MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS
RPPRDVIQ FOH RELEASE DATE-1
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of thit estimate.
The Control Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence organlrations of 'he Depart* menu of Stole ond Defense, aod the NSA,
Dr. Edward W. proctor, for me Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
Mr.enrwy,or the Director of IntoilKtortce and Research, Depart-mem of State
Vice Adm.owronce, for the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Lfc Gen. Marshall S. Carter, the Director, National Security Agency
Mr. Howard C. Brown, ihe Assistant Generol Maooger. Atomic Energyand Mr. Williom O. Oegar, for me Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their Jurisdiction.
NORTH KOREAN INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH KOREA, doled7
Events since last September (end to confirm the conclusions of, that North Korean activities willampaign of military harassment in the DM'/ area, continued attempt* toguerrilla teams, and the dispatch of terrorist and sabotage missions. The raid on the Blue House represents the most dramnlic and flagrant manifestation of the campaign begun in6 to disrupt political order in South Korea, to tie down large ROK forces, and to encourage insurgency in the South. North Korean handling of the Pueblo crisis reflects an intention to heighten tensions and exploit US preoccupations with Vietnam.song's recent speeches indicate he Is still determined toellicose posture.
These developments have hardened Seoul's attitude and increased the likelihoodajor ROK reaction to North Korean harassments. The North Koreans probably believe that the US will impose restraints on the ROK and will be reluctant to escalate its own responses in Korea. The North Koreans now probably see great and continuing opportunities to exacerbate relations between Seoul and Washington.
We continue to believe that Pyongyang realizes that anof incidents and attacks could escalate to the point of open warfare. We still estimate, however, that North Korea does not plan to invade South Korea and will not deliberately provoke hostilitiescale which would amountesumption of the war.
Nevertheless, the general situation in Korea is more dangerous than it was last fall, since the possibilities of miscalculation are greater. The North Korean attitude is more openly truculent than at any timehe raid against the Presidential residence indicates that the North Koreans are willing lo run high risks; they must have been aware that assassination of President Pak would haveajor ROK retaliation. They may be counting heavily on USwith Vietnam, and on the deterrent value of their own mutual defense treaties with China and the Soviet Union.
We believe that North Korea Is pursuing an independent policy. Pyongyang probably does not consult with Moscow and Peking on the tactical development of its policy against the ROK and the US. North Korea's relations with China are cool, and thus Peking'* influence is quite limited. In any event, we believe Peking does not want to be involvedew Korean War at this juncture. As for the USSR, recent events have probably forced it to pay somewhat more attention to developments in Korea. Wc believe that the USSR docs nolajor war in the area. In the eventrisis in Korea, the Soviets would probably be reluctant to apply immediate pressures onlest they jeopardize the position they have built up there. And in any caw their influence would not necessarily be decisive.we believe that if major hostilities seemed imminent the USSR would try to exert some restraint over North Korea.
Additional evidence since our last estimate suggests that North Korea will continue its efforts to establish guerrilla bases in the South. Bui we believe that their prospects for success in this endeavor remain poor.
We now believe that the North Korean Navy has at least four "W'-class subniarines, at least seven "KOMAR"-class guided missile boats ami associated Styx missiles, and twofast patrol boats. Eighteen surface-to-air missileites.f which are occupied, have been identified Otherwise, the general level of equipment and strength of the North Korean forces is as described inf.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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