DD/S&T NOTES ON OXCART PROGRAM RELATIVE TO EXCOM TO BE HELD 23 APRIL 1968

Created: 4/17/1968

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

78

BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL, INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: DD/SKcT Notes on OXCART Program Relative to EXCOM to bo Held8

This briefing note suggests action on the part of the DCI; this action is contained in paragraph 6.

Tho roview of2 program status and phase-out plans

for the OXCART program is due to take place on Tuesday,cheduled Executive Committee meeting.

Director, National Reconnaissance Office, hason the above subjocteel you should havebenefit of our thoughts on Dr. Flax's paper, as well assuggestions and recommendations on the subject.

RO has suggested four options ae follows:

Option 1. Transfer OXCART vehicles to SAC. Option 2. Transfer OXCART to SAC and store eights. Option 3. Move the OXCART aircraft to Beale AFB and retain operational control and management in CIA.

Option 4. Maintain the OXCART fleet

APPROVED FOB RELEASE

DATE: AUG

BOB SSCftST

s

5. You may wiah toilth option not noted by Dr. Flax which would be to reduce theleet by eight aircraft and with OXCART status quo. Since it appears that from an NRO standpoint it isational budgetary problem at issue, the need for the totalircraft) now in inventory should be reviewed in light of the relative savings,is, the intelligence gathering potential under all combinations and circumstances. This fifth option would be comparable and compatible with all of the optionshroughoted above. The arrangement under option five would continue to provide higher authorityual (civilian or military) option in the future, depending onand could accomplish significant savings possibly even over and above that amount noted In other options. 6. RECOMMENDATION:

That you maintain your position as you stated earlier that the OXCART fleet, as presently under control and management of CIA, be maintained

without further reduction over

and above that already effected.

NOTE: Comments on the budgetary considerations as presented in

D/NRO's memo are attached for your information.

OXCART THg SFiPBFiT

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OXCART

ATTACHMENT

SUBJECT: Coat Review of Memorandum from the Director of NRO to the Deputy Director of Defense,8

did not participate in development of the cost figures cited inRO paper, nor do we have access to the details formulating the gross totals for fiscal9 and fiscal We are, therefore, unable to attest to their validity; however, based on the figures providedRO's paper, some of the cost figures for the various options appear unsoundomparative basis and in such cases, we have presented our opinions.

Fiscal year OXCART aircraft support costs quoted for the various options are:

9

illion

PTION 4

0

illion

Since the costs quoted for the four options for fiscal9 differ markedly from those quoted for fiscalt is concluded that the coats quoted for optionsre based on curtailment of OXCART operationsortion of fiscal This fails to recognize that

OXCART ,

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OXCART

ATTACHMENT Pago 2

the program cannot be turned off and rapidly regenerated, and that support must be continued at very nearly its present level if extension of the operation of the vehicle is contemplated. Procurement of spare parts must not bo interrupted; aircraft engine and sensor overhauls, and ovorhaul and repair of spares must be continued. People involved in all engineering and maintenance activities must be retained or theirwill be lost. Electronic warfare systems development must also be initiated. Vehicle support costs for fiscal9 must be at least as high for the first three options as for option 4.

3. roposes that2 fleet be transferred to SAC at Beale AFB,ike number ofs be stored, and that OXCART vehicle support will thenillion ineduced8 million in9illion in0 through storage of thes. This comparesillion quoted for optionxperience has proved that operationixed fleet is much less efficient and more costly than operationleet of one type of aircraft. Under this arrangement, the Air Force would be confronted with all of the problems associated with acceptanceew and unfamiliar aircraft and would gain no advantages. The only basis for acceptance of tills option would be a

OXCART

policy decision that the total fleets andhould not exceed the number ofs now in the inventory. If this determination were made, there are only two reasonable alternatives: store all ofs and let tho Air Forco operate only one type of aircraft; or store eightet the Air Force operate the remainder ofs at Beale, and continues under CIA management

If

the.illion saving in9 andillion saving in0 for storinga are valid, the savings would accrue

whether or nota were moved

The narrative of the memorandum recognizes that whatever option is selected, the system of contractor maintenance which ia now followed by the Agency will have to be followed for an indefinite period in the future. It is unreasonable to suppose0 million dollar

4. roposes that the OXCART Program remain under CIA control but that it be relocated at Beale Air Force Base. For tho purpose of comparison,tates that vehicle support wouldillion dollars in9 if the entire program were moved to Beale AFB under CIA management, whereastates that vehicle support wouldillion at

OXCART

facility

could be abandoned, that other comparable facilities could be constructed at Beale AFB, mat hundreds of people could be transferred from one post to another, that this could be accomplished between October and December, and that it could bo done at less cost than staying at the original

either case,

5. This leavesor consideration. ndicates that FYosts for Air Force operation willillion dollars, as comparedillion dollars indicated inor CIA support of the same vehicles under the same conceptj^

we feel it is irrational that the entire program complete with support

equipment, buildings, housing, and people can move

Beale AFB, operate under the same maintenance concept and still do the job for half the price.

6. There is no indication in the memorandum that any advantage other than dollar saving will accrue to the Government through changingor location of the OXCART Program. The cost figures quoted are very questionable. It is our conviction that purely operational costs would be substantially the same at one base as at another, and that moving the project and constructing new facilities would result in greater immediate and long-range costs rather than savings.

TOP GfiCRgT .

OXCART

7. There are obvious advantages in the retention of the covert civilian capability and for maintaining the integrity of the OXCART Program. The present organization which is, inoint CIA/Air Force organization and program, is unique. If the capability for the design production of this very advanced aircraft for the development of all special features,ighly sophisticated photographic system, is to be preserved, then the choice of any other option other thanr anreduceleet by eight or more aircraft and leave OXCART status quo) would probably erode this organization and program and type of competence that has resulted in the production of the OXCART system.

OXCART TOP liTf WFT

Original document.

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