SPECIAL '
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
. j
Communist Capabilifies and Intentions in Laos Over the Next
The lolhwlngtgonliaHom portkipoltxl Inrepofaf'on of 'hi*
CenHat InXJIIgaiva Agency end ihior.'ia*loni of theolinn, end tS.
Concurring:
Vke Adm. Huh* Toytor, the Depoty CXiedor, Ceofiul Intelligence
"iV.ttehti. th* Director ol IntelKgenc* ond Keteo/ch, DeportmentSt**
Li Ce* Joseph f. Cofroll. tf. Dttedor, Defense Intelligence Agency U. Gen. MorihoUorter, lh* Dbedor,y Agency
Abttoiningi
Dr. Chorfe* H. Rekhordt, lor Ihe AmHIoaI General Manoger, Atom'* Energy Com. mHiIon ond Mr. YVilSom O. Cregor, for the AeOifort Dwedor,'tou ol ln>titigotk>n,eing collide ol their futddlcnen.
WAWfNG
materiel cenfolftl tnfcvmotion^^kfiftg themeaningeIS,or revektnon ol which lo ony
of Ihe UobW, the Ironi-JneotSorbedtoNbMd.
COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN LAOS OVER THE NEXT YEAR
CONCLUSIONS
Ihe past year the Ctonununists have girattycombat forces In laos. The combined Fathetrmy (NVA) forces novr numberhey could overwhelm the regular and guerrilia forces oflaotian Government (RLC) in the coming dry season.do not think that theipand the size orronths from domestic sourceseoo'ain the Communists.
do not believe that the Communis intend to conductdrive to the McVoog, lestove provoke US entryIaMian corridor and perhaps upset any negotiations underwayVietnam. However, in the next few months, we expectto exert further military pressure on governmentguerrillain order to strengthen their.o'iikm. They now demand that US bombingreroquisile to discussions of an Internalmust be based on 'the realities of the current situation."
C Even if NVA resources were released from South Vietnam, we doubt that this would in Itself alter Hanoi's intentions In Laos, since the forces already there can launch an offensive without furtherThough developments in Vietnam could change Hanoi! calculations concerning laos, in general we believe that the Commu-nls's hope to achieve ihelr objectives without runnuig great risks of military co* in tc'action.
DISCUSSION
Hanoi ha* ambitions lo cont'd all of Laos, but has been unwilling to talc actions there which would Jeopardize higher reSwity goals in South Vietnam. In paiiKultir, Hanoi has limited Ihe scope of its military action* in Lao, in pait, at least, out of concciu foruge-Kale US grouncJ action against the vital supply route* to South Vietnam which run through Laotian teiiltory.
Since2 Genoa settlement, the war in law ha* been charactfriicd by Royal Lao(RLC)during the lalny wax* (May to (Xlober) when the mobility of Pathet laond North Vletnameae Army (NVA) forces it restricted, and by Communist coontcioflensivcs during the dry Mason (November to April) lo relate lost areas, often just in rime to scire the ike harvest. Thus an uneasy equilibrium has been estabhsbed, with mili. taiy factors operating on ihe PLC and political factors on the Communists to restrain actions that mightajor reaction by the other ride.
a In the political ficM. both sides have continued to pay lip service lo2 Genoa Accords, which neutralised Laos, and until iccently to the Zurich and PUine des Janes Agreements, whkh ertahbehedtripartite government--rightists, neutralists, and the PL. This arrangement has persisted despite the fact (hat the PL vacated their cabinet seats Ineso are still kept open foe them by Souvanna, the neutralist Prime Minister. Until this July it seciiKd as though tlte PL objective, despite their denunciations of Souvanna. was the restoration of the tripartite arrangements.
