WORLD TRENDS AND CONTINGENCIES AFFECTING US INTERESTS

Created: 6/6/1968

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CONTENTS

Page

NOTE

AIN TRENDS IN THE WOULD

A. Continuing US-Soviet 3

3 Continuing Turmoil In 5

Problemi Among the Poorer Nations . 6

Importance of the Old 8

in the Influence of tlie fl

Emergence o( New Power10

If. PROBLEMS AND TRENDS IN MAJOR WORLD11

A.11

B The. Near East and North13

C SubSihiiran Africa 14

D. Latin America IS

HI.15

A. In Soviet

R. In

C- In Europe ,

Areas ol Contention nod

the World

IV.19

ANNEX: LIST OF SELECTED NATIONAL INTELLIGENCEWHICH ASSESS FUTURE TRENDS INAREAS AND NATIONS

world trends and contingencies affecting us interests

note

This estimate lias been prepared in responsepecific request in connectiontudy of US requirements for overseas bases. The purpose of the estimate is to project, to the degree possible over the next decade, those trends and developments which might affect US security and the commitment of US resources. It does not examine the requirements for or the prospects of retaining particular bases; more detailed studies than are possible here would be appropriate to such questions. Rather, the emphasis is on tltc political, economic, social, and military environment in which US policy will be operating.

SUMMARY

The pace of change in the world is accelerating, and there hasarked increase in the interaction of political events in different parts of the world. Conflicts or rebellions in one area encourage dissidents in others, and major changesation's political life can occur quite suddenly. Important departures from present world trends are almost certain over the next ten years.

Some of the principal trends will nonethelessontinuation or acceleration of existing ones: US-Soviet tensions seem likely to persist; the disruptive effect of the turmoil in China will be felt for many years at home, but China will stillery significant power in Asia; the political, economic, and social problems of the poorer nationsseem likely to persist and in some places to intensify; the twoUS andlikely to continue to lose mote of the authority and respect which they have enjoyed in the past. Two significant new trends can already be identified: the old ideologies arc losing much of their impact, and new forms of radicalism are ap-

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pearing; and nt least Iwo new world power centers areJapan and the European Economicvery substantial economic power and undeveloped political potential.

Any prediction ol tierxbecade must be tieated with reserve because in nearly every case there are forces at work which could alter them. Sudden and significant swings in Soviet policy cannot be ruled out. The Chinese revolution could partly succeed, though this seems unlikely, or it could be soon suppressed and Communist order restored, though this alio seems unlikely. Changes could occur rapidly in Europe. Some of the poorer nations could collapse into anarchy oi be overcome by their economic weaknesses; in some world regions there couldapid disintegration of seveial existing regimes. Tho assumption, most likely valid, that the world economy will continue to grow could be underminedreakdown of internationalon monetary and trading arrangements.

In Europe the influence and authority of the superpowers isunder challenge. Their influence among their allies is being eroded, partly because East-West tension in Europe has been reduced and partly Iwcause ihe statesboth halves of Europe-wish to assert greater national independence and to dissociatefrom US or Soviet policies of which they disapprove.Asia and East Asia will remain areas of contention during tlie decade ahead, with the intensity of the conflict dependent in large measure upon the course of events in Vietnam. The Near East seems likely to be an area of turmoil for at least another decade, and new fightingajor scale will probably occur in the Arab-IsraeliThe Soviets will attempt to expand their influence in the Arab world and will piobably succeed, though new political movements there, as elsewhere among the poorer nations, seem likely. Events in tropical Africa piobably will have less effect upon world affairs than developments in most other areas; the African states are becoming more deeply absorbed with their own problems In Latin America the US will face increasing diplomatic and political challengesthe continent and the weakeningariety of joint ventures. Some truly revolutionary regimes may come to powei; they willnot be Communist but highly nationalistic and suspicious of the US.

SEG*E7

SEGRET

The political atmosphere of the world over the next decade thus seems likely to be dominated even more by uncertainty than in the recent past. There willrowing tendency for various nations to defy the great powers which have been their protectors and sns-tainers. The world climate will be one in which host nations will less and less welcome foreign bases or the stationing of foreign troops, even when they find them advantageous for their economy and At the same time, the national interests of the superpowers will become increasingly complex. Both will probably seek means to make the competition between them less overt, less expensive, and less binding than in the past. Terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and Countcrinsurgency as forms of conflict are likely to be more common than open military confrontations between national forces. In an atmosphere where confiontation between major powers becomes less direct, oppor[unities may develop to improve the formal andrelations between the superpowers, for example in the area of arms control. But it appears unlikely that any real detente can develop.

DISCUSSION

I. MAIN TRENDS IN THE WORIO SITUATION

l* pace of change In die world continues to accelerate. Technological progress has opened up many areas to modem life for the firsl time, if has alio brought to these areas the conflicts and frustrations of the modern world.communications have markedly increased the interaction of developments in various parts of the world. Social and racial conflict or rebellion against authority in One area will, more than In the past, encourage dissalis6cd groups in other areas to ac! on their own grievances. Antagonisms of the poor nations toward the rich willwareness of the widening gap between them grovvs This does not mean Uvat the whole structure of world powM will come un-hinged in the decade ahead. The general shape of things may not be greatly different from what it is today, but there will be Substantial changes in many places and among many of the Mruetural parts. This estimate will discuss first those trends which seem lifcely to affect the world at Urge, then trends which seem primarily regional in their impact, and finally contingencies which, if they materialized, would unite profoundly affect rhe world order.

