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i-BJ MHRAK, Mandaiory Review
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No Foreign Dissem
President Mendez' sudden dismissal of three key military officers on8 has given the Guatemalanresident in fact as well as in name for the first time in five years. The President was apparently motivatedesire to end the bloody government-controlledthat had racked the country foronths.
With his new-found power, Mendez nay believe that he can begin to make much-needed socioeconomic reforms, but he willifficult time. Much of the military establishment has been alienated, and the wealthy conservative elements will watch his moves carefully. If they believe that Mendez is trying to curtail their power or is trying to change the status quo, they will not hestitate to take action against him.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by =he Office of Currentand coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Office of National Estimates, and the Clandestine Services.
Background
The growing penchant for drastic solutions by both the left (reformers and Communists) and the right (defenders of the status quo and activeis dimming the already poor prospect for peaceful progress in Guatemala. The promise ofaction implicit in the Revolutionary Party's assumption of the presidency6 has soured to disillusionment. There is no longer hope that the first honestly elected government1 can squash the Communist insurgency and at the same time move toward curing the national illnesses on which Communism feeds. The "fight fire with fire" philosophy inspired increased violence as anti-Communist terrorists fought Communist rowing despair is indicated by theof some memberseligious organization and their followers {the Melvilleho admit no solution to the miserable poverty of mostexcept by violent destruction of theorder.
Bitterness between the right and left has been strong, especially since4 revolution. Yet in the past, political action occurredutual recognition that today's discredited exile may be tomorrow's president. With the return6 to the brutal style of the, it may be difficult to put the genii of violence andback in their bottles.
The political situation makes it extremely difficult for any government, even in peacefulto break down the barriers of Almost half of Guatemala's five million people, the Indians, remain outside the moneyeparate society apart from the effective national life. The literacy rate and other indicators of social progress are among the lowest in the
The Shake-Up
one dramatic presidential move, on
arch, the immediate circumstances of Guatemalan
Mo Je-raign Pi
politics changed radically. President Mendezthree key military men of their posts, and gaveresident in fact as well as in name for the first time in five years. Guatemalans of all political shades have interpreted Mendez' assertion of authority as the end of the armed forces' constriction on civilian rule.
At Mendez' formal inaugurationhe military caretaker government transferred little power to the elected government, retaining its free rein in anti-Communist counterinsurgency action.
ear the "counterinsurgent"had degenerated into "counterterrorism." strategists armed and fielded variousterrorist groups, includinganti-Communist civilians and elite corps of the armed forces and police. y varying to include laborixed bag of democraticand members of the President's party, as well as Communists and their collaborators. The daily spectre of mutilated bodies created an atmosphere
of terror.
International attention focused onproblem of Communist terror andterror when two members of the US militarywere assassinated by Communists inhe US press gave wide publicity to President Mendez' inaction and apparent captivity by the military while the public was terrorized by extremists on both sides.
Whether dismayed by his poor public image, or driven to political courage by the desperate need to end the bloodshed, or angered by someoutrage such as the kidnaping of the archbishop, Mendez acted without warning and "exiled" thosefor the counterterrorism by sending them to posts abroad.
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secret lio Pogmign Disserr
The NewMendez Has Gained and Lost
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military support has beenby surprise and unwilling to risk anin the armed forces, the "exiled"not protested. Although some retainpersonal following within the militarythe armed rightist civilians, they haveresisted the urgings of these groups to Mew commanders were immediatelyall have pledged allegiance to Mendez.
The general overhaul of commands that followed the first personnel changes has left many key positions in the hands of second-ratewho lack qualifications to maintain the pace of the army's regular counterinsurgencyfarodel of effectiveness even under the best of the military leadership. Most of the new officers have little experience in this realm, and signs of disaffection have already appeared within the military establishment. Army discipline has deteriorated. Many junior officers haveack of confidence in the hew minister of defense and in some of their new commanders. The action and elite status of the clandestine counterterror campaign are now denied them. Young officers, an ever-restive group in the military, are already showing signs of rebellion.
Theivilian commandos in the northeast are also concerned about their future under the government's new policy. With theirnow undesirable, these bandsotential threat to the government if it attempts to disband and disarm them.
Mendez has now regained the approval and support of political moderates and the non-Communist left. These groups had been embittered by the lack of forward motion in the depressed socioeconomic sphere and alienated by the uncontrolled They are, however, not dynamic in thepower structure and their support is not vital.
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there has beei
members)
have been quiescent. They have been reorganizing for several months, and reports suggest that they plan to postpone major action for some time. Their leaders have recently stated their recognition of pastushing into action without adequate preparation, and their intention to recoup the losses sustained under the counterinsurgency and terrorist campaigns. Their current plans call for sporadic action in Guatemala City to force the government to retain the state of alert or to raise it againtage of siege, essening of urgency among thebased on the belief that they now have more time and freedom to reorganize. They can be expected to assess carefully the new political atmosphere and their own position, altered also by thefrom the Guatemalan Communist Party and theof Yon Sosa's moribundovember
16. The Communist Party has gone more deeply underground, presumably also to reconstitute its ranks and strength. It has years of experience at survival and retrenchment under adverse conditions.
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Recent reports describe its continued commitment to armed revolution once its reorganization is complete.
The Outlook for Mendez
are few moves Mendez can makeupsetting the delicate balance. Ifuntil his term expires inemake little significant progress exceptin invigorating the regularand holding down the extralegal portion
of that campaign. This would have the double value of keeping the Communists on the run whileMendez* critics that he is not soft on the The fact that power in Guatemala resides with strictly conservative elements means that anyespecially the suspect incumbentwith political disaster in pushing for even the most elemental progress and reform. Mendez' impositioneneral sales tax in January lasted for lesseek in the face of opposition from conservative business elements who control the economy.
The powerful forces newly antagonized by Mendez1 unheralded and abrupt use of his official prerogatives will examine suspiciously theperformance. Tho appeal by the new minister of defense that all citizens lay down their arms and work for national pacification is interpreted as anof the left. Any further evidence (from their viewpoint) of the government's shift leftward will increase the likelihood of military intervention.
There is the danger that Mendez, buoyed by his successful move against the right, feels an illusion of power that will lead hla to provoke that side further. One of the most perilous courses he might attempt, for example, would be to disarm the civilian counterterrorists.
The Mendez government has taken littleagainst the many social and economic ills, in part because of political problems but in largebecause slowing economic activity has cut back
government revenues. In addition, Mendez has not moved to useillion in available foreign assistance. In the best light, the government haso-nothing one.
21. Tact, delicacy,lear commitment to continue the fight against the guerrillas may immunize Mendez from succumbing to the continual conspiring that will surely ensue. Becausehas been adoptedactic by both sides, therereater possibility than in the pastoup attempt would generate widespread If indeed the passivity of the general public hasuture military regime aligned with defenders of the status quo may need harsh repressive measures to keep control.
Original document.
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