I. RECENT OEVEIOPMENTS
everal recentowever, suggert that the Communists ate developew position. For the frit time, they haveombingpecific perquisite to discurnoni of an internal political settlementwhile still reaffinning2 fotccnaliooal agreements, t'vey havethat tbe Internal settlement must take into account "the reah'tiet of the current situation."
oviet spolesmen have tapblned thai "realities"ecognition of PL cootie" over large areas of Laos (they claim two-thirds of the territory and ooe-hjU then addition, they contend that the US and its "puppets" have destroyed ihe tripartite structure, that Souvanna noeutralist faction, and that tho present gov. emmenl is, in ctfret. illegal. Apparently. Ihe PL are laying the ground work toarger toteew govenunent. and may demand that the neutralists aligned with them in the so-called "National United Bloc" occupy the positions now held by Souvanna's neutralist faction.
Wlille thus signaling their intention to reorder the old tripartite(lie Communists have reaffirmed their regard lor (he monarchypermanent feature" of Lao ivational hfc. Indeed, tho whole point of the lather odd visit of the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Julyour year absence seemed to be toramatic distinction between the King and the present lao government, and this lino has been supported by the new Soviet Ambassador and the Neo lao llak Xat (NLIIX) spokesman In Vientiane. Ihe Communists have always paid deference to the King's position and may hope that the King's desire to preserve the kingdom andnited national community ran be played upon to their advantage.
The Communists are taking other steps to improve their political position. During the past rainy season, they have made more of an effort than ever before to consobcUte vontiol over their territory. After unsuccessful attempts to tcrroriie mountain people who have been aiustlnguetrillas in the north, the Communists are soiling to win th>*in over by cajolery. This is apparently partider effort to Improve their hold over the mountainous and sparsely populated reaches of Phongaiang Prabang, and Uoua I'hao (Sam Neua) Provinces, where they have been stepping up their propaganda and political in. doctri nation programs. Newly cor-sti iKted toads give Ihe Coininunisls access to hitherto isolated areas; In the south. PL troops have been busy trying totheir hold over the rkc-rkh Scdone Valley, where the governmentevekspiMnt program5 untilhere are recent reports that the PL civil aAninist/ation it being reinforced bypolitical cadre who have Just completed political training in North Vietnam. One report indicates that in Savannakhet Province North Vietnamese political cadre have fc-eenlo the Communist aujiiinbtiatiou lor the Cist tlnic.
By Ihe fallhe HIX" had made consideiable inroads on territory that tbe Communists held" The Communists finally responded by turning an KLC oflensive In the Nam Pic areaebacle for the government inwing Ihe rtnsaindfr of the dry season, the Comma-nbtscries of defeats to the PLC which added up to the wont goyenuncot setback since the precarious days1heimpact was considerable. Thereood deal of apprehension in Vientiane that the Communists would break out from the previous pattern of military action and push on to the Mekong.
But this did not happen, and peshaps the most notable feature of the lainy season now drawinglose was the lack of significant new moves by cither side. The Communists did not press their advantage, but devoted them* servesore intensive potslk-al consolidation of their territory thanPLCho for their pari, usually regain considerable terrain in the lainy season, had only some limited successes in the northeast and in the
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ami ui'IIffot<*v AikI in tl*-ir ntnil viati-
n iKijheI<*a tHtltinfni onrnnk- ufeatmn in Noulh Vietnam BwAT intoIn thoil.liongtln ;- while at Ihe unw tinwthey are preparing il ihein Vietnam wairanti. to moveore active politii jI phwOS
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L and FAR Hoops aie probably about evenly matched in tenia of bV generalof individual tioopi or ball ikons, and man for man the Mco guerrillas are probably belief Bglilcr* thanVAre definitely bcltei than the FAR. and the piychologicaln die lalicr whin attacked by the NVA is often Mifficunl to precipitate iter defeat. Ihiiite inlcfiinilv o^ivn. by
i dye largely lo ikyhit nil support with fllfctive ukftrirmlly guerrilla fotm.