A.Soviet Tensions

he shift From the flamboyant leadership of Khrushchev to the bureaucratic administration of the present collective hashange of style in the cnnd'.ict of Soviet affairs, both at home and abroad. Then- haxreater

appreciation of lhe complexity of international problem* ond the limits of the USSR's ability io act on these problems, oncT'a related disinclination to move forcefully, or even to threaten to do so. At the same lime, there haseversion to earlierrowing reluctance toraditionalof the Outside world or to soften hostile attitudes toward the US.tendencies are also evident on the internalradualtoward more orthodoxy in doctrine includingartial rehabilitation ofterner party line low,<td restive intellectuals,omewhat more repressive and conformist atmosphere in general.

Soviet military power continues to grow. Programs under way indicate an effort lo achieve some kind of parity with the US. especially in strategic missiles. The Soviet leaders no doubt would like further to improve their military position, and to attain the attendant political and psychological benefits, but They are facing new decision* of great complexity about how to overcome America's present strategic advantage. They appear to have decidedontinuing across theboard improvement of their capabilities, mill special attention to certain arms, such as the navy, where tlicy have been relatively inactive.

Even though tliey may be uncertain about what they would in fact achieve by continued deployment of their existing modtrn weapons inventory, the Soviet leaders probably would be unable, even if they wished it, to slow downch the momentum which any large military complex possesses. Someoff in new advanced weapons deployment Is possible, but would depend heavily upon US policy and the world situation gcneially. Military research and development, however, lias been and will continue to be one of the highest priority undertaking* in the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders regard such an effort as imperative in order to prevent the US fromechnologicalloadvantage for themselves, and to strengthen the technological base of Soviet power. But, in those research and develop, rneni programs about which we have knowledge, we see nothing which would give thelear advantage or in any other way significantly alter the present relative strategic positions of lhe US and USSR. Considering the long lead time required for the clteclive development of newechnologicalitprobably not lead suddenlyew level of power, al least during the not five years or so

everal new factors have entered into Soviet calculations which seem likely to persist for some time. One is the deepening hostility between the USSR and China; this has prompted the USSR to begin deploying more substantial elements of its foiccs on the long Soviet-Chinese frontier and in Outer Mongolia. Another IS the reduction of tensions with Western Europe, which has made lhe chances of war in Europe seem morehird factor is the USSR's increased military interest in areas outside Eurasia proper. This is manifested in its roleajor supplier of military goods and advisersumber of non-Communist states. It is seen in an enlarged scale ol Soviet naval operations worldwide. In the years ahead, the Soviets may acquire significant capabilities

(or military Intervention in remote areas. Thin tho nature and role of the USSR's military power, as the Soviet leaders see it, may be changing

hether Soviet American relations become more oi Iras tome over the next decade will depend not so much on the t'SSH'i military strength as on the set of Its foreign policiesn the character ol its leadership. The Soviet leaden have frequently chosen to pursue Itussiati national interests rather than those of the international Cornmurust movement Bui the USSR has in no way withdrawn from time doctrinal precepts whichommunist world the goal ol the Sow* state Its propaganda remains menacing and its actions stillillingness to pursue provocative and occasionally ruky police, Al the same time, however, the Soviet leadersome waysvested interest in the status quo This Is most obvious in relations with other Communist states and in tho international Communist movement, hut is also reflected In attitudes toward various international questions (eg. nuclearn some ateas (eg. Latinoscow has lound it expedient to conserve and nuiturc pohtlc.il lesources rather than to use them In revolutionary ventures. And toward the US. while on the one handenerally antagonistic stance, and on the other permitting piecemeal Improvements in Ihethe Soviets seem mainly interested in avoiding extremes in either direction.

ignificant change in the attitude of the Soviet leadership does not now appear to be in the oCng. The younger men prominent in the party today may be leu doctiinaire than their elders but aie certainly notdisposed toward ihe US. On the contrary, they seem hard and hostile, devoted to ihe notion of Strong compeuiiao with the US. If more So.bW and potentially frwndlier politicians exist, they have not as yet revealed themselves to us, or. perhaps, even lo each other.

B Continuing Turmoil in China

S For the past fee years. China has beenevolutionary upheaval which has succeeded thus far in destroying or disrupting much of the stability and order achieved. The present period thus appears to beout ol which willolitical order different from Mao's.by his desire totuly new society and akind ol Communist man, Mao hat done damage which will takend has set forces in motion that will profoundly affect the Chinese sceneeneration. Thus, his likely passing during tlie next few years wdj not make up for the economic development which hoi not taken place, the youths who have not beentho enfecbkmcnl of the Communist Party, the thorough disruption of cornenurucatioa between generations, and the failure to put something solid in the place of the sonal and political .nstttunom which hare been under attack

isruptive effem of the Culfvjal Revolution will probably be felt for many yean, and thus continue to constrict China's inSuence in the world.Chinadeveloping an advanced weapons capability which, though it will be modest in slxoecade hence, will have political and psychological

at home and abroad. China willation with crminouiand social problems, butery sifnAatrX power in Asia. Almost any new fcadeTship in China will tesent the influence of the USSR and the US in Ana ando reduce and remove H. China might become much bolder in such efforts, especiallyi the US in Southeast Asia, but ito be more flexible in the meant employed

C. Growing Problems Among lhe Poorer Nations

The impact o( the modem world upon the poorer nations is revolutionizing their way of life nnd complicating their problems. The consequence isfailure and disorder, ns unprepared loaders nnd elites try to cope and the hopes of populations arc unfulfilled. In tome former colonial areas,and lack of experience make it unlikely that present governments will survive. In others, archaic Institutions and entrenched ariitocrncies will collapse before rising demands lor moderni*ation ond change. Tribal and class rivalries, antagonism among ethnic groups, and racialism will probably boil over within some of the new status. Extreme forms of nationalism may arise and hinder realistic programs and solutions None of these situations can be readily changed, or easily influenced from Outside, and widespread poverty will add to the potential for disorder

