SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES (NIE 11-14-67 M/H)

Created: 5/9/1968

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

MEMORANDUM TC HOLDERS NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

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Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by Ike UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED

Authenticated;

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DlODCM -erFCClAl LIMITED -OinTtiiaUTIOI

THE SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

FOREWORD

Lxpressed uncertainly. regarding thc actual equipment holdings of Soviel line divisions, as follows: Hitherto we have estimated that all divisions innd IIull set of equipment on hand or immediately available. It now appears that this may not bc true of many divisions in thc USSR, but wc are as yet unable to determine with confidence thc actual extent of the shortages that may exist

An intensive study has been undertakenesolve this uncertainty and. eventually, to reassess the combat and remforccment capabilities of Soviet ground forces. This study is far from complete, but our findings to date with regardhe actual holdings of major items of equipment by Soviet line divisions in East Cermany and in the Belorussian, Carpathian, and Kiev Military Districts (MDs) in the USSR require the issuanceemorandum to Holders of

Wo take occasion to include, in paragraphs 1M2 below, an updating of the discussion of Soviet theater air defense inf7 and of new attack submarines in

The Equipment of Soviet Line Divisions'

have very good evidence regarding the major items of equipmenttwo divisions in the Croup of Soviet Forces, Cerroanyotorized

Vealey C. Franklin, (heisbtaru Chief of SlatT lor InwUigenee,of the Army, believe* the methodology utilhea* Id tbe study has provided useful additional data. However, fn hlr opinion, the findings must be regarded only aa tentative indications of what .nifor equipment, may currently be held by Soviet divisions and may create an erroneous impression lhat the capabilities of line divisions have been reduced. f_

... . . ait,CJ ta>"ie USSR so far considered in

the analysis may bT somewhat larger than indicated. Cen. Franklin believe* lhe methodology employed in thi. analyrir include* many judgments and assumptions which (codminimi the estimates of dMsleaal holding! and should not be used as the only bass for judgingof any given divulon. He believe* lhat at more Is

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he number iH increase

lie also anticipates that the toul number of Soviet diviiaons throughout die USSB will rue during the conduct of tlur amlyilr.

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rifle division, (heank division. Our analysis indicates ihat the motorized niTe.division liasajor items of equipment, ihc tank division. llie provision ol major items of equipment thus indicated is someercent lower than we previously believed. Thc number of tanks and artillery pieces, however, remains essentially the same. The difference lies principally in the number of wheeled vehicles and major items of support equipment organic to tlie division. This difference would not affect either the firepower or the initial mobility of these divisions.

have not reexamined the oilieroviet divisions in Cermanysufficiently to be able lo compare Ihem will, there two divisions inwc are satisfied Dial this particular motorized rifle division is typical ofSoviet motorized rifle divisions in Germany, and lhat this particularis typical of theoviet tank divisions in Cermany and Poland.

have no doubt thai Ihe Soviets consider all of tlieir line divisionsand Poland to beull state of readiness for immediatetake the two divisions cited to reflect the Soviet conception- of what Isto cpjalify as "ready for immediate operations" aod have used tlieirholdings of major items of equipment as the criterion by which toreadiness of thether Soviet line divisions that we havedate*

On the basis of this criterion and' good evidence, wc conclude that nine divisions, in thc Belorussian and Carpathian MDs should be judged to beull state of readiness for immediateive are motorized rifle divisions, four of themordon close to the western frontier of the USSR. Four are tank divisions belongingank army located not far west of Kiev.

We judge that thc otherivisions in thebian, aod Kiev MDsotorized rifle divisions andank divisions) fall short of the CSFC criterion in their holdings of major items of equipment In most cases, their equipment amountsercent of that standard.

We must stress that our study to date has been directed solely towardthe quantities of major items of equipment actually held by Soviet line divisions. We find these to be lower than we had previously supposed tn the case of "combat ready" divisions, and much lower in the case of other line

divisions. This reduction in our estimate of thc amount of equipment held by

these divisions would imply some reduction in our estimate of their maurung.

but we liave not as yet studied the direct evidence regarding nworung and are

as yet unready to present an estimate on that subject.

must note also that we have not yet studied the army aod frontelements in the Soviet ground forces, and consequently are asto reassess the Soviet organization for combathole. Neither have

of the low divisions in u> Baltic MO and (be five line division* in ibe Moscowalio iclcvant to (he ididoccemeat problem, bui we have nor yet cunuocd tbemInclude them In this

ho iv conccntra-

we studied what would be requitedreduced strength" division Io com bit strength, how lhat could be accomplished, and consequently

quickly such division* could bc made icady "toreas of concert

lion." These matters will be addressed in

Theater Air Defense

IL Since thc publication ofe have obtained 6rm evidence of Soviet efforts to strengthen their theater air defense, particularly against low-nlliludc attack. Thc ground electronic environment has been improved. At most operational airfields aiicraft revetments haw been constructed, dispersed aircraft

parking patterns employed, and antiaircraft artillery positions occupied. Tlie SA-3.

missile system has been deployed to tactical au fields in East Cermany, Poland.

and Hungary. We now have evidence that lhe Soviets have begun deployment

nf both the mobileissile system and (he radar-controlled, quad-mounted,

m weapon system,ith their field forces.

New Torpedo Attack Submarines

e now have firm evidence of the construction of two new types of torpedo altack submarines in addition to tlie new class of nuclear-powered attacknoted in paragraphfll three of these new types have streamlined hulls and large rounded bows suggesting high speed, lower noise levels, and improved sonar capability. At least two of the three new types are probably nuclear-powered. These two may bc capable of speeds up tonots and operating depths on tlie ordereet. All three types will probably be operational bye continue to believe that someo GO new atlack submarines will be in service

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE

I.y the Cent-ollor rh* ^formationf lh* leoptOnl ono of pvriant undero

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aidonirolkm o< the Jo'nl Chlofi ol Sloff C. Aiililori! Chief ol Slofi loreportment of ih* Army, it- the Department of the Army

d Atvloiil Chiel ol No.ol Operoiiarrt (IrtcliigdACwl, for Ihe OvfwiHrueni ot Ihe Nary

* Airluom Chief of Siofl,SAF, for the< ih* Air Fore*

I. Dirortor ofK. for Ae Aiomlr EnergyMM g ertar. FBI. lo- th* txUrol ottav olwecter of NSA. far me Nohonol Scrwr.t. Agency

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