I) for local yea'*.and nln HIIrndcis.he mih lary.l thattm the pri-wim- of NVA bourn. Itl.fiitMild ptoluhlv ijiihMv'l. lliiial In nm view,o fiptuimth. AlllKmgliUftl*reuiil Nteinglh*lh MuW. Hm.il
tiMuIn tmW, m* do ihiI Inline (ImI iImi imnMiHal advantage would bin vkw ol Hu- many wealm-vw'. sewi diiiviom dial will continue loAH effeerivenevtrnenit it ttmirontv We do believe.Oarklmbte amount ol NVA iBpeotl lo mountmajor attack, end (ha) illil.MmM alimnl itrtainly (Onliin ihcnv VVe alto believe thai inn the Meo gurmlht could jut considerable fxetiuic onI. fiul HLC Inters could piul>al>ly not reduce PL form l'id tcilitolyel all lhout subtUniU) outside logbtkal and airl
e continueli. howevef a* we did in MannInit the combined PL/NVA foicei now in Lao* have ihe military capability to ieduce the RLG area ol controlew eexlavcs in fairly thnrl order They coukl do to without diveiting resource* liom South Vietnam or diawing iigni¢ rriiilorecnvnts limn the Ntnlh And wr do not think ttiBtlorori tvuMr capability tuffkiemlyr II tnontht dom domett ic mwiocs alone lo contain the Communitts.
Ill COMMUNIST INTENTIONS
here are icvcrat option! opene Communists over the Mat lU months or so. There are various inshValiont ol propaiaNcert lo resume military activity at the diy season corn nh nee t. and it It pottible thai the Communistt have decided to eaeicite ttieir military lupfrb&iity and rjiikkly OtcnuD WOllnt. ihey might think this would be an cOextivc meant of putting the US under new piessnres loenera) teltleiiirril in Indochina- We believe thit ii unlikely Ihe CraniUuniMt would necessarily (eel tout ioVr able oncer-Umty overes in Ihe Laotian corridor, especiallyime of changeover In Annikan administrations. And. at long at the outcome Inam it in doubt and under wine sort of negotiation, we be bete that Hanoi would not run needless military ritlt in laos before the chanceseweal settlement there hid been letted
1ft Wr do eapett. however, that Communitt foecet will keep up luhttanbal militaiy pressure on: forcer, in the eoming dry season. In the northeast, where Central Vang I'ao's Meo guemllat hate longhorn in their tide, paitkularly in Houa linn andhouang Piovioces, they will prob-ablyonsiderable effort toumber of guerrilla jitei and ton-volxfale their cinn "fhey willalso liy to clear the guerrilla outpotlithe boedi'i of wmIIm astern Khnntiitotunr Province with North Vietnam."ell at in the noithurM Piuvinco iffnd Luang Prahang. In ii- south, the* will maintain ihr lhri-.it lu ihr Mtkteig from Thakhei> imp.its.il PiiivIimt,ill altenvpl to ditrupl US iiMintrced aMl <md*in ul (iro^iantt And til courvr.ill prui.vi their vital innltralliui and sulkily lontat lo South Vi.lnim tn the Laotian eieridor.
We anticipate more ilirect political pressure* on Vientiane and the King, which these military moves wilt serve to reinforce. At some point, depending again on developments in South Vietnam, the Communists might oBer to openroviding the bombing In laos ended. In any case, Hanoi would believe it* militaryould Improve the chances for eventualon better term*.
ajor change in the situation in Vietnam could aScct Hanoi'sHut we do not believe that the release of NVA assets fiorn South Vietnam would, in and of itself,ecisive factor In changing llanoa's policy in Laos. In the eventietnam settlement favorable to them, the Noith Vietnamese would anticipate that political pressures wouH cause Laos to fall into their hands fairly soon. They would therefore see no need for ambitious moves in Laos that migtrf risk upsetting any agreements reached on South Vietnam, particularly respecting US military withdrawals. Should the Settlement be unfavorable to tbe Communists, we believe that military cautions would appear even more desirable to them.
Eventually, if the Communists cannot achieve what they want in Laosomb (nation of pressures, they may resortigorous mibtaryBut for now. they appeal to be moving slowly, calculating that theIn Vietnam will be suchew settlement in laos can be reached which would provide them an improved power ration, from which they couM ultimately lake control
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Original document.
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