Some nations will continue to have great ditSculty providing enough food to meet their rapidly expanding populations Many countriesast record of food shortages probably will increase output more rapidly in the futurethey are devotmg more resource* to tlie problem and beginning to take advantage of recent technoIojkjIgriculture But populations will abo continue to grow very last, even in those lev. countries hketyndeataU birth control programsge scale. Some countries will export enough to obtain the foreign exchange for necessary food imports withoutther sectors of lhe economy For others, the costs of oblamuig sufficient food will wcicly impede industrial development And in most of the less developed nations, ignorance. IllUciacy. and liadtlional ways will opetate to keepin production and distribution of food far below what is possible.

Acute famine is unlikely over the noxt decade, exeep! in localisedwhere poor governmental management and problems of distributionfood shorlagcs But even if food supplies improve somewhat in many of the pooier nations, chronic malnutrition with its debilitating effects on the initiative and capacity of peoples will continue toevere problem. Food shortages are likely to bo worst in Alia. Both China and India will have an uphill fight to achieve minimal self-sufficiency In these large nations, the food problem must be solved pnmanly through population control and domesticsince foreign exchange earnings and imports will remain small relative to the amounu of food needed. Elsewhere, areas which may face food deficits are Pakistan, the Indonesian island of Java, theMalaysia. Morocco, and some of the Canbbean and Andean countries of Latin America In some

cases. these deficits will reflect not only population pressure, but also demands which have grown because incomes have grown.

he poorer nations face other serious problems. Fluctuations in world prices of primary products on which many of them depend will, as in the past, impede development. Economic progress itself, while beneficial in the long rim, is likely toource ol further political instability. The combination of industrialization and rural poverty draws many people from the countryside into urban slums, where expectationsetteramong thearc generally disappointed. These problems arc frequently made worse by economic policies which give priority to immediate desires and neglect the requirements of future stability and growth. In several of the more developed Latin American countries, for example, policies of expediency have ledequence ol rapid inflation, shortages of foreign cxcliangc. and recession. As the poorest and most backward nations begin the process of modernization and development, fairly simple problems will be displaced byomplex ones. Some Icss-devciopcd countries will be able to control the strains and make great strides; South Korea. Taiwan, and Iran have shown it can be done. In many, however, economic and social change, urbanisation, and increased politicalare likely to be disruptive rather than Stabilizing.

M. llie amount and kind of economic aid available to the poorer nationsled their prospects for economic progress in all fields. Over the course of the next decade, there may be increasing indifference and pessimism in the advanced nations toward the ptoblems ol the poorer states. We think thatwith loteign aid is likely to grow because it is apparently bringing the donors fewer advantages than they had anticipated. Recent history would tend to suggest, for example, that Soviet aid to Cuba, the UAR. Indonesia, and India has produced less political benefit for Moscow than the Soviets had Hoped. Aid programs will almost certainly be more cautiously administered andfcuer resources lo developing nations than in the past. This might increase the pressure on some of the less-developed nations to adopt moreeconomic pobcies; it could also cause some of them to abandon long-term goals for short-term expedients.

n general, the pooter nations appear Ukely to be the scene of considerable revolutionary activity. Only some of this will, be Communist in origin. Much of it will simply be the consequencerowing awareness that other people live better lives. New political ideologies may develop as the politicalacquired from the advanced nations fail or come under attack. Thus, much ol the revolutionary activity will be directed against the existing order of things, though many of the revolutionaries will be people whose only aim is to enfoy the privileges ol power. Rut pressures lor change and resistance to change will both become stronger, and the result is likely to be considerable violence. In some nations sweeping social changes may bo initiated by the privilegedin an effort to protect llvcmselves and to make the process orderly and constructive Revolutionary leaders are likely to emergeariety of bacL-

military establishment, the priesthood, local tribes or clans, the educated and the uneducated Most will be ardently nationalistic and often anti American. Not all ofvolutions will matterS interest Some will matter, and some will come to mattes' because lhe Communist powers will seek to subvert them to their own ends

D. Declining Importance of the Old Ideologies

rowing tendency is emerging within the advanced nnlions to shuck off much of flic intellectual baggage which was inherited hornh andh centuries. The evangelical quality of Soviet communism has been on the decline for some time. Utileh century capitalist ideology remains; all advanced countries have become welfare states with managed economies Most of die Socialists of Western Europe have accepted the mar Let-system economic structure of then- nations and are content to use the classical economic tools toward social ends. In Europe, even the Christian Democrats have become less consciously Catholic and have assumed the character of crouist parties mildly leiormist and mildly concernedrotect clerical inleiest foi political reasons Some of the Communitt patties in the West have become bureaucratic and (end to concern themselves with participation in (he normal political process rather than with the vigorous putsuit of power,

long with this decline in Ideological politics, there appears to haveagging and sometimci widespread annoyancethe whole business of parties and pobcieuiti. of pricsti and parliasncnti. Antagonism to present ideologies and political processes appears most starkly in the discontent and even alienation of growing numbers of younger people and students Thishas broader causes tlian student grievances agamst universityOf opposition to the Vietnam war, and it is not confined to these young people who participate In demonstrations or who have ostentatiously dropped out. It ii an attitude held by many of the brighten and most tapablc among college and university students. We think that this will nol ptove to be aphenomenon. Certainly some students will abandon their pteientey leave the university and enter upon working and family responsibilities.rge proportion will, we believe, hold to the conviction (hat sweeping changes must be undertaken quickly in their sooet.es

