sasal FAR 2CO (Cotai Monies)
Original document.
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