CBttTRAL IMTKLLIOEMCE AOEHCY-
APPROVKD FOB *
SUBJECT; MTMOKWrciM TO UOLuEIS OF THE BOYIET AND KAW EUHOPEAH GEhTiluM. PUKrOSE POIIOEG
I. xpresses uncertainty ixsaraina tha actual oqulxoont holdinEa of Soviet lluo dlvislono, cd follows (parogrnpb ih):
Hitherto we have estimated thot all dlvlnions Innd IIull act of eoulpacnt on hand or iained lately available. It nov appears that this nay not be true of cany divisions In tho USSR, but ve are as yet unable to Oetcrnino with confidence the actual extent of tho shortages that noy oxiat.
S. An intensivehas been undertaken toreBOlve thia uncertainty ond, eventually, to reasceos tho combat and reinforce, meat capabUltlea of Sovlot (wound forcea. Thia efcudy Is far
cto but our findings to date with regard to the actual
xcludedutomatic downgrading and dcclsfoification
ho)dlog3 of major itens of equlittont by Soviet line flivleiona In East Germany ond In tho Belorusalan, Carpathian, ond Kiev Milltery Dle^rlctala the USSR require tho issuanceamorandua to Koldorg of NIE
3. Uo toko occasion to locludo. In. below, on updating of tho discussion of Soviet theater air defoooo ink$ of NIEnd, oC oew attack subnarluos in
-lhe Zqulrseot of Soviet lice Divisions*
k> Ho hove vory gocd. evldcnco rctfordlng the najor itona ofhold by two dlvlelona In tho Group of Sovlot Forces, Germanyotorlsed rifle divlolon, theank
Con* Hoaloy C, franklin, tha Acting assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, reportcent of the Aray, bolloveo tbe l/ cethodology utilized in the study has provided uaoful additional cata. Howover, in hie opinion, tho flndlnga amst bo regarded only oa tontotlvo Indications of vhet najor equiptrontacurrently bo held by Sovlot divisions ond nay creato on erroneous inprofloion that tho copobllltlOB or lloo dlvlsionB havo been re-iuiced, Blnoe tho lutolllQonce coniounlty cannot state witholnty the subordination and location of oil divisional elotronts, unit holdings for any given division in tho USSRur considered in this snalycls nay be coiiewhat larger than Indlcatod. Gen. "ranklln bollovea the cotbodology employed In this analysisjudgwntB ond acevaptlons which tend to ololalre tbe thef divisional holdings and should not be usede only basis for judging roodincss of any given division. Eo 'bollovea that as wore is known about the' divisional equipment and vho tany as yet unsubordinated units located outside knownareas, the nunber of divisions which tba Kaicoraudum to Holders haa do&ignatad as coitbat ready, willlhereaso, Kb also sntlclpatos that tbe total aunjber of Sovlot divisions throughoutK will rise during the conduct of thin analysis.
division. Our analysis indicates that tne cot exited rifle dl vie Icq hasaj or lteos of equipment, the tank division about EjEOO. 'Ibe provision of major Itorcs of equipment thus Indicated lo gotopercent lover than ve previously bcltovcd.. Tho nuulber ofand nrtlUory pleatsj houovor, remilua voeoxtlaUy tbo corje, Tho dtffcronce llos principally In tho nucher of wheeled vohlclao nnd major Items of support equipment orgonlo to tho division* Thle difference would not affect either tbonitial RobUlty of theeo divisions.
Wo hove not examined tho otherSovlot dlvlslooo In Ccrxany and Poland sufficiently to be ublo to cccparo thenso two divisions, but wc bolicvo this particular motorized Vltll division to bo typical of theoviet motorized rifle uivioiona In Germany, nod thlo particular tank division to be typical of the IS Sovlot tank divisions in Germany and Poland.
He have no doubt that the Sovleio consider oil of thoir UM divisions In Germany ond Polaod to beull etoteadtueao for Immediate operotions." Wo toko the two divisions cited to reflect the Soviet conception of what is required to ouallfy as "ready for immediate oporatlous" ond have ured their Indicated holdings of major ltoco of equipment as the criterion
by which to Judge tha roadlnoso of thother Sovlot line divisions that wo have oxansioed to date.*
o tho boslo of this criterion und good ovldocco, wo con-dude that nine divisions lo tho Boloruasicn and Carpathiat iDu ahould bo Judged to beull ctoto of readiness for itsodiateivo are notorized rlflo dlvlclons, four of tfceaordon oloso to tbo western frontier of tho USSR, Four are tank divisions bolonglnaook crny located not for veot of Xlov.
a Judge that tho otherivisions ia the Belorussloa, and Klov KOsotorlxed rlflo divisions and lb. tank divisions) fall ohort of the QSFO orltcrion in tholr holdings of la&Jor iteua of equipment. Io most cases, their oo.ulpnent amountsoroont of that standard.
9t We Bust stress that our study to date has boon dlroctod solely towardtho quantities of aajor items of ooulp-went actually bold by Soviet lino divisions. We find theto to bo
lover than wo had previously supposed in the case of "combat ready"
*f the lino divisions in the Biatio KD and tha fiveivisions lo the Moscow M) are also relevant to theproblm, but we hove not yot aamalaad then sufficiently -toheo In tots analysis.
divisions, and each lover in the com of Other lino divisions. This roductloa In our eoti&ato of tho amount of eouipsent hold by tboso divisions would imply ecuo reduction in our estimate of thoir censing, but we have not as yot studied tho directr.rdin'j manning and are as yet unready to present an estimate oa that subjoet.
10* We must note alao that we have not yot studied tho aray end front level supportingin the Soviet ground forces, end oonsaeuantly arc as yet unablo to reassess the Sovietfor caebathole. Molthor havo wo studied what would bo required toreduced strength" division up to ccobut stv-.agth, how that could bo accomplished, and consequently how quickly such divisions could be made ready "to proceed to areas ofhese matters will bo addressed In fiZE
Theater Air Defense
11. Since the publication of KGe have obtained flr^ avidenco of Sovlot efforts to strengthen theirrao particularly against Icw-altltudo attack. Thelectronic envlroncent has been improved. At most operational olrCields aircraft rovotnauto havo boon aonotruotod, dtcporced
aircraft parking pattarae employed, and antiaircraft artillery positions occupied. Tholssllo eystea hae boon deployedtactical alrfiolds inermany,nd Hungary. Wo now bays evidence that the4 Soviets bava begua deployment of both the mobiletUelle system ond tha radar-controlled,BO weopoa eyeten,with thalr field forces.
o now have firm evidence of the construction oftypes of torpedo attack aubmarlaos in addition tb tboof nuclear-pcuorcd attack submarine noted lathree of thesa now typos have streamlined
huUa end largo rounded bows euggeatins high epeod, lower noise levels, ctd Improved aonar capability. At ieost two of the thrco acw ty^Cw oro probably auoloar-powercd. Toeee two may bo capableece up toknots and operating depths oa tha orderoot. Ail three types will probably bo operational by mld-.Wo continue to beliave thatew attack cUb^arluoa will be la eorvtoeOriginal document.