IS. All this is likely to bring new political and social strains in the advanced countries, both directly through the pressures tbe young people themselves try to esert, and indirectly through the sharp reactions which will bo produced among older, conservative elements. Over the next few yeais, as France has shown, lluise activities could open deep Inures in modern society and threaten existing political and social institutions. In atew of lhe advanced countries, these attitudes among young people will contribute to growth of anti-US JnJ anti-Soviet lentrment in both populations and governments Over the longer tun. alienated gsoupsresect present ideologies may provide fertile ground for new ideologiesadical or touUtarian bent. Even now some of the studanl groups in various countrieslend of right and left radicalism

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Ideologies ol the past generation appear co be waning also innations. Ins andany of litem seemed tothey had to have an ideology in order to claim their rightful placesovereign states of the world. Most of thethe more advancedpioved irrelevant to theirideologies generated within these countries also failed to takeidea of an Afro-Asian entity that wouldole on the worldthe superpowers has virtually disappeared. Nehru's idealism,Emerging Forces. Nkrumah's Pan-Africanism, and Nassersall faded away. More effort is Currently being expended Onond less on the construction and preachment ofin dogma, programs, andia the recent past. 'this, new nationalist ideologies, perhapsadical character, willas time goes by.

Decline in the Influence ol Ihe Superpowets

It is perhaps not unrelated to ihe decay ol established ideologies that the US and USSR aie losing some of the authority and respect which they once enjoyed. Each has been portrayed as archetypicalarticular ideological position. The concepts and institutions associated with the idea of Worldunder Soviet leadership andree World under US leadership have lost much of their force. Among many of the poorer notions thereeeling that the two superpowers do not really care about them, but only want to useheir struggle with each other Thereelated belief that the two superpowers are much alike, that they are rich and materialistic nations which dole out largesse only in return for fiefdom, and then fail to honor theywhen they are needed. Moreover, many countries now realize that there are great political inhibitions upon the superpowers in attempting to force their will on others, and this has led increasingly to tlie defiant pursuit of national interest despite great power diplomatic, and even economic, pressure.

In Western Europe, the US has lost considerable prestige This Is partly because Ihe US is no longer felt to be needed as much as it formerly was. The Vietnam war has been unpopular; the US has lost respect for having gotten into it and for not being able to finish It quickly. America's economic strength is Still seen as formidable, but the worsening of the US international 6nancial position has increasingly limited US freedom of action abroad. US technology is both resented and sought after; fearsechnological gap havepur for nationalistic policies and European cooperation. Even Canadian-US relationshipsroblem arising out of Canadian ethnic tensions and the reluctance of many Canadians to identify with US interests and policies. The USSR's troubles in Eastern Europe may be even greater than those of the US in Western Europe What appears to be happening is that even theo: Eastern Europe want to escape the close-order drill which Moscow has imposed upon them. The national characteristics of these peoples arc being

combined with, or arc penetrating through, the Contmuniti political and economic superstructure.

would be easy to make too much of this trend in tho positions ofgreat powers Changes may occur in tho North Atlantic Alliance OrPtict. but no major reversal of alliances is likely to take place.sign* point to an erosion, whereby the variousreater degree of independence inroader control over mam own economic development It is,unlikely that there willenera) European settlement during thbcurrent fiends could be greatly slowed down or even reversed byof new tensions or changes of pohcy by the superpowers.

F. The Emergence of New Power Centers

decline In th* authority of the twocflect.ofrelated in some measure to the fact thatbecoming diipcried. Besides China, several now and powerful nationsof nations nie developing. If Is too early to detcimino whether allwill in time rise to major stature But two of thorn are rapidlyof inch statute. One is Japan and the other is the European(EEC) Neither is striving at the moment ro influence eventsworld scale, indeed, in both cases, it is thei. economic strength which isfdt. And. of course, mi the ease of the EEC. no central political.or dominant leader now exists.

Japan's rjualificaiiom toajor world power are considerable It has replaced West Cermany as thendustrial power.ew yean ii will be the fourth largest trading nation in ihe world Inoears living standards will be comparable lo those In tlie advanced nations of Europe The rate of investment in Industry and in tlie untiling of human resources is the highest in ihe world Japan is becoming moro assertive in regional nflairs. though it is reluctant to assume the responsibilities which its powerful economic position would suggest This restraint will probably not persist for long,eadlong pursuit of world influence seems unlikely within the decade ahead, largclv because the economic costs and political rilki still seem too high.llie post important factors in determining what role live Japanese will choose to pby will be the evolution of Japanese relations with the US tn the economic and security fields on tlve one hand, and their perception of both the threat and the opportunities emanating from China on the other. How these factors develop will profoundly affect ihe domestic political balance ai well as Japan's foreign posture

Inecade of life the EEC has made substantial progress toward economic unity. Common external tariffs are being impoied. and internal customs eliminated The KEC isingle organ lor In let national trade negotiations, its executive lias been merged with that of tlie other sixnution communities, and national economic policies arc subjected to community scrutiny and influence.

In the decade ahead, greater hartoonlzatfori of economic policies is on the schedule, to cover such matters is agrsctuture. taxes, and money. In general, tbe results so tar have been highly favorable for the economies of the nations concerned; having uicceesfuUy come so far down tbe road. It would be extremely costly, andractical matterlbttlve, for any to turn back.

be EEC Is becoming not soositive and active force Inaitsermanent and powerful factor of which others must take sellout amount Erco without any further formal steps toward greater politicalor unity within the Community, the economic integration which Isfa imposing restraints upon national foreign as well as dornearJc policy. Thus, individual notions are less free to pursue their own policies if these depart too far from those of their economic pat men. This has restrained both France and West Germany, and ft seems likely to continue to do so. Tbe departure of de CauDe from the scene. If it occurred In an atmcrpherri of political and economic turmoil In France, wouldhile hamper the further progress of the Community, but hts departure would also remove one of the main obstacles to the further integration of Community economic and pohtical life.

U- PROBLEMS AND TRENDS IN MAJOR WORLD AREAS

conUaertt can insulate itself from the main forces at work In thefrom tho irnpact of great power interests. Wars, revolutions, andin one place will impinge more and more upon the national fortunesnot directly Involved, Tho discussion below is designed to raketrends which, while they may seem largely regional In impact, arehave rcptacussioos outside the area in which they occur.1

A. Asia

Alia, prosperity in Japan, the growing irrypoitaDCt of Australia,RevoliitWo in China, confrontation in Korea, war in Vietnam, subversionAria, tension in the Indian subcontinent, and the pressures ofnearly everywherearied picture. Some of these mattersdiscussed above, and there Is such uncertainty about others thatthem arc discussed later. It is essentia) to recogiihe that eventswill greatly affect all of Aria, that the problems of food. Deputation,development will overlay all other matters, and that la timecome torroch more Important tole. One of the majorthe extent to which Western political and economic influence wiDbe an active force In the area. To an important degree the outcomethe course of events in Vietnam, and upon US actions after theterminated.

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egotiation in Vietnam which leaves the Communist apparatus and the non-Communist political lotccs intact but no longer in active combat, the situation in Vietnam and Laos would probably be indecisive for some time. Subversion in Cambodia and Thailand would continue, but could probably be contained. Elsewhere in SoutheastBurma. Malaysia, Singapore.and thewould confiont the continuing and intractable problems of economic development and ol nation-building; these would provide issues and situations susceptible of exploitation by forces wishing to unseat or Subvert theregimes. By and large, the governments would probably get the belter of it. Even if Vietnam fell fairly soon into the handsegime dominated by the Communists. Ihe other regimes would probably not collapse, but their' struggle for existence would become more intense and their survival more precarious They have assets South Vietnam has never had. namely, relative peace, some sense of nationhood, and real successes against Communist subversion

US intervention in Vietnam. Japanese alliance with the US, and US presence In other areas of East Asia and the Western Pacific have probablymuch that was intended. They have induced prudence in Peking and Moscow,ense of security in the non-Communist countries, and provided some of the resources and skills for the development of moregovernment and social and economic improvement. This Is not to say that the situation is solid. On the contrary, great problems remain, and some of them will be intractableeneration or more. But the same problems face those wlto would like to destroy existing regimes. Thus, for the decade ahead, it appears most likely that Korea and the lands of Southeast Asia will remain an area of contention, while China sorts itself out and Japan makes up its mind. Meanwhile the US will remain invoked, constantly suspected of perfidy but constantly being import lined for help.

So long as the Chinese internal scene remains troubled, the threat to Taiwan will probably remain quiescent In Taiwan itself there will be aperiod when Chiang Kai-shek leaves the scene. His departure willprecipitate some friction within the Kuomlntang and between the main-landers and the Taiwanese It is possible, as the situation evolves both on theand in Taiwan, that some effort at an accommodation would be made, or that the legime on the mainland would engage in new efforts to take over Taiwan. It appears unlikely, however, that any large group on Taiwan would willingly turn the island over to Communist control. The North Korean threat lo South Korea seems unlikely to diminish and may intensify significantly from time to time The South Korean regime, while it might undergo some change In leadership, will probably remain firmly tied to tlie US. There may be periodic rises in US-South Korean frictions over responses to North Korean actions and over military and aid policies.

In the Indian subcontinent, tlie political problems arc more likely than those in Southeast Asia to be contained in regional scope and repercussions. Havingostly and inconclusive war, India and Pakistan will be more

SEflRET

cautious about approaching the brink. In Pakistan, the disruptive potential of provincialism and the unsettling consequences of modernization are being kept under firm control by an authoritarian, pragmatic regime which bas to its credit very Impressive successes in economic development. The prospect, how. ever, is for growing political instability centering around the Succession toAyub. In India, continuing, and probably increased, political turbulence appears likely as the nation attempts to cope, by democratic means, withlinguistic, and other communal rivalries, and with the frictions of massive but uneven social change. Mot cover, live prospects foralancefood and population in the next decade will be heavily dependent on weather and foreign aid, as well as on India's own efforts. There appear toufficient sense ofufficient number of sensible people, enough signs of progress and sufficient hope generally to keep these nations together until solutions begin to take shape. But to all appearances political turmoil in the subcontinent willontinuing feature, and may get worse before it gets better.

outh of the Asian continent, the century-long dominance ol Great Britain and British naval power in the Indian Ocean area will come to an end in the next several years as London completes its withdrawal cast of Suez. Some of the areas where the British have had forces or bases may End it difficult to maintain either political or economic stability, and opportunities may arise for other powers, if they so desire, to extend their activities and influence. At the same time, Australia isuch more important force in this area. With its close alliance to the US and close tics to Malaysia and Singapore, and with its rapidly growing economy. Australia is likely toey locus of Western strength in the Indian Ocean area throughout.

B. The Near Eosl and North Africa

he Near East will be an area uf turmoil and probably warfare for at least another decade. The goal of Arab unity seemsscape those Arabs who search for it. in large part because national interests have strengthened and will probably continue to do so. Diversity within the Arab world seems to be growing rather than receding; some nations are making remarkable progress, while political disunity and economic distress hatass others. The Arab states of North Africa, where these considerations also apply, appear increasingly to be going their own way.

he problems raised by (he Arab-Israeli war7 remain unsolved, and most of them seem not even to be fully appreciated by the pariesinvolved. Arab frustration has risen, but no new course has been set. Bitterness against the Israelis has increased, and the governments of thestates have been shaken. Some new political movements will probably arise, but if is too early to foresee their character. The most likely thing the Aiabs will do is to prepareew war against Israel. Israeli truculence being what it is, new fightingajor scale will probably occur in coming years and will ptobably result in new Israeli victories. This situation will be

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the source of pressures upon the great powers, who could promote an easing of tension! if they could agree among themselves, but this they probably cannot do. Tunned up locertain level will . serve Sovietut the

Soviet leaders may be unable to control the situation. They will attempt to eatend their influence and will probably succeed- Dot even in the mostArab states they will encounter some reserve against foreign influence, in others stiffcr resistance, and In some.trong disposition to incline toward the US. The Soviets prohebh/ will not wishl. and probably could not succeed in. trying to establish out-and-out Communist regimes in the urea, at the same time, tlvey will not be able to shrug off some responsibility for those whom they have accepted as clients. Thus it may be difficult fot the US and USSR to avoid confrontations in this area even though they wish lo.

C. 5ub-Saharon Africa

ropical Alrlca seems likely to have less impact than other areas on world affairs. Most of the independent slates now on the scene arc likely to survive in some form, though thcte mightew splits and peterger or two. Most African states will continue to be Introspective, absorbed with their internal problemj. particularlynvolved in ihe movement from tribalism toward nationhood. In the process Ihey will encounter formidable financial troubles, and will be hard pressed lo allocate scarce resources among education, health, military demands, and economic development There willonsiderable amount of confusion and inttabilvly. including tribal strife factional disorders, and urban unrest, as the new states grope for leadership and for political forms and pohoes vvhsch more nearly correspond with the aspirators ol the populace. The educated elite* now emerging will be increasingly influential. Economic development will be spotty and generally poorly organ,red It will largely depend upon outside assistance and upon the possible development of new

MflMeafCflSi

frican leaders are likely to become increasingly ambivalent toward live US. ihe USSR, and other major foreign powers. Alt states will need assistance from abroad lor development (in tome eases merely loremblanceodernut most will resent the attempts of donors to build influence in their countries. Civen the sensitivity of African governments and ihelr tendency to blame outsiders for their lack of progress, the US and the Soviets willifficult time translating aid, goodwill, and acceptance intopolitical influence. France, ihe United Kingdom, Communist China, and Israel are also likely to play important roles in parts of black Africa, but all vnll -encounter some resistance and. like the superpowers, will find it difficult toor maintain firm centers of influence Ethiopia will probably remain stable while Haile Soiasue lives, but his passing will usherune of great uncet-tainty. winch could be prolonged and violent The confrontation between blacks and whites in southern Africa will cause continuing diplomatic problems for the US in Africa and in the UN. though ihe bboL* liberation nvmerncnts are unlikely to make BgniFcanl progress for some years. Communist coiintriet

will continue to support these movements, but probably will not themselves become directly involved.

Lenin America

3S. For years there has been frequent political turbulence in Latin America; coups and assorted power giabs have been commonplace But five resulting changes of government have usually brought about little real social change, and most countries have continued to be ruled by the same oligarchies or military groups. Despite the existence of some popular anti-Yankee sentiment, these governments generally haveore friendly and pliable environment for US interests than has existed in most other parts of the world. But this environment has already begun to change. Over the next ten years thereood chance that some truly revolutionary governments will come to power. The Castroist-Communist insurgency movements seem likely to decline in strength. Soviet diplomatic, commercial, and cultural activities will probably increase. Any revolutionary regimes which emerge would be unlikely to be Communist controlled but would tend to be highly nationalistic, suspicious of the US. and more amenable to Soviet overtures than their predecessors.

The arrival ol new revolutionary regimes on the scene will probably lead to further decay of close relationships with the US. Even without the advent of revolutionaryumber of anti-American themes arc likely to develop and lo endanger special US positions. The more advanced countries will probably demonstrate resentment over US efforts to influence their economic development, their military procurement, and their positions on inter-American and international issues. The main obstacles to Latin American progress toward modernization seem likely, if anything, to loom larger: population growth,in agricultural production, weak civilian political leadership, and many deeply ingrained traditionsocial and political character. Thus the US. as the principal outside protector and tutor, will face increasing diplomatic and political challenges throughout the continent and the weakeningariety of |Oint ventures, from the Alliance for Progress to military collaboration.

Particularly serious problems will arise in Panama, where social and political conflict and antagonism over arrangements concerning the Canal Zone will probably mount even beyond present levels. It will continue to bedifficult to work out new arrangements acceptable both to Panama and the US, and even if one Panamanian governmentew agreement its successor might not honor it. We believe the prospects for new treatiesboth to Panama and the US are Weak; in the end, the question of US base rights may be more contentious than that of the present Canal and plansew one,

III. CONTINGENCIES

estimate of trendseriod as long as ten years must bereserve. Some things are simply unpredictable; some trendssome stop or reverse. Those which have been discussed in the two pre-

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ceding section' are the most likely, but Ihere sue dearly forces a: work whicher.ne enters the second half of (he decade ahead Soene of these other lines of development are dtseussed beiow. While these alternatives and possibilities do not now seem likely, thereufficient chance of their occurring that account should bo taken of Uscns,

Soviet Policy

s in other states. Soviel political life is dynamic, and there will be changes in the leadership and in ihc influence of vniious sectors of society on the leader-jhip. Our basic judgment ii that such changes seem likely lo produce gradual shifts In policy, rather than abrupt swings But sudden and significant changes certainly cannot be ruled Out. They could be provoked, for example, by the emergenceingle leader with the will to wrench Soviet society into new conformations. Rapid change could also come about as tlic consequenceispersion of political power among vested inteiest groups, tlie various regions, or even the people at large

alterations in the leadership or In the overall poeticalof course, vitally affect the USSR's foreign policies. While there ispattern associated with personalingle leader,few domestic lesuxntt. mighc be impulsive and mighteans to protect hit own position atnewOn the Other hand, dispersed authority (night tend to divertdomestic concerns, stimulate discord, and obstruct clear courses ofaction. Creater raarticipattfn of (he pubhc in the political processescertainly leadore emphasis on cons timer welfare partly at tlicthe military, and this in turn would probably in the long run makepolicies less bellicose. In any even I, however, both the rulers andof the USSR uill bo aware of their country's positionoildunlikely voluntarily to give up the interests, responsibilities, andwith that ilatus.

China

the forces which Mao has loosed in China appear morethan constructive, it is nonetheless possible that ho might have somesuccess, that these forces might surge forward after his death, and thatof permanent revolution he has envisaged might push China to newdomestic achievement and revolutionary impetus. This could, indeed,upsetting to the peace of Asia and to the more realistic andof the Communist movement in the world today It couldon the Chinese-Sovset frontier, stimulate revolutionary activityAsia, and encourage Japan quackly to reassess its policy in Asia and inat large.

is also possible lhat. rather than succeed, the Cultural Revolutionrepressed more rapidly and effectively than now seems likely, and thatis ts within the government nnd the military will ruthlesslyorder. If they could do so only in part of the country, thereinartial destiuclion of the nation. If they could do sowould set upon the tasks of rebuilding the party and its instruments ofinstitutionalize military control. They would probably alsoights China's external relations, lower the- temperature inand avoid costly and dangerous foreign adventures. Even so. itvery doubtful lhat Soviet-Chinese unity could be restored or thattoward the US would be substantially reduced. With appropriatepolicies and management, China might be able lo case its foodproblems and to get economic development under way again.strength, in turn, would enhance China's international influence.

C. In Europe

is also possible that the trends noted inof US(he West, growing congruence of interest and economic integration inand reduction of Soviet authority in Easterngreatlyor abruptly be reversed by events. The Communist opponents ofin Eastern Europe are still strong and capable- of fightingcould provoke enough disorder,amplc. to provide the excuseimposition of police Or military control (where they still control thosefor Soviet military intervention (as in Hungary. Or, they coulda new crisis in Berlin, thus raising tensions generally andightening up all around Eastern Europe. Such changes of(he East would have the effect of reviving, temporarily at least, anf purpose between West European nations and the US.

n tho other hand, the movements toward grca(er independence ofS and USSR in both Western and Eastern Europe could accelerate far more than we now think (bey will. If Czechoslovak liberalization proceeds apace, anded is get away with it, pressuies on Other East European governments lo follow suit could mount rapidly. The passing of Ulbricht could even leadhanges in East Ccrmany. Ten years hence, Eastern Europe could beas closo to Western Europe at to the USSR. In Western Europe itself, the passing of de Caulle could lead to major changes in Frencheftist president,opular front government. And there might be far greater acceptance of Communists or extreme leftist! in other West EuropeanasItaly or Scandinavia, for example. The North Atlantic Alliance could disintegrateaster pace than now seems likely. Inramatic alteration of the European structure of power could conceivably come about quite quickly,ituation in which most Europeans would regardoken US military presence on the continent as undesirable.

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SECTET

n Areas of Conrtntion ond Turmoil ^

d addition to China, other aieai where (buggies are going on are places concernings diaWt to lee! confident of one's judgment White it now appears unlikely, the possibility must be recognized that the Arab cast or the Indian subcontinent or some areas of Africa could fall into complete chaos, lhat some possible outcomes of the war in Vietnam could leadapid caa integration of exuting regimes in Southeast Asia,ajor nation of Latin America or Eutope could confront such serious problems of interna! division or economic weakness as to leadreakdown of order. In some cases, tlie emergence of widespread political and social chaos might notatter of much consequence to US interests In oilier cases it might matter very much.

a recognition lhat such contingencies could arise, it is worththe impact of such events may depend upon the degree to whichchoose to allow themselves to be affected or upon the extent toevents are exploited by one's rfvah Anarchy in India, for example,very bad for India but might not menace the US unless it appearedopponents could exploit the situation. The inherent depth ofmight make such outside exploitation impossible, thus removingfrom international contention. On the other hand, the extent of thepsychological and political comtiutrnent in Southeast Asia is so greatquick disintegration of the established regimes there in the wake of ainmight make considerable difference to relativeall over East Asia

E. In the World Economy

Except lor the problems ofod. and development noted in connection with trendi among the poorer nations, the discussion so far has been based upon the assumption that most nations would continue to grow eco nomically. that world trade would continue to mount, and that technological piogress would continueoderate pace to spread Its benefits among most nations of the world. This assumption is probably correct. Nevertheless, there arc possibilities which could invalidate It In whole or In part.

The most bkety source of danger to continued world economic growth Is the current world monetary crisis. This growth has been strongly stimulated by an expanding world trade and was facilitated by the lowering of trade barrierstable international economic syitom anchored on the US dollar. Since thehe US has consistently run large deficits in its balance ofand has therebyargo part of the worlds needs for new bquid assets in the form of dollars and of gold drawn from to large reserve In recent years, however. European governments have become tductant to help finance US deficits by holding dollars, and confidence in tbe dollar has di minished as US gold reserves have dwindled. Steps to resolve the loternauooal riyonetary problem have been Initiated The question is how rapidly these Uept

SEZR6T

will be pul into effect and by what means the US balance of payments deficit Is corrected. If tliCrcreakdown in international cooperation and if the major trading nations undertook to protect themselves by means oftrade and payments restrictions, trade and economic activity could be badly hurt,orld economic depression could occur.

Technological advances not now foreseen probably could not markedly diange the world economy in one decade, but (hey might make possible newin the arms race. Scientific discovery, stimulated by arms programs, is movingapid pace. While new weapons systems are costly and have long lead times, new discoveries are constantly being made and newcan suddenly appear. Thus, uncertainty can exist even when parity or superiority might be apparent. While the great powers arc those which would most seriously be affected by sudden breakthroughs in their Opponent's scientific and technical development programs, the elFect of technological progress on weaponry is by no means limited to them. By the end of the coming decadeumber of countries could have nuclear weapons if they chose tothem. While die military advantage of such capabilities in the handsecond or third rate power is often overestimated by those who advocate them, the political and psychological effect which Ihey would have upon their adversaries might be considerable

The rate at which technological progress Operates to improve well-being In Ihe less developed nations will be partially dependent upon discovery and exploitation of resources in these areas themselves. The entire economies of some nations, as in the past, could be changed unexpectedly if oil or other marketable commodities were discovered in their lands, or if world needs for particular commodities were alteredajor degree. Thus, it is now possible to hope that such iron ore suppliers as Mauretania and Liberia can make progress toward modernization, and that such new oil producers as Algeria and Egypt can growore rapid rate than in the past.

IV. IMPLICATIONS

or not any of ihe contingencies noted above materialire,aimosplvere ol the world over the new decade will be dominatedFor example, even should tlie fighting in Vietnam boan end, Southeast Asia will remain an arena of conflicting interests;the turmoil in China cease, it will be some years before thedirection of the new regimeeversion to one-man rule ina major political realignment in Europe, the dissolutionargeas India, or the disintcgiaeiontrategic area such as the Arabmagnify this sense of uncertainty.

n this atmosphere, and with the experience ofehind them, the major powers will have real difficulties in formulating policies. Memories of their mistakes will tend to deter them from undertaking new commitments, bul fear of tho consequences of inaction will press them toward at least some

SKRET

form of intervention. Whether they wiih to emphnsixt' it or not. the two majormany of thebe obliged to engage in competition for influence and position. But there arc now and probably will continue to be strong reasons for this competition to assume forms less overt, less expensive, and less binding than in the past two decades.

mong those reasons are live declining malleability of foreign situations, the ccor.omic costs of assuming responsibility for other nations, the difficulties of controlling foreign leaders, the risks ol inducing hostile reactions, and the penalties intervention might provoke among friendly powers. Indeed, in the world at large there seems torowing tendency among nations and peoples to insist upon their right to stand alone and even to defy great-powers who have been their protectors and sustalncrs. This tendency creates si climate In which host nations will less and less welcome foreign bases or the stationing of foreign troops, even when they find them advantageous for their economy and security.

ajor factor militating against costly and binding commitmentsrowing complexity of national interestrowing dissimilarity between the symbols and actualities ofation's economic interests might flourish most readily when its efforts to assert foreign political influence are least (Japanase ination might retain great political influence even alter withdrawing the symbols of its poweroreover, the value of an interest in one part, of the world might rise or fall relative to that in another as political conditions, military strategies, or economic andalter over time. Sea space, air space, and outer space may become more important than particular pieces of real estate.

n these circumstances, it seems likely that the interventions of the greater and lesser powers, and confrontations between them, might become less direct. Terrorism, guerrilla warfare, banditry, and countcrinsurgciiey. often supported from without, will be more common than Open military confrontations between national forces. Advice, training, and logistical support by foreign military or clandestine services will be mora common than the open operations of foreign military units, and naval and air patrolling in international Space more common than naval and air force participation in organized operations. In the economic field, growing resistance by the recipient to theconomic aid and the declining value of the returns to the giver mayreater reliance upon international consortia, private investment, or outright gifts than in the past. The various agencies of the UN will continue toseful role in economic development, public health programs, and related areas. The UN's rolo in security questions will probably continue to be largely what it has been In theforum for letting off steam or fee face-saving, delays, or

n such an international atmosphere, it is conceivable that some steps might be taken to improve the formal and conventional relations between the greatexample in the area of arms controlather fierce competition will almost certainly continue beneath the surface, and it appears

unlikely that anythingeal detente can develop. Open ant ago-ism between the US and ussr could abate, ai it hu Irem tune to time, without any teal reconciliation. Real change in US-ussrubstantial and permanent reduction In the influence of the superpowers, would flow from the rise of other powerWestern Europe, and Japan. These centers have already become so Important to the future positions of both the us and USSR that each must divert some of its attention to courting, neutralizing, or rounUring them, thus diluting and broadening the competition for influence, power, and world leadership.

i*cn this broader arena of competition, options are also becoming broader and main lines of national policy less simple to define Methods of pursuing national policies thus might become more subtle with apparent contradictions while long and short-term objectives arc pursued simultaneously; bridge-building and truculence eon go hand in hand. It might be possible in this kind o( world for competing powers to unite in programs to attack hunger, narrow the dangers of nuclear warfare, explore space, exploit the high seas, or control the world's weather. This is not to say that the not decade will initiate an era of good Feeting SetiOuS tensions and even threats of another world war will trite from time to time, but the chances appear goodommon interest inthem will prevail.

Original